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“An absorbing volume that integrates an extraordinarily wide area of work, 
with interesting observations and new twists right to the end.” 
Ruth Millikan, University of Connecticut, USA
What is the role of the environment, and of the information it provides, in cognition? 
More specifically, may there be a role for certain artefacts to play in this context? 
These are questions that motivate “4E” theories of cognition (as being embodied, 
embedded, extended, enactive). In his take on that family of views, Hajo Greif first 
defends and refines a concept of information as primarily natural, environmen-
tally embedded in character, which had been eclipsed by information-processing 
views of cognition. He continues with an inquiry into the cognitive bearing of 
some artefacts that are sometimes referred to as “intelligent environments”. With-
out necessarily having much to do with Artificial Intelligence, such artefacts may 
ultimately modify our informational environments.
With respect to human cognition, the most notable effect of digital computers 
is not that they might be able, or become able, to think but that they alter the way 
we perceive, think and act.
Hajo Greif teaches at the Munich Center for Technology in Society (MCTS), 
Technical University of Munich, Germany, and the Department of Philosophy, 
University of Klagenfurt, Austria. His research interests cover the philosophy – 
and some of the history and the social studies – of science and technology, as well 
as the philosophy of mind.
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This is a book about machines, intelligence and environments, but it is not a book 
about intelligent machines inhabiting some environment. Nor is it a book about 
machine intelligence as conceived of under the paradigm of Artificial Intelligence. 
Let alone is it a book about environments as intelligent agents of sorts. Instead, it 
is a book about human intelligence, how it is shaped by its environments and what 
role some kinds of artefacts play in that shaping. It sets out as an endeavour to 
defend and refine a concept of information as primarily natural, environmentally 
embedded information, which had been eclipsed by the notions of information 
processing that came to the fore with the rise of the computer. The argument con-
tinues with an inquiry into the cognitive bearing of some technologies that happen 
to be computational by design and are sometimes referred to as “intelligent envi-
ronments” – and that do not necessarily have much to do with Artificial Intelli-
gence. This work aims at a somewhat unconventional perspective on technologies 
whose relationship to human cognition may have been misrendered by the notion 
of intelligent machines and, vice versa, it aims at a somewhat unconventional per-
spective on human cognition whose nature may have been misrendered by models 
that rely on that same notion.
If one looks for a banner under which my project sails, that banner should read, 
in the naturalist spirit of a robust cognitive externalism: “Reasoning [. . .] is done 
in the world, not in one’s head” (Millikan 1993b, 12). If reasoning commences 
from direct interaction with the world, it might be worthwhile to begin with tak-
ing a closer look at what that world does to and with our thinking rather than 
starting from a rather traditional, cognitivist or ‘Cartesian’ image of the mind in 
order to criticise it and then move on to claim that our thinking is situated in and 
extends into the world. (Anyway, that Cartesian image usually seems to serve as 
a convenient myth rather than being treated as a serious philosophical position 
worthy of serious critique.) The variety of externalism endorsed in what follows 
will be roughly in line with the views of extended, embedded, embodied and 
enactive cognition, also known by the family name “4E cognition”. Even though 
not all of the following authors would agree to be subsumed under this rubric, 
and even though they would not all agree with my arguments, the closest match 
between what is presented here and other contemporary work in philosophy and 
cognitive science is, on my opinion, to be found in Chemero (2009), Clark (1997), 
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Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and Sterelny (2003), with Dretske (1981), Gibson (1979) 
and Millikan (1984) as the relevant proximate and the American naturalists as the 
historically more distant precursors.
Some readers may be struck by the lack of a clear distinction between the con-
cepts of cognition and perception in what follows. However, there is a method to 
this apparent confusion: as some of the authors referred to in this book, and unlike 
the advocates of what is inelegantly called “cognitivism”, and certainly unlike a 
great deal of philosophical tradition (which, I am told, was even more scrupulous 
in distinguishing among sensation, perception and cognition), I believe that there 
is no such clear distinction. There is no thinking without perceiving and acting in, 
and interacting with, an environment. Perception already is a form of interacting 
with the environment and, historically and systematically, all of the less action-
bound activities of our nervous systems flow from such interaction.
In pursuit of its main argument, this book will incorporate some themes from the 
philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science (with focus on cognitive sciences 
and biology) and the philosophy of technology, but at its very heart it involves 
all three of them at once, and it draws on some disciplines outside philosophy. 
The specific constellation of disciplines involved is a reflection of my intellectual 
upbringing, but I am hopeful to make a credible case for the usefulness and non-
arbitrariness of this combination – and perhaps for the virtue of a certain degree 
of intellectual generalism. If one still needs a rubric under which to file this work, 
that rubric may read “philosophy of mind-through-machines” (but certainly not 
conventional, qualia-and-supervenience philosophy of mind) or “philosophy of 
technologies of cognition” (but certainly not philosophy of engineering or criti-
cal theory of technology) or “philosophy of biology of cognitive functions” (but 
certainly not of a comprehensive sort), or perhaps to some extent “philosophy of 
some of the cognitive sciences” (but certainly not philosophy of Artificial Intel-
ligence, and nothing near proficient in those sciences). Each of these labels will 
fit partly, none entirely, and all will look a bit awkward. Hence, I am aware of 
the risk of getting proverbially “caught between two stools” (or even more if that 
were topologically possible), but by virtue of incurring that risk, this book may 
have something to offer to several audiences.
So let me try to identify a few matches between parts of my argument and 
some communities to which these might be of interest: first, philosophers of mind 
interested in the varieties of naturalised semantics may find something worth-
while in my reconstruction of the notion of natural information and informational 
environments (see Chapters 2 through 6). Second, philosophers of perception or 
philosophers of psychology, and possibly some cognitive psychologists, might 
be interested in my reconstruction of what is ecological in the ecology of percep-
tion (see Chapter 3 in particular). Third, students of 4E cognition might see a 
contribution to their debates in my exposition of how cognition “extends” over 
and is “embedded” in the environment (see Chapter 7 in particular). Fourth, phi-
losophers of technology and members of the science and technology studies com-
munity who are interested in digital technologies might find something to relate to 
both in the general outlook of the study and in the case studies presented towards 
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the end of the book (see Chapters 8 and 9 in particular). And, fifth, computer 
scientists, designers and engineers working on smart environments might gather 
some useful information for their work from those same chapters. Reaching this 
latter audience I would consider the greatest success for this book, as it might 
stand a chance of, however indirectly and modestly, feeding into the shaping of 
those environments.
The unabashed naturalism of what follows has a serious epistemological impli-
cation that should be added as a disclaimer here: real-world scientific theories 
of perception, evolution and other phenomena as well as some of their empiri-
cal groundwork will be relevant and sometimes indispensable to my arguments. 
I hence not merely incur the risk of my arguments falling with the possible empiri-
cal falsification of the theories in question; I actually embrace that risk, happily 
embarking on the boat imagined by Quine (with the help of Neurath 1983, 92), in 
which philosophy and science sail together:
A boat which [. . .] we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There 
is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all 
scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as 
welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere.
(Quine 1969b, 126f )
Any serious quest for knowledge is exposed to the risks that come with this open-
ended task.
Research on which this publication is based was funded by the Austrian Science 
Fund (FWF), grant number J 3448-G15 within the Erwin Schrödinger Programme.
The manuscript on which this book is based was first written over the course of 
nearly three years between October 2011 and August 2014, with several intermis-
sions. Part of it was written when I was working at the Department of Science 
and Technology Studies at Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt (AAU) – but only 
a small part of this part has been included in the present book. Most of what fol-
lows was researched and written, and everything was thoroughly rewritten, within 
the context of my FWF Erwin Schrödinger Fellowship at the Munich Center for 
Technology in Society (MCTS), Technical University of Munich (TUM). The full 
manuscript was then submitted as a thesis for “habilitation”, that oddly Continen-
tal academic rite of passage for senior post-docs, with the Department of Philoso-
phy at AAU, in late 2014. The manuscript has been heavily edited and revised 
since then, on the basis of the reviews I received and the second thoughts I gave 
to my initial ideas.
The contributions of those who supported and believed in my work, but also of 
those who criticised it, shall be duly acknowledged here, beginning with those of 
the reviewers of my thesis, Ursula Renz and Holger Lyre; those of Ruth Millikan, 
who had no obligation to read and pick apart central parts of the draft manuscript 
but generously did so anyway; those of my funding agency, FWF, and the anony-
mous reviewers who assessed the project proposal from which most of what fol-
lows grew; those of nine interview partners from the fields of computer science, 
robotics and ergonomics at TUM who helped me to ground at least some of my 
speculations about the nature of cognitive artefacts; those of the publishing house, 
Routledge, with Robert Langham and Michael Bourne to be named in particular, 
and the two anonymous reviewers they recruited for assessing the book proposal; 
those of Alfred Nordmann, the series editor, who first provided me with a chance 
of having my manuscript published with Routledge; those of several audiences 
at several conferences upon whom I tried out earlier versions of what follows; 
those of Arno Bammè, my former head of department in Klagenfurt, who first 
encouraged me to embark on this project; those of the Department of Philosophy 
at AAU, which took care of my habilitation project and proceedings after Arno’s 
retirement; those of Klaus Mainzer, my host in Munich; and those of my other 
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements xi
colleagues at MCTS. More detailed acknowledgements are to be found in the 
endnotes.
My greatest gratitude, however, is reserved for my wife, Karin, and our two 
children, David Marius and Simon Valentin. When I started writing, David 
was a tiny embryo enjoying the safety and warmth of his mother’s womb. 
When I was in the thick of writing (or at least supposed to be so), Karin deliv-
ered him in good health. When I submitted the manuscript for review with the 
faculty, David could already walk and talk, play with other children and make 
fun of his parents, while Simon was just a few weeks away from being born. 
Now that proceedings, contracting and revisions are finished and the book is 
going to publication, Simon is steadily moving towards the same achieve-
ments. My accomplishments of the last few years invariably pale before those 
of my dearest ones.
Parts of this book are based on papers that have been presented at conferences, 
partly published in conference proceedings, and in one case as a peer-reviewed 
journal article:
• “What is the Extension of the Extended Mind?” Synthese Online First, 
2015. Print version to appear in Cognition Special Issue edited by Cameron 
Buckner and Ellen Fridland. URL: http: //link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s11229-015-0799-9 (slightly extended version of Chapter 7).
• “Resurrecting Dretskean Information”, submitted paper for the Ninth Inter-
national Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP.9), 
Osnabrück, Germany, September 2015 (short version of Chapter 2).
• “What is an Informational Environment?”, submitted paper for the Sixth 
Workshop on the Philosophy of Information (WPI6), Society for the Philoso-
phy of Information, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA, May 2014 (short 
version of Chapter 6).
• “Affording Illusions? Natural Information and the Problem of Mispercep-
tion”, invited paper for the interdisciplinary conference “What Affordance 
Affords”, GOTO Project (Genesis and Ontology of Technoscientific Objects), 
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany, November 2013 (version of 
parts of Chapter 3).
• “Perceptual Illusions, Misperceptions, and the Empirical Strategy”. In: Mind, 
Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Sympo-
sium. Ed. by D. Moyal-Sharrock et al. Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS, 2013, 
163–165 (early version of parts of Chapter 3).
• “Wie denkt eine intelligente Umwelt? Modelle adaptiven Verhaltens in der 
Ambient Intelligence”. In: Vernetzung als soziales und technisches Para-
digma. Ed. by H. Greif and M. Werner. Wiesbaden: VS Research, 2012, 207–
232 (early German version of parts of Chapter 9).
• “Erweiterte Phänotypen und Erweiterungen des Geistes: Die Rollen der 
Umwelt in der KI-Forschung”. In: Die Neukonstruktion des Menschen. 
Beiträge zum 7. Internationalen Tönnies-Symposium. Ed. by A. Bammé. 
München: Profil, 2011 (early German incarnation of parts of Chapter 7).
xii Acknowledgements
• “Die Natürlichkeit künstlicher Intelligenzen und Umwelten”, Technikfolgen-
abschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 20.1, 2011, 26–32 (early German incarna-
tion of ideas related to Chapter 9).
• “Thinking with the Environment. Language, Pictures and Other Guides for 
the Extended Mind.” In: Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science, and 
the Arts. Papers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. Ed. by 
R. Heinrich et al. Kirchberg am Wechsel: ALWS, 2010, 110–112 (early incar-
nation of parts of Chapter 8).
• “Where am I and Who are You? Coping with Ambient Intelligence”, sub-
mitted paper for the Seventh European Computing and Philosophy Confer-
ence, Barcelona, Spain, July 2009 (earliest incarnation of ideas related to 
Chapter 9).
Permission for reusing a major portion of “What is the extension of the extended 
mind?”, Synthese, Springer, 2015, for this book has been kindly granted by the 
publisher. This material is used as per the terms of the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) and 
was slightly adapted by the author for inclusion in the present context. Permission 
to reuse portions of publications Greif (2010) and Greif (2013) for this book has 
been kindly granted by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
This publication presents results of Austrian Science Fund (FWF) research grant 
no. J3448-G15. Open Access publication is supported by FWF publication grant 
no. PUB 488-Z24.
Unless stated otherwise, this publication is licensed under Creative Commons 
license CC BY 4.0.
A man, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent complexity of 
his behaviour over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment 
in which he finds himself [. . .] provided that we include in what we call man’s 
environment the cocoon of information, stored in books and in long-term memory, 
that man spins about himself.
(Simon 1969, 126f )
To some readers’ surprise, perhaps, this thought was articulated by one of the 
pioneers of Artificial Intelligence (henceforth AI). Depending on emphasis, two 
markedly different readings can be given to it:
(1) One may focus on the human being as a behaving system, highlighting its 
relative simplicity while not further analysing the contributions from its envi-
ronment. Under this reading, human cognitive achievements indeed appear 
rather modest.
(2) One may focus on the environment and the information it provides to the 
human being. Under this reading, environmental information is factored into 
the equation as a constitutive element of human cognitive achievements in all 
their richness.
Joseph Weizenbaum, an AI pioneer-turned-critic, bases his criticism of Herbert 
Simon’s statement on the first of these two readings: such a statement, he contends, 
reveals a highly unfavourable view of human nature in which that nature is reduced 
to processes of a purely formal kind and to mechanically reactive behaviour (Wei-
zenbaum 1976, 128–130). He does not even seem to consider the possibility of 
the second reading – which, however, appears to be the more plausible one in the 
context of Simon’s argument. To be fair, it has to be noted that Simon first used 
the same phrasing to characterise the behaviour of ants (1969, 52), in order to pro-
vocatively substitute them with humans on the next page, and later adding human 
artefacts to the picture. The question is whether and to what extent the characteri-
sation of the behaviour of ants as “quite simple” is supposed to be equivalent or 
analogous to that of human beings, with the normative implications that ensue.
1   Preliminaries




The second of the aforementioned readings may seem somewhat untypical for 
what one expects from a pioneer of classical AI. Viewed in the light of that read-
ing, Simon’s hypothesis even appears to anticipate some of the core tenets of what 
has come to be labelled “active externalism” in the philosophy of mind, and the 
“4E” set of doctrines that flow from it, namely extended, embedded, enactive and 
embodied cognition.1 Nonetheless, Simon remained committed to the notion of 
computational models of cognitive processes, as heralded by AI.
If we follow the second reading of Simon’s hypothesis, human cognitive accom-
plishments do not appear unfairly depreciated but rich and complex in kind. That 
richness, however, depends first on the richness of the information available in human 
environments. Second, it depends on the richness of informational relations that 
human beings are actually in a position to exploit, in perception and action, within 
those environments. Only if these conditions are in place, human cognitive traits may 
also comprise representational capacities that finally, but still only partially, transcend 
the bounds of what the environment provides. This ranking is one of causal and, in 
terms of the evolution of cognition, historical priority. It does nothing to deny the 
importance of the ‘internal’ component of cognition, but makes the richness that there 
is to the mental life of human beings dependent on factors that are not in our heads.
In this book, I will try to develop a perspective on how Simon’s insight into the 
cognitive importance of the environment and the information provided by that envi-
ronment could be accounted for in general, and what implications this analysis will 
have for an account of information-providing artefacts like the ones referred to in 
the earlier quote. In doing so, I will have made a statement on the accomplishments 
of AI and the cognitive sciences with respect to what are important components of 
cognitive processes. However, that statement, unlike the Weizenbaum – Searle – 
Dreyfus continuum of fundamental critiques of AI, neither dares to dictate solutions 
to the problems that AI and the cognitive sciences have to deal with nor lectures 
them about the ultimate futility of their endeavours. In order to provide the reader 
with an idea of what follows in the two parts of this book, I will first sketch the 
backdrop against which I develop my approach, and then outline my argument.
Background
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call 
the ‘imitation game.’ It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and 
an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart 
front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine 
which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. [. . .]
We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in 
this game?’ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played 
like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These 
questions replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’ [. . .]
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the 
physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.
(Turing 1950, 433f )
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Or is it an advantage? Both AI and its philosophical critiques to a large extent 
have been and remain living under the spell of the notion of the Turing Test, which 
essentially depends on drawing that “fairly sharp line”. Taking this line to be a 
firm boundary rather than a heuristic, that test evolved into something quite far 
removed from Alan Turing’s classical “imitation game”, as described in the previ-
ous quote. It is the notion of such a firm boundary that has attracted criticism from 
the camp of 4E cognition with some justification and in some detail.
However, as has been argued with some justification, too (most prominently 
by Copeland 2000; Moor 1976; Whitby 1996), the aim of Turing’s thought- 
experimental game of machines imitating human conversational behaviour was 
not to prove that machines could think, or to provide a test for whether they can 
think. After all, the “imitation game” was playfully fashioned after an eponymous 
popular Victorian parlour game.2 Instead, that game was part of Turing’s inquiry 
into the possible scope and depth of the tasks he designed for a certain class of 
theoretical machines when devising his theory of computability in Turing (1936). 
He considered digital computers one possible material incarnation of those theo-
retical machines – and human computers another, which served as the blueprint 
for the former.3
Turing’s theory of computability was driven by a genuinely meta-mathematical 
interest: if, within the confines of a logical calculus, there is an unequivocal, well-
defined and finite, hence at least in principle executable procedure for deciding on 
the provability of a proposition that has been stated in that calculus, this procedure 
should be translatable into arithmetical forms. These, in turn, could be broken 
down into a set of simple mathematical routines that would be executable for a 
human ‘computer’, that is a person with basic mathematical skills who is provided 
with a set of input numbers and a set of instructions and then ordered to calculate 
the result (and pass on that result as input for further computation). These inputs 
and instructions, Turing’s argument continues, would be simple and unequivocal 
enough to be handled by a suitably designed machine, too.
Although representing only an expressly restricted subset of human intellec-
tual abilities, these tasks were well beyond the scope of traditional, cog-belt-
and-pulley machines. Margaret Boden (2006, 168f ) notices that the thought that 
machines could possibly think was not even a ‘heresy’ up to the early twentieth 
century, as that claim would have been all but incomprehensible. The reason is 
that intellectual capabilities were thought of as essentially tied to the (most likely) 
human organism whereas the capabilities of machines were mostly thought of 
as being restricted to the exertion and harnessing of physical forces. More pre-
cisely, according to machine-age definitions of machines, “the primary function 
of a mechanical device can be either the modification of motion (direction) or the 
modification of motion and force (amplification and reduction)”, where the former 
would be a mechanism and the latter a machine proper (Mitcham 1994, 170, in his 
reconstruction of definitions of machines that go back to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury). A more reductive definition confines the activities of machines to “changing 
the direction of motion” of matter, because “moving matter is all the force with 
which machines deal” (“What is a Machine?” 1872, 39). A more differentiated 
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classic definition conceives of a machine as “ ‘a closed kinematic chain’ or ‘a 
combination of resistant bodies so arranged that by their means the mechanical 
forces of nature can be compelled to do work accompanied by certain determinate 
motions’ ” (Mitcham 1994, 170f, quoting Franz Reuleaux’s 1876 book Kinemat-
ics of Machinery). In seeking to extend the domain of what machines can do 
beyond kinematics (and, by extension, the effects of electrical energy), Turing 
aligned himself with a small tradition of thinkers and inventors who conceived of 
machines that could serve logico-mathematical purposes beyond basic calculating 
functions, most notably Charles Babbage (1864) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1685). In abstraction from what cog-belt-and-pulley machines do, a machine was 
now conceived of as any arrangement of discrete elements and the discrete opera-
tional steps associated with them which, with determinate regularity, transforms a 
certain input into a certain output.
With respect to comparing human and machine accomplishments on the basis of 
this theoretical concept, the key novelty introduced by Turing’s theory of comput-
ability was twofold: first, his theoretical machines, in analogy to human comput-
ers, could switch between different sets of instructions, and hence between different 
logico-mathematical tasks, without necessitating a change to the structure of the 
machine proper. The input-output relations and a certain subset of the machine’s 
operations were now conceived of as modifiable. Second, the same type of logical 
operations could be realised in a variety of different systems, from human beings to 
specific machines, in a variety of ways, and thus in abstraction from their physical 
characteristics. The first part of this twofold idea is entailed by Turing’s description 
of his theoretical “Universal Machines”, whereas the second has become known as 
“Turing Machine functionalism”. It includes opening up the conceptual possibility of 
artefacts to accomplish tasks that would count as thinking in a human. However, this 
is an implication (not a corollary) of the larger argument, which is not about human 
beings or machines in particular but about a meta-mathematical method. Above all, 
the second part of Turing’s idea waives any requirement that those accomplishments 
would have to be reached by the same means in the machine analogue.
Hence, a superficial reading of the imitation game is prone to misguiding the 
reader into seeking for an analogy between human and machine accomplishments 
that is closer than intended. In one of the first philosophical essays that took 
Turing’s thought experiment seriously, Keith Gunderson (1964) captures a point 
that seems to have been lost in the long-lasting, and arguably not always fruitful, 
philosophical debates around the possibilities and limitations of AI:
One might well contend that machines can’t think, for they do much bet-
ter than that. [. . .] Machines can almost instantaneously and infallibly pro-
duce accurate and sometimes original answers to many complex and difficult 
mathematical problems with which they are presented. They do not need to 
“think out” the answers. In the end the steam drill outlasted John Henry as a 
digger of railway tunnels, but that didn’t prove the machine had muscles; it 
proved that muscles were not needed for digging railway tunnels.
(Gunderson 1964, 244f )
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Competing with the steam drill in an epic battle at the height of the industrial age, 
our folk ballad’s hero scored the costliest of victories. Exhausted from his suc-
cessful race against the machine, John Henry was found “dying with his hammer 
in his hand”. In this tragic manner, he has become an African American folk hero, 
as a symbol of black workers’ struggle for respect in a society where many odds 
were against them. One of these odds was the progressive displacement of their 
labour by machines.
In keeping with Turing Machine functionalism, the previously quoted passage 
suggests that such displacement normally works precisely because machines do 
not reproduce or replicate human organic features and behavioural patterns, but 
because they achieve the results of goal-directed human behaviours more quickly, 
more effectively and more efficiently – or because they enable the achievement 
of certain, hitherto unattainable, goals in the first place. The steam drill outlasted 
John Henry not because it was like him, only stronger, more enduring, but because 
it was very much unlike him. Hence, analogy in function does not require similar-
ity in structure. Provided that the task in question is well-defined, any structure 
that produces effects that result in the accomplishment of that task, and that pro-
duces these effects in accordance with an equally well-defined regularity (rather 
than coincidentally), will count as functionally equivalent.
Turing’s specific concern with logico-mathematical tasks aside, his style of 
functionalist argument has a long pedigree in biology, where analogies in the func-
tions of traits can be determined for phylogenetically unrelated species, whereas 
sameness of kind depends on common descent of some trait – and only on common 
descent. The underlying physiological structure might remain identical over the 
course of generations, although both the function which it serves and its observable 
shape may be subject to change if conditions to which that trait responds are altered. 
The independence of functional from structural relations in biology was captured 
in the conceptual distinction between “analogues” and “homologues” by Richard 
Owen (1848). This distinction was put on an evolutionary footing by Charles Dar-
win, who provided vivid examples of homology himself when he asked:
What can be more curious than that the hand of a man, formed for grasping, 
that of a mole for digging, the leg of the horse, the paddle of the porpoise, and 
the wing of the bat, should all be constructed on the same pattern, and should 
include the same bones, in the same relative positions?
(Darwin 1859, 434)
Hence, on the one hand, one ancestral form, for example a mammal’s forelegs, 
may come to serve divergent functions – as wings in bats and arms in human 
beings. On the other hand, one and the same function may come to be accom-
plished by structures of various degrees of similarity that have developed along 
independent pathways in genealogically remote species – as for the structurally 
similar but evolutionary independent lensed eyes in vertebrates and many Cepha-
lopods, and the structurally dissimilar and equally independent compound eyes in 
Arthropoda.
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However, this evolutionary type of functionalist argument cuts both ways: first, 
it exposes a fallacy in the claim made by AI critics that a disanalogy in structure, 
that is in the way in which and the means by which some task is accomplished, 
precludes analogy in function. This is basically the inverse of Turing Machine 
functionalism, or indeed of any functionalist argument of this kind, and it appears 
to be the bottom line of John Searle’s AI critique in (1980) and many other cri-
tiques that follow his route (which include philosophers as eminent as Dretske 
1985 and Fodor 1981). If similarity in structure were thus required, and unless 
that similarity were superficial or coincidental, the requirement would be one of 
homology. This is a condition that, by definition, any machine would invariably 
fail at. Moreover, it is a condition that does not respond to the claim of functional 
analogy, as homology and analogy are independent affairs. Second, and for the 
same reason, similarity in structure is uninformative as to an analogy of function. 
Hence, human-likeness of some machine in appearance or behaviour does not 
warrant any inference with respect to intellectual abilities of that machine.
Despite this implication of a functionalist argument, and in keeping with the 
questionable interpretation of Turing’s imitation game as a test for, or definition 
of, intelligence, AI was long committed to the criterion of human-likeness of its 
systems, in appearance and behaviour. This commitment is reflected in the defini-
tion of the research programme that kept dominating the field at least until the 
1990s: AI was understood as an inquiry into the nature of the human mind in 
which theories about its structure, properties and functions were tested by means 
of computer programmes, computer systems or robots as models. However, the 
long-standing dominance of AI as the modelling and simulation of human thought 
processes may have helped to obscure rather than illuminate other, possibly more 
instructive, roles of computers and robots as models concerning (if not to say of ) 
human cognition and action.
Turing himself deliberately styled his inquiries into the possibility of thinking 
machines as flights of fancy that he only could – and did – wish to be true, but 
he also pointed towards two implications of the presence and use of computing 
machinery that is much closer to home in many respects:
The original question, ‘Can machines think?’ I believe to be too meaningless 
to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century 
the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much 
that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be 
contradicted.
(Turing 1950, 442)
Irrespective of the question of whether they match human intellectual abilities, 
the accomplishments of computing machinery would ultimately alter our under-
standing of what human thinking is – a point made so explicit by Turing that 
I keep wondering why it has not raised more scholarly attention. Digital comput-
ers may be relevant to human cognition, and to how we conceive of it, in other 
ways than simulating human thought processes.
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As the flip side of the same coin, the accomplishments of computing machinery 
will also alter our understanding of what a machine is. Given that advanced tool 
use is a uniquely human characteristic, a change in what artefacts can accomplish, 
and a change in human perception of those accomplishments, will have an equally 
pivotal influence on the human condition. Both changes that Turing had in mind 
are happening right before our eyes.
The paradigm of what I have in mind here has been articulated, in related but 
slightly different fashion, by two computer scientists who wrote half a century 
after Turing inaugurated that very discipline in his 1936 paper: Rodney Brooks 
and Mark Weiser. Both authors highlight the importance of the relations to the 
respective environments of the systems they were developing while relegating 
those intellectual accomplishments which were central to classical AI to second-
ary importance.
As one of the first proponents of “Nouvelle AI”, Brooks argues that traditional 
AI systems were incapable of grasping important aspects of human cognition 
because these aspects are not located in human beings’ heads but in the envi-
ronments in which they act and interact. Thus, inclusion of these environmen-
tal aspects in embodied, that is to say robotic, systems has to take precedence 
over criteria of human-likeness or mental representation. It is best accomplished 
in bottom-up and modular fashion, starting from fairly simple systems, Brooks 
continues:
It seemed a reasonable requirement that intelligence be reactive to dynamic 
aspects of the environment, that a mobile robot operate on time scales similar 
to those of animals and humans, and that intelligence be able to generate 
robust behavior in the face of uncertain sensors, an unpredictable environ-
ment, and a changing world. [. . .] Internal world models that are complete 
representations of the external environment, besides being impossible to 
obtain, are not at all necessary for agents to act in a competent manner. Many 
of the actions of an agent are quite separable – coherent intelligence can 
emerge from independent subcomponents interacting in the world.
(Brooks 1991, 1228)
No AI system will capture the mechanisms responsible for the specific patterns 
of organism-environment interaction unless it is able to capture their purpose, 
too, which, in turn, can be accommodated only by modelling the organism-
environment interaction in a most direct way. Directness in this sense does 
not require the creation of similes of traits or behaviours on a phenomenal 
level, nor will it suffice to consider the structures and processes inside the 
organism. Instead, one will have to identify, and factor into the equation, spe-
cific couplings between variables within organism and environment, and the 
emerging patterns of interaction between them. This is the premise on which 
the research programme of “behaviour-based AI” was developed (for state-
ments of this programme, see Beer 1995; Brooks 1999; Maes 1993; Steels and 
Brooks 1995).
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Weiser’s work, in turn, is considered visionary in setting the stage for, and coin-
ing the term of “ubiquitous computing” (to which he also referred as “embodied 
virtuality”). He describes his ideas in hardly less vivid terms than those used by 
Turing to illustrate his concept of computing machines:
In our experimental embodied virtuality, doors open only to the right badge 
wearer, rooms greet people by name, telephone calls can be automatically 
forwarded to wherever the recipient may be, receptionists actually know 
where people are, computer terminals retrieve the preferences of whoever is 
sitting at them, and appointment diaries write themselves. No revolution in 
artificial intelligence is needed, merely computers embedded in the everyday 
world. [. . .]
Machines that fit the human environment instead of forcing humans to 
enter theirs will make using a computer as refreshing as taking a walk in the 
woods.
(Weiser 1991, 99 and 104)
Under this paradigm, human thinking is primarily considered with respect to prac-
tical tasks in everyday contexts, and as being mostly implicit in nature. Computer 
systems embedded in the environment may unobtrusively assist in such practi-
cal, implicit problem solving. Reference to AI is even explicitly avoided. Despite 
these apparently humble aims, we encounter machines that accomplish things that 
were not anywhere near conceivable as machine accomplishments in Turing’s 
day. (Arguably, even Turing himself had other accomplishments in mind.)
Although AI remains a factor in computer science and engineering, and 
although computers have not ‘disappeared’ into the background of the environ-
ment altogether since Weiser wrote the aforementioned lines, this shift in empha-
sis is significant. As evidenced by the attention that Brooks’s and Weiser’s works 
have received, and continue to receive, this shift in emphasis affects the develop-
ment both of the cognitive sciences, with AI as one of their founding disciplines, 
and of user-oriented computing applications. On either level, human cognitive 
abilities will appear in a different light when viewed from the perspective of the 
environments in which they develop and unfold.
Outline
On the background of these preliminary observations, the aim of this book can be 
parsed into two related questions, which roughly correspond to the two parts of 
the text: first, what is the role of the environment, and of the information it pro-
vides, in cognition? Second, and more specifically, what role do artefacts play in 
this context? Part of my mission will be to demonstrate that the focus on artefacts 
in the second question is not an arbitrary narrowing down of the topic but inherent 
to the first question – at least as far as human cognition is concerned – and that 
this condition continues to hold if I further narrow down my focus on specific 
kinds of artefacts.
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Both in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences, it is a relatively recent but 
now well-established proposition to seriously consider a constitutive role of an 
organism’s environment to his cognitive abilities and their accomplishment. So, 
as to the first question, I will present a take on the role of the environment in cog-
nition that shares the notion of such a constitutive role but claims distinctiveness 
in how it conceives of the information encountered in the environment. More pre-
cisely, I will seek to rehabilitate the notion of natural information introduced by 
Fred Dretske (1981) against the altogether reasonable criticisms brought forward 
by advocates of 4E cognition who, following Ruth Millikan (2001), argue for a 
local and probabilistic rather than nomologically governed character of natural 
information. In fact, these criticisms will be helpful in carving out the main point 
to be defended here. In the service of that defence, I will align Dretskean informa-
tion with a reading of the notion of information for perception in the ecological 
approach to perception (Gibson 1979).
As to the second question, both sides involved in the aforementioned debates 
either confine their considerations of the role of the environment in cognition to 
the natural environment or they have a restricted view of the role and importance 
of artefacts in human environments. However, throughout all of human history 
and much of prehistory, artefacts have been invented and used that remain deeply 
involved in how human beings perceive and act in their environments. One may 
think of carvings, figurines, pictures and inscriptions back then or books, broad-
cast media, phones and computers now. Basically, one may think of all things 
manufactured that do not primarily aim at altering physical conditions in the envi-
ronment but at providing information in some way. Their function is to augment, 
supplement, substitute or, in some cases, even first enable, human cognitive func-
tions. It will be helpful to conceptually distinguish between these types of contri-
butions by artefacts, which I will henceforth refer to as “cognitive artefacts”. If 
one considers language an artefact, it will be the paradigm of strongly constitutive 
cognitive artefacts.
My main focus in this context, however, will be on a subset of cognitive arte-
facts whose very existence owes to Turing’s work, namely digital computers. 
Among these, I will focus on computer-based artefacts that are directly concerned 
with their users’ perception of, and interaction with, their environments. I will 
hence seek to decouple my account of those artefacts from the often poorly speci-
fied criterion of human-likeness that holds sway over much of what followed 
upon classical AI – including parts of 4E cognition. I will try to demonstrate that, 
with respect to human cognition, the most notable effect of digital computers and 
their manifold descendants is not that they might be able, or become able, to think 
or to provide a simile thereof, but that they alter the way we perceive, think and 
act. What they do is to modify our informational environments. Whereas all tech-
nologies have the effect of materially changing human environments and perhaps 
also of affecting our perception of and interactions with these environments, those 
technologies which directly operate on information have a capacity of equally 
directly modifying the patterns of available informational relations by which we 
steer. Despite the involvement of artefacts, and despite being technologically 
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modified, the information involved shall remain being conceived of as natural 
information.
Changes in the informational environment, I will continue to argue, prompt acts 
of accommodating or “naturalising” them. These effects of cognitive artefacts 
also work to question the boundary between what is commonly considered the 
inner workings of the mind and the role of the outer environment in cognitive pro-
cesses. The technologies in question do not even have to be extremely sophisti-
cated or, in the conventional sense, intelligent, to achieve these effects. The way in 
which they make available, possibly modify and present the information on which 
human action depends will make the difference. The incorporation of simulated 
or virtual elements in human environments will be the paradigm of the changes 
I have in mind but not their only manifestation. Typically, the purpose of such 
elements of “smart environments” is to enable quasi-natural interactions between 
human being and machine in a given context. Under some circumstances, the 
machine need not even be a – machine- or human-like – counterpart that could 
be easily identified or individuated as such by its human partner. Although not 
literally, a thus-designed artefact might cease to be a machine in a relevant sense.
In order to develop this argument, I will use Part I of this book to present 
an account of natural information, as encountered in our environments, and its 
contribution to “the apparent complexity” of our behaviours as referred to by 
Simon – which is not merely a seeming complexity, but that complexity which 
we can observe in and of ourselves. After all, what Weizenbaum still held to be 
an “impoverished” conception of man might ultimately be the richer one. I argue 
that information and environments are generally objective affairs but that organ-
isms (human and other) live in informational environments that are, in a qualified 
sense, particular to them and that are constituted by the specifically relevant vari-
ables that they have to keep track of in order to get by. I will use Chapter 2 to spell 
out the notions of natural information and its role in perception and behaviour on a 
general level, with focus on the Dretskean view. In Chapter 3, I will discuss three 
theories of visual perception that give markedly variant importance to the role 
of information and of the environment of perception and action: David Marr’s 
computational theory of vision, James Jerome Gibson’s ecological psychology 
and Dale Purves’s Empirical Strategy of vision. This discussion, and in particu-
lar a comparison between Gibson’s and Dretske’s concepts of information, will 
help me to carve out a notion of natural information in more detail in Chapter 4, 
and it will prepare the ground for a hypothesis on informational environments in 
Chapter 6.
In Part II, I will match my account of informational environments against what 
may seem its closest relatives in contemporary debates, namely the 4E family of 
theories, so as to sort out relevant commonalities and differences and prepare the 
ground for an account of cognitive artefacts (Chapter 7). I will then develop that 
account of cognitive artefacts in more detail (Chapter 8). In order to ground that 
still fairly theoretical discussion, I will proceed with brief inquiries into some 
technological attempts at taking the role of the environment in cognition seri-
ously (Chapter 9). None of these technologies aim at modelling, simulating or 
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explaining the inner workings of the human mind, but they may help to practically, 
and productively, undermine the very distinction between these ‘inner workings’ 
and their ‘outer’ environment, and they are likely to make a difference to how our 
informational environments stand. In conclusion, I will offer an outlook on the 
wider implications of my account on philosophical issues (Chapter 10).
In focusing on the role of the environment rather than the inner workings of 
mind, I will appear to skirt the long-standing issues of qualia and propositional 
content in the philosophy of mind. However, rather than merely cheating my way 
around or flatly denying the importance of phenomenal qualities and the inten-
tionality of the mental, I will seek to make a case for the relevance of what is 
in the environment, and our interactions with it, to the existence and richness of 
these phenomena.
Notes
1  The term “active externalism” was coined by Clark and Chalmers (1998), but see also 
Hurley (1998), which was published together with Clark and Chalmers’s more famous 
paper and provides a much more systematic account of externalist positions, and 
Wilson (1994). The moniker “4E cognition” was later established as a generic term for 
the class of extended, embedded, enactive and embodied cognition by Menary (2010c) 
for the Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Special Issue “4E Cognition: Embod-
ied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended” which he edited.
2  It is interesting to observe that this possible historical source is rarely acknowledged 
(but see Evans and Collins 2010, 60). Most scholars either take the game to be a proper 
scientific test, whereas others focus on the gender rather than the game aspect of that 
game; see, for example Saygin et al. (2000) and Sterrett (2000).
3  This direction of modelling from human being to machine is explicitly stated by Turing 
(1950, 436) himself and highlighted in the reconstruction of Turing computability in 
Copeland (2009). Also compare Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1984, 197) observation: 
“Turings ‘Maschinen’. Diese Maschinen sind ja die Menschen, welche kalkulieren.” 
(“Turing’s ‘Machines’. These machines are humans who calculate.”) If there were a real 
machine involved in the design of Turing’s machines, it was the mechanical typewriter, 





When choosing the title for this chapter, I considered adding some qualifiers to 
it, such as resurrecting Dretskean information “in part” or “(somewhat)”. I ulti-
mately chose to stick with something more clear and crisp though. One of the 
purposes of this chapter is to demonstrate that there are some insights to Fred 
Dretske’s theory of meaning in his Knowledge and the Flow of Information that 
are worth defending, and that they have to do with his concept of information. 
Another purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the distinction between the concept 
of information defended here and the one established in the mathematical theory 
of communication (Shannon and Weaver 1949), and to highlight the importance of 
this distinction to what follows.
This chapter will begin with a brief outline of the notion of information and 
its role in an organism’s behaviour on a general, introductory level. I will then 
dig more deeply into the issue of natural information, trying to recover the main 
insights of Dretske’s account of natural information and discussing some of its 
difficulties. The chapter will conclude with a consideration of some implications 
of this view with respect to the phenomenon of intentionality.
Information, behaviour and probability
The frog does not seem to see or, at any rate, is not concerned with the detail of 
stationary parts of the world around him. He will starve to death surrounded by 
food if it is not moving. His choice of food is determined only by size and move-
ment. He will leap to capture any object the size of an insect or worm, providing it 
moves like one. He can be fooled easily not only by a bit of dangled meat but by 
any moving small object. His sex life is conducted by sound and touch. His choice 
of paths in escaping enemies does not seem to be governed by anything more devi-
ous than leaping to where it is darker. Since he is equally at home in water and on 
land, why should it matter where he lights after jumping or what particular direc-
tion he takes? He does remember a moving thing providing it stays within his field 
of vision and he is not distracted.
(Lettvin et al. 1968, 234)
According to these observations, the frog lives in a fairly simple environment. 
To the frog, objects that do not move are just like objects that do not exist. Those 
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objects which move in a certain way, and which are also of a certain size, will 
indiscriminately be treated as food. And the frog’s anti-predator strategies seem 
to be exhausted by quickly moving away from illuminated areas. If a behaviourist 
psychologist had to dream up an organism to fit his theory, where pure stimulus-
response mechanisms reign supreme and qualitative mental states either do not 
count or are denied to exist to begin with, this would be it – at least on Lettvin 
et al.’s account. However, the frog’s apparently rather modest accomplishments 
have done nothing to diminish the lifespan, in evolutionary terms, of the frog as 
a species, although they might have contributed to many an individual frog’s life 
being cut short by a more clever animal that professes in preying on frogs.
The general idea to be promoted by this example is that, on the one hand, 
human environments are certainly more complex than frog environments, despite 
being governed by the same laws of physics, and despite human beings and frogs 
inhabiting much of the same segments of space-time. On the other hand, one gen-
eral condition applies to frogs and human beings alike. This condition is neatly 
captured by Dretske:
There is no difference [. . .] between what happens to an electron in a mag-
netic field and what an electron does in a magnetic field. There definitely is 
a difference between what happens to an animal placed in water and what it 
does when placed in water.
(Dretske 1988, 11, emphasis in original)
Different things will happen to different animals when placed in water. Some may 
drown, whereas others will depend on that very placement for survival, whereas 
frogs will be indifferent, under many circumstances, to being placed on land vs. 
in water. Quite obviously, water will be a different thing in many ways to different 
animals. However, although different animals will do different things when placed 
in water, the general kind of exchange is common to all animals (and perhaps in 
some respects to plants, too). That exchange is behavioural and informational 
in kind, with these two aspects being closely intertwined. In conjunction, these 
aspects set an organism’s exchange with his environment apart from the exchange 
between, say, a pebble or a spoonful of salt and the water in which they are placed.
As to the behavioural aspect of the exchange between organism and environ-
ment, it is obvious, on the one hand, that identical physical conditions, such as 
heat or pressure, will have the same determinate effects on all organic matter as 
such, just as magnetic fields will have the same determinate effect on electrons. 
For example all organic matter of the kind that can be found in organisms will be 
subject to processes of pyrolysis or combustion at elevated temperatures; blood 
and other body liquids will invariably start to boil at body temperature when 
exposed to an atmospheric pressure of 6.3kPa; no organic matter will ignite when 
placed in water. On the other hand, however, changes in physical variables in 
different organisms’ surroundings, unless they affect the composition and integ-
rity of organic matter as such, may trigger or structure behaviours by means of 
which various organisms react to these changes. Such changes in the environment 
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include the waning of daylight for plants, diurnal and nocturnal animals or the 
overall reduction of daylight hours and ambient temperatures over some weeks 
for migrating birds and hibernating mammals. Unlike the effects of physical 
forces on inert matter, a behaviour is not exhausted by the observable effects 
of such forces, as for example impact or heating, on organisms. Behaviour is a 
structured response to a condition or a set of conditions in the environment, and 
it is internally caused by the organism. This is the distinction Dretske was after.
As to the informational aspect of the exchange between organism and environ-
ment, all behaviours, and many things that are not immediately discernible as 
behaviours, are structured by informational relations. It is not the physical nature 
of the conditions in the environment as such that determines the response. Instead, 
a certain change of variables, or a certain constellation of constancies and changes 
of variables in the organism’s surroundings, has a signalling effect to the organ-
ism. It is the presence or absence of a signal or the difference between signals 
that accounts for a difference in behavioural responses. Instances of some envi-
ronmental variable moving outside a certain neutral or equilibrial range will, by 
virtue of the value assumed by the variable rather than by virtue of the electrical, 
chemical or other properties that are hence subject to variance, prompt a nega-
tive feedback reaction that results in returning the value of the variable into the 
equilibrial range.1 This is the first sense in which informational relations are partly 
independent of, or underdetermined by, physical conditions.
The second sense in which informational relations are underdetermined by 
physical conditions is complementary to the first: as the functional and physical 
structure and dispositions of the organism are crucial structuring features in the 
generation of behaviour, a condition identical in physical terms may give rise to 
widely variant behaviours, depending on the informational relations in which it is 
embedded. Hence, frogs and humans will do different things when placed in water. 
Being so placed conveys different information to frogs (to whom it is the normal 
habitat) and to people in different contexts (Am I going swimming, or did I slip 
when walking on the river bank?). I will argue in Chapter 6 that, in providing dif-
ferent organisms with information for different behaviours, the set of variables that 
an organism responds to in his specific way constitutes his specific environment.
As the flip side, as it were, of the coin of underdetermination, information is to 
be thought of as an objective commodity, despite being used in diverse ways, in 
diverse constellations and to diverse purposes by different receivers or “consum-
ers”, for being relevant to them in distinctive ways. Information does not reduce 
to whatever an interpreter takes to be information. In some important respects, it 
is even indifferent to any interpreter’s dispositions or the presence of any inter-
pretation. Instead, it is a relation between world affairs that can be both inde-
pendently observed and subject to probabilistic and context-specific modes of 
analysis. This view of information will be defended here as the proper reconstruc-
tion of Dretske’s theory.
This view of information might be best understood when properly placed among 
the broad variety of theories of information that exist in the literature. In the first 
instance, it sees itself as part of a historical lineage of approaches that departed in 
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some way from the mathematical theory of communication, as originally proposed by 
Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver (1949). That theory was not concerned with 
natural information and its role in animal cognition but with technical require-
ments for reliable signalling in telecommunications. Although one might argue 
that it is thus wholly irrelevant to the explanatory purpose at hand, it has continued 
to influence the debate for many decades and remains a common reference point 
for all sorts of theories of information, including the semantic concept of informa-
tion introduced by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap (1952) and refurbished 
by Luciano Floridi (2004). Even in theories that are far removed from Shannon 
and Weaver’s original purposes in grounding theories of meaning in a notion of 
natural information, the mathematical theory of communication remains a refer-
ence point. This influence is most prominent in Dretske (1981) but has proven 
somewhat difficult to parse and has been countered with accounts that partly or 
wholly distance themselves from the mathematical paradigm (e.g. Millikan 2001; 
Skyrms 2010; more on this debate in the following section).2
The mathematical theory of information, at the time of its introduction, was duly 
concerned with genuine engineering problems in telecommunications, namely 
with the requirements for reliable and effective transmission of messages between 
sender and receiver – signal rates, channel capacities, measures of levels of the 
noise that interferes with signal transmission and the degrees of redundancy that 
could compensate for noise-induced loss (Weaver 1949). However, there is a core 
set of tenets of the mathematical theory that can be formulated without reference 
to senders and receivers of signals as intentional communicators of messages – and 
arguably also without implicitly presupposing their presence. The minimal formal 
characteristics of information can be summarised in the following two definitions:
(IN-1)  Any sequence of events in which a set of possible states of affairs at the 
source {s1,. . ., sn}, as determined at t0, is reduced by that state s1 within the set 
which turns out to be the actual state at t1, is an instance of information. The 
amount of information x involved is measured as the logarithmic function 
x = log2 
1_
p from the probabilities p of antecedent states to the actual state.
3
In a second step, the conditions for the transmission of information will be 
accounted for, so that the relation between the transformations of probabilities at 
the source and those at the receiving end is determined:
(IN-2)  The reduction of possibilities at the source must be sufficient to reduce the 
uncertainty on the receiving side R under conditions of “lossy” transmission.
 Transmission is lossy
(a) if information produced at s is lost in equivocation, or
(b) if noise added to r compromises the information received at R.
 Information is successfully transmitted only if an amount of bits is 
received that reduces the possibilities to an extent that is sufficient 
for specifying R’s response.
Resurrecting Dretskean information 19
Hence, at least as much additional or “redundant” information must be produced 
at the source as will have been cancelled out by the intervening noise and equivo-
cation. If for example 50% of the information produced at the source is lost in 
transmission or if 50% of what is received at R is, in fact, not produced at the 
source, and if the losses are randomly distributed over the set of signals under 
consideration, the number of bits will at least have to double.
To begin with, IN-1 says that there must be some reduction of possibilities 
at the source s in order for information to obtain (a condition that will receive 
some qualification in the first section of Chapter 4). For example if there are eight 
equiprobable antecedent states at the source, it takes three binary decisions and 
thus three bits of information to attain a state of certainty. For sixteen equiprob-
able states, the required amount of information will be four bits. If the set of pos-
sible states determined at t0 composes only the actual state that will be observed 
at t1, and thus if the probability of s1 to obtain is 1, no information is generated. 
Entirely static conditions at the source, with no intervening factors that could 
produce an altered state of affairs, would be a case in point. If, in contrast, a set of 
(roughly) equally possible states at the source at t0 approaches infinity, and hence 
if the actual state s1 at t1 is extremely improbable to obtain, the realisation of s1 is 
equally rich in information.
On this analysis, it appears that, to quote Weaver (1949, 14) again, “the words 
information and uncertainty find themselves partners”. Prima facie, uncertainty 
seems to be related to unwelcome phenomena like noise that interferes with com-
munication, and it raises a semantically relevant problem that was first identified 
by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952) and hence christened the “Bar-Hillel Carnap 
Paradox” (see Floridi 2004): the authors observed that, on a formal analysis, a 
self-contradictory sentence carries the highest amount of information, so that “it 
is too informative to be true” (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1952, 8). In the face of such 
unwelcome implications, Weaver highlights the distinction between what he calls 
“undesirable” and “desirable” uncertainty (1949, 12f ). The latter is to be found 
in the freedom of choice at the information source in selecting a message from 
a set of possible messages. Hence, a higher degree of freedom is correlated with 
a higher degree of uncertainty. If no alternative possibilities to some message 
exist at the source, there will be no information. As the alternative possibilities 
multiply, so does the amount of (desirable) uncertainty – and hence the amount of 
information that is available.
In thus distinguishing between uncertainty – and hence information – that is 
desirable vs. undesirable to sender or receiver, and in referring to the degrees of 
freedom at the source in selecting a message, it is implied that the information in 
question has to be sent by, or to originate in relation to, an intentional agent, that 
is a sender with a purpose. Only a sender with a purpose will be capable of goal-
directed action that allows for some degree of deliberation as to what goals shall 
be attended by what means and on what grounds. Only such a sender will be in a 
position to select a message from a variety of alternative possibilities.
There seems to be an ironic twist in the positions adopted by the mathemati-
cal and the naturalistically inclined semantic theories of information: on the one 
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hand, the mathematical theory makes no reference at all to the meaning of the 
messages whose transmission is the topic of inquiry, whereas an informational 
theory of meaning will have to consider the mathematical properties of informa-
tion.4 On the other hand, however, the mathematical theory of communication 
bases its concept of information on the notion of communicators of linguistic 
meanings, whereas informational theorists of meaning, being primarily interested 
in the origins of meaning, add qualifications to the role of agents as purpose-
ful communicators. On these latter theories, information is, first and foremost, 
natural information, to be encountered and picked up by its receivers in their 
environments. It serves to first ground all sorts of intentional relations and hence 
cannot presuppose their presence. Purposeful transmission of signals comes later, 
historically and systematically.
The content of natural information, and some discontent
Retaining the Shannon-Weaverean presupposition that the presence and the 
activities of purposeful communicators of meaning are the basis of an analysis of 
information, Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952), in their semantic theory of informa-
tion, restricted the domain of their theory to sentences within a language. That 
domain includes not only natural languages but also arguably privileges proposi-
tions formulated in formal languages. As Bar-Hillel and Carnap argue in some 
formal detail, the information transmitted by a sentence simply is the content of 
that sentence. This point, however, cannot be readily transferred to cases where 
there is information but no sentences or other linguistic forms.
A rather different and influential take on the role of information in meaning 
was presented by Dretske (1981) – although it might be argued that the influ-
ence of Dretske’s theory on philosophical debates is almost entirely composed of 
stimulating arguments against his view. Dretske’s aim was to conceptually root 
intentional phenomena in general and the possibility of knowledge in particular in 
natural relations that he reconstructed as informational relations. These relations 
were couched in probabilistic terms that, although commencing from an inter-
pretation of the mathematical theory of information, depart from it in important 
respects.
The obvious starting point for a reconstruction of Dretskean information is his 
near-infamous definition of informational content:
Informational content: A signal r carries the information that s is F = The 
conditional probability of s’s being F, given r (and k [standing for “knowl-
edge”]), is 1 (but, given k alone, less than 1).
(Dretske 1981, 65)
On this account, information is a certain relation between two world affairs s and 
r (things, events, properties or a combination thereof ) in which r is a signal of the 
other affair s being or having property F only if and only when the signalled affair 
of s being F is the case whenever the signalling affair r occurs. Because there is 
Resurrecting Dretskean information 21
a conditional probability involved in this definition, the relation in question must 
concern types of signals r that compose all the various r-tokens which obtain 
when s is F, so that a statistical correlation between r-tokens and F-conditions at 
s can be identified. Singular, non-repeatable co-occurrences of r, s and F cannot 
establish probabilities. This condition does not imply that informational relations 
can only hold for types of F-conditions at s, but it implies that there must be types 
of r-events that occur when some s assumes some property F. Thus, F may be 
a singular occurrence, or s may be an individual. The presence of informational 
content is strictly dependent on the presence of a correlation between r, viewed as 
members of types, and s being F.
At the same instance, Dretske’s quest is for the content of a specific, individual 
signal, over which one cannot average, plainly and simply because it is an indi-
vidual. It is either the case or it is not the case that s is F when some r-token is 
present. The conditional probabilities established for types of r-signals suppos-
edly govern the individual instances. On Dretske’s view, the correlations involved 
are of a strict kind, so that the conditional probability in his definition is p = 1. 
Whenever it turns out that s, instead of being F, is G or that t is F instead of s, any 
r that seemingly signals s as being F does not convey information, hence is not a 
signal, and accordingly has no content either.
To back up this claim, a second necessary condition for the presence of infor-
mational content is introduced, which is not contained in Dretske’s definition but 
explicitly stated in the context (Dretske 1981, 73, 76f ): r must be tied to the affair 
of s being F by some, at root nomological, regularity. Coincidentally parallel 
transformations of values at s and r will not count, even if the probability, in terms 
of frequency, is p = 1. Information is transmitted if and only if the conditions at 
the source affect the conditions on the receiving side in some regular way, that 
is in some way that stays the same over the full extension of instantiations of r.
If r may be caused by other conditions at the source than s being F (say G, H, 
etc.), or if F-conditions may hold for something other than s (so that z is F) but still 
cause r, or if s being F only intermittently causes r, no informational relation with 
the content that s is F obtains. Hence, causal relations are not sufficient for establish-
ing informational relations, nor are they always necessary (Dretske 1981, 33–36). 
In turn, however, the relation between source s and signal r need not be a relation of 
condition F at s causing r. A causal relation between s and r may be indirect (Dretske 
1981, 38). For example both s and r might have a presumably distal common causal 
antecedent that ensures covariance between these otherwise independent affairs.
If conditions at the source are to be reliably matched on the receiving side, sta-
ble “channel conditions” are required under which r-signals can be detected by R 
(Dretske 1981, 111–121). The presence and the nature of channel conditions will 
account for both the possibilities of information uptake by organisms and the kind 
and amount of informational noise that intervenes between source and receiver. 
It would not suffice for r to reliably covary with s being F if many or most sig-
nals could not reach a receiver R, for being lost in transmission and thus creating 
equivocation, or if the intervening noise added seeming r-signals that, in fact, did 
not originate at the source.
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In an ideal situation, the channel neither subtracts information generated at the 
source nor adds extraneous information. In such an ideal situation, any transfor-
mation of conditions at the source would be matched by a transformation of the 
signals, and any distribution of probabilities for different outcomes at the source 
would be matched by an identical distribution of probabilities for different signals 
to obtain. This is, in fact, as much of an idealisation as a friction-less plane or point 
masses in the context of scientific modelling – whereas the central question for the 
mathematical theory of communication, as Dretske acknowledges, did not concern 
ideal situations but real-world problems caused by precisely those noisy channel 
conditions which one might just wish to idealise away: how much redundant infor-
mation should be produced at the source so as to ensure that enough information 
will get through a channel affected by a specified amount of noise? That measure 
does not concern the reliability of information in terms of the probability with 
which r is generated in relation to s being F. Instead, it concerns the conditions 
for successful transmission of that information – which do not generate additional 
information about s. If channel conditions are variable, additional information on 
these conditions (rather than on what happens at s), ideally available through inde-
pendent channels, will be useful to the receiver – that is if it is available.
It is the question of what happens in less-than-ideal situations that separates Dret-
ske’s theory from its main critiques. The critics claim either that the information- 
theoretical terminology of signals, channel conditions, noise and equivocation 
he mobilises in his account of informational content is misguiding in terms of 
bearing no tenable relation to the mathematical theory of communication from 
which it was borrowed (let me call this the “misnomer critique”) or that Dret-
ske’s requirements for informational relations to obtain are too restrictive to meet 
real-world conditions (let me call this the “restrictiveness critique”). These two 
critiques are related and are best considered in relation to each other.
According to the “misnomer critique”, as brought forward by authors such as 
Kenneth Sayre (1983), Dretske’s focus on the content of a signal rather than the 
conditions for its successful transmission amounts to changing the topic, so his 
reference to that theory is tenuous or even purely rhetorical, and his liberal re- 
definitions of information-theoretical terms are prone to misguide the reader (Mil-
likan expresses a similar view in personal communication). On slightly different 
grounds, but to similar effect, Brian Skyrms (2010, 34) argues that Dretske’s seman-
tic notion of information, in which informational content is conceived of in propo-
sitional form, relegates the insights of information theory to secondary importance.
The mathematical theory of communication confined itself mostly to measur-
ing the signal strength and channel conditions required for successful transmis-
sion of some signal, whatever meaning it may have. Determining that meaning 
was considered an affair of senders and receivers of signals, not of objective rela-
tions between world affairs that do not per se presuppose the presence of a sender 
or receiver. The relations Dretske had in mind could be detected by a receiver, 
and they might be communicated by a sender, but in order to do so and convey 
information to them, the relations between source conditions and signals will have 
to be of a certain kind, independently of any sender or receiver.
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The “restrictiveness critique”, as brought forward by authors such as Ruth 
Millikan (2001; 2004) and Skyrms (2010) maintains, as Dretske later acknowl-
edged, that setting admission criteria to the realm of informational relations as strict 
as Dretske originally did might leave us with an account of information that is quite 
removed from the ways in which organisms successfully perceive and act under less 
tightly bounded but more natural conditions. Reliance on relations between source 
and signal that are not nomologically governed but more probabilistic and local 
in kind is a common practice in nature. Some, and arguably most, conditions in 
nature will hold only within locally or temporally circumscribed domains, possibly 
with no method available to the organism for determining the boundaries of these 
domains, let alone the degree of reliability of some putatively informative signal.
If, on the one hand, one requires a strict, nomologically rooted covariance between 
the presence of r and s being F for there to be information at all, and if, on the other 
hand, it shall be acknowledged that natural organisms live under less-than-ideal, 
variable and often uncooperative conditions, the probabilities considered on either 
side, although related, have different reference points. Information as a probabilistic 
affair, in the manner introduced in IN-1 and discussed by the mathematical theorists, 
concerns only the question of how many binary decisions or “bits” are required to 
reduce a given number of antecedent possibilities to one determinate state at the 
source, and how much redundancy will have to be added at the source in order to 
compensate for noise-induced loss of that information during transmission, so as to 
avoid or minimise equivocation on the receiving side.
In contrast, the probabilities introduced by Dretske in his definition of informa-
tional content concern the question of whether a signal transmits information on a 
certain world affair, namely that s is indeed F. The question here is whether some 
affair r is related to what happens at s with sufficient reliability and regularity:
The conditional probabilities used to compute noise, equivocation, and 
amount of transmitted information (and therefore the conditional probabili-
ties defining the informational content of the signal) are all determined by the 
lawful relations that exist between source and signal.
(Dretske 1981, 77)
That conditions at the source lawfully affect the signalling relation is the one 
core presupposition of the mathematical theory of communication – which is 
not further explained or elucidated in that theory. This presupposition is one key 
reason for Dretske to actually mobilise that theory, as he most clearly states in 
(Dretske 1983, 56): “For what this theory [= communication theory] tells us is 
that the amount of information at r about s is a function of the degree of lawful 
(nomic) dependence between conditions at these two points.” Still, that depend-
ence between conditions at s and r tells us something only about the measure of 
probabilities in a signalling relation.
The difference in focus here can be illustrated as follows: there may well be an 
r-token that signals “conditions at s unchanged”. This would be an information-
ally rather bland affair on the mathematical theory, as the probability at t0 of s 
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being or becoming F at t1 would be p = 1, so that no binary decisions are required 
and no information would be generated. However, to the extent that this signal is 
tied to that condition at the source unequivocally and lawfully, it is this kind of 
relation that is relevant to Dretske, in that only such a relation is able to ground 
knowledge. In turn, the transmission conditions investigated by the mathematical 
theory determine how strong a signal has to be, how much redundancy is required 
and hence what degree of reduction of possibilities at the source has to obtain 
in order for it to successfully reach its receiver once it relates to conditions at 
the source in an appropriate way. Both conditions have to be fulfilled in order to 
afford knowledge to the receiver of information. In fact, all the remarkably steep 
conditions Dretske imposes upon his notion of informational content are best read 
in the light of his ultimate purpose, which is a genuinely and rather traditionally 
epistemological one: what are the conditions of knowledge?
On Dretske’s account of informational content, the probability in question is 
explicitly designed as an all-or-nothing affair: if p is not 1, it is bound to be 0 
(Dretske 1981, 60). It is either true or false that s is F when some r-token that 
signals s being F is produced and transmitted, and if it is false, no information is 
transmitted. Only under these clear-cut conditions, Dretske continues to argue, 
can information afford knowledge. If information were allowed to be false or 
uncertain, and still be information proper, there would be no knowledge – not-
withstanding the possibility of poor channel conditions or faulty mechanisms of 
information uptake that add uncertainty to its use. We could not even be properly 
mistaken about something in the first place if the underlying informational rela-
tions were already equivocal. Hence, the probabilities concerning informational 
content and those concerning information transmission uptake should be clearly 
distinguished – a distinction that is not always clear in Dretske.
To return to the example of frog vision that opened this chapter: a certain pattern 
on the frog’s retina will elicit a certain behavioural response, namely the tongue 
darting out to catch and eat the object so projected. Under normal conditions in 
frog habitats, and under normal conditions of functioning for the frog’s percep-
tual apparatus, the respective patterns are virtually always caused by insects, and 
they are so caused in accordance with fairly robust natural regularities. Given 
that insects provide nourishment to the frog, one would be entitled to say that the 
patterns on the frog’s retina convey information on the presence of insects-as-
nourishing-objects in his vicinity. However, if there is something dysfunctional 
about the frog’s perceptual apparatus or if unusual external conditions intervene, 
the informational relation in question cannot be tracked. The perceptual mecha-
nisms involved may well maintain their functions even if they fail to perform it. If 
an experimenter tosses lead pellets across the frog’s visual field, any object caus-
ing a sufficiently similar pattern on the frog’s retina would be met with the same 
response. The experimenter would be tampering with the channel conditions, add-
ing seeming signals that do not have their proper source. Hence, the visual pattern 
would not convey information on the presence of insects anymore (Dretske 1981, 
33–35).5 If, however, the original informational relation were not firmly in place, 
the frog could not react appropriately, even under optimal channel conditions.
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So here are the points that I see in Dretske’s theory that are worthy of being 
‘resurrected’: first, information is, above all, natural information, in terms of being 
present in the environment independently of any means of signal transmission or 
processing, and independently of senders and receivers. Second, and conversely, 
informational relations serve to ground content for their receivers. Third, informa-
tion is relationally defined, in terms of lawful covariance between r and conditions 
at s, with no reified informational entities being postulated. The term “informa-
tion” denotes a set of invariant relations in the environment that is foundational 
to the possibility of keeping track of objects and events throughout a multitude of 
conditions for a variety of differently constituted organisms. Hence, one key task 
will be to tell the variant from the invariant relations in this context. However, the 
question remains of how to account for the possibility that, under certain condi-
tions, less-than-unequivocal relations (in which p < 1 for s being F, given r) might 
be of informational value to such a variety of differently constituted organisms, 
and that these conditions are the normal conditions under which perceiving and 
cognising organisms operate. Knowledge might not even be the gold standard on 
which to evaluate these conditions.
Alternative views of information
In contrast to Dretske’s rigid approach to probabilities concerning informational 
content, Skyrms uses a more relaxed and expressly game-theoretic approach of 
“signalling games” between senders and receivers (Skyrms 2010, 35). On his 
account, the informational content of a signal shall be determined from the prob-
ability with which tokenings of the signal, in relation to some world affair, will 
influence the behaviour of the receiver (Skyrms 2010, 33–41). The direction and 
magnitude of that influence (the “vector”) plainly is the informational content of 
the signal. The content vector determines the meaning of a signal within the con-
text of a specific signalling game that applies to a given situation for the organism 
using and, in a subset of cases, also the organism producing the information in 
question. The direction of the vector might be objectively measurable, but it is a 
direction relative to the organism involved. His constitution, his abilities and his 
aims need to be taken into account. The information effects something in relation 
to him, and what it effects – in most cases, the adaptive response on individual or 
population levels – is the content of that information.
If a signal always and exclusively occurs in correlation with one of n possible 
states of affairs, its content is unequivocally determined within the context of 
the game, as is the response from the receiver. If the relation is less than une-
quivocal while still being identifiable as a vector of the aforementioned kind, the 
information transmitted is weaker, but it does not cease to be information. On 
this view, the probabilities for informational content come in frequency-based 
degrees. Moreover, the probabilities involved are now all treated on one level. If, 
on the repeated occurrence of some signal, there is an effect on the behaviour of 
an organism or a population in terms of an increased probability of some kind of 
behaviour to obtain in comparison to all available alternatives, and hence if the 
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occurrence of some s being F to a certain degree covaries with a reduction of pos-
sibilities in the receiver’s behaviours between t0 and t1, an informational relation 
is established.
The game-theoretic aspect of Skyrms’s theory is not supposed to be read too 
literally: the signalling games involving senders and receivers of information are 
introduced in order to provide a formal model of patterns of modifications of 
probabilities that can be detected even in kinds of natural processes that could 
not possibly involve any consciously pursued strategies of players. For the send-
ers and receivers, there is no presupposition of a “pre-existing mental language”, 
and the analysis shall include cases “where no plausible account of mental life is 
available” (Skyrms 2010, 7, endorsing David Lewis’s 1969 account of sender-
receiver games).
It does not become entirely clear to what extent Skyrms introduces these 
notions as formal analogies that shall help reconstructing informational relations 
of all kinds, or whether they are to be read in a more material sense, where senders 
and receivers are involved in sending and receiving signals even in cases where 
they are not endowed with a mental life. At any rate, the probabilities involved 
are meant to be understood as frequency distributions of certain outcomes, not 
as degrees of belief on the sender’s or receiver’s side. What, however, is pre-
supposed whenever real-world organisms are involved is some kind of adaptive 
dynamics that accounts for the transition from randomly variant towards directed 
and world-fitting behaviours. Variation and natural selection within populations 
are a necessary precondition of the evolution of signalling games. Successful 
behaviours and failures are accrued by real-world organisms, and provide the 
values on the basis of which a strategy is determined within the context of the 
game-theoretical model. Even though the players of signalling games need not be 
aware of certain strategy or of following that strategy, they will remain players in 
terms of their real-world behaviour and its consequences, as they are influenced 
by signals received and, sometimes, emitted by them.
Even more explicit reliance on the Lewisian notion of sender-receiver games is 
displayed in recent work by Peter Godfrey-Smith, who focuses on the co-evolution, 
broadly conceived, of sender and receiver behaviour – which may also comprise 
functional components of one organism. Instead of the uptake of natural informa-
tion encountered in the environment, the paradigm applications of this model are, 
first, mechanisms of signalling within an organism, more specifically mechanisms 
of transmission of genetic information and of memory (Godfrey-Smith 2013b) 
and, second, rule-governed activities of signalling between organisms, in the con-
text of animal communication (Godfrey-Smith 2013a). In the following chapters, 
I will make a case for environmental information for perception being the genu-
ine paradigm of information, from chemo- or magnetotaxis onward, with active 
signalling within or between organisms building upon such natural information.
In a different critical take on Dretske’s approach to the role of probability in 
information, Millikan (2001) observes that, if the probability required for infor-
mational content shall be p = 1, r would have to not only be a signal of s being F 
but also, at the same instance, transmit a mark of its reliability to its consumer, 
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thereby confirming that it indeed is a signal of that very affair in a given context. 
If we briefly return to Dretske’s discussion of channel conditions, however, we 
will see that the requirement looks slightly different: if the channel conditions are 
variable, the animal will have to use a different, independent channel that either 
confirms or disconfirms the original information or that transmits information on 
the conditions in the former channel. Meta-information of this kind is separate 
information and is to be assessed separately.
In either case, however, the consumer may not have additional means of inde-
pendently verifying whether conditions hold under which a series of r-tokens or a 
single instantiation of r in his or her stream of perceptions transmits the informa-
tion that s is F, nor does he or she necessarily have independent means of verify-
ing that conditions in his or her habitat are normal. Little knowledge on these 
matters can be presumed on the side of the frog in our example. On a higher plane, 
human cognition faces the same problem. In any given perceptual situation, we 
cannot independently verify whether our perceptions are reliably connected with 
their distal objects – which Dretske does not consider problematic because such 
uncertainty does not affect the conditional probabilities of the informational rela-
tions as such (Dretske 1981, 56).
As an alternative to Dretske’s view and the problem of the mark of reliability 
it seems to incur, Millikan (2001) suggests a decoupling of those probabilities 
which hold for informational correlations at the source and those which apply to 
the channel conditions, and thus to the noise and equivocation that will inevitably 
enter into the transmission of the signal and hence reduce the reliability of the 
information to the consumer. In prima facie analogy to Dretske, the probabilities 
involved hence are treated separately again, but in a fashion that differs in one 
important respect from Dretske’s account – namely in what status accrues to prob-
abilities p < 1 for the co-occurrence of r, s and F.
In order to accommodate for the possibility of probabilities to be lower than 
one in informational relations, Millikan goes on to distinguish between two types 
of natural information: the first, christened “informationL” (or “context-free infor-
mation” in Millikan 2004, 35), is based, in Dretske’s spirit, on correlations at the 
source that hold with a probability of 1 by virtue of natural necessities. How-
ever, Millikan continues to argue, there are not many correlations of this kind 
that would be within a normal consumer’s reach. Instead, all organisms rely on a 
‘softer’ kind of information most of the time, which she christened “informationC” 
(“local information” in Millikan 2004, 35). InformationC is based on local statisti-
cal frequencies that may well remain below a probability of 1. These statistical 
frequencies reflect a history of co-occurrences between signalling and signalled 
affairs and thus are determined on a different base from Dretske’s in terms of 
underlying regularities. These regularities are not nomologically but historically 
and ecologically grounded. The statistical frequencies Millikan has in mind are 
hence also determined on a different sample of occurrences, namely local, spatio-
temporally bounded ones, and hence subject to variation.
Actually, the statistical frequencies for the signal to actually occur in rela-
tion to the signalled affair might even be extremely low without undermining 
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the informational relation as such. Millikan (2004, 71f ) argues that, if there are 
enough successful instances of signalling a certain world affair to outweigh the 
effects of wasted effort or damaging mistakes, so that the ratio between the effects 
of the successful instances and those of the failures contributes to an explanation 
of the individual’s and/or its species’ persistence and reproduction, the successful 
instances in which r indeed signals s being F will suffice to determine the infor-
mational content of the signal.
In turn, the separation of the probabilities for the source and the channel con-
ditions highlighted earlier is designed to specifically account for the possibility 
of failing instantiations that are due not to unreliable conditions at the source or 
dysfunctions in the receiver but to uncooperative environmental conditions that, 
varying over space and time in kind and intensity, may negatively affect the trans-
mission. Under real-world conditions, less-than-perfect consumers of informa-
tion will have to make do with abundant but incompletely trackable information 
in less-than-noise-free environments. Formal idealisations of the kind Dretske 
appears to endorse may contribute to missing this point.
Despite these differences, a common concern for Dretske, Skyrms and Mil-
likan lies in providing an account of the possibility of meaningful yet false, mis-
representing signs. They diverge on the question whether there can be such a 
thing as false natural information to begin with. Where Dretske holds that, if it 
is false, it is not information, Millikan maintains that, if it can be false, it is not 
natural but already intentional information, while Skyrms settles for a kind of 
laissez-faire probabilism that allows for all degrees of reliability of information, 
the only threshold being the possibility of a breakdown of the hypothetical or real 
sender-receiver game. In fact, Millikan claims that the mark of distinction of the 
entire teleosemantic programme does not as much lie in the theories of meaning 
it proposes but in its specific set of theories of misrepresentation (Millikan 2004, 
Chapter 5). Depending on whether one counts Dretske and Skyrms as teleose-
manticists, the variety of such theories within that camp seems to be fairly broad. 
As we will see in the next section, these differences concerning false information 
may ultimately betray a mostly implicit disagreement about a less obvious but 
more foundational set of philosophical presuppositions.
Natural information and the roots of intentionality
The fact that Dretske, when discussing informational content, treats probabilities 
at the source and probabilities concerning the channel conditions separately and 
sets the standards for the former improbably high is, with some likeliness, system-
atically grounded: it is the very detachment of knowledge-conveying information 
from meaning and its characteristic side effects of intensionality and error on which 
Dretske’s approach builds. In his original definition of informational content, the 
consumer of information appears only as the unnamed bearer of the knowledge 
k in relation to which, under certain conditions, a signal r becomes the informa-
tion that s is F. Under some, but not all, circumstances, k will become relevant 
to the informational relation, and only under some, but not all, circumstances, 
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fully fledged propositional knowledge, or even any knowledge, is the product 
of the informational relation.6 The addition to the definition of the parenthetical 
and – at least seemingly – optional condition of the presence of knowledge on the 
receiver’s side, and the reference to a “suitably placed observer” who “could learn 
something about X” by consulting the information conferred by some state of 
affairs (Dretske 1981, 45), might distract the reader from the systematic point that 
he places at the centre of his inquiry (Dretske 1981, vii): that for natural informa-
tion to exist, there is no need for interpretive processes that confer meaning upon 
a signalled world affair, so that there is no presupposition of a system capable of 
delivering such interpretations to be involved in informational processes either. 
Receivers of information might be of much more primitive nature than that of 
being interpreters or “consumers”. A receiver of information may simply react to 
a signal in the most mechanical fashion or simply record it without doing anything 
else with it, yet without signals reliably transmitting information about world 
affairs, there would be no knowledge and no reference point for meaning. Hence, 
in order to keep the distinction clear, Dretske locates the paradigm of information 
below not only the level of linguistic forms but also the level of any interpretation 
in even the most elementary or rudimentary of semantic terms.
Interpretation of information, on this view, is a higher-level affair, where a sig-
nal not only triggers a reaction, but is recognised, consciously or otherwise, as a 
bearer of some information. Only on this level, intentionality and error will make 
their appearance. The world abounds with information, and the organisms’ task 
lies in tapping into this resource, depending on their respective constitution and 
abilities. If an organism is unsuccessful in providing himself with reliable infor-
mation on what is relevant to him, the blame will never lie with the presumed 
informational relations as such. If those relations are not reliable, they are not 
informational relations in the first place. Instead, the organism’s own misfortunes, 
deficiencies or dysfunctions will be the first thing to be held responsible for any 
unhappy outcome that ensues.7 In order to balance for this consumer-unfriendly 
bias, Dretske supplements his account of natural information with an elaborate 
theory of misrepresentations, as they will occur once we move from the realm of 
abstractly defined correlations towards the realm of biological functions of repre-
senting these correlations. Fulfilment of these functions may not only be thwarted 
by internally caused failures to perform them but also by abnormal conditions in 
the environment, Dretske (1986) later admitted – but this does little to undermine 
the foundational role of genuinely misrepresentation-free natural information.
What is at issue here is, on a proximate level, the difference between “infor-
mational semantics” as proposed by Dretske himself, Jerry Fodor, Dennis Stampe 
and other authors, and the “consumer semantics” brought forward by Millikan, 
David Papineau, Peter Carruthers, probably also Skyrms and others (see Dretske’s 
own account of the distinction in Dretske 2009): although both approaches are 
of an externalist kind, the latter authors prefer to locate the meaning of linguistic 
signs or other signals ‘downstream’ from the source of information, namely in 
its effects on the receiver and his or her behaviours, whereas the former insist on 
grounding meaning in the original informational relations at the source.
30 Informational environments
If, however, we follow Daniel Dennett (1987, Chapter 8, “Evolution, Intentional-
ity, and Error”) in his account of the “Great Divide” in the contemporary philoso-
phy of mind, the difference at issue here may ultimately be more fundamental than 
between systematically grounded preferences for variant perspectives and variant 
methods. Only to the extent that Millikan and other authors view information from 
the perspective of its consumer, that is the receiving and interpreting organism, 
and take this to be the relevant perspective for a theory of meaning, the problem 
of markers or meta-information on the reliability of the signal arises – which is 
to be solved by a functional-historical account of organisms dealing with signals 
that, with varying degrees of reliability, are related to world affairs. Whether by 
phylogenetic or by ontogenetic means, they acquire mechanisms for coping with 
those varying degrees of reliability and for tapping into other information channels 
that help to assess the affairs on the source side. Not so for Dretske and the authors 
Dennett subsumes on the other side of the Great Divide: the firmness and consumer-
independence, if I may call it so, of the informational relations that Dretske insists 
on shall account for a solid grounding of whatever further operations in the organ-
ism’s nervous system will obtain in terms of representing world affairs. There is an 
indefinite amount of natural information, and because that information is an entirely 
objective affair, all the information there is could be, in principle at least, assessed 
with determinacy. Only under this condition of a firm, nomologically governed, 
rooting in natural informational relations, symbols can become meaningful, and be 
endowed with what John Searle (1983) calls “intrinsic intentionality”, also known 
as “original intentionality” – a notion that, on Dennett’s account, Dretske endorses 
(Dennett 1987, 288f ) and that, if tenable, would spell bad news for computational 
models and simulations of meaning-conveying processes.
Despite its rooting in natural relations, this latter view implies the assumption of 
a discontinuity between intrinsic intentionality and the definition and characteri-
sation of normal biological traits. Organic traits allow for the existence of inter-
mediate and proto-forms and thus for some degree of ambiguity in definition and 
function. The debates within and about evolutionary theory will never ultimately 
resolve, nor can they possibly evade, questions of delimitation between biological 
characteristics, such as, for example: at what stage in the course of evolution does 
a (dinosaur’s) arm become a (bird’s) wing? Is the demarcation between species 
determined by variance of traits, too, or by reproductive isolation only? When 
precisely does a speciation event occur? Is evolution always a continuous process? 
Even the Cambrian Explosion and Punctuated Equilibria, viewed in relation to the 
time-frame of evolution, remain gradual processes, albeit with a steeper gradient.8 
In these processes, there are no unequivocal, predetermined thresholds to tell us 
when something really has become something else, and when a fast-paced process 
really amounts to a rupture in the course of evolution. In contrast, the phenomenon 
of intrinsic intentionality, as conceived of by of Searle and like-minded authors, 
makes its appearance as an either-or affair. It will be difficult to imagine it as 
being partially realised or as an intentionality-in-the-making. Nor is it unequivo-
cally admitted to being a product of processes of adaptation by natural selection in 
the first place. An explicit plea for such a discontinuity that is based on an explicit 
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refusal to accept arguments for naturalising intentionality in Darwinian terms, 
and that, unsurprisingly perhaps, explicitly recurs to heterodox, non- adaptationist 
strands in contemporary evolutionary reasoning, is provided by Fodor (1996) in a 
polemical review of Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). In contrast to the 
“adaptationist programme” (as understood by Fodor but not Dennett, who vigor-
ously defends a different interpretation),9 natural selection is not a teleological 
process in terms of biological traits being selected for, that is selected with respect 
to pre-existing criteria of fitness that may not (yet) have a counterpart in real-world 
conditions. Even if there were such a teleological element to natural selection, 
Fodor continues, that element would not suffice to ground the intentional character 
of thought – whereas the teleosemanticist is supposedly committed to believing 
that the intentionality of thought is derived, in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, from some presumed intentionality of natural selection.
Whatever teleology there might be to natural selection, Fodor claims, it cannot, 
as a matter of biological fact, consist in being directed towards anything that is 
not actual, whereas the intentionality of the mind is characterised by the thoughts 
being directed towards real, ideal, prospective, imaginary or other states of affairs 
that, on Franz Brentano’s famous definition, specifically and sometimes only 
exist in those thoughts (and hence in-exist, 1874, 115f ). Fodor concludes that 
there must be something particular about the intentionality of thoughts that is not 
covered by a teleological nature of natural selection. This does nothing to speak 
against semantic naturalism, since Fodor, like Dretske, not only acknowledges but 
endorses the existence of natural representational content. The important quali-
fication is that such content does not exist qua being selected for, but qua deter-
minate natural correlations of the informational kind. Nor is Fodor’s objection 
supposed to include the claim that intentional phenomena are not a product of 
evolutionary processes, including natural selection. However, he insists that it is 
not some intentional character of natural selection that makes them intentional.
Dennett’s reply to this criticism in Dennett (1996) is every bit as instructive as 
Fodor’s argument itself: the assumption that there is an element of intentionality 
to natural selection is a false allegation, so Fodor’s critique appears to be based on 
an utter misreading of his and any serious evolutionist’s work. Dennett insists that 
his point was precisely to demonstrate that intentionality and representation can 
be derived from processes that do not, and could not, be endowed with these same 
characteristics. Not only can teleological structures emerge without a conscious 
agent at the wheel, they can also emerge from processes that have no trace of goal-
directedness to them. Goal-directedness begins with biological functions, not with 
natural selection, but natural selection is the causal antecedent of all biological 
functions, understood as “selected effects”. It also is the historical antecedent of 
each individual biological function. The natural information an organism encoun-
ters in his environment becomes relevant to the organism only in the light of, and 
in relation to, these functions.
On these grounds, Dennett, like Millikan, goes on to claim that there are ever 
so slight degrees between the non-intentional and the intentional, in terms of the 
evolution of cognitive abilities, that it would be arbitrary to draw a line and decide 
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where in the history of nature intentionality really begins. As all organic functions 
(which is not to say: all organic traits) are derived from processes of variation and 
natural selection, cognitive abilities, to the extent they do have a function, are 
derived from such processes, and in this circumscribed sense their endowment of 
intentionality – but not their concrete content – is derived from these processes, 
too. Hence, Dennett concludes: 
You have to give up original intentionality and see that all the late, robust, 
representation-wielding varieties of intentionality, both the words on the 
shopping list and the mental images in your head, are artefacts, and hence 
have derived intentionality.
(Dennett 1996, 268)
It is the same idea that underlies any attempt at creating artificial systems that 
produce functional analogues to adaptive organic traits, including cognitive ones. 
Whether deliberately or not, Dretske’s insistence, like Fodor’s, on hard, nomo-
logically grounded information amounts to a denial of this family of ideas. I will 
return to providing my own account of the probabilistic and context-bound nature 
of natural information (but I will not say much more about intentionality) in 
Chapters 4 and 6, after inquiring a bit more deeply into the role of natural infor-
mation in perception, as it is controversially discussed in the literature. The key 
question in the following chapter will be how a reconciliation between a strict, 
Dretskean interpretation of informational relations with local, probabilistic condi-
tions of information uptake in perception can be accomplished, and why it should 
be accomplished.
Notes
1  This is the basic concept of cybernetic machines as proposed and built by W. Ross Ashby 
(1960). His paradigmatic machine, called the “homeostat”, was explicitly designed as 
a material model of the elementary mechanisms of adaptive behaviour in organisms.
2  A markedly different turn has been taken by John Maynard Smith (2000), who proposes 
a notion of information in the biological sciences that takes the original mathematical 
theory of communication to be rather directly and literally applicable to the relation 
between genes and ontogenetic development.
3  This semi-formalised description of information is based on Weaver (1949, 12) and 
Dretske (1981, 12f ).
4  There is a fine distinction that already shows up in Shannon and Weaver (1949, 8, 31) 
and marks a divergence in opinion between the two authors: Shannon assumes a com-
plete irrelevance of meaning to the mathematical theory of information, and seems to 
imply that, conversely, the mathematical theory of information is equally irrelevant to 
any account of meaning. In contrast, Weaver maintains that there is an asymmetric sys-
tematic relation between the two, obtaining from mathematical theory to theories of 
meaning, most explicitly in Weaver (1949); also see Dretske (1981, 41 and endnotes 2 
and 3 to that passage).
5  This example is also discussed in similar contexts by Dennett (1987, Chapter 8), in an 
explicit critique of Dretske’s and other authors’ position on the phenomenon of misrep-
resentation, and in Millikan (1986, 71f ) in an analysis of the conditions for an organism 
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of exercising his natural, evolutionary acquired proper functions; see further discussion 
on pp. 112–113.
6  With a somewhat different aim in mind, Millikan (2001, 106) suggests that we could 
drop the k-condition without any loss if we integrate r into a more complete signal that 
includes information about s previously transmitted to the receiver.
7  One socio-political connotation of this interpretation of Dretske’s view will not escape 
the attentive reader: it reads like the semantic counterpart to a roughshod conserva-
tism which I would paraphrase as follows: “If you make it in life, it’s because you’re 
quite smart, so you deserve it. If you don’t make it, it’s your own fault, so please don’t 
blame unfavourable circumstances or, even worse, sinister forces of falsehood conspir-
ing against the honest workingman’s fortunes.” (I am, however, convinced that Dretske 
never intended such a parallel.) Compare this to Millikan’s emphasis on the importance 
of the environment and her emphasis on the possibility of its uncooperativeness – 
and the generally very favourable reception of her theories, albeit mostly on different 
grounds, among animal rights activists.
8  The theory of Punctuated Equilibria was introduced by Eldredge and Gould (1972) 
and received thorough criticisms from Dawkins (1983, 412–418) and Dennett (1995, 
Chapter 10.3). Both authors target the issue of choosing the appropriate time-frame. 
The clause “viewed in relation to the time-frame of evolution” is relevant in this context 
because, in a trivial sense, everything, even the ignition of a nuclear bomb or the Big 
Bang, is a gradual process – if we adjust the time-frame accordingly. The most elemen-
tary unit of evolutionary processes are generations of organisms. Definitionally, every 
modification that takes n > 1 generations to obtain and does not suddenly appear from 
one generation to the next may count as a gradual process in evolutionary terms. Factu-
ally, however, even for rather rapid or fairly minor developments, n will normally be 
much larger than 1. The Punctuated Equilibria debate concerned the distinction among, 
first, a notion of continuous evolution, second, alternating paces with periods of relative 
stasis punctuated by processes of relatively rapid change and, third, genuine evolution-
ary saltation, that is macro-mutation. These are different processes, occurring on differ-
ent time scales, that should be, but not always are, viewed apart from each other.
9  The term “adaptationist programme” was coined, with critical intent, by Gould and 
Lewontin (1979). Fodor’s critique builds on this seminal essay and adds some more 
radical tenets to it (which he continues to do in Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010). 
For the classical sources of Neo-Darwinian adaptationism adhered to by Dennett, see 
Dawkins (1983), Pittendrigh (1958), and Williams (1966); for a qualified and nuanced 
defence of adaptationism as a research programme against Gould and Lewontin (1979), 
see Sober (1998).
3  Varieties of perception
One implication of Fred Dretske’s nomological, objectivist view of information 
is that his aforementioned “suitably placed observer” is not necessarily identical 
with the actual receiver or consumer of the information in question. He might be 
the observer of an informational situation in which a different receiver is involved. 
The receiver in that situation may or may not learn something about X, and he, she 
or it may or may not have access to information about the reliability of the signals 
received. Presumably, the frog belongs to the less privileged group. The human 
observer is taken to be in a better position, for being able to assess informational 
situations in a way that other organisms are not. This epistemic privilege seems 
to include, again in principle at least, the informational situations he, she or it is 
involved in – even if no ultimate verification of the relations of our perceptions 
to their distal objects is in reach. This epistemic privilege seems to be assumed 
without further justification, and it places human agents outside the environmental 
constraints that affect other organisms.
A second implication of Dretske’s informational semantics is that, despite all 
his reference to the mathematical theory of information, his concept of informa-
tion is at variance with notions of information in mathematics or computer science 
in at least one important respect: it may work as a remedy against the symbol 
grounding problem that keeps haunting AI, but provides no account of how natu-
ral information is processed. Conversely, AI, along with the mathematical theory 
of communication, often confines itself to the tasks of information processing, 
leaving the grounding of the symbols so processed to take care of itself, or assum-
ing it to be someone else’s business anyway. This observation does not rule out the 
possibility of a division of labour between computer scientists and AI researchers 
on the one side and approaches to cognition based on theories of natural infor-
mation on the other. However, the very paradigm of a psychology of perception 
that is based on an account of environmentally rooted natural information, a par-
adigm endorsed by Dretske (1981, Chapter 6), is expressly sceptical of AI, in 
assuming that no processes of a computational kind are involved in perception to 
begin with: James Jerome Gibson’s ecological theory of visual perception (1979). 
Although other proponents of theories of natural information are not as resolutely 
disinclined towards the computational realm, Gibson’s stance may count as symp-
tomatic of a systematic incompatibility.
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These two implications of Dretske’s view of information stand in an interest-
ing but not immediately obvious relation to each other. Besides further inquiring 
into the nature of natural information in the context of perception and aligning 
the Dretskean with the Gibsonian concept of information, the meta-goal of what 
follows in this chapter is to show how the two implications of Dretske’s view 
are connected – although probably not in terms of being mutually supporting 
constituents of his theory. It is the computationalist view of perception that is 
ultimately committed (or condemned?) to relying on an objectivist standpoint in 
which relations between a perceptual state and its object can be unambiguously 
determined – while they cannot be warranted by the computational models proper. 
Conversely, everything in the view from natural information, if and when pur-
sued consistently, speaks for informational relations that are objective in kind but 
context-bound all the way down, with no epistemic privilege to be assumed for 
the human being perceiving and acting within an environment. In this chapter, 
I will discuss three theories of perception that are markedly at variance with each 
other in these respects: David Marr’s computational view of visual perception, 
Gibson’s ecological approach to visual perception as the former’s main antago-
nist and the main focus of attention in this chapter, and the Empirical Strategy 
of perception as a contemporary theory of intermediate status, which endorses 
the notion of context-boundedness of perception while relying on computational 
models. The issues of illusion and misperception discussed in that latter section 
will be particularly instructive to elucidating the role of natural information and 
its environmental context in perception.
Perception as information processing: the computational view
One peculiarity of all accounts of natural information discussed so far is that 
they do not include any notion of data or information processing. Dretske, Brian 
Skyrms, Ruth Millikan, like Gibson, all use concepts of natural information that 
either rest on the expectation that all kinds of information are deducible from 
a basic theory of natural information (Dretske, Skyrms) or do not include any 
notion of likeness between natural information as used in perception and the 
information-processing kind of information (Gibson, Millikan) – as Anthony 
Chemero (2003b) has usefully highlighted.
Notions of data and information processing are characteristic of the non-
semantic mathematical theory of communication. They are also used in other, 
non-naturalistic, semantic accounts of information, such as in “General Definition 
of Information” or GDI that Luciano Floridi (2011) refers to as an “operational 
standard” in fields such as data mining or information management. Floridi’s GDI 
characterises semantic information as well-formed and meaningful data – a defi-
nition prima facie both more vague and more specific in character than Dretske’s. 
It is more vague in having to be supplemented with further definitions capable 
to cash out the requirements of being well-formed and meaningful. It is more 
specific in focusing, by definition, on the kind of data that can be processed by 
computers. Although not formally restricted to data of this kind, a fairly material 
36 Informational environments
notion of signals that are transmitted from sender to receiver through information 
channels, as in computing and telecommunications, serves as the paradigm of 
semantic information. In fact, Floridi identifies the source disciplines of his GDI 
to lie in those fields which treat data and information as reified entities – almost 
literally: information is composed of bits and pieces (or bits and more bits for that 
matter) that are processed by an appropriate assembly of hardware and software 
so as to produce a certain output. No such reified entities can be found in theories 
of natural information, where information is a probabilistically described (but, in 
Dretske’s case, nomologically governed) relation between world affairs that does 
not add anything, ontologically, to a natural environment and that assumes its 
status as information long before and perhaps without ever becoming processable 
by some appropriate, organic or other, machinery.
With respect to the use of information for perception by organisms, the pro-
cessing view of information presumes that, in order for an organism to produce a 
structured response to some external stimulus, that stimulus, which taken by itself 
is insufficient to structure that response, has first to be encoded in perception and 
then modified through a series of processing stages, which are likely to include 
the addition of other information, coming from different sources and through dif-
ferent channels, so as to arrive at a fully image-like or propositionally structured 
representation that finally serves to inform the organisms’s response. The infor-
mation relevant to the organism is constructed in the process of perception. Marr 
was the advocate of such an explicitly computation- and AI-based view of visual 
perception and is aptly considered the founder of computational neuroscience. He 
not only was a leading opponent of the Gibsonian view in the field of the psychol-
ogy of perception but also closely worked with leading figures in classical AI such 
as Seymour Papert and Marvin Minsky. In Marr (2010), which was first published 
in 1982, he conceived of vision as the process of constructing, on different levels 
of perceptual processing, descriptions, via internal representations, of the infor-
mation derived from an input image. “Representation” and “description” are to be 
understood as technical terms in this context:
A representation is a formal system for making explicit certain entities or 
types of information, together with a specification of how the system does 
this. And I shall call the result of using a representation to describe a given 
entity a description of the entity in that representation.
(Marr 2010, 20, emphasis in original)
In Marr’s own example, the Arabic or binary numeral system would be the repre-
sentation that provides the elements and the rules by which to generate any string of 
elements (33, 42, 999, etc.) as the descriptions of the individual numbers (rather than 
the numbers themselves). Hence, a representation is not a mental image or a sen-
tence that is supposed to refer to some world affair, and that would be generated in 
the perceptual process, but a formal method of generating symbolic descriptions of 
that world affair or the intermediate staged of the perceptual process. The perceptual 
process generated by representations, so understood, and resulting in descriptions, 
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so understood, is divided into stages (summarised in Marr 2010, 36–38): from the 
representation of the two-dimensional retinal image, a “primal sketch” is generated 
as a symbolic description of properties of the input image in terms of “intensity 
changes” (edges, boundaries, virtual lines, etc.). On these grounds, surfaces, tex-
tures and their orientation are described and apparent motion is constructed. Only 
from there, a three-dimensional representation, now understood in a non-technical 
sense, is generated that describes shapes and spatial arrangements and that is cen-
tred on objects. Only at this last stage, conscious perception is accomplished. In this 
process, the physical characteristics of a “scene” are “recovered”, that is inferred, 
from the image (Marr 2010, 330f ). Those physical characteristics work as objective 
constraints upon perception – which remains otherwise underdetermined by what is 
present in the perceiving organism’s surroundings.
Perception remains underdetermined in Marr’s theory inasmuch as the retinal 
image from which the perceptual process commences is conceived of as a mere 
pattern that does not convey information, and certainly no informational content of 
the kind defined by Dretske, about the world. The pattern is made up of the distri-
bution of intensity values and their transformations across the retinal image. These 
intensity changes are caused by the geometry and the reflectance of the visible 
surfaces, the illumination of the scene and the viewpoint (Marr 2010, 41). The dis-
tribution and changes of intensity values thus caused are all the perceptual system 
has for processing. Detection of intensity changes is accomplished by algorithmic 
operators that transform the input so as to produce values for mathematical func-
tions with peaks, troughs and zero crossings as their output (Marr 2010, 54–73).
Quite self-evidently on this account, the same pattern and the same distribu-
tion of values for a set of mathematical functions may be caused by a variety of 
different things, so that the organism has to make inferences as to how the world 
stands from the analysis of these patterns in further stages of visual processing. 
This is the problem of the ambiguity of the retinal image or of inverse projection, 
as classically stated in George Berkeley’s Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision 
(1709). Berkeley’s initial observation was that distances cannot be directly per-
ceived, and that space as such cannot be seen, and that similar conditions apply 
to other perceptual qualities, such as the magnitude of objects. Identical retinal 
images can be caused by various objects, under various conditions, in various 
constellations. Where the association of experiences was the main disambiguating 
factor in Berkeley, inference of spatial properties from the retinal image serves 
that purpose in Marr (as in the “geometrical” theories of visual perception by 
Descartes and Malebranche to which Berkeley’s was intended as an alternative). 
If, however, such inference is insufficient for disambiguation, and thus if the frog 
has no means of telling apart the intensity changes for insects and lead pellets 
moving across his visual field, there is not much that Marr’s theory could do about 
this unfortunately ambiguous state of affairs. Issues of this kind would have to be 
relayed to ecological or other biological theories that, very much independently 
from a theory of perception, account for how frog’s environments are shaped and 
how changes in environmental conditions will affect the frog’s survival and repro-
ductive success.
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Visual processing is one contributing factor to an organism’s successful behav-
iour, but, taken by itself, it only allows for inferences as to how the world stands, 
which may or may not be borne out by how the world actually stands. These 
inferences are consolidated for the perceiving organism by the repeated success of 
his behaviours towards what is perceived over the course of repeated perceptual 
instances. They are consolidated for the external observer by matching different 
perceptual instances against each other and against the physical knowledge at 
hand. To some extent, this picture resembles W.V.O. Quine’s image of “how the 
human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data” 
on the one hand (1969a, 83), and of “total science” as “a field of force whose 
boundary conditions are experience” on the other (1961, 42).
In order to get this “cognitivist” view of visual perception as information pro-
cessing to work as proposed by Marr, and in order to counter the underdetermina-
tion problem, information has to be reified, so as to keep a mark of identity for 
what is being processed throughout all stages involved while, at the same time, 
keeping it attached to the original stimulus and the outgoing response. Marr does 
not present an explicit concept of information, but only on a reading of informa-
tion as entities that can be subject to a well-defined sequence of formal operations, 
traceable from input to output, the complex array of symbols and their transforma-
tions involved in perception will be properly grounded. And only to the extent that 
there is a parallel between representational and computational processes, in terms 
both of the nature of information and of the methods of processing involved, and 
in the same sense as computation is cognition to Pylyshyn (1980), the perceptual 
processing in Marr’s theory has a claim for an empirical grounding (see the sche-
matic representation of the parallel in Marr 2010, 332).
Where information is reified in Marr’s account, its receivers, in certain 
respects, are not. Information processing, Marr maintains, must be understood 
on three clearly distinct levels: first, the goal of the computational process has 
to be established; second, the algorithms and the representations for input and 
output need to be determined; and, third, the physical realisation of representa-
tion and algorithms has to be identified. Although they will provide an under-
standing of some information-processing task only in conjunction, these levels 
are relatively independent of each other (Marr 2010, 24–27). Accordingly, and 
in alignment with the computational paradigm, the formal, algorithmic structure 
of the subject matter can be analysed in abstraction from its concrete physical 
realisation, and may be realised in a variety of physical arrangements. Hence, 
one could not only provide machine models and computer simulations of per-
ceptual processes but also construct a “general purpose vision machine” (Marr 
2010, 331). The concrete physical realisation of a perceptual system, being part 
of an organism interacting with his environment, is relevant to be sure, but 
remains underdetermined by the computational theory proper, and is described 
in abstract formal terms. Together with the presumed parallelism between per-
ceptual and computational processes, it is this assumption that bears witness to 
the alignment of Marr’s theory with AI and placed it at the origins of computa-
tional neuroscience.
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Information specifies affordances: the ecological view
Animals and humans communicate with cries, gestures, speech, pictures, writing, 
and television, but we cannot hope to understand perception in terms of these 
channels; it is quite the other way round.
(Gibson 1979, 242)
If Marr concludes from the observation that “vision is the process of discover-
ing from images what is present in the world” that vision is, “first and foremost, 
an information-processing task” (Marr 2010, 3), and hence a task that involves 
various levels of symbol manipulation and inference in the very process of dis-
covering what is present in the world, we find very different conclusions being 
drawn from the same basic observation, and from one seemingly shared premise, 
in Gibson (1979): that an inquiry into visual perception will have to concern the 
uptake of information and the channels through which it arrives at the visual sys-
tem. However, where Marr focuses on the complexities of processing that infor-
mation as the key to his analysis, Gibson quite flatly denies that perception is a 
matter of information processing in the first place. Instead, he maintains, one will 
understand vision only if and only when starting from the relation of the perceiv-
ing organism to his environment and the information provided by that environ-
ment. Informational relations are ubiquitous and objective, and can be directly 
acted upon without stages of processing and inference intervening: “Information 
as here conceived is not transmitted or conveyed, does not consist of signals and 
messages, and does not entail a sender and a receiver” (Gibson 1979, 57).
Even though Gibson provides only a rudimentary positive definition of his con-
cept of information when maintaining that it “refers to specification of the observ-
er’s environment, not to specification of the observer’s receptors or sense organs” 
(Gibson 1979, 242), it is obvious enough that no concept of information could 
be further removed from the mathematical theory of information, and from its 
presumption that intentional agents are present at the source and receiving sides 
of information, and that they are in charge of the meaning of whatever is commu-
nicated.1 If information is not symbolic in the first place, and if it is not processed 
in perception (whatever else is done with it in the process of perception), and if it 
is an objective affair that is present in the environment even in absence of sender 
or receiver, it will not be affected by issues of its proper grounding. Natural infor-
mation is grounded as such, in the very environments as they are inhabited by 
organisms, and it can thus become the root of all perception and, by implication, 
all cognition and empirical knowledge.
It is unsurprising that Gibson’s account of perception, unlike Marr’s, did not exert 
much influence on cognitive science, let alone computational neuroscience, while 
having laid the foundation to an entire school of ecological, non-computational 
psychology of perception. Gibson’s approach has also become a source of inspira-
tion for naturalistic philosophers such as Dretske and Millikan, and it has exerted a 
strong, though mediated, influence on many domains of designing artefacts, from 
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architecture to computer interfaces.2 This divergence of influences did not come by 
coincidence, as Marr had while Gibson had not much to say about processes on the 
neuronal level of perception, whereas Gibson had while Marr had not much to say 
about the guidance of action by perception in an environment. The illustrations to 
each author’s main work will provide a hint of the fundamental difference at issue 
here: the figures in Marr (2010) are, for the most part, patterns that are supposed to 
represent retinal images and the stages of their processing, circuit diagrams of the 
computational architecture of perception and function graphs of the algorithms that 
govern visual processing, whereas Gibson (1979) provides the reader with a num-
ber of semi-abstract, schematic visualisations of how ambient energies impinge 
on organisms placed in, and perceptually directed towards, an environment with 
certain properties.
Perception, according to Gibson’s view, does not amount to an image-like rep-
resentation of an outer physical world. One should not take experimental settings 
as the paradigm of perception, where the subject’s visual apparatus is exposed to 
momentary stimuli detached from environmental settings (“snapshot” or “aper-
ture vision”, Gibson 1979, 1). Nor do pictures or other mediated representations 
of world affairs provide a suitable paradigm of perception, as the information 
they provide is confined to a few aspects of their subject matter, allowing the 
viewer to capture only a limited subset of the information available in the envi-
ronment (Gibson 1979, Chapter 15). When moving in relation to a picture, one 
will discover the difference to a real scene with ease. It is the dynamics of spatial 
and somatic relations between perceiving organism and object that has to be sys-
tematically accounted for. This is a distinction that Marr could not have made in 
a principled way. An identical retinal image caused by a natural scene and a picto-
rial representation would be treated in identical fashion by the perceptual system. 
Only the context of that representation could account for the difference, but that 
context is not part of Marr’s inquiry.
The idea that visual perception begins with the projection of an image onto 
the retina, Gibson holds, will be misguiding to begin with. Animals with com-
pound eyes, that is animals whose eyes neither have a lens nor a retina but are 
composed of an array of closely packed light-sensitive tubes, can produce reason-
ably accurate visually guided behaviour without even the possibility of deriving 
their visual perceptions from retinal images, or equivalents thereof (Gibson 1979, 
61f ). The concept of a retinal image misguides us into believing, first, that we 
not only process such images but also actually see them, or that some instance 
in our brain could see them, and make inferences – which Gibson derides as 
the “ ‘little man in the brain’ theory of the retinal image” (Gibson 1979, 60). 
We might stop and reflect upon our perceptions by wondering what that red blot 
over here may be, or what shade of red it displays. Arguably, most philosophers 
think of perception in this fashion, but part of Gibson’s mission is to demonstrate 
that this is not how perception works. Second, and more subtly, the notion of the 
retinal image suggests that we perceive stimuli, and that perception is a response 
to those stimuli in which we derive information from them. Information would 
come into play, or even would be generated, only here, in the stages of perceptual 
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processing. However, there are perfectly conceivable situations in which there 
is an abundance of stimuli that does not convey any information, such as in a 
brightly lit room filled with dense fog (Gibson 1979, 52–55; see the discussion in 
Chemero 2003b) – or, to use a more commonplace example, occurrences of so-
called whiteout conditions, which can be dangerous to pilots, motorists or moun-
taineers precisely for the combination of a strong stimulus with the utter lack of 
visual information. Stimulus and information are in this sense detached, whereas 
stimulus and perception are not.
First and foremost, perception, on the Gibsonian view, is to be considered 
an activity that is intrinsically tied to other activities of an organism, and that 
depends on his general constitution and abilities – his physiology, his body scale, 
the behaviours he is capable and the resources he is in need of – on the one hand, 
and on his current position and movements within his environment on the other. 
Perception consists in the “pickup” of information from the “ambient energies” 
surrounding the organism. In relation to his position and movements, these ener-
gies form the “optic array” for perception (Gibson 1979, Chapter 5). To accom-
plish the task of information pickup, visual and non-visual information about the 
position, orientation and movement of the perceiving organism is included in the 
act of perception (Gibson 1979, 115–120).
In this fashion, information is actively retrieved from the environment, so as 
to detect patterns of persistence and change therein and track the “invariants” 
of some object. Invariants are to be understood in analogy to the mathematical 
meaning of the term (Gibson 1971, 30; 1973), as those properties of an object 
which remain unchanged when a set of rule-governed transformations is applied 
to it. For example the length ratios of a geometric figure remain unchanged when 
it is scaled up and down proportionally. These ratios, but not the absolute measure 
of the figure’s elements, are the object’s invariants. In the context of perception, 
the transformations will encompass all naturally occurring changes in the condi-
tions of perception, and the invariants will be what remains unchanged, as viewed 
in relation to the transformations of these conditions. In Gibson (Gibson 1979, 
45), we find a non-comprehensive list of candidate invariants, which comprises 
“alignment or straightness [. . .] as against bentness or curvature; perpendicularity 
or rectangularity; parallelity as against convergence; intersections; closures and 
symmetries”. Citing Gibson’s own example (1979, 13), a solid substance is rather 
persistent in shape, so shape is an invariant in the perception of all solid objects, 
but not in the perception of any less-than-solid object, for which density or vol-
ume are likely to count as invariants.
The acts of retrieving information from the environment and hence tracking the 
invariants of some object or event do not involve the “replication” or “copying” 
of that object or event in the ambient light, as though some replica of the object 
were picked up in perception (Gibson 1979, 102f ). The tracking of invariants is 
much less concerned with detecting similarities between an image and an object 
than with guiding the perceiving organism’s activities towards that object. That 
guidance has to be accomplished throughout a multitude of transformations of 
conditions within the environment.
42 Informational environments
We may find Gibson barking up a largely uninhabited tree of naïve metaphys-
ics when he thus insinuates that other psychologists and philosophers of percep-
tion actually believe in a “copy” theory of perception, but his underlying point 
is quite remarkable: that perception does not involve representation. It neither 
builds on image-like representations, nor does it rely on generating an internal 
model that would represent the relevant variables that determine the appearance of 
an object, or on classifying objects or on otherwise abstracting from their concrete 
properties – all the things the computational approach to visual perception cannot 
do without.
Above all, the organism’s acts of perception imply the direct uptake of infor-
mation on what can be done with a perceived object. Throughout all instances of 
being perceived, objects of all kinds, including other organisms, to use Gibson’s 
most used (and often misused) concept, provide affordances to the perceiving 
organism. An affordance is what some object offers to be done with it, in the par-
ticular way in which it is related to the perceiving organism at a given time, under 
a given set of conditions. Accordingly, an object’s affordance is always described 
in terms of possible actions of, or interactions with, the perceiving organism, such 
as standing, sitting, climbing up, jumping over, falling off. For example a fruit 
may afford activities such as being eaten, burrowing, being picked and used as a 
missile or poisoning – or simply nothing at all. Affordances will vary among dif-
ferent animals for one and the same object or even the same organism on different 
occasions. The activities an object affords to an organism constitute its specific 
“values” or “meanings”, which can be directly perceived by the organism (Gibson 
1979, 127).
It would be unfortunate though to simply equate affordances with values and 
meanings. These are normatively highly charged terms that are likely to result in 
philosophical entanglements – which to avoid was one of the purposes behind 
the introduction of the concept of affordances (see Gibson 1966, 285). However, 
there are at least two related points at which that concept appears so vaguely 
circumscribed in Gibson’s famous definition (1979, 127, 129) as to invite such 
entanglements: there, he says that “affordances of the environment are what it 
offers the animal” (emphasis in original), but he also says that an affordance is 
“neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like” 
and that it is “equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour”. So, first, 
are affordances properties of objects, or are they better defined in terms of rela-
tions and situations? On an ecological view, objects and their properties might, 
and should, not be considered in detachment from the environments in which 
they are encountered, so Gibson’s reference to objects and their properties should 
be read in the light of this basic commitment. Second, are affordances entirely 
provided by the environment, or are they (partly) subjectively defined? If they are 
something that can be detected by an organism, they are supposed to be contained 
in the environment, but what is actually afforded in the act of perception can be 
determined only by reference to the constitution and abilities of the perceiver. 
Although the second apparent vagueness can be demonstrated to have a system-
atic purpose behind it, the first might be more difficult to parse.
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Gibson’s ambiguous characterisation of affordances as properties and as facts 
might seem a minor issue, but the implications are significant if facts are taken 
to be composed of things, properties and their relations. Context indicates that a 
reading of affordances as relationally defined facts rather than properties will be 
the most appropriate one. If affordances, their meanings and values were plainly 
and entirely properties of the environment and the objects therein, we would not 
only have to accept that such normative qualities were constituents of the envi-
ronment, but also we would end up in a world cluttered with an indefinite array 
of such qualities that would have to be embodied or embedded in the objects and 
environments in which they are encountered, readily pre-packaged for all possible 
perceivers and detectable under all natural conditions of perception. These quali-
ties might even contradict each other in certain cases, for certain perceivers, and 
still would have to be granted the same ontological status.
If one, disheartened by this prospect, does not want to settle for the opposite 
view that all normative qualities of some perceived object, and all variance therein, 
are located inside the organism proper and hence a subjective affair, an alternative 
is to locate values, their specificity to the perceiver and their variance between 
perceivers in the relations between organism and environment. Affordances, as 
Gibson insists, are always related to activities, and are preferably described as 
capacities or abilities of the object with respect to the perceiving organism’s con-
stitution and abilities. The chair has the capacity of getting me seated, and the 
cliff has the ability to make me fall off. Even if we render these facts as seeming 
properties of fall-off-ability or sit-on-ability, these can be defined only in relation 
to the animal – with rather different outcomes for ants and primates. These rela-
tions will be best captured by a more complex, fact-like description, such as “the 
chair is sit-on-able for humans” or “the cliff is fall-off-able for large mammals”.
Hence, it is a relational interpretation of affordances that appears best to make 
sense of that other, purposeful vagueness in Gibson’s characterisation of affor-
dances as being objective and subjective at once. This relational, bi-directional 
interpretation can be further substantiated by an analysis of the nature of the infor-
mation involved in affordances as being equally relational and bi-directional. This 
is what Gibson himself suggests when says that both affordances and information 
point “two ways, to the environment and to the observer” (1979, 141).
On this reconstruction of Gibson’s notion of affordances, it is both realist and 
anti-dualist in philosophical spirit. This reconstruction should carry over to an 
account of ecological information for perception. There is one seeming ambigu-
ity in Gibson’s underdefined account of information that should be taken to be 
systematic.3 On the one hand, “information [is present] in ambient light to specify 
affordances” (Gibson 1979, 143), and as such is present and specific even if and 
when an affordance is not perceived. On the other hand, information for perception 
is always composed both of relations within the environment and of the perceiv-
ing organism’s relations to his environment. Hence, an important part of informa-
tion for perception is dependent on the perceiving organism, and all information 
for perception is relational in kind. Within ecological psychology, there has been a 
variety of diverging interpretations of the relation between Gibsonian affordances 
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and information. Affordances are viewed as properties by some (Heft 2001; Reed 
1988; Turvey 1992), as relationally defined by others (Chemero 2003a; 2003b); 
information is considered properly external to the organism by few (Reed 1988), 
and as organism involving by most others (Chemero 2003b; Costall 2004; Heft 
2001; Turvey 1992; 2013; van Dijk et al. 2015).
In particular, Michael Turvey refers to affordances as dispositional properties 
of objects that are actualised under a concrete set of conditions, whereas Chemero 
(2003a) develops a relational theory of affordances that is complemented by 
an equally relational account of information for perception (Chemero 2003b). 
Whereas relations exist between entities with certain properties, this does not 
entail that these relations are properties themselves. For example John is taller 
than Sally. Quite obviously, “being taller than” is not an absolute measure, nor 
is there a complex property of taller-than-ness, let alone taller-than-Sally-ness 
possessed by John (Chemero 2003a, 187). If we conceive of information as infor-
mational relations from the start, we do not incur the ontological challenge of 
justifying such complex properties. If perception of an affordance is based on 
relations between the ambient energies and structures in the environment, includ-
ing the perceiving organism himself (Chemero 2003b, 580f ), an affordance is, in 
Chemero’s wording, a relational “feature” of entire “situations” of an organism 
moving in and through a certain environment. The information picked up in per-
ception does include relations between organism and environment. It specifies 
the environment and the self, and hence can be both an objective commodity and 
relationally defined.
Under this interpretation at least, Gibsonian information for perception assumes 
an appearance quite similar to Dretske’s notion of information. Although he does 
not clearly define it as such (and although Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 166–167 
claim otherwise), Gibson appears to employ a view of information that is simi-
larly realist and relational when he discusses the perceiving organism’s tracking 
of the invariants of some object in the environment and the activity of extracting 
information from the ambient optic array. If that information is supposed to remain 
identical throughout the various instances and situations of perception, it has to 
be regular in a fashion that is independent of subjective conditions – even though 
the perceiving organism’s position, constitution and abilities will enter into the 
set of perceivable relations. As these relations remain stable and unequivocal in 
an otherwise changeable environment, he can relate to them in various ways over 
time, under variant conditions. Although organism-related variables enter into a 
given set of informational relation that he uses, the functional status of his sensory 
organs or his degree of attentiveness in a given perceptual situation will not. Only 
if the informational relations and their stability can be taken for granted will there 
be affordances that are organism specific.
An object affords what it affords because some of its properties remain stable 
and reliably detectable in the ambient optic array for the perceiving organism. 
They are reliably detectable precisely if there are, first, conditions for perception 
which are such that any transformation of the object or its position has strict and 
unequivocal correlates in its placement in the ambient optic array. Second, the 
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perceiving organism is able to match his position, movements and aims against 
the relevant environmental invariants over time, thereby using proprioceptual 
information. Both sets of relations in conjunction are the informational relations 
that specify, in Gibson’s phrasing, the environment for the organism. Third, the 
organism must be in a condition suitable to actually picking up that informa-
tion. Precisely if and when both the environment- and the organism-bound condi-
tions are fulfilled, there will be a direct perception of affordances: the perceiving 
organism is enabled to immediately rely on the relation between himself and what 
remains invariant, what varies regularly and what varies arbitrarily in an object 
over the course of his perceptual activities.
For thus including organism-related variables, information in the ecological 
sense is “intrinsic” to a perceptual situation, as distinguished from “extrinsic” 
information that allows for absolute, perceiver-independent measurements of 
physical and physiological variables by an external observer. Intrinsic, affordance- 
related information still allows for measurement, although on a different basis 
(see Gibson 1979, 128). The paradigm of measurement-oriented approaches in 
post-Gibsonian ecological psychology are the measurements of stair-climbing 
affordances for persons of different leg lengths in William J. Warren’s study 
(1984, where the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is introduced; see also Boumans 
2013). Although there is considerable variance in the relation between riser 
heights and leg length for short and tall persons, the results of the experiments in 
this study suggest that there are ratios for stair-climbing affordances that remain 
constant across the study population. These ratios can be expressed in an intrinsic 
or body-scaled metric that matches the dimensions of the subjects’ bodies and the 
dimensions of the object in question – in this case, the riser height of the stairs. 
Such ratios can be found both for perceptual category boundaries – between stairs 
that are perceived as still being climbable and stairs that are already perceived as 
being unclimbable – and for optimal heights in terms of effort to be invested into 
climbing. The ratios are such that short people will perceive the same affordance 
for relatively low risers that will be perceived by tall people for proportionally 
higher risers. The ratios, however, do not express subjective factors, in that they 
remain constant across the population, with identical absolute measures for peo-
ple of the same size, and in that perceived optimal heights quite closely match the 
actual energetic optima in physiologically based trials. Hence, Warren concludes, 
environmental objects are perceived by an organism in relation to his action capa-
bilities, where that relation is rather stable and unequivocal.
On this background, affordances can be relationally defined, in a two-step fash-
ion that builds upon informational relations and the perceiving organisms’ abili-
ties to track, and act upon, these relations – which will include his own specific 
relations to his environment. This relational view allows for a fairly clear set of 
distinctions to be made with respect to situations in which an affordance, as it is 
perceived by an organism, and information for perception do not appear to match: 
there is no information if the relations between signalling and signalled world 
affairs are not unequivocal, even if and when an organism appears to track such a 
relation, so there is no affordance to be perceived either. Conversely, if there is a 
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malfunction in an organism’s perceptual system, information will still be present 
in the environment, as there will be nomologically governed relations between 
incoming light, refraction and reflection on surfaces and so forth, but these rela-
tions could not, or not properly, be detected by the perceiving organism for rea-
sons internal to him. Hence, the third of the previous requirements, namely that 
of being in a condition suitable to picking up information, will be violated. This 
condition will be violated in a different manner if modifications or untypical con-
ditions in the environment obtain, to the effect that the relations involved are not 
within the range of what is detectable even for a properly functioning perceptual 
system despite being nomological in kind.
Perceiving organisms, being finite creatures with finite resources acting within 
concrete ecological situations, are in practice not in a position to track all those 
specifying relations. Gibson himself admits that information may be inadequate, 
impoverished or masked in a given perceptual situation, so that conditions for 
perception fall out of the range of variance that an organism is accustomed to 
(Gibson 1966, Chapter XIV). Such will be the case when unusual lighting condi-
tions obtain or when distorting mirrors or similar devices are placed in the envi-
ronment. These qualifications, however, apply to what the perceiving organism 
is in a position to pick up from his environment rather than to the specificity of 
information as such.
In developing this account of “misrepresentation”, Dretske (1986) seeks to 
accommodate for the possibility that an organism might get things wrong despite 
informational relations being in proper shape. Under normal conditions, he 
receives information on some world affair through several independent channels, 
and will be able to evaluate some signal or channel condition and remedy against 
what a faulty, information-less signal might seem to convey. Although he care-
fully avoids information-theoretical talk of “channels”, Gibson apparently holds a 
similar view when he refers to information as being redundantly available in the 
environment, allowing for “multiple specification” (as paraphrased by Runeson 
1988, 296f ). Still, Gibson can be seen struggling with the concept of misper-
ception (see Gibson 1979, 243f ). He accepts that misinformation could still be 
information, while he insists that one will need separate theories of successful 
and unsuccessful perception respectively (Gibson 1966, 287f ), so the parallel 
to Dretske’s (1986) view that a theory of information cannot be symmetrically 
applied to cases of misinformation is only partial. Hence, the question arises of 
how to account for illusion and misperception if information is an objective com-
modity and perception is the activity of tracking the relations that make up that 
commodity.
Perceptual illusions vs. misperception: the empirical strategy
On some accounts, the possibility of misperception and illusion appears to be a 
hard, and possibly insurmountable, problem for an ecological theory of percep-
tion (see, first and foremost, Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 153–155). A short answer 
to this apparent problem is offered in a reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn from the 
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camp of ecological psychology. It says that the Gibsonian conception of informa-
tion “is roughly the claim that real possibilities are specified by current states of 
affairs” (Turvey et al. 1981, 293). On this view (which is largely shared here), the 
requisite information is present only if the affordance or “possibility” in question 
is real, and hence is warranted by current states of affairs. Sometimes, the perceiv-
ing organism will have to find out the hard way whether a possibility is real, and 
whether the information he seemed to pick up is there at all. Quite often, how-
ever, he has means of reliably making that distinction in the course of perceptual 
activity.
There is a variety of ways of being mistaken about some world affair, which are 
only partly acknowledged by Gibson. In his Ecological Approach, he only briefly 
and tangentially refers to misperception and perceptual illusions, and he does so 
primarily in the context of artfully created illusions. His prime examples are of 
two kinds:
(pi 1)  Pictures that are purposefully made to create the appearance of objects 
that are not present in the environment.
(Gibson 1979, 281–283)
It is quite remarkable to hence find pictures subsumed under illusions, but this 
claim is consistent with Gibson’s theory, and its normative connotations are not 
negative by default. A picture of some concrete object will contain some of the 
information that would be necessary for the object in question to provide the req-
uisite affordance in its proper environment to its perceiver, yet without actually 
providing that affordance – for example sitting-on and sitting-at for the picture 
of a chair and a table. In such cases, we normally recognise both that would-be 
affordance and the pictorial nature of what is presented to us, and hence are not 
misguided. We are able to do so primarily because we actively explore what we 
perceive, by moving our eyes and heads in relation to an object. Only if and when 
we did not hence “test for the reality” of what we perceive, there could be such a 
thing as a perfect picture that tricked us into mistaking it for the scene that is being 
pictured (Gibson 1970, 426):4
(pi 2)  Devices that are purposefully placed in the environment so as to create 
discontinuities in perception.
Drawing on the experimental work of his wife, Eleanor J. Gibson (Gibson 
and Walk 1960), Gibson cites as the paradigm of such artfully created illu-
sions planes of solid glass that extend over visual cliffs and thus provide sup-
port while maintaining the visually based affordance of falling off the cliff 
(Gibson 1979, 142f ). Here, conditions are modified in such a way as to create 
a mismatch between current states of affairs and an affordance or “possibility”, 
which thus becomes “unreal”. Misguiding the subject’s perception is one cen-
tral aim of the experiment, so the purpose of the artefact is clearly at variance 
with (pi 1).
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These two cases, being quite distinct affairs themselves, are rather different, but 
not clearly distinguished by Gibson, from two other kinds of cases:
(pi 3)  Naturally occurring perceptual illusions, such as illusions of length, col-
our or brightness.
(pi 4)  Instances of misperceiving an object for another object that would have 
afforded different activities to the perceiver.
The primary issue here is not the naturalness vs. artificiality of the illusions and 
misperceptions in question – although, quite obviously, (pi 1 and pi 2) are based 
on artefacts, whereas illusions of kind (pi 3) occur naturally (while typically being 
investigated in laboratory settings), and misperceptions of kind (pi 4) might do so 
as well. More fundamental than this distinction, and not fully coextensive with 
it, is the one between perceptual illusions and misperception and their normative 
status.
In distinguishing illusion from misperception, I am following a fairly straight-
forward and presumably commonsensical distinction discussed by David Arm-
strong (1960, 4) in his interpretation of George Berkeley’s theory of vision in 
Berkeley (1709): if I see something as red, round and having all the visual quali-
ties of a tomato, and it turns out not to be a tomato but a plastic replica, I am likely 
to have misperceived it, for having mistaken it for another thing on the grounds 
of some similarity in perceivable surface properties. Still, I have not fallen for a 
visual illusion – that is unless I was mistaken about the replica’s redness, round-
ness and so forth to begin with. If, in turn, conditions in the environment or my 
sense organs are such that I see something as square, purple and perhaps lacking 
other visual qualities of a tomato, and it turns out to be a very normally shaped and 
coloured fruit of that kind, I have been subject to visual illusion or hallucination 
respectively, in not getting the surface properties of the object right.
In either case, I might be at a disadvantage, and it seems natural to assume 
that this is the standard, the statistically normal result of instances of mispercep-
tion, hallucination and illusion. If, on Gibson’s theory, information for perception 
is supposed to specify an environment for a perceiving organism, it seems self-
suggesting to characterise any divergence between what is perceived and how the 
environment stands as a failure, and to look either for deficiencies and dysfunc-
tions in the organism’s perceptual system or for inconducive or even treacher-
ous conditions in the environment as the causes of that failure. And this is what 
Gibson does in his earlier The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), 
and in his discussion of the difference between natural perception and hallucina-
tion (1970).
However, not every divergence between instances of perception and how the 
world stands needs to be a failure. The case is clear for hallucination but not for 
perceptual illusions. Perceptual illusions do not automatically result in misper-
ception, and they may not be maladaptive per se – as Gibson’s discussion of pic-
tures as illusions that nonetheless preserve some of the information pertaining to 
their subject matter should have demonstrated. In naturally occurring perceptual 
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illusions, the normative qualities of my perceptual relation are determined by the 
actual match or mismatch between the information that is present and the suc-
cessful realisation of my abilities to act upon conditions in my environment, not 
the illusionary appearances. Getting all the physical properties of an object right 
might not be all that important in this respect (properties that Gibson did not care 
much about either). This is the basic idea brought forward by one relatively recent 
theory in cognitive psychology that has come to be known as the “Empirical Strat-
egy” or, less memorably but more descriptively, the “wholly empirical approach 
to perception” (Purves et al. 2001; Purves et al. 2011).5
In combining an environment-directed outlook with a distinctive set of compu-
tational and statistical methods, the Empirical Strategy seeks to explain the pecu-
liarities of perception by reference to a history of interactions between organisms 
and conditions in their environments. The Empirical Strategy is termed “empiri-
cal” precisely for rooting the character of perceptions in past experience of the 
individual or the species. How something is perceived, out of a spectrum of vari-
ant possibilities, is determined by how it has been acted upon – and not merely 
on how it has been perceived – in the past. Past success in doing something in 
response to a perception will act as a necessary condition in determining how the 
object or scene in question is being perceived at present.
The authors commence from the “inverse optics problem”, also known as the 
problem of the ambiguity of the retinal image, as it was paradigmatically for-
mulated in Berkeley’s Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) and briefly 
discussed earlier in this chapter. In view of this problem of perceptual ambiguity, 
Berkeley’s proposal was to ground the ability to perceive distances and magni-
tudes of objects and, in fact, any spatial arrangement, in the perceiving subject’s 
experience. Only from experiencing certain objects in certain constellations, one 
learns to associate prima facie identical visual cues with different perceptual situ-
ations, and hence to reliably identify the correct distance, magnitude, and so forth 
of objects.
Purves and his colleagues follow Berkeley’s lead when identifying the inverse 
optics problem as the issue “that light stimuli cannot specify the objects and 
conditions in the world that caused them” (Purves et al. 2011, 15588), and, like 
Berkeley, they delegate the task of specification to the perceiving subject’s expe-
rience. Their solution to this problem, however, is not as exclusively based on 
subjective experience as is Berkeley’s, and it certainly does not follow Berkeley’s 
idealism. Instead, they adopt a more externalist and supra-individual stance. Con-
versely, with Gibsonian ecological psychology, the Empirical Strategists share 
an emphasis on the relation between perception and environmentally embedded 
behaviour and a markedly realist outlook.
The core of the Empirical Strategists’ argument can be parsed into three steps, 
and it is this: “Proximal stimuli trigger patterns of neuronal activity that have been 
shaped solely by the past consequences of visually guided behaviour” (Purves 
et al. 2001, 285). These consequences, in turn, are evaluated purely in terms of 
adaptive success rather than any correspondence with the measurable physical 
properties of the perceived objects. Hence, the measurable physical properties 
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of some object provide only a set of boundary conditions that underdetermine 
the possible ways of perception. At any rate, they are not represented in vision 
(Purves et al. 2011, 15592).
In this circumscribed sense, the Empirical Strategists share Gibson’s view that 
perception is not a process of representing the physical properties of some object 
or scene but an interaction with some concrete object in its concrete context under 
concrete conditions of perception. What one can do with or about that object in a 
given situation or, in Gibsonian terms, what that object affords to the organism is 
what fixes the way in which it is perceived.
As conceived under the Empirical Strategy, the relation between perceptual 
qualities and their target appears at once rather simple and fairly complex and 
abstract: some perceptual token will be reproduced if it is closely associated with 
successful behaviours towards its source or towards some correlate of that source. 
This condition is sufficient for a very specific sort of empirical adequacy. This 
empirical adequacy is very specific because it does not build upon any direct rela-
tion – and perhaps not even a proper covariance – between a perceptual quality 
and the physical properties of the perceived object. Divergence between percep-
tual qualities and the physical conditions at the source does not amount to misper-
ception: “Since the measured properties of objects are not perceived, they cannot 
be misperceived” (Purves et al. 2001, 296).
Instead, what is decisive for getting things right in perception are the frequency 
distributions of different retinal patterns, which are mapped not onto variance in 
physical variables but onto variance in behaviours that differentially respond to 
certain world affairs, in accordance with the probability distributions of the occur-
rence of these affairs (Purves et al. 2011, 15594). For example the observable 
mismatch between differences in lightness or brightness of an object as perceptual 
qualities on the one hand and measured illumination and luminance of the physi-
cal objects on the other is attributed to the relation between two factors:
( f 1)  Frequency distributions can be determined for variant luminance values of 
some object as they obtain for the contexts of the various natural scenes in 
which it, individually or as a member of a type, appears. Objects of some 
kind will be more often encountered under certain lighting conditions than 
under others.
( f 2)  Frequency distributions are assumed for the rates of success of behaviours 
of the perceiving organism or his ancestors towards that kind of object 
under variant conditions. These frequency distributions will be affected 
by processes of selection, on phylogenetic or ontogenetic levels, of variant 
behaviours.
These two types of frequency distributions can be mapped onto each other, so 
as to see how reliable behavioural success with respect to the object in ques-
tion will be under the predominant conditions of appearance in the perceiving 
organism’s environment, and what the cost of failure under less frequent condi-
tions will be. The general strategy is to match perceived qualities of some object 
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against databases of frequencies of occurrence of retinal images corresponding to 
commonly occurring natural scenes containing that kind of object.
In the present example, equally luminous objects or patterns are perceived as 
darker when placed in a brightly illuminated context and lighter when placed 
in a darker context because the differential rates of occurrence of the retinal 
projections caused by the same objects under lighter vs. darker conditions are 
matched by adaptive behaviours towards those same objects under the respec-
tive conditions (Purves et al. 2011, 15589). At first, the probability distributions 
of luminance values of objects under lighter vs. darker conditions and the per-
ceived brightness will seem to be skewed towards greater perceived brightness 
than measurement of luminance would suggest for those retinal patterns which 
occur most often, namely under poor lighting conditions. However, perception is 
not skewed in terms of the behaviours that respond to the world affairs as they are 
encountered under these conditions. There will be some use to perceiving objects 
as exceedingly bright under poor lighting conditions. The use of this seeming illu-
sion should be expected to lie in more reliable or efficient recognition of the kind 
of object in question when lighting conditions are poor, and hence in more reliable 
responses to the presence or behaviour of that object. Similar conditions apply to 
other seeming illusions, such as illusions of length or colour.
Alternatively (a possibility not discussed by the Empirical Strategists), there 
might be cases where a seeming illusion is a side-effect without adaptive func-
tions of its own (or, in the terms of Gould and Lewontin 1979, a “spandrel”) 
of perceptual processes whose mechanisms of production serve some adaptive 
purpose. Such side effects would then either be adaptively neutral or only mildly 
detrimental – so mildly in fact that they are more than outbalanced by the benefits 
gained from the successful performance of the adaptive functions of the mecha-
nisms that happen to generate them. Under these latter conditions, getting the 
luminance values wrong would be the artefact of the operations of mechanisms 
of perception whose success is more relevant to the organism in positive terms 
than the bias in perception of luminance is in negative terms. But even then, there 
would have to be some kind of correlation between the frequency distributions, 
across the perceptual situations the organism encounters, of the physical variable 
under observation ( f 1) and the presence of some other factor that is relevant to the 
rates of success ( f 2) of those behaviours guided by that other mechanism. Other-
wise, no statistical relation between f 1 and f 2 could be identified to begin with.
Either way, the normative implications of getting the luminance values or other 
physical variables wrong are either inverted or at least much relativised. The 
length, shape, colour and so forth of some object may be invariably misrendered 
in perception, hence misperceived, while being appropriately treated on the level 
of behaviours and their adaptive functions. If the effects of the behaviours towards 
the object in question are conducive to the perceiving organism’s welfare, in the 
light of his overall constitution and abilities, and if this conduciveness is rooted in 
a history of phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection of whatever ways of perceptual 
rendering of the respective properties may come to pass, that perceptual rendering 
will be vindicated. Systematically misperceiving the physical properties of some 
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object, in terms of measurable variables, might be essential to correctly perceiving 
the object in terms of what can and should be done with it. Hence, the apparent 
mismatch between experimentally determined perceptual qualities and measured 
physical variables is an epiphenomenon of the operations of properly functioning 
mechanisms and may be discounted as such.
Ecological psychologists after Gibson have offered partly similar accounts of 
the relation between illusion and misperception. With reference to the Ames’s 
distorted room illusion, Sverker Runeson (1988) argues that prima facie illusions 
are easily corrected for in the course of perceptual activity, and that, in order 
to persist, illusions typically have to be meticulously created and maintained – 
which usually does not occur under natural circumstances. Perceptual ambigu-
ity in terms of equivalent configurations in the optic array may be geometrically 
possible, but these configurations are either physically impossible or encountered 
only in manipulated environments. Either way, Runeson argues, these equivalent 
configurations would be informationally irrelevant. Moreover, any residual ambi-
guity that might get in the way of correctly perceiving affordances is likely to be 
mended in the further course of perceptual investigation, and in developing one’s 
perceptual skills.
Perceptual learning might allow for correct judgement about some state of 
affairs even when an illusion persists, argue John Kennedy and colleagues with 
respect to geometric illusions (Kennedy et al. 1992): When presented with two 
well-known size illusions (the Jastrow curves and the Sander parallelogram), 
transformations of the respective shapes that correspond to perceptual investiga-
tion of an object from different angles allowed the majority of the subjects in the 
experiments to make correct judgements about the true size ratios between the 
shapes – without the size illusion actually being dispelled. One shape still looked 
larger than the other but now was known to be of the same size. Although Ken-
nedy et al. (1992) do not make that inference, one should expect that an affor-
dance related to the objects in question would have come to be correctly perceived 
despite the persistence of the visual illusion.
An even more direct match between an ecological view and the argument of the 
Empirical Strategists is provided by Qin Zhu and Geoffrey Bingham (2011): one 
of the most robust natural perceptual illusions is the size-weight illusion, in which 
an object will be perceived as being heavier if and when it is smaller than another 
object of equal mass. That illusion, the authors seek to demonstrate in an experi-
ment, has a correlate in human subjects’ learning of perceiving throwing affor-
dances in terms of selecting objects for optimal size-weight ratios. These ratios 
are correctly chosen by proxy of a biased perceived quality. On the background of 
an evolutionary argument, it is concluded that the illusion has a function in terms 
of guiding human beings to pick objects that are optimally throw-able over long 
distances, which was a highly relevant skill in Palaeolithic hunter-gatherer socie-
ties, and which has been identified as an ability as uniquely human as language.
In light of these observations on the possible adaptive functions of mismatches 
between measured physical variables and perceptual qualities, should these mis-
matches still count as instances of misinformation? Given the relation between the 
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perception of affordances and the notion of natural information that I suggested 
was held by Gibson, there might be a good reason for believing otherwise: to the 
extent that an external observer could apply point-to-point mappings, in terms 
of a multidimensional mathematical function between, first, the variable as it is 
being registered in any perceptual situation that falls within the range of what the 
perceiving organism is adapted to, second, the variable as it can be measured by 
that external observer, third, the concrete conditions under which the ability to 
perceive that variable in a certain way is realised and, fourth, the adaptive function 
of that ability under the given type of conditions, the information that is seemingly 
misrendered is actually preserved.
Any apparent mismatch between perceived qualities and measurable variables 
detectable in perception can be resolved by accounting for the very situation in 
which perception occurs and the adaptive function of the mapping that applies 
to this type of perceptual situation. If, under certain conditions, something looks 
longer, brighter and so forth to the organism than measurement would suggest, 
these conditions and the functions which that seeming departure serves override 
correspondence with physical variables. More precisely, adding a “condition” and 
a “function” variable to the equation will keep the informational mappings intact 
and allow for an, albeit complex and indirect, correspondence to the values of the 
physical variables – if and when perception works normally.
Under a genuinely ecological perspective, and in keeping with the strategy of 
the Empirical Strategy, perceived qualities will be overridden by the informa-
tional relations on which successful activities are grounded. Genuine mispercep-
tion will occur only if, returning to Warren’s aforementioned case, the subject 
perceives a stair to be climbable when it is, in fact, not climbable, or vice versa, or 
if he mistakes an exhaustingly steep stairway for a conveniently climbable one.6 
The subject will then misperceive the respective affordance – which does not even 
need to imply that he or she is mistaken about the absolute physical measures of 
the object. Conversely, perceptual illusion will occur if the subject turns out to be 
mistaken about absolute, extrinsically measured riser heights or transformations 
of heights in the course of the experiment – which, if the experimental set-up 
matches normal conditions for perception, is unlikely to negatively affect percep-
tion of an affordance. Hence, perceptual illusion and misperception of affordances 
may coincide but are independent issues. In some cases, perceptual illusions may 
even contribute to the correct perception of an affordance.
Although the preceding discussion suggests that the Empirical Strategy in some 
respects elegantly complements the ecological view, two notable limitations to 
this approach should be mentioned here: first, almost all examples discussed by 
the authors are concerned with cases in which identical targets look different to 
the perceiver under different conditions, whereas their point of departure, the 
inverse projection problem, was identified by Berkeley as the problem that dif-
ferent targets, when placed in a certain relation to the perceiver, will look identi-
cal. Berkeleyan ambiguity does not imply that perception is at variance with the 
measurable properties but that it becomes ambiguous by one retinal image being 
in accordance with different instances of measurable properties. The Empirical 
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Strategy thus accounts for only one of two types of cases of illusion (see Purves 
et al. 2011, 15590). Second, the Empirical Strategy remains exclusively con-
cerned with isolated perceptual qualities, such as brightness or perceived angles, 
length and motion rather than more complex perceptual affairs in which seeming 
illusions are mended in the course of perceptual investigation, and in which an 
object with complex and perhaps multi-modal perceptual qualities is relevant to 
the organism in certain ways. In contrast, Gibsonian ecological psychology refers 
to the environmental context and the additional cues it provides to the organism, 
so as to correct for perceptual ambiguities of the second, the Berkeleyan kind.
Despite these limitations, the Empirical Strategy is correct in suggesting that a 
perceptual illusion, in terms of a prima facie mismatch between perceptual quality 
and measurable values for some physical variable, may serve adaptive functions. 
A certain class of perceptual illusions, one that is not clearly distinguished from 
instances of misperception by Gibson, can thus be accounted for. A necessary pre-
condition for the accomplishment of the adaptive function of a perceptual illusion 
will be that the illusion is embedded in the context of an environment that is stable 
enough to allow the organism to handle world affairs with some reliability and 
within the bounds of his constitution and abilities. Genuine misperception occurs 
only if and when either the conditions within organism or environment depart 
from what he is adapted or accustomed to or if and when the perceiving organism 
fails to grasp what can or should be done with the object in question. Perceptual 
illusions, if and when they have acquired an adaptive function, may actually both 
be a constituent of the perception of affordances and provide accurate information 
about some world affair to the perceiving organism. Under normal circumstances, 
perceptual illusions of the kinds discussed previously, for their very regularity and 
their possible adaptive function, have precious little to do with the misperception 
of affordances but, very much to the contrary, with helping the organism to get 
right about some object what he needs to get right.
Any insect replica in an experiment in frog vision that shares most or all per-
ceivable (i.e. ‘frog-perceivable’) surface properties with edible insects will be 
perceived and treated identically, however, without being nourishing to the frog. 
Such ambiguity can be resolved only if other cues as to the insect replica’s identity 
as a replica are or become available to the frog. These are situations of genuinely 
ambiguous information for perception that is prone to end in misperception – but 
misperceptions, so understood, are certainly not cases of perceptual illusion of 
any kind. Misperceptions of this kind will be difficult to assess for any theory 
of perception that does not spell out the specific conditions for perception with 
respect both to its historical and to its ecological context.
If, in turn, studies in the measurement of affordances are right in assuming that 
the information relevant to perception normally is intrinsic, the perceiving organ-
ism’s correct grasp of his relation to the environment will override any apparent 
mismatch between perceptual qualities and the absolute values for some physical 
variable that could be measured by an external observer. Misperception, then, can 
only be misperception of objects in their entirety, not of their measured properties. In 
Gibson’s terms, such misperceptions would be misperceptions of affordances – not, 
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for example, misperceptions of spatial relations or colours. After all, perception, even 
if it can be assessed in terms of measurement of physical variables by an external 
observer, does not amount to such measurement by and for the perceiving organism.
This observation will fit rather well with Gibson’s contention that we do not 
perceive such abstract relations as space – a contention that grounds his ecologi-
cal approach (Gibson 1979, 32). It is the ecological environment rather than an 
abstractly and formally described physical space that is directly and objectively 
given to the organism, and that he acts upon. He is perfectly entitled to get things 
wrong in terms of conditions in physical space as long as he gets them right in 
terms of the ecology of perception. Still, the ecological environment, despite being 
objective in nature, cannot be defined in abstraction from the organism inhabiting 
it. He contributes to the informational relations that he uses. His contributions, 
if regular in form and adaptive in function, will neither make that information a 
subjective affair, nor give rise to the misperception of affordances.
Notes
1  In a revealing passage, Marr (2010, 29) criticises his predecessor and opponent for that 
“he did not understand properly what information processing was, which led him to 
seriously underestimate the complexity of information-processing problems involved in 
vision”. If one is convinced that information is not processed in perception in the first 
place, one will hardly feel exposed to the charge of underestimating the complexity of 
that processing.
2  The mediation I am alluding to was through the work of Donald Norman (2002), who 
applied a rather liberal interpretation to some of Gibson’s core tenets.
3  There is no unequivocal definition of information in Gibson’s 1966 and 1979 books, nor 
is there one in his smaller works on information (1960; 1971).
4  Several years prior to the Ecological Approach, Gibson was involved in a debate with 
Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim on the nature of pictorial representation, in which 
the perceptual status of what is pictured in a picture and its recognition was the topic; 
see Gibson (1971) and Gombrich et al. (1971). My acknowledgements go out to Alfred 
Nordmann for highlighting the subtleties of this debate.
5  I have to thank Brian McLaughlin for introducing me and others to the Empirical Strat-
egy during the workshop “Perception and Knowledge” at the University of Graz, Austria, 
in October 2012, and I have to thank Martina Fürst and Guido Melchior, the organisers, 
for placing that workshop and McLaughlin’s paper right when and where I needed it.
6  In fact, as Warren (1984, 695) reports, a stairway can be just as exhaustingly gentle, with 
low raisers and deep treads, as it can be exhaustingly steep. The perceived gentleness of 
ascent may indeed be a common misperception of an affordance.
If natural information is to be properly understood as something provided by the 
environment to its consumers, and hence as something that grounds their percep-
tion and behaviour in the first place, the discussion in the preceding chapters will 
have helped to identify some of the properties to be expected from this kind of 
information: Natural information shall be an objective commodity but also allow 
for the possibility of being relevant in different ways to different consumers. It 
specifies the environment for the perceiving organism but often leaves the organ-
ism with situations of underspecification. It may convey knowledge but most of 
the time serves more immediate uses, as in Gibsonian affordances. It shall provide 
for the possibility of getting things wrong but also help to account for how we can 
get them right. It shall not presuppose the presence of beliefs, desires and know-
ledge but be part of their causal-historical preconditions. It shall be well-grounded 
but need not be symbolic. And it shall allow for accommodating changing condi-
tions, over place and time, in the environment. An understanding of these prop-
erties of natural information will help us to understand just how an organism’s 
environment contributes to his cognitive accomplishments (further discussion 
in Chapter 6), and what to look for when considering the role of information- 
providing artefacts in this context (further discussion in Part II).
What I have not provided so far is my own account of natural information, its 
rooting in the environment and its role to its consumers in precise enough terms 
to add something worthwhile to the earlier attempts discussed in Chapter 2: Fred 
Dretske presupposes that information should be natural information in the first 
place, and he provides a definition of informational content that is firmly rooted in 
the laws of nature but finds it difficult to accommodate for the conditions of infor-
mation uptake in the real world. Ruth Millikan criticises Dretske for restricting the 
presence information to a small subset of real-world conditions, maintaining that 
organisms typically rely on more local and probabilistic conditions as informa-
tion. Brian Skyrms’s and Peter Godfrey-Smith’s Lewisian approach, in turn, while 
being ecumenical about the criterion of lawfulness, are at risk of remaining in the 
grip of game-theoretic metaphors that presuppose active senders and receivers of 
information. Among the theories of perception discussed in the preceding chapter, 
James Jerome Gibson’s approach comprises a notion of natural information that, 
once made more explicit and precise, might help to carve out a synthesis of those 
4  The domains of natural 
information
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views, which to undertake is the purpose of this chapter. I will outline the concepts 
of natural information and of informational domains that, I suggest, are the best 
way to go, and then very briefly recapitulate the lessons to be learned from Dret-
ske’s and Gibson’s notions of information.
Natural information and reference classes
Let me try to provide some theoretical definitions that, although certainly not 
aspiring to constitute a fully fledged theory of natural information in its own 
right, or to provide a genuine conceptual analysis of “natural information”, still 
integrate and synthesise the insights from the preceding discussion in a way that 
describes natural information as both objective and context-sensitive enough to be 
useful to its consumers under the manifold conditions under which it is encoun-
tered. Above all, it shall help telling apart the variant from the invariant aspects of 
what a perceiving organism encounters in his environment. The basic idea to be 
promoted here is that natural information is both a nomologically governed rela-
tion and domain specific in relevant respects.
(NI-1)  The invariance condition: informational relations obtain if and only if 
distal conditions F and their transformations at s are matched by detect-
able proximal conditions and transformations at r in accordance with a 
strict natural regularity I that requires a uniform explanation.
(NI-2)  The reference class condition: the probability of a certain informational 
relation between r and s being F to obtain in accordance with regularity 
I is determined with respect to a certain reference class C, where
(a)  C may universally comprise all real and possible situations of I-regular 
covariance between type-r signals and s-conditions – the upper 
boundary case;
(b)  C may comprise a spatio-temporally bounded region in which type-
r signals covary with F-conditions at s under I, with other condi-
tions concerning r, s or F obtaining outside that region – the case of 
locally bounded information;
(c)  C may comprise a regionally bounded or global set of type-r sig-
nals of which only a subset {r1
i,. . ., rn
i} covaries with s-conditions 
under I, with no means of further discrimination available – the 
case of probabilistically bounded information.
(NI-3)  The receiver condition: the definition of the reference class C is depend-
ent on the concrete situation, purposes, constitution and abilities of a 
receiver R.
Part NI-1 should be general and basic enough to capture Dretske’s central claims 
on the nature of information discussed in Chapter 2 while omitting his reference 
to knowledge and conditional probabilities. Only in NI-2, do receivers and prob-
abilities begin to make an explicit appearance. In the case of NI-2a, the receiver 
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will be an external observer by default, whereas in cases NI-2b and NI-2c, the 
receiver will typically be involved in a concrete situation of tracking information 
that is relevant to him. Conversely, what is relevant to him and what he is capable 
of tracking will make a difference to the probabilities of the signals he uses to 
actually match distal conditions. The issue of the level on which and the degree 
to which the receivers or “consumers” of natural information become important 
is hence related to the issue of the degree to which natural information may be 
an openly probabilistic affair, that is an affair allowing for probabilities p < 1. 
These two points of contention concern the proper choice of a framework of ref-
erence for determining the probabilities of informational relations (see p. 23 in 
Chapter 2).
Already quite early in the discussion of Dretske’s (1981) information-theo-
retical account of knowledge, Gilbert Harman (1983) pointed out that one could 
determine the probability of a certain outcome in any information-generating situ-
ation only in relation to a given “framework”, so as to measure the reduction 
of possibilities that takes place – a point not contested by Dretske (1983, in 
his “Author’s Response” to Harman’s peer commentary). The observation of a 
coin-tossing game with a set of unequally fair coins, for the mixed probabili-
ties involved, will deliver different values than the observation of frequencies of 
results for each coin individually. Similarly, Dretske’s requirement of p = 1 for 
informational content can be met only if the framework or “reference class”, as 
Dretske himself calls it, is tailored tight enough to allow only this outcome, so 
that, whatever the initial distribution of possible states has been, the result is unity. 
The observation of a coin-tossing game, if comprising a reasonably large sample 
and if confined to one or the set of all fair coins, will never produce a conditional 
probability p > .5 over the course of that observation. Here, the reference class is 
the entire game or set of games, as observed over a number of rounds between t0 
and tn. However, quite obviously, we will know with certainty what result only 
one toss in the series produces after we have observed that one toss of the coin. 
Here, the reference class will be restricted to one single case, where this case, in 
turn, is supposedly governed by laws of nature – that set of laws which is suffi-
cient to explain why the coin, under the given set of antecedent conditions, landed 
this way.
Cases of this latter sort are what Dretske envisions. Only under these condi-
tions, Dretske’s underlying argument goes, information may convey knowledge. 
There would be no knowledge if conditions at the source were allowed to be at 
variance with what is being signalled with whatever small degree of likeliness. 
On these grounds, he restricts the assignment of the status of information to those 
cases where the condition of unity is met. Probabilities concerning the entirety 
of conditions within sets of events may be shaped by a variety of factors, and are 
ultimately not his concern.
As authors such as Millikan and Skyrms argue with some justification, setting 
admission criteria to the realm of information as strict as Dretske might help us to 
an account of information that satisfies a (foundationalist) criterion of knowledge 
but bears little information on how organisms successfully perceive and act under 
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less tightly bounded but more natural conditions. Knowledge may not always 
and under all circumstances belong to the conditions of success in perceiving and 
acting within an environment. Conversely, setting the admission criteria too loose 
might be similarly dissatisfying, because there are innumerable ways in which 
all sorts of world affairs are related, with whatever degree of probability. If such 
relations could pass as informational without being reasonably unambiguous and 
reliable, and perhaps even without being detectable to any organism, the cognitive 
value of information would be inflated away.
The previous definitions, in their reference to strict natural regularities and 
reference classes, aim at allocating a proper place both to the “nomological” or 
“specification” views defended by Dretske and Gibson and the “probabilistic” or 
“local” views advocated by Millikan and Skyrms in particular. The mark of dis-
tinction between the respective domains of application of those accounts is that 
between the description of information as being present in the environment (NI-1) 
and as being factually available to a receiver (NI-2 and NI-3). The claim that the 
limited and imperfect availability of natural information to an organism leads to 
underspecification, as indicated in NI-2b and NI-2c, does not militate against the 
specificity criterion in NI-1.
According to NI-1, information basically is specification of the environment. 
It is so to the extent that there are invariant relations between world affairs that 
could be tracked by some receiver, if only hypothetically. If there were no such 
relations, a receiver would have no possibility of keeping invariant aspects of 
the environment apart from the variant ones. Nor could he keep rule-governed, 
invariant-preserving transformations apart from random ones. On this level of 
analysis, the reference class for the informational relations will comprise of the 
set of all uniformly regular invariant relations in the world that could be possibly 
tracked by an – unspecified – observer. Hence, this part of the definition covers 
both Dretske’s requirement of a nomologically governed probability of p = 1 for 
information to obtain and the independence of that relation from any particular 
observer. By implication, NI-1 excludes from the class of informational relations 
such relations between world affairs that are probabilistic, for being governed by 
a disjunct set of regularities {i1,. . ., in} or for including an element of randomness 
and thus altogether failing to meet condition I.
Conversely, NI-2 excludes the hypothetical case of relations that, even if they 
were properly regular, would be unobservable in principle (although perhaps 
manifesting themselves in other, intractable ways). Informationally inscrutable 
situations in this sense are part of certain metaphysical or religious doctrines, such 
as the Hegelean Weltgeist, cosmic conspiracies, the Judeo-Christian inscrutable 
God or the Occultation of the Mahdi in Shia Islam. For these sorts of boundary 
case, there would be no reference class identifiable in accordance with NI-2 or 
any of its sub-clauses.
Epistemically more mundane and relevant are situations of epistemic uncer-
tainty as they are characteristic of many areas of probabilistic, statistics-reliant 
science. In this kind of case, one typically expects some natural regularity or law 
I to underlie a set of variant phenomena, while having to rely on signals that are 
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not unequivocal enough to determine that regularity, or r as an expression of that 
regularity with certainty. Intervening factors will be held accountable for blur-
ring the signal but are either of random nature or too many and too complex to 
actually be accounted for. What can be achieved instead is partial, approximative 
confirmation or refutation of a hypothesis within the bounds of available data and 
applicable methods. NI-2c covers this sort of case in particular, with the possibil-
ity that NI-2b may apply, too.
For example there is the possibility that someone contracts an infectious dis-
ease, let us call it u-fever, while lacking the key symptoms of the illness, which 
might be called u-rashes, or even remaining asymptomatic. The condition of s 
being F will then be fulfilled, and I-regularly so, but r does not always obtain, 
so that false negatives obtain. This is a frequent case in medical practice, and 
it belongs to the realm of possibilities that, like the possibility of indiscernible 
symptoms with variant aetiologies, educate any responsible physician to being 
a careful probabilistic reasoner.1 If u-rashes could be caused either by u-fever or, 
say, morbus y, that symptom by itself would not provide information on the under-
lying condition within the context of the reference class relevant to the physician. 
If, however, the u-rashes symptom occurs only intermittently but in rather exclu-
sive connection to u-fever, and if the proper aetiology of that symptom is in place, 
and if the intermittency of the symptom can be ascribed in contextual conditions, 
u-rashes will count as a signal of u-fever, and hence provide natural information 
about the presence of u-fever in the patient. With respect to intermittency, the 
uptake of additional information about s by R, taken up by different means, will 
help to reduce uncertainty on the receiver’s side as to whether the illness is present 
in the absence of that typical signal.
However, most relevant to the present context are situations of underspecifica-
tion that occur in perception in a natural environment. On the one hand, condi-
tions in the ambient optic array, to recur to Gibson’s terminology, are specific in 
terms of the laws of reflection, refraction and spatial geometry being in place. 
On the other hand, visual information may become masked, blurred or otherwise 
distorted, or conditions are such that some of the information present will not be 
taken up at all. This is the case for NI-2c in perception in natural environments. 
Alternatively, some of the information may be reliable only in certain places, at 
certain times. This is the case for NI-2b in perception in natural environments. 
In reversed order of argument to the previous set of examples, NI-2b is the para-
digm case of underspecification in natural perception, where NI-2c will often also 
apply. The reference class for the signals involved will not comprise probabilities 
near the Dretskean condition of unity in NI-2c cases. Under NI-2b, they might but 
need not locally approach it.
In view of this issue, and along the lines of Millikan’s critique of Dretske, Mat-
thieu de Wit et al. (2015), together with Rob Withagen and Anthony Chemero 
(2009) suggest a ‘softer’ notion of natural information as the biologically more 
realistic one: “epistemic contact” with the environment, in Withagen and Cheme-
ro’s wording, typically comes in degrees. Perfect contact, that is full specification, 
is practically unattainable for organisms under natural conditions of perception, 
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and hence will pose too high a requirement. Given that organisms are always bound 
to locally and temporally variable environmental conditions, this argument has 
some prima facie plausibility. As de Wit et al. (2015) admit, locating ambiguities in 
perception in the informational relations themselves will be a concession to “infer-
ential” approaches to perception, for the sake of ecological credibility. However, 
achieving such credibility does not require one to accept the inferentialist “doctrine 
of intractable nonspecificity” of informational relations (as Turvey and Shaw 1979 
call it). If informational relations may hold between all sorts of world affairs, and if 
they are regular in the way outlined by Dretske, there will be relations in the envi-
ronment that remain fully specific even under changeable ecological conditions.
Although highlighting the importance of the degrees of a perceiving organ-
ism’s epistemic contact with his environment is well-taken, acknowledging situ-
ations of underspecification does not require one to admit for a nonspecificity of 
information. Just as the presence of invariants in the environment does not imply 
invariance in ecological conditions for perception, variance in ecological condi-
tions for perception does not amount to a weakening of invariant relations in the 
environment. Indeed, camouflaged predators indiscernible from harmless twigs 
may evolve, or humans may invent windows that happen to block a bird’s flight 
path. In such cases, the optical invariants that are amenable to perception for the 
animal and that had hitherto been sufficient for specifying to him an ecologi-
cally relevant condition in general or an affordance in particular remain in place, 
whereas some of the distal conditions typically related to these optical invariants 
have changed for a relevant subset of cases. However, if an optical invariant had 
been sufficient to specify an open flight path to the bird before the invention of 
glass windows but now is insufficient to do so, that invariant itself will not have 
become compromised after that invention. What has happened is that this optical 
invariant alone cannot be used as a reliable proximal signal of the distal ecological 
condition anymore, and hence is now associated with a probability p < 1 within 
the reference class of the type of proximal signals available to the bird.
Ecological changes affecting epistemic contact do not per se constitute a prob-
lem, yet there will be a penalty for being mistaken too often if and when the 
receiver depends on discriminating between different conditions with a certain 
degree of reliability. It is the requisite degree of reliability that determines the ref-
erence class for the signals and their probabilities. If the first and slightest mistake 
is sufficient to get the organism into trouble, the reference class will be restricted 
in such a way as to approximate Dretskean rigidity. If an individual or population 
can live with 95% false alarms, conditions will be much more relaxed. Still, all 
rounds of picking up the putative signal will be counted into the respective refer-
ence class. An organism is not typically in a position to gather information about 
changes in ecological conditions or the degree of reliability of a signal. Depend-
ing on where the acceptable margin of error lies, he will either have to live with 
increased uncertainty or undergo some adaptive reorganisation. He must then 
either be or become able to detect where and when the reliability of the signals 
attains specificity, which, under natural conditions for perception, seldom occurs, 
or he must detect where it remains high enough to meet his or her requirements. 
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If he has no such means of detection, he must remain confined to living within the 
boundaries of the region in which these conditions hold. I will discuss this point, 
introduced by Millikan as the “domains” of natural information, in more detail in 
the next section.
While NI-2 considers the question of specificity vs. probability of relations 
within a reference class as being dependent on the constitution and abilities of a 
receiver, and hence refers to NI-3, the receiver condition stated in this clause also 
caters for the intrinsic nature of natural information to a perceiving organism: 
informational relations may not always and under all circumstances involve a 
straightforward, organism-independent matching between a received signal and 
the values of the physical variables at the source. As the discussion of perceptual 
illusions in the previous chapter should have shown, a signal may be found to 
never match the value of a variable at the source and still be useful to a perceiving 
organism. Getting the values of some physical variables at the source wrong may, 
under certain circumstances, actually be in the service of getting something more 
important about that source right, namely what can or should be done with respect 
to conditions at that source. If an – external – observer of the informational relation 
limits his perspective to conditions at the source and types of environment-bound 
signals related to that source, the relevant pattern will not be properly detectable 
for him to begin with. Only to an external observer who does thus not account for 
the intrinsic, organism-involving mappings that are part of the informational rela-
tions, will there be an informational bias involved in perception. To the perceiving 
organism, the reference class of the signals may well comprise of tokens mapping 
distal conditions in indirect but highly reliable ways.
The correspondence to the physical variables does, however, not typically 
become explicit to the perceiving organism in the perceptual process. Otherwise, 
the perceptual tokens would have to carry a mark of how they map onto the physi-
cal variable under a defined range of conditions – something like an indicator of 
the complex affair “the object looks n degrees brighter now that the total amount 
of visible light decreased by m lm”. Although there is no such indicator, the infor-
mational mappings will remain intact to the organism. If, in this kind of case, a 
bias in perceived qualities were to result in two different values for some physical 
variable being perceived equally, such as equal perceived brightness for variantly 
luminous objects, an ecological argument might be applicable (or even necessary) 
to account for such situations: the equivocation either does not matter, in that it 
does not, or not significantly, interfere with the attainment of the organism’s goals, 
or the other type of object or lighting condition does, as a matter of empirical fact, 
rarely or never occur in R’s environment, where that matter of fact should be due 
to one or a number of natural regularities in their own right.
Hence, there is no “too bright” in the perception of some object if the appropri-
ate perception of the conditions at the source – the affair to which the perceiving 
organism is supposed to respond and hence the affordance that it presents to him – 
depends on perceiving the object in question as being brighter than the measured 
luminance values would suggest. Although the organism might thus appear to 
be misinformed about the luminance values at the source, he will be correctly 
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informed about the presence of the object that he will need to recognise in order 
to persist. By virtue of its regularity, the seeming mismatch will constitute an 
informational relation in its own right. Again by virtue of the regularity of these 
relations, the inclusion of organism-involving relations is perfectly compatible 
with the notion of information being an objective affair. It may be true that the 
informational relation in question would not exist in absence of the receiver, but 
only in the same trivial sense in which any informational relation depends on the 
existence of certain world affairs.
The regularities involved in this complex mapping relation will have been 
established in a history of interaction, on individual or population levels, with 
those states of affairs. The seeming departure from the values of the physical vari-
ables involved in such situations is not at all capricious but depends on processes 
in which that deviation acquired an adaptive function that consists precisely in 
enabling the organism to get a grasp of the conditions at the source that are rel-
evant to him and his kind. The probabilistic element in natural information, on 
this level, is not one of random distributions in which, for example, an object 
appears n degrees brighter than measured at t0, exactly as bright as measured at t1, 
n degrees darker at t2 and so forth, but in the frequency distribution of perceptual 
situations under which the function of perceiving objects of that kind in a certain 
way evolved – notwithstanding the possibility of false positives or false negatives 
in perception, and allowing for some degree of variability in perceived qualities 
over a series of perceptual events.
The preceding discussion should have served to show that it is the situation, 
the constitution, the abilities and the purposes of the receiving organism that are 
indispensable to the definition of the reference class for the information involved. 
I will try to articulate the upshot of that discussion, and add more detail to clause 
NI-3 in particular, by stating a set of conditions for the successful use of natural 
information by its receivers:
(NI-4)  The detectability condition: different signals {r1,. . ., rn} must be discern-
ible to some determinate degree for some receiver R, where
(a)  the conditions at s to be detected by R are determined with respect to 
the constitution and abilities of R – the condition of the intrinsic defi-
nition of the reference class for the mapping relations of {r1,. . ., rn};
(b)  the mapping relations between {r1,. . ., rn} and the conditions at 
the source make a difference to R in terms of the fulfilment of R’s 
specific purposes – the condition of relevance;
(c)  the conditions for information uptake are such that signal tokens 
{r1,. . ., rn} occurring in accordance with the respective conditions 
at s remain detectable for R over time – the condition of stability;
(d)  the frequency for R of recording r1 where s is not F, or where some 
other rn occurs instead of r1 or where no r at all occurs remains 
below a threshold that is critical to the fulfilment of R’s purposes – 
the condition of unequivocality.
64 Informational environments
The conditions in NI-4c, as the “channel conditions”, are based partly in the 
organism, partly in the environment. They include the organism’s perceptual 
apparatus as well as enabling and limiting conditions in his surroundings for the 
detection of informational relations, and these, in turn, may include general physi-
cal conditions, such as lighting, as well as, more formally and generally, the level 
of noise and error that are present to interfere with information uptake. Nonethe-
less, neither the perceiver’s condition nor the environment are supposed not to be 
capricious, that is the channel conditions are not supposed to change randomly.
At what level an ability to discriminate between different conditions at s is 
located and how many information channels are available in what quality will 
depend on what may be called the adaptive economics to which an organism is 
exposed. An organism who would have to spend a significant effort or a species 
that would have to invest a lot, in evolutionary terms, into an elaborate percep-
tual apparatus that could discern between, for example specimen of an edible and 
nourishing but relatively rare prey species and a more populous sort of nutrition-
ally unrewarding but not poisonous lookalikes, where specimen of both kinds are 
equally easy to catch, will get along well with his inability to discern between 
r-signals correlated with the less numerous but nutritionally rich s1-specimen and 
the more numerous but nutritionally poor s2-specimen. The condition that deter-
mines the value of such trade-offs between the cost of an investment into the pos-
sibility of finer discrimination and the effort spent on a large number of useless 
catches will be the ability of the organism or species to maintain and reproduce 
themselves. From the perspective of the prey, a complementary situation arises: 
what is the trade-off between the cost of investment into an ability of reliably 
distinguishing between a rare but efficient predator and his numerous but rather 
harmless lookalikes or investing into an elaborate camouflage or mimicry that 
interferes with detectability for the predator on the one hand and the cost of repro-
duction of another specimen of one’s own kind on the other?2
This sort of adaptive economics is supposed to apply not only to natural organ-
isms but also to technological systems, minus the supposedly red-in-tooth-and-
claw mechanisms of selection at work in the biological realm. In either type of 
case, there are different strategies for safeguarding against disruption: a refined 
apparatus designed to always record information as accurately as possible through 
as many channels as can be made available, or the design of choice may be one 
for resilience, by means of robustness or redundancy, against the effects of numer-
ous misreadings. The seeming simplicity of the latter strategy is not to be con-
fused with any sort of adaptive disadvantage. However, not all strategies will 
work equally well under all conditions. A complex but informationally relatively 
tractable environment is likely to suggest the former strategy.
If not earlier, as Skyrms and Godfrey-Smith suggest, it is at this point where 
game- theoretical considerations, if carefully hedged, become helpful to an 
inquiry into natural information and its use. The receiver of information need not 
be consciously engaged in applying an economic calculus to guide his behaviour. 
The relation among the information present, the number and quality of the infor-
mation channels available to him, and the expected results of his behaviours will 
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be sufficient. It is in this light that NI-4d and the condition of the “determinate 
degree” of discernibility in NI-4 should be understood. There is no awareness 
required from the receiver of the presence and kind of the informational relations 
that he relies on. It will be the privilege of the followers of the complexity- oriented 
strategies to develop some degree of awareness, perhaps even a conscious one, of 
the informational relations used, but many organisms can do without it under nat-
ural conditions. These issues of information-related strategies will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter.
Informational domains
The final piece to an account of natural information that characterises it as both 
specifying and including a local and probabilistic element will be to spell out 
the relation between the local and the probabilistic element in more detail. When 
moving from informationL into her softer but supposedly often more relevant 
informationC, Millikan appears to target two related ways for that information to 
become ‘soft’, which I outlined in the previous section as NI-2b and NI-2c: first, 
the regularity I of the signalling relation might turn out to be statistical rather than 
nomological in kind; second, there might be regions in space and time – chris-
tened “domains” by Millikan – to which that regularity is restricted. The notion 
of informational domains in particular will become important in an inquiry into 
informational environments in Chapter 6.
(NI-5)  The domain-boundedness condition: informational relations may be 
bound to certain domains D of some set of signals {r1,. . ., rn} or types of 
signals {r1,. . ., rn}, where
(a)  D is a spatio-temporally circumscribed region in which type r sig-
nals are present and detectable that correlate with some individual s 
or type s with a given degree of probability p = n, where 0 < n ≤ 1, 
as distinguished from other regions where p < n or p = 0, providing 
for local maxima and minima;
(b)  the extension of D is demarcated by empirical regularities Ie, as 
they apply to individuals, species and other spatio-temporally 
restricted entities at s;
(c)  type r signals may pertain to different domains {D1,. . ., Dm} at 
once and in non-contradictory fashion, depending on the regulari-
ties described in NI-5b;
(d)  there is a possibility for a receiver R to keep track of one or vari-
ous types of signals within D, under conditions described in NI-4, 
where R additionally may but need not be able to identify the exten-
sion of D.
More often than not, as Millikan’s argument in (2004) goes, the only regularities 
at hand for a consumer of natural information are of a statistical kind. For these 
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regularities, in turn, spatio-temporally local maxima and minima can be detected 
in many cases. If there are such local maxima and minima, these may serve as 
indicators for informational relations that concern individuals, populations, bio-
logical species or other kinds of entities whose identity is determined historically 
or genealogically. The laws of nature will provide some boundary conditions that, 
however, taken by themselves, will be insufficient to determine the identity of 
individuals and species or their possibility of existence – which may turn out to be 
the one thing relevant to R. Or those laws will not be sufficient to determine the 
specific local character of a bundle of conditions – why some individual or species 
not only could but had to exist here and now.
Basically, both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ natural information are relevant to perception 
and action, but in different respects, on different levels: informationL concerns 
basic invariants in the environment, and the conditions for the perception of 
objects in the ambient optic array (what basic substance characteristics, what size, 
how distant, how transformed in visual in appearance when the perceiver moves). 
These conditions are, except under the most extraordinary circumstances – which 
we are most likely to find in some philosopher’s possible worlds – not specific to 
any domain. InformationL, for its basic, foundational character, does not change 
across domains but first enables the tracking of individuals or kinds of things 
throughout their specific domains. Without some core regularities, environments 
would be capricious and unpredictable. The validity of informationC, in turn, 
depends on both the concrete informational domains that the perceiving organ-
ism is accustomed to, and the relative reliability of the signals that make up these 
domains.
Hence, informationL and informationC will also differ with respect to their ref-
erence classes (see NI-2 in the previous section): informationL comprises all and 
only those detectable relations in the environment which are governed by strict, 
and universally applying, natural regularities. InformationC, however, comprises 
relations that depend on less strict and less universal regularities by their very 
nature, and hence have their reference classes constrained by where and how 
those regularities apply.
It might seem that domains, as defined previously (especially in NI-5a), are thus 
a special case of reference classes, as defined previously (especially in NI-2b), so 
that D ⊂ C. There is a difference though: a domain is a domain of a type of sig-
nals, bound together by what is being tracked, or supposed to be tracked, by R (an 
individual, a population of individuals, a set of entities) and the Ie-regularities that 
respectively apply. A reference class, in turn, comprises whatever set of proximal 
r and distal s entities and a regularity I between them, which together shall serve 
to determine a probability with which some r within that set signals some condi-
tion at s. The choice of the reference class is, like the identification of a domain, 
dependent on the purposes, constitution and abilities of R. Hence, the reference 
class of a certain type of informational relation might be partly coextensive with 
the domain of a type of signals (namely in comprising these signals), but it makes 
no reference to why it should be circumscribed in a certain way, whereas a domain 
of some type of signal is explicitly defined with respect to the circumscribing 
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condition, namely the presence of some individual, population or set of entities 
to be tracked by R (see NI-5b). The domain of a type of signals is a natural way 
of carving out a reference class for the informational relations involved, and its 
spatio-temporal boundaries.
In order to illustrate the problem to be solved by introducing the concept of 
domains of natural information, a brief discussion of Millikan’s own example in 
(2004, Chapter 3) which she, in turn, borrowed from Dretske (1988), will be help-
ful: if tracks of a certain shape in the woods of her (or mine, or someone else’s) 
home state have hitherto always and exclusively been created by quail (or, to 
abstract from concrete species, “q-birds”), they carry information about q-birds 
with a probability of 1 and, one might believe, they do so with lawful causal 
determinacy, as no other animal in those woods would be able to create tracks of 
the same shape, size and relative placement. The domain of the signal will be the 
entire set of q-tracks in those specific woods, and the reference class will comprise 
those tracks, the q-birds and the regularities by which q-birds give rise to q-tracks, 
which will be quite strict under this perspective. Nothing, however, rules out the 
possibility that pheasants (or “p-birds”) may happen to cause tracks of the very 
same appearance, save for the fact that there are no p-bird populations in that area. 
What information, then, would tracks of that shape carry if a population of p-birds 
happened to migrate, say, from Tyrol to Carniola? And what would warrant the 
lawfulness of the correlation between tracks of that specific shape, size and rela-
tive placement in the woods of Tyrol, save for the fact that q-birds have not hap-
pened to migrate the other way? Finally, even if there were no such species as the 
p-bird to exist at the time of observation in the first place, what would rule out the 
possibility for them to evolve at a later time, or to have roamed the same and other 
woods in bygone days but now having become extinct? Under this perspective, 
the domain of the signals involved might remain the same in terms of the set of 
q-tracks in a given wood under investigation, whereas the regularities and pos-
sible source conditions included will have changed. The reference class will now 
encompass q-birds and the patterns of p- and q-bird population dynamics.
If there are q-birds as populations with a limited extension in space and time, 
and if there is a possibility of p-birds existing at other times and in different places 
while leaving behind identically shaped tracks, the information carried by those 
tracks would end up being equivocal and fall prey to the problem of disjunctive 
content that, according to Jerry Fodor (1990), bodes ill for an evolutionary natu-
ralism about content. Thus, on Dretske’s definition, it would not be information 
at all (although he allows for a softer notion of information in other places).3 
Millikan’s alternative is to characterise natural informationC as probabilistic and 
locally bound – which, as I have begun to argue in the previous section, are not 
precisely the same thing.
On this background, domains of natural information or “natural signs” are to be 
understood in accordance with the mathematical meaning of the term “domain” in 
the first place. The mathematical meaning is that of the domain of a function, that 
is the set of input values for which the function is defined (e.g. all real numbers 
or all positive integers), and from which the output values, as the “image” of the 
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function, are mapped onto its target set (Millikan 2007). When transferring this 
notion to the realm of natural information, a domain is described by the map-
ping rule by which a series of signals {ri,. . ., rn} relates to a source or a set of 
sources {s1,. . ., sn}, where that mapping rule is determined by causal, genealogical 
or other regularities Ie. These regularities become part of the explanation of the 
recurrence or reproduction of r-signals on occasions of s being F, and they also 
play the role of a necessary condition in explaining the presence and persistence 
of the mechanisms in R for detecting r-signals.
A certain ambiguity is introduced into this mathematical analogy when Mil-
likan says that the domains of natural information comprise not all possible values 
that could be generated by some function (which, in some cases, may be indefi-
nite to begin with) but those which have, in fact, been realised at the time tn of R 
recording the signal. Under this interpretation, what is called the domain would 
actually be the image of the function, that is a region in space and time in which 
the mapping relation in question has been instantiated for a finite set of input val-
ues, and where it did so in accordance with that mapping rule which defines the 
domain of the function in the former, properly mathematical sense. A mere series 
of concrete instantiations of a seeming regularity by itself would be insufficient to 
warrant that regularity, because some of those instantiations might have different 
aetiologies. In the light of this observation, the most consistent practice would be 
to refer to domains in the proper mathematical sense, where it denotes the set of 
‘permitted’ input values for a function defined for some mapping rule. But then, 
if we are talking about individuals and historical entities, such as populations and 
species, the history of concrete instantiations will be a constituent of the empiri-
cal regularities that make up some population or species. After all, the domains 
of natural information related to higher mammals would be differently shaped, in 
terms of available variation, environmental conditions and selective pressures for 
their ancestors, if the dinosaurs had not become extinct. Higher mammals might 
not even have evolved in the first place.
There is a recursiveness to the definition of domains of natural information in 
all cases that rely on regularities that are, partly or wholly, historically founded. 
Conditions that have obtained at some time and place will enable or constrain reg-
ularities at some later time and place. If we treated domains as the set of concrete 
instantiations of some informational relation and thus as the image of the map-
ping functions involved, that recursiveness might easily turn into circularity: the 
domain of a natural sign would then be whatever happened to have co-occurred 
to date, and the mapping rules could be identified only by recourse to that history. 
Strictly speaking, they would not even be rules but, with some likeliness, amount 
to mere enumerations of instantiations of co-occurrences that may be or may be 
not properly supported by, and would be entirely uninformative about, underlying 
regularities at the source.
On the view defended here, and certainly on the view that Millikan defends, too, 
informational domains are more than arrays of spatio-temporally proximate and/
or phenomenologically similar but otherwise discontinuous, “gerrymandered” or 
randomly compiled sets of world affairs in which some seeming correlation can 
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be detected by R. The definition and extension of domains would then be fully 
dependent on R’s perspective, with conditions at the source having at most a limited 
bearing on the nature of the informational relations utilised by R. The limitations 
of R’s perspective, given that R is a being of a specific constitution, with specific 
abilities but limited resources and a limited existence in space and time, do have 
an effect on what domains of natural information are used by him. On this level of 
analysis, where purposeful creation of information is not considered, the domains 
as such are constituted by regularities that may involve the nature and behaviours 
of the receiver, but they are not constituted by the receiver. That one signal may 
belong to different domains, where those domains may be found to carve up the 
world in different ways and to different uses, owes to the applicability of different 
but non-contradicting mapping rules to the otherwise observer-independent regu-
larities involved (see NI-5c). For example one rule may circumscribe the domain 
of an individual, whereas another defines the domain of the population to which 
that individual belongs, so that the latter domain comprises at least some of the 
signals pertaining to the individual, too, and vice versa.
Hence moving from mathematical analogy to types of concrete cases, domains 
of natural information might be constituted in one of three fundamental ways:
First, informational domains may be results of natural history. A shadow of a 
certain shape circling overhead in a particular way conveys information about the 
presence of an Andean Condor in the Andes and of a California Condor in the 
mountains of the American West, and is unlikely to convey information on the 
presence of any species of Condor on the rare occasion of occurring anywhere 
in the Alps. Events of speciation, population dynamics, migration and extinction 
define whether, where and when a signal of a certain shape matches conditions 
at a certain source. The shape itself and its causal relation to the source, taken 
by themselves, are insufficient to achieve unequivocality in these respects. As in 
the p- vs. q-bird case, an indistinguishable shape could be created by a pheno-
typically and behaviourally very similar but genealogically rather remote bird. 
In order to make use of that information, the consumer would have to stand in a 
certain relation to those birds. However, to the extent that California and Andean 
Condors are phenotypically and behaviourally very similar to each other while 
inhabiting spatially discontinuous but ecologically similar regions, their com-
petitors in the respective regions are not in need, and normally do not have the 
means, of distinguishing between the two species. A competing scavenger who 
would be moved by the appearance of a such-shaped and thus-moving shadow 
to defend his spoils against the Condor (or, more frequently, abandon them, as 
Condors are the dominant scavenger in the food chain) or take his presence 
as a signal of the presence of carrion nearby would be rather indifferent to the 
distinction between California and Andean Condors. The distinction is more 
relevant to a field biologist or conservationist surveying Condor populations. 
The Condor’s competitor would not be indifferent, however, to the distinction 
between a Condor and a behaviourally very different disposed bird, say a preda-
tor of minor scavengers like him, mimicking a Condor’s appearance in the sky 
with deceptive intent.
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Second, domains may be composed of individuals or aggregates of individu-
als, for example if we try to follow one specific Condor specimen or popula-
tion through space and time. Not just any such-shaped and thus-moving shadow 
within either California or Andean Condor habitats would do. The observer will 
have to use other information within the domain of the specimen, but transmit-
ted through different, independent channels, to identify the shadow as a signal of 
the presence of this individual bird. Through various channels, the observer has 
to remain focused on, and keep track of, the domain of this individual in order to 
properly retrieve and use the information emanating from it. California Condors, 
for example for being extremely rare and critically endangered, are subject to a 
population recovery programme which includes the marking of individuals with 
numbered tags and transmitters – which makes for much easier tracking than hav-
ing to rely on information collected in the wild. Aggregates of individuals need 
not be phylogenetically related though. Depending on the receiver’s needs and 
purposes, they even could be simply that in some cases: aggregates of individuals 
in specific constellations and at certain times and places that are relevant to him. 
In such cases and only in such cases, the regularity governing the domain is partly 
constituted by the receiver’s constitution and needs.
Third, domains may owe to universally law-like rather than locally bound 
probabilistic regularities on a physical level but are circumscribed by concrete 
conditions of realisation that only hold locally. For example a hygrometer will 
not convey any information on atmospheric water content when placed on Venus, 
nor will there be any use for a barometer or olfactory organs in interstellar space. 
The conditions on Venus or in interstellar space do not fall within the range of 
values for which the function or functions of the respective detectors are defined. 
Under these conditions, although the operation of the instruments and organs can 
be expected to accord to universal laws of nature, they will not be able to exe-
cute their functions, namely the collecting of natural information. This is not to 
say that they do not have any function or lose their function when hence placed 
outside their range of operation. The informational relation they are supposed 
to detect is not present where they are, and/or the channels they would need for 
detect that information are missing or misaligned, all for perfectly law-governed 
reasons. Some receivers of natural information might be able to discern between 
those regions in space-time where the conditions are in place for the presence and/
or transmission of the information in question and those regions in which they 
are not. Or the receiver might be physically constrained to remaining within the 
region or merely happen never to leave the region in which it holds.
Dretske’s famous magnetotactic bacteria may serve as a paradigm of lawfully 
bounded domains of the latter kind (Dretske 1986, 26–28): For those anaerobic 
marine bacteria, about the only relevant variable in their environment is the oxy-
gen content in the waters they inhabit, which is strictly, and rather lawfully, corre-
lated with depth below the water surface. With increasing depth, the concentration 
of oxygen they will encounter reduces. Magnetotactic bacteria, however, do not 
have any sensors for oxygen content in their surroundings. They do not perceive 
it; nor is even the most simple of stimulus-response mechanisms involved. What 
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they do is to track a correlate of that gradient that also holds with law-like regu-
larity, namely the direction of the Earth’s magnetic field. The lines of the Earth’s 
magnetic field are aligned, as for any other magnetic dipole, as field lines, which 
can be described by any smaller magnetic particle being placed in the field. These 
lines emerge from the magnetic south pole, bend outwards towards the equator 
and return to Earth at the north pole. As a result, the lines will point upward rela-
tive to the surface of the Earth in the south and downward in the north. The mag-
netic particles enclosed in the bacteria’s cell membrane align with the field line. 
In this sense, magnetic orientation is a lawful proximal correlate of the vertical 
gradient of oxygen concentration. This is where the bacteria will invariably move. 
However, this direction is inverted from one hemisphere to the other, so “north-
ward” will be “upward” in the south and “downward” in the north. Each specimen 
of the respective subspecies of bacteria must be placed on the right hemisphere in 
relation to its northward- vs. southward-oriented constitution in order to maintain 
the mapping between field direction and the gradient of oxygen concentration on 
which it depends. With no supplementary sensory facilities to warn it, the bac-
terium cannot identify the domain of the downward signal, however lawful the 
correlation.
The first and the second of the ways of carving out domains of natural informa-
tion are the ones Millikan has in mind, whereas the third seems to be implicitly 
subsumed under the former two or, more probably, under their preconditions.4 
The first two ways even fall into one if one conceives of species as historical indi-
viduals (as in Millikan 2000) rather than extensionally defined populations. The 
choice of species concept makes a difference to the interpretation of the nature of 
the informational relations involved. Quite obviously, if a species is to be treated 
as an individual, and if its being an individual is not considered a theoretical 
fiction in the service of explaining biological phenomena, but a real entity held 
together by a well-defined set of genealogical relations of descent and proximity, 
the observer’s task, when attempting to track the domain of the species, lies in 
tracking the domains of the individuals belonging to that species. The domain of 
the species specifies the domains of its individuals. Misidentifying some r as a 
signal of a q-bird qua q-bird rather than merely of a such-shaped (p- or q-) bird 
leaving such-shaped traces, amounts to a failure at correctly recording natural 
information related to that individual as a member of the species, although it may 
still be correct of that individual as an individual (that bird in my garden last 
night, or that bird gracefully circling overhead in the Andean skies).
If, in contrast, species are extensionally defined, the definition of their domains 
is observer-dependent in a very specific way: Signals {ri,. . ., rn} emanating from 
different individuals {si,. . ., sn}, where the mapping of ri onto si, rj onto sj and so 
forth is supposed to be unequivocal on the source side, have to be subsumed by R 
under a common type of signals r that correlates with a type of individuals s. That 
mapping is not, or not fully, determined by the natural information carried by the 
individuals {si,. . ., sn}. The signals might be marks of type-identity in properties 
for the individuals, but there will also be signals of properties in which these indi-
viduals differ. Hence, R is endowed with the task of identifying the similarities 
72 Informational environments
and differences relevant to his purposes without the benefit of an additional prop-
erty that would help him to type {si,. . ., sn} together in an unequivocal way and 
thus warrant R’s acts of identification. Any misidentification of an individual will 
be a misidentification only in relation to the practical purposes of R and only if 
these practical purposes are adversely affected by that misidentification. The prac-
tical purposes of the competitors of California Condors will not be affected when 
an Andean Condor accidentally appears in Californian skies, given their pheno-
typical and behavioural similarities, whereas the practical purposes of a California 
Condor looking for a mate and the practical purposes of the California Condor 
Recovery Programme are likely to be affected.
If we restrict our view to practical purposes, the latter observations will equally 
hold for either species concept. Millikan (2004, Chapter 18) applies the term 
“practical kinds” when referring to those situations in which a difference between 
species or other types of things or even between one and the same vs. different 
individuals is practically irrelevant to R since the effects on R’s purposes and 
behaviours of treating them as identical are negligible. Thus, it will also be irrel-
evant in practical terms whether the species involved is a historical individual or 
an aggregate of individuals, as long as R carves them up in proper alignment with 
his practical purposes. The California and the Andean Condor form one “practi-
cal kind” for the competing scavenger, but two different practical kinds for other 
Condors, and two natural kinds for the field biologist and the conservationist. 
Even the distinction between repeated encounters with one and the same indi-
vidual and with other members of the same species may not be important under 
all circumstances (see Millikan 2004, 219f ).
However, the theoretical implications of the choice of species concepts may be 
notable, and some higher-level practical considerations may flow from it. Choos-
ing species, understood as historical individuals, as the paradigm of domain-
bound natural information might serve to mix up the local and the probabilistic 
character of natural informationC. Assuming species to be individuals implicitly 
suggests that the character of natural informationC amounts to being probabilistic 
qua locally bound (see p. 65 in this chapter, see also NI-2b and 2c). This is no 
minor point, and it takes some explaining.
The extension of a domain of a species as a historical individual would be 
marked by its incipience at t0, its population dynamics, its patterns of migration 
and its extinction at tn. Prima facie, the sources of all possible equivocation in 
the definition of a domain of a species would hence lie with, first, determining its 
time of incipience, second, the lines of descent that flow from it, third, its popula-
tion distribution and fourth, its time of extinction (which might be the easiest to 
identify if it has happened already). These are all things that R could be mistaken 
about, but not the species itself, as it were. The rule that determines when a spe-
cies is a species is supposed to be unequivocal and observer independent, and 
hence the membership conditions of individuals pertaining to that species are sup-
posed to be unequivocal and observer independent, too.
On this view, it should be a straightforward matter to account for the possibility 
that one may encounter, on the one hand, individuals that belong to the species in 
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question but, being imperfect copies of their type, display some divergent char-
acteristics and that, on the other hand, one may encounter individuals that dis-
play the seeming characteristics of the species in question but do not belong to 
it genealogically. Instances of the latter possibility would be the equivocal traces 
of p- and q-birds and the moving shadows of the ‘wrong’ species of Condor, 
instances of the former would include any organism with dysfunctional organs 
or other phenotypical aberrations. Prima facie, the same conditions will apply to 
types of artefacts: an individual Ford Model T will be a Ford Model T because it 
was designed by Ford Motor Co., and moved off the assembly lines at Ford Motor 
Co. factories between 1908 and 1927. A bootlegged car or an artful replica of the 
historical model, meticulously reverse engineered from an original Ford Model 
T, would not count, and R would be fooled if having it sold to him as a classic 
car from a fraudulent vendor. Conversely, a somewhat wayward Ford Model T 
specimen, for having been produced at Ford Motor Co. factories according to the 
Ford Model T design, albeit with some obvious aberrations, will still belong to 
the same type.5
However, just as pirated copies of digital media, every bit indistinguishable 
from the original and produced in the same way as legitimate members of the type 
but only illicitly so, partly undermine the seemingly clear-cut relations of descent 
for types of artefacts, treating species as individuals is exposed to some ambigui-
ties contained in their very definition. For example it will be difficult to precisely 
determine a speciation event, both in terms of pinning down the moment when a 
variety becomes a new species (a problem that has haunted evolutionary theory 
ever since Darwin) and in terms of demarcating species from mere varieties in the 
first place (a problem that has been haunting natural history even before Darwin).
In these and many other kinds of cases that concern the question of member-
ship of some s in a type s, if this membership shall hold by virtue of certain type- 
defining properties rather than definitional stipulation on R’s side, the rules 
governing the mapping between the domain of signals of an individual and the tar-
get set might turn out to be underdetermined. There may be boundary cases where 
the mapping of signals pertaining to a putative member of the type in question 
onto the target set, that is its being a proper member of the type, may be irreduc-
ibly equivocal. If this is so, some of the ambiguity that makes natural informationC 
probabilistic may well reside at the source of that information. In such cases, the 
local character of this kind of natural information does not fall into one with its 
probabilistic character. The species would be unequivocally defined at the centre 
but less so at the spatio-temporal margins of its extension. Whereas the adherent 
of a population view will leave the disambiguation of conditions at the margin to 
R and her explanatory purposes, and find this unproblematic, the species-realist 
will be more likely to ascribe to R the responsibility for that very residual ambi-
guity and to remain (implicitly) committed to a fundamentally non-probabilistic 
view of natural information. He will also find it difficult to acknowledge that 
ambiguity as a matter of fact.
In most relevant situations, however, the practical purposes of the perceiving 
organism will dictate the rules of disambiguation so that he remains able to carve 
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up the things he encounters into practical kinds that are suitable to the fulfilment 
of his purposes (see NI-4b). Residual ambiguities might assume some importance 
if and when conditions in the environment become unstable or change in ways 
that the receiver cannot easily anticipate and accommodate into the practically 
determined domains of the signals that he relies on. In such situations, the condi-
tions of stability (NI-4c) and unequivocality (NI-4d) of natural information have 
been violated and call for some kind of adaptation or, less biologistically speak-
ing, readjustment.
Resurrection at last
If I have to summarise the discussion in the preceding chapters in two brief points 
that pick up on the key authors on which I built my account, it will be these: first, 
despite acknowledging the irreducibility of situations of underspecification for a 
perceiving organism, both Dretske and, albeit less unequivocally, Gibson, estab-
lish natural information as a specification relation. Second, despite his reference 
to knowledge, the Dretskean notion of information from which my inquiry com-
menced partly parallels Gibson’s deflationary spirit with respect to knowledge 
and mental representation – which is ultimately the more coherent view.
It is these two parallels that I see as deserving to be defended or, as the title 
of Chapter 2 had it, “resurrected”. At the very beginning of Knowledge and the 
Flow of Information, Dretske says: “In the beginning there was information. The 
word came later” (1981, vii). He thus anticipates that the historically and sys-
tematically prior thing for organisms is to “selectively exploit” information in 
the environment to adaptive ends, that is the guidance of activities. Dretske cor-
rectly identifies Gibsonian information as “higher-order invariants in a temporal 
series of signals”, but then continues to refer to sensory representation (Dretske 
1981, 145) – a notion that Gibson would not have subscribed to. In the endnote 
to that passage, he also mentions that a distinction has been made between Gib-
sonian information for perception and information under the mathematical para-
digm, including by Gibson himself (Dretske 1981, 255, n10). He then goes on 
to quote a passage from The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems in which 
Gibson says that “a property of the stimulus is univocally related to a property 
of the object by virtue of physical laws” (Gibson 1966, 187). It seems, however, 
that Dretske quotes this passage in order to actually relativise the very distinction 
between Gibsonian and mathematical information – which should not be surpris-
ing because Dretske himself apparently believes his account of information to be 
in line with both Gibson’s and the mathematical paradigm.
In this attempt to align himself with two concepts of information that are 
demonstrably disparate, one can detect, first, the tension between Dretske’s defla-
tionary view of information and his epistemological aims and, second, the subtle 
but significant difference between Dretske’s and Gibson’s accounts: on Dretske’s 
view, informational relations are invariant relations between world affairs that 
could, in principle, be detected by a receiver, whatever his constitution and abili-
ties might be. These relations can be analysed in isolation from each other, and 
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may be integrated by a suitably disposed observer, who is viewed in detachment 
from his environment, in inferential processes of knowledge acquisition. On Gib-
son’s view, informational relations are invariants in the patterns in the ambient 
energies that can, in practice, be detected by a perceiver on the concrete grounds 
of his constitution and abilities. Some of these invariants, as I will further elabo-
rate in the following chapter, form specific integrated bundles for the organism 
that are determined in relation to what he can and needs to do in his environment. 
Assessing those invariants in isolation would not do justice to the complexity and 
multi-modality of interactions. By virtue of being thus integrated and situated, the 
information available in the environment will paradigmatically be sufficient to 
directly guide the perceiving organism towards the intended state of affairs, with 
no k-condition needing to intervene.
If we want to know how animals and humans, to return to the quote that opened 
my discussion of Gibson (see Chapter 3), have come to “communicate with cries, 
gestures, speech, pictures, writing, and television” (Gibson 1979, 242), and how 
they have thus come to be knowledgeable creatures, we might wish not to include 
the knowledge criterion from the start, as most organisms do quite well without 
it most of the time. One might also come to more precisely identify the locus of 
informational content, namely in the specific relation among, first, what informa-
tion is present in the environment, second, what of this information is available to 
the perceiving organism and third, to what ends he uses it.
Notes
1  The possibility of equivocal symptoms is mobilised against Dretske’s nomological 
account of information by Millikan (2001).
2  The different answers that can be given to this question are analogous to the – somewhat 
notorious – distinction between K- and r-selection.
3  One example for a more liberal approach in Dretske would be the very passage in Dret-
ske (1988, 56) in which he introduces the quail vs. pheasants example, as Millikan 
(2004, 32) notes.
4  In Millikan (2004, 52), she says: “Don’t trust what looks like that needle when you go 
up to Mars, but here on earth, the positions of needles on gas gauges all fall in the same 
roughly defined locally recurrent sign domain.” By implication, gas gauges belong to a 
type of artefact that shares a number of relevant properties with species, namely being 
reproductively established as a type of artefact, which is distinguished by its proper 
functions, and which populates only a limited set of slices of space-time. Here on earth, 
we recognise what a gas gauge is and what it signals when we see one. Similarly, don’t 
trust your olfactory organs when you go to the moon and seek to identify objects on the 
moon by smell – but we know the shape and function of olfactory organs of different 
species, as established in processes of biological evolution, and we know something 
about the conditions for performing that function.
5  This exemplary juxtaposition characterises one of the core tenets of Millikan’s theory of 
proper functions, as proposed in Millikan (1984) and discussed in more detail in Chap-
ter 7, namely that of (first-order) reproductively established families.
We should now be equipped with a concept of natural information that is more 
detailed and specific than James Jerome Gibson’s negative claim that information 
is not best understood on the model of communication, and his positive claim, 
placed right next to the former, that information “refers to the specification of the 
observer’s environment” (1979, 242). Although these claims are closely related, it 
might be helpful to consider their bearing on my core argument separately.
Taking up Gibson’s negative claim, we can now ask for the implications of the 
theoretical notion of natural information developed in the previous chapter for 
non-natural information, hence the very kind of information that Gibson charac-
terised as a misguiding model. To what extent is information that has been pur-
posefully produced and added to our environments to be understood in the same 
way as natural information? I will reserve most of the discussion this question for 
Part II but start working towards it near the end of this chapter and in the next.
Taking up Gibson’s positive claim, we can now ask for the role of the environ-
ment proper in both being specified for the organism by the information therein 
and being specific to the organism – and in often leaving him with situations of 
underspecification. Even though natural information is an objective commodity, 
human and other natural beings may get a variety of things wrong in a variety of 
ways, without necessarily being exposed to the charge of error and dysfunction. 
However, they will also encounter opportunities for adapting their environments 
and the information therein to their needs, so as to make them more specific both 
for and to themselves.
Given that the creation and use of artefacts is a special case of making the envi-
ronment more specific, I will discuss the latter point first, and dedicate this and 
most of Chapter 6 to it, with respective focus on the shaping of environments and 
the nature of informational environments. I will begin my discussion with expli-
cating the requirement, mentioned only in passing earlier (see p. 54 in Chapter 3), 
that both the historical and the ecological context of perception and behaviour 
have to be considered. These contexts are intertwined to the extent that a natural 
history of every organism and of every trait of an organism is identical with a his-
tory of the environmental conditions under which it emerged and by which it was 
shaped, whereas any environment is a result of history of particular interactions 
between populations of organisms and the physical and biotic conditions under 
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which they acted and interacted. These interactions, I will continue to argue, 
include various modes of modification or “construction” of conditions in the envi-
ronments by the organisms themselves.
History, ecology, environment
Information specifies the environment for the observer but that specification, as 
I have sought to demonstrate, always obtains with respect to the constitution and 
abilities of the organism perceiving and acting within the environment that he 
inhabits. Why the organism’s constitution and abilities are shaped the way they 
are is the question of historical context, which specifies both the selective pres-
sures to which an organism or a population has been exposed over time, and 
hence the processes of adaptation, and the adaptive functions that result from the 
selection of those variant forms which have been produced over time. The selec-
tive pressures to which an organism or a population are exposed are determined 
by no fewer than two factors in conjunction: first, the traits already present in the 
organism or population at t0, and second, all relevant conditions encountered in 
the environment, that is the status and the rate and intensity of changes of those 
variables which affect the organism from t0 onward.
What is not implied here is the assumption that all traits of an organism are 
to be viewed as adaptations and that all adaptive traits are a direct and exclusive 
product of natural selection. The possibilities are preserved of the existence and 
relevance of “spandrels” and “exaptations”. Whereas spandrels are adaptively 
neutral, hence function-less, traits that arise as secondary effects of adaptive 
ones or are shaped by constraints on form (Gould and Lewontin 1979), exapta-
tions cater for the possibility of adopting existing traits for new functions (Gould 
and Vrba 1982).1 Nonetheless, presuming that complex abilities are ultimately 
to be understood as adaptive traits, and that natural selection will have made an 
indispensable contribution to shaping them, the Neo-Darwinian view appears 
defensible. Even so, the further implication shall be avoided that organisms were 
passively exposed to selective pressures that work in analogy to external forces 
on inert matter. After all, the organism-environment relation is of a two-way kind, 
both in terms of an organism’s abilities to detect and respond to conditions therein 
and, more basically, in conditions environment- and organism-bound conditions 
affecting each other.
That latter set of relations defines the ecological context for the organism, and 
thus how the organism is shaped in his specific constitution and with his specific 
abilities, so as to respond to conditions in the environment that he inhabits. An 
environment in the sense to be discussed here is marked by two important proper-
ties: it is to be considered dynamic on different levels of description (discussed 
further in the last section of this chapter), and it is, in a qualified sense, specific 
to an organism. Any type of ecological reasoning, from plainly biological to nor-
matively political (the latter of which will not be considered here), will share at 
least these two broad characterisations of environments as dynamic and specific, 
although different approaches are unlikely to agree on all details.
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As to the property of specificity, the notion of an environment, if it is to be use-
ful in biological ecology, should neither be plainly equated with an organism’s or 
other system’s physical surroundings, nor should it be confounded with the sub-
jectively experienced environments of the organisms inhabiting a certain region 
in space-time. A well-known attempt at providing an intermediate account was 
undertaken by Jakob von Uexküll (1956). On his view, there would be a plurality 
of differently constituted individuals living in a plurality of differently consti-
tuted environments, each pair being intertwined in their specific fashion but along 
similar patterns of interaction (a “Funktionskreis” or functional cycle). The per-
ceived, phenomenal environment will be at variance between different organisms, 
as will the relevant variables within the environment and the possible ways for the 
organisms of influencing conditions in their environment, in scope and depth. The 
environment would even be different for different members of one and the same 
species, for the rather trivial facts that they inhabit different slices of space-time 
and that their constitution, perspectives and behavioural opportunities will vary, 
however slightly. What remains identical across all those individually constituted 
environments is the general functional pattern of interaction. However, this usage 
would make it difficult to account for how those many individual environments 
are related to each other, and on what grounds.
Conceiving of environments in the Uexküllean way is instructive when exclu-
sively focusing on an organism’s phenomenal environment, but not when seeking 
to account for how different organisms interact in shared surroundings. Moreover, 
his view will be fully tenable only within the neo-vitalistic framework within 
which it was developed. The teleological structures within which an organism is 
embedded could then be taken for granted rather than being the explananda for 
a theory that seeks to illuminate the ways in which some such structure emerges 
and is maintained. In absence of the neo-vitalistic premises of von Uexküll, and in 
view of accounting for the interaction of various organisms in a shared environ-
ment, a promising solution will be to conceive of environments in a way that ech-
oes the intermediate, twofold nature of Gibsonian affordances, as being specific 
to an organism but objectively rooted.
A conceptual distinction between different notions of an organism’s environ-
ment that highlights its twofold nature has been introduced by Robert N. Brandon 
(1995), within the context of theories of natural selection. It was crafted in order 
to distinguish between those instances of differential reproduction within popula-
tions which are and those which are not due to the environmental fit, hence the 
adaptedness, of certain traits of the organisms involved rather than sheer luck. 
Under “external environments”, Brandon subsumes all physical and biotic condi-
tions in an organism’s or a population’s surroundings that may affect them and 
the local or temporal variance in these conditions. These conditions are typically 
directly measurable by an external observer. The “ecological environment”, in 
turn, is constituted by those factors within the former set that have an effect on, 
and thus are relevant to, individual organisms with respect to their rate of repro-
duction, and hence their contribution to their population’s demographic make-up. 
Precisely to the extent that the organisms within that population are genetically 
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homogeneous, variant rates of reproduction implicitly measure the variance in 
environmental factors. Finally, the “selective environment” is made up of those 
factors which account for differential rates of reproduction between genetically 
heterogeneous subsets of some population. Here, the distribution of phenotypical 
traits among the population, if and when affecting rates of reproduction, becomes 
part of the environment, too.
As an illustration for the distinction between ecological and selective environ-
ments, Brandon (1995, 47–49) uses the image of a field with soil conditions that 
vary over certain areas or that change over time. If we plant seeds from a geneti-
cally homogeneous stock in a regular pattern, the patterns of growth and health of 
the plants that emerge will provide a measure of variation in the soil conditions that 
have an effect on the plants, allowing us to identify a number of relevant variables 
within the plant species’ ecological environment. If we plant seeds from two or 
more different varieties in the same manner, the variant patterns of growth will help 
us to identify a number of relevant variables within the different varieties’ selective 
environments. For example, one variety might be more affected by a change in soil 
conditions than the other, so the variant patterns of growth and reproduction will 
provide a measure of the relative fitness of the respective varieties. In this sense, 
the organisms themselves can be interpreted as measuring instruments that are able 
to determine the conditions in these two latter types of environment.
Hence, the line of distinction between the three levels of description of an 
environment is drawn by distinguishing levels of conditions outside and within a 
population with respect to their objective relevance to that population and its indi-
vidual members. Although the external environment can be defined in disregard 
of the constitution, the abilities and the needs of the particular organisms inhabit-
ing it – apart from the question whether the reference point for “external” is the 
individual or the population – the latter two can be defined only in relation to the 
properties of individuals and populations. Nonetheless, there is, strictly speak-
ing, no ontological difference among external, ecological and selective environ-
ments. There are only different levels of description that refer to different relations 
between the constituents of an environment, and their respective relevance to a 
population and its members.
The point that Brandon seeks to make with his threefold distinction is that exter-
nal, ecological and selective homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of some environment 
may not necessarily reflect each other (Brandon 1995, 64–66): a homogeneous 
external environment may be heterogeneous in ecological terms, as the key factor 
of reproductive relevance may lie with other members of the same population. 
Such would be the case for a high population density of adult specimen in some 
area that gets in the way of the growth and reproductive chances of juveniles. 
Even developmental stages of an organism may become selectively relevant. 
Conversely, although there will be no selective heterogeneity without ecological 
heterogeneity, a physically and ecologically heterogeneous environment may still 
be selectively homogeneous, as relative fitness of genetically variant sections of 
the population may covary with variation in the ecological conditions, that is the 
variant forms may be identically affected by the ecological conditions in question.
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Although the focus of the Brandonean analysis quite naturally lies on the selec-
tive environment with respect to genetically variant populations, the ecological 
environment and the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity therein with respect to vari-
ous individuals will be of main concern here. The general upshot of the Brando-
nean distinction is that different sets or bundles of – objectively given – conditions 
obtaining within the same spatio-temporal surroundings will matter in different 
ways to different organisms, or even to the same organism at different times, and 
that these conditions are measurable in principle. In the context of ecological con-
siderations, this means that patterns of similarity and difference among a variety 
of conditions, that is patterns of distributions of values across different ranges of, 
partly interacting, variables will account for different types of ecological environ-
ments. We will encounter savannahs, rainforests and even urban environments in 
a variety of different geographical regions. As such, these environments are not 
characterised by spatial proximity but by the presence of certain values and cer-
tain degrees of variability, within variant ranges and with variant frequency, for a 
number of variables. To these conditions belong temperature ranges, the presence 
or absence of seasonal changes or patterns of precipitation vs. evaporation but 
also the presence and behaviours of other organisms. The values of some variable 
or combination of variables will have to remain within a certain range for some 
organism in order for him to persist and reproduce. He will either have to pick 
up information about those values and their transformations or he will have to be 
reliably placed within an area where they are, and remain, suitable to him.
If it is the values and ranges of variability of some environmental variables 
that define an ecological environment for an organism, these environments may 
but need not coincide with a certain physical location or contiguous region. For 
example if the values for a number of environmental variables show only minor 
variation within the range of habitation of some organism, and if the organism 
depends on relative constancy of those values, he may not ever be challenged to 
react to any major changes, in rate and intensity, of the respective values. Nor will 
it be important for him to collect information about changes or imminent changes 
in those not-so-variable variables, as long as he remains confined to living in sur-
roundings of low variability. In the tropics, much unlike most of North America or 
the Central Asian steppes, temperature will be one such low-variability variable. 
There will be some temperature-related information in the organism’s surround-
ings, but neither is there much of a reduction of possibilities at the source in play, 
as the range of values to be assumed is limited to begin with, nor is the extension 
of the domain of those signals actually small enough to matter. If the domain 
of those signals, in spatio-temporal terms, is coextensive with or larger than the 
organism’s range of habitation, and hence if the organism is unlikely to ever leave 
that domain, he is equally unlikely to encounter conditions in which he would 
have to keep track of that domain. He may be physically unable to climb nearby 
mountains with lower and more variable temperatures (he might be a plant, after 
all). Alternatively, he may be informationally bound to his tropical lowland by a 
reliable proxy of the temperature gradient, such as the disappearance of his main 
food source with increasing altitude and decreasing mean temperature.
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In either case, relatively constant temperatures are part of the background con-
ditions for the respective organism. These are conditions on which the organism 
relies, and which will have a direct or indirect bearing on the fulfilment of the 
organism’s goals, but which may not be directly perceived by, or even be directly 
perceivable to, the organism. Continuing with the present example, temperature 
constancy will not be part of the background conditions for a hardy plant that 
evolved in a more variable climate and is hence adapted to endure, and react 
to, major temperature swings. Nor will constant temperatures at some location 
belong to the background conditions for an animal that follows a regular pattern 
of variation in temperature and daylight over the course of the seasons across 
geographical regions. Such will be the case for a migratory bird, who visits a 
sequence of locations precisely in order to avail himself of suitable temperatures 
and a suitable supply of food. The conditions on which the bird depends have to 
be relatively constant, although locations will change according to whether they 
provide conditions that remain within the required range over some time. The 
bird is in the business of actively seeking out the conditions he requires. These are 
variant strategies of coping with patterns of variation in environmental conditions.
Adapting ecological niches
Both on the perceptual and the behavioural side, there is a dynamic aspect to envi-
ronments, even if some environment is marked by a high degree of constancy or 
by stable recurring patterns for some relevant variables. Let us recall that one of 
Gibson’s primary concerns is that perception is an activity in which the perceiv-
ing organism interacts with an object of interest over time, and that this activity 
is based on tracking its invariant aspects. In a similar vein, tracking the domain 
of a signal, as suggested by Ruth Millikan, means to keep up with the behaviours 
and transformations of conditions at the source that are mapped by a multitude of 
signals within that domain.
On the perceptual side, information related to some source is not collected in 
one-off encounters with static states of affairs. Typically, an organism will not 
come up against things that do not move, cannot be moved and look the same 
from every angle, from any distance and under all lighting conditions. Such static 
conditions for perception do not even apply to situations of looking at a picture – 
unless the viewing conditions are artificially restricted, as in what Gibson calls 
“aperture vision”. Instead, a broad variety of signals related to a distal affair is col-
lected over time, from different relative positions and under conditions where that 
affair is likely to change in various respects, in various ways. So much I consider 
to have established in the preceding chapters.
On the behavioural side, there is a case to be made for organisms not merely 
adapting to pre-existent conditions in their environments but interacting with, and 
thereby actively altering, states of affairs in those environments, some of which 
will be specifically relevant to them. An active adapting of, rather than merely 
to, conditions in the environment may occur on developmental, ecological and 
evolutionary time scales, with the possibility of overlaps being granted. Hence, it 
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comprises effects that manifest themselves first, within the lifespan of the organ-
ism himself and his contemporaries, second, over the course of generations of a 
population and third, in the selectively relevant conditions for further evolution 
within a population. Moreover, the active adapting of conditions in the environ-
ment includes the creation both of recurring patterns, such as seasonal collecting 
and storing of food, and of more persistent effects or structures, such as built 
features of the environment or tools.
The concept of ecological niches in biology may in effect, if not in intention, 
turn out to obscure the dynamics and bi-directionality of organism-environment 
relations that are at issue here, and sometimes even their specificity. The earli-
est concept of an ecological niche, as introduced by Joseph Grinnell (1917), still 
referred to niches as the particular delimitation of a concrete species’ habitat, and 
hence as tailored to that species, with the aim of describing the current status of 
the environmental relationships of an organism by a naturalist. For its focus on 
as-is conditions, a perspective on the dynamics of organism-environment rela-
tions was not part of this account, whereas specificity was the aim by definition.
In the meantime, a concept of ecological niches has become entrenched that 
compartmentalises environments into specifications of functional roles for adap-
tive traits and maps them onto types of spatio-temporal contexts. An ecological 
niche, on this influential view, which was proposed by Charles Elton (1927), actu-
ally is an organism’s functional role, or “its place in the biotic environment, its 
relation to food and enemies” (Charles Elton 1927, 63–64, emphasis in original). 
Defined in the Eltonian way, there would be niches, for example for aerial preda-
tors specialised on terrestrial animals, with sub-specifications for prey size; that 
niche would require certain conditions regarding terrain and climate to be present, 
and it would be populated by eagles, hawks or falcons; it might have been popu-
lated by Pterosaurs during the Cretaceous; the niche for aerial scavengers would 
vary from the former in several respects, and would be populated by Andean or 
California Condors or any other organism who meets the specifications for the 
niche. Thus defined, an ecological niche might be occupied by various species 
at different times, in different places, and it might remain unpopulated in some 
places, at some time. An ecological niche is hence considered stable over place 
and time, and it is specific only with respect to functional role specifications. 
All the dynamics of changing environments would leave the functional roles and 
matching types of locations intact while allowing both for types of locations being 
realised in various places over time and for ecological equilibria to be upset, so 
that inhabitants of niches become dislodged and possibly replaced by new tenants, 
resulting in the establishment of new equilibria.
In another classic definition that competes with Elton’s, Evelyn Hutchinson 
(1957) distinguishes between the “fundamental” and “realised niche” of a spe-
cies. The former is defined in abstraction from all constraining factors, such as 
competition and predator-prey relationships, as a hypothetical “n-dimensional 
hypervolume”, to be described as a geometric function, and composed of the 
coordinates of all values of all relevant variables in the ecological environment 
of some species. That space is bounded by the limit values of those variables 
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that, in the absence of concrete constraining factors, would be compatible with 
the continued existence of the species under consideration, and it will thus be 
filled by the suitable ranges of these values. The realised niche is the sector of 
this hypothetical hypervolume that is circumscribed by a given set of concrete 
constraining factors. Realised niches, then, are always subject to the whims of the 
current conditions of realisation, and may change over time or may be changed by 
the organisms, for better or for worse. On the level of realised niches, a dynamic 
aspect enters the conception of ecological niches that allows for the notion of 
niches being modified by their inhabitants. On the level of fundamental niches, 
evolutionary change of the constitution of a species will be the exclusive provider 
of dynamics. In addition, specificity is acknowledged in terms of the variable 
dimensions and extension of the mathematical spaces of both fundamental and 
realised niches for each species. However, these notions are not systematically 
elaborated with respect to the possibility of organisms modifying the dimensions 
and extension of that space.
The Grinnellian, Eltonian and Hutchinsonian niche concepts are, first, partly 
idealising in an unfavourable way in that they abstract from concrete conditions 
of realisation and the specific properties and activities of specific organisms. In 
the case of Hutchinsonian niches, this critique applies to the notion of the funda-
mental niche, whereas the Grinnellian niche concept is altogether exempt from 
it. Second, these definitions are static to the extent that they do not sufficiently 
account for the possible effects of the behaviour of organisms on the shape of a 
niche, with partial exemption for Hutchinson’s realised niches.
It is these two points on which Richard Lewontin’s critique of what he deems 
the received view of organism-environment relations, and hence ecological niches, 
picks up. He argues that an environment is not merely a set of pre-existing condi-
tions to which organisms would adapt in reactive fashion, by the trial-and-error 
process of random variation and natural selection. If this were so, those external 
conditions would be the fixed problems to which their adaptations were the fixed 
solutions (Lewontin 1982, 162). Conversely, an organism’s traits, on the view 
criticised by Lewontin, would “map the demands of the environment through 
adaptation” (2000, 47). Instead, an environment, on the Lewontian view broadly 
shared here, is both dynamic in bi-directional fashion and specific to an organism:
The environment of an organism is the penumbra of external conditions that 
are relevant to it because it has effective interactions with those aspects of the 
outer world.
(Lewontin 2000, 48f )
To illustrate this point, Lewontin notes that one would find it hard to describe the 
environment of an organism without first describing the activities of that organism 
(Lewontin 2000, 50f ). In his earlier essay on the same topic, he goes one step fur-
ther when he says: “Indeed, an environment is nature organized by an organism” 
(Lewontin 1982, 160) – a view that may be aptly labelled as “environmental con-
structivism”. Environmental construction, on Lewontin’s account, will include 
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any intervention by an organism or population into processes in the external envi-
ronment that changes conditions therein in such a way that the intervention in 
question becomes a necessary part of the explanation of the nature of the organism 
or population and their adaptive success – or failure. The construction of environ-
ments is not to be understood in a literal sense, although the building of material 
structures might be involved.
On the face of it, construction, Lewontin-style, refers to the observation that 
some properties of the environment might be modified by behaviours of the 
organism, not only in terms of animals building structures in their environments, 
but more broadly in terms of certain variables being affected by the behaviour in 
question, where these variables might be relevant to the organism himself or to 
other organisms inhabiting the same slice of space-time, or a subsequent one. For 
example a herd of grazing animals is likely to affect the shape of the flora and soil 
conditions of their pastures, both in the short and in the long term. The effects of 
their grazing might also improve the conditions for reproduction of some inedible 
plants that would otherwise be outcompeted by those now eaten by the animals.
Lewontian environmental construction also includes cases where features of 
the environment remain physically unaltered while being treated in such a way 
as to affect the attainment of an organism’s or population’s goals. This kind of 
construction seems to be implied in his example of subspecies of Drosophila 
pseudoobscura and their humidity preferences (Lewontin 2000, 53f ): one would 
expect that the subspecies from drier regions have a lower humidity preference 
than those from more humid regions, but the reverse was demonstrated to hold. 
The arid-environment subspecies live in small crevices in which the little mois-
ture there is in those environments accumulates. In this case, the term “construc-
tion” refers to the activity of animals seeking out microhabitats with suitable 
conditions, which will count as their environments proper, rather than an activity 
of modifying conditions in that microhabitat.
These cases should be distinguished from a third type of intervention by organ-
isms into environmental conditions that was also subsumed under the “construc-
tion” label by Lewontin: situations where the effects of an organism’s behaviours 
undermine rather than foster the attainment of his goals or his chances of repro-
duction. For example the behaviours of a grazing herd might affect rates of soil 
erosion in their territory, thus possibly undermining their own chances of repro-
duction while, at the same time, being beneficial to algae or bacteria living off the 
nutrients swept downstream during this year’s rainy season. Hence, the overgraz-
ing herd might contribute to constructing the niche, and to improving the ecologi-
cal environment, for some plant in some remote place while ultimately destroying 
its own ecological environment. Such accidental side effects only indirectly, and 
clearly only negatively, relate to the possible adaptive functions of the traits that 
produce those effects. It is here the latest where Lewontin’s notion of environmen-
tal construction becomes too broad to be entirely useful, as Peter Godfrey-Smith 
(1996a) observes.
Theories of niche construction, having found their paradigmatic formulations 
in F. John Odling-Smee et al. (1996; 2003), with Meredith West and Andrew 
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King (1987) as relevant predecessors, may provide more focus to the notion of 
construction involved here. Broadly speaking, ecological niches are the specific 
sets of conditions in an environment that are reproductively relevant to a certain 
population. Different populations inhabiting one area at one time will depend on 
different sets of conditions at that place at that time. The make-up of these con-
ditions partly depends on the activities of the organisms themselves. If there is 
some adaptive function to the construction of features of the environment, these 
features will become part of the necessary conditions in an explanation of an 
organism’s success on a proximate behavioural or an ultimate selective level, or 
both. If these features are indeed part of the necessary conditions in question, 
there are good reasons to view them as coupled with the organism: he has to track 
the presence of some feature and put himself in the right relation to it, or he has 
to modify some feature in order to prevail. These necessary conditions, whether 
found or made, will make up his niche.
Although the views of niche and environmental constructivism are related, their 
terminology diverges, and with it, perhaps inadvertently, the general argument’s 
focus. Ecological niches are specific by definition on the niche construction view, 
whether they are static or dynamic in nature. Hence, attention will be drawn to the 
latter aspect: are niches found or constructed? Environments, in turn, are specific 
only on some accounts – as, for example, for von Uexküll and, in some respects, 
Lewontin – but are more readily accepted to be dynamic affairs. Hence, the argu-
ment will gravitate towards the aspect of specificity: what particular contribu-
tions do organisms make to the dynamics of their environment? To be sure, these 
aspects interlock: if an organism makes a number of contributions to the shape 
and dynamics of his environment, some of these contributions will be relevant to 
himself, and hence be specific. If, in turn, an organism creates the niche that he 
inhabits, he will also have altered his environment. However, as we have seen, not 
all of the contributions that an organism makes to his environment will actually be 
constructive with respect to creating his niche. The third mode of environmental 
construction implicated by Lewontin in particular, namely that of undermining 
the conditions necessary for reproductive success, is not part of the concept of 
niche construction. Nor will all aspects of niche construction involve construction 
in a material sense. There are subtle distinctions to be made, and I will return to 
Godfrey-Smith (1996a) in the next section to elaborate on them.
For a start, however, it will be sensible to assume that organisms, in manifold 
ways, contribute to the environmental conditions under which they thrive – or 
fail to thrive. The activities involved need not always be adaptive: by altering 
the environment, animals change the conditions to which they will have to react 
further down the timeline, and sometimes these changes might actually be for 
the worse. One of the puzzles Lewontin sets out to solve is why, if adaptation 
by natural selection plays such a prominent role in evolution, organisms are not 
optimally adapted to their environments. If the conditions in some population’s 
environment remain largely stable over time, one would expect that some state of 
optimal adaptive fit will be reached in many instances – if only conditions remain 
stable for long enough. Besides environmental pressure from competitors and 
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other externally induced changes in environmental conditions that work against 
long-term stability, part of both the agency of change and the blame for sub-
optimality may lie with the organisms themselves.
The aspects of specificity of an environment to an organism and of the bi-directional 
nature of the organism-environment dynamics are probably best integrated in an 
approach that, among other strands of heterodox biological theorising, incorpo-
rates environmental and niche constructionism, and that has become known as 
developmental systems theory (abbreviated DST and introduced by Susan Oyama 
2000). Being a deliberate change of perspective on the animate realm rather than 
a conventional predictive theory, as Oyama et al. (2001, 1f ) admit in the introduc-
tion to their developmental systems anthology, it reverses the direction of change 
taken by Richard Dawkins (1999) in his “gene’s eye view”: Dawkins suggests a 
perspective of inquiry under which the organism ultimately becomes “transpar-
ent” (1999, 4f, 250), so that what becomes visible instead are replicating gene 
sequences of which the organism and his environment in conjunction are the 
wider environment in which it acts, and which it manipulates. Thereby, the notion 
of the gene as the basic unit of natural selection shall be defended.
In contrast to this paradigm of an adaptationist view, a developmental system 
is introduced as a theoretical concept to comprise the conjunction of organismic 
and environmental factors that accounts for the presence of certain phenotypic 
traits within an organism or population, where environmental and non-genetic 
organismic factors are considered as intrinsic to the development of the organ-
ism as genetic ones. On the one hand, an identical set of genes might be found in 
clearly distinct phenotypes. For example first-generation worker ants of a newly 
founded colony, one of whose tasks is to construct many of the standard features 
of ant colonies, will look and behave differently from genetically identical later 
generation specimen raised in the fully established colony, and hence in an envi-
ronment that was shaped by those first generations (Gordon 2001). Similarly, the 
sex of turtles and crocodiles is not genetically determined but depends on environ-
mental temperature during embryonic development (Bateson 2001). On the other 
hand, modification of environmental factors may affect the development of traits 
that match with environmentally unmodified genetic variants, hence providing 
for distinct developmental routes to a similar phenotype, as in the phenomenon of 
“phenocopying” (Goldschmidt 1949).
Either way, the focus of inquiry has to be on the combined system, with envi-
ronmental factors fully integrated but not necessarily interchangeable with genetic 
ones, and with the key unit of analysis often not being the individual organism 
but supra-individual entities. The very notion of one central unit of control in 
development might be misguided to begin with. Even mechanisms of inherit-
ance might be distributed over a variety of factors, including persistent struc-
tures in the environment. There is no such thing as genetic information that could 
be taken by itself and still be informative about what phenotype an organism 
will develop. Such would be the case only if “strong instructionism” were true, 
that is if genetic information were supposed to fully specify phenotypic traits 
(Wheeler and Clark 1999; 2008). Rather than being relegated to the status of 
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context, however important, to the content of the genetic code, environmental and 
other non-genetic factors are placed on equal explanatory footing with respect to 
informing biological development. Some developmental systems theorists even 
reject the notion of genetic information altogether, and speak of genetic and non-
genetic inheritance of developmental resources instead (Griffiths and Gray 2001). 
One may prefer, but will not need, to adopt this latter view in order to appreciate 
how complex, dynamic and bi-directional the relation between organismic and 
environmental factors in development and evolution is. One may actually wish 
to retain the notion of genetic information in order to appreciate the interplay 
between information as specification and the specificity of organism-environment 
relations that often makes the former appear as underspecifying.
Construction and constitution
The ambiguity in Lewontin’s argument among activities of construction in a lit-
eral sense, general modification of conditions by organisms, and the tracking of 
local conditions may have a very interesting upshot for my general argument. So 
it may be worthwhile to spell out the nature of construction involved here in some 
more detail. A critical inquiry of this kind has been undertaken by Godfrey-Smith 
(1996a, Chapter 5) in his account of the function of cognition as a means of coping 
with environmental complexity. He managed to distinguish between no fewer than 
five notions of construction in Lewontin’s work. Construction may simply refer to 
modification of conditions in the external environment, where these changes are 
observable and measurable. It may, however, also involve the creation of proper-
ties of the environment that would not exist, sensu strictu, in absence of an organ-
ism’s behaviours, where some of the properties are not observable and measurable 
in the same sense as changes to the external environment. Hence, organisms may 
be involved in activities in which properties of the environment are either con-
structed or constituted by their behaviours (see Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 144f ).
In Godfrey-Smith’s terms, “construction of the environment exists when-
ever an organism intervenes in formerly autonomous physical processes in the 
external world, changing their course and upshot” (Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145). 
A formicary, a fox earth or, most paradigmatically perhaps, a beaver dam are 
features causally and materially constructed by organisms in a quite straight-
forward sense, and will be relevant to the respective animals’ reproduction. 
Godfrey-Smith’s take on construction, however, does not account for one sort 
of case of direct physical modification that Lewontin had in mind, namely situ-
ations where organisms overpopulate or pollute their environments, or other-
wise causally undermine their livelihood and hence end up constructing their 
environments with reverse signs, as it were, in ecological and selective terms. 
Only physical changes that do have or may acquire an adaptive function for the 
organism and that may hence be subsumed under an evolutionary strategy for 
the organism are counted in by Godfrey-Smith, and only modifications that add 
structures to the external environment or alter its overall shape in relevant ways 
will count as construction proper.
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A somewhat more abstract but equally important relation is established when 
organisms constitute elements of their environments: “Features of the environment 
which were not physically put there by the organism are nonetheless dependent 
upon the organism’s faculties for their existence, individual identity or structure” 
(Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 145). An organism who brings himself into a relation to 
some environmental variable so that it suits his needs, by moving or otherwise 
behaving towards that variable, will be the paradigm of constitutive relations. 
On the physical side, the effects may well be negligible but, as in the case of a 
herd’s territory, much in the life of the population depends on treating or perceiv-
ing certain features of the external environment in certain ways. A herd’s terri-
tory, which, although having a spatio-temporal extension and sometimes being 
bounded by topographical features, too, will be sufficiently defined only by the 
herd’s population dynamics, patterns of spatial movement, interaction with other 
populations and so forth, and the extension of that territory will alter in accord-
ance with changes in these factors. A slice of space-time becomes an animal’s or 
population’s territory only by virtue of the animals behaving towards objects and 
organisms within that slice in a certain way while behaving differently, or not at 
all, towards objects outside that slice. The territorial animal acts upon the relation 
between the nature of an object or of another organism he encounters and their 
relative placement inside vs. outside the slice of space-time that is treated by the 
animal as his territory. The territorial animal hence deals with domain-specific 
regularities as outlined in NI-5 in the previous chapter, and doing so will be part 
of creating and maintaining his ecological niche.
The common denominator of constituted features of the environment, which 
include a variety of other ecological relations, such as being a mate or a com-
petitor or a specific microhabitat, is that they can only be relationally defined. 
The physical nature of the objects and organisms inside and outside the slice of 
space-time that an animal treats as his territory does not make the difference in 
terms of relevance to the organism, apart from their relative placement inside vs. 
outside of that slice. Their being placed inside vs. outside the territory is not an 
intrinsic property of those objects and organisms but a relational property that 
exists only in view of the behaviours of the territorial animal. Where a beaver dam 
is a material structure with a function to the organism, a territory, mate or com-
petitor exists only in relation to the organisms involved in treating other things 
and beings under that relation.2 Similarly, a microhabitat, such as the crevices 
in the case of the arid-environment Drosophila pseudoobscura, although defined 
by local variance in physical conditions, does exist as that microhabitat only by 
virtue of being treated by the organism in a certain way, namely by virtue of his 
activity of tracking the variance and invariance in local conditions and moving 
where conditions are suitable.
In the light of these observations, it might seem that at least some elements 
of environments are indeed subjectively defined. As for natural information, this 
would be a premature conclusion though. That the existence and shape of terri-
tories have the presence and the behaviours of organisms as their necessary pre-
condition does not make these entities restricted, ontologically, as it were, to the 
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organisms’ particular perspective. What they are restricted to is the domain of 
ecological and selective environments, and these can be described only in relation 
to the organisms inhabiting them. If a population moves to a different place, for 
example in response to depletion of resources, it will establish a new territory that 
will be demarcated by its members’ behaviours, which will possibly include the 
use of some signals to the effect of marking the boundaries of the territory. Hence, 
environmental entities constituted in such fashion are independently observable, 
although by different means than direct physical modifications, namely by proxy 
of the behaviours of the organisms and their effects.3 In this respect, observing 
and describing constitutive relations to an environment parallels observing and 
describing intrinsic information in perception.
Godfrey-Smith’s distinction between organisms constructing and constituting 
features of the environment, although not identical with the distinction between 
physical and informational properties of the environment, stands in an instruc-
tive relation to the latter. Taken by themselves, physical conditions directly affect 
behaviour, and are directly affected by it. Completion of a beaver dam will quite 
directly improve conditions of success for the beaver’s foraging behaviour, and 
hence will act positively on his reproductive chances. Cattle and beaver may be 
able to collect information on the physical changes they purposefully or inadvert-
ently brought about. Some of the world affairs they encounter will then serve as 
signals of these changes. The animals might even be aware, to some extent, of the 
effects of these changes on themselves. Although the ability to use information on 
self-induced physical changes in the environment – on the possibilities and the 
consequences – is common currency among higher animals, there is a necessity 
for doing so only in a subset of cases. The animals may fail to grasp the changes 
they induce and still get along well (although not in the case of overgrazing cat-
tle, but these are not constructive activities in Godfrey-Smith’s sense anyway). In 
contrast, the constitution of features of the environment is always informationally 
based, because it by definition involves treating these features as something in 
relation to the organism himself, for example as being part vs. not being part of 
one’s territory. The degree to which the uptake of information is involved in either 
case depends both on the number of variables an organism has to rely on and the 
degrees of variance in these relevant variables.
Not least for their orthogonal relation to the kind and amount of natural informa-
tion involved, constitution and construction are strategies that are not correlated 
with degrees of organic complexity, let alone a presumed hierarchy in the tree of 
life between primitive and advanced organisms. Although building artefacts, on 
the face of it, may look like more of an accomplishment than moving to where 
the conditions are right or treating an area as a territory, many higher animals, 
too, will be found to follow the strategy of constitution rather than construction 
in order to cope with the vagaries of their environments. As examples, Godfrey-
Smith’s contrasts cockroaches, hawks and dolphins as followers of the constitu-
tive strategy with termites, beavers and human beings as constructors (1996a, 
146). Animals of different degrees of complexity in organic and behavioural traits 
may follow either strategy.
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Construction and constitution are distinct strategies, and they will stand in 
various relations to the use of natural information, from information-extensive to 
information-intensive. This distinction should, however, not lead us to the con-
clusion that these strategies were mutually exclusive. We are much more likely 
to find differences of degree between them, with few organisms populating areas 
near the extreme ends of the spectrum. Conceptually useful as Godfrey-Smith’s 
distinction between constitutive and constructive relations is, it should not mis-
guide us into believing that we will find an equally neat distinction when empiri-
cally describing the behaviours of organisms. We are much more likely to find 
them combined in different arrangements across the entire spectrum of organic 
diversity and complexity. By implication, there will be instances of activities that 
include constitutive and constructive elements in conjunction.
An animal who marks his territory might not only be picking up natural infor-
mation related to physical conditions that bound his territory. He may also be 
placing physical markers in the external environment, so as to make them per-
ceptible to conspecifics who will then adjust their behaviour to the informa-
tion they encounter. The features constructed by one animal may hence play a 
constitutive role for the behaviour of another. The effect will possibly be sym-
metrical, in terms of adaptive functions, while the process is not, as different 
activities are involved on the sender and receiver sides respectively. We might 
also encounter the condition that neither un-constructed information nor physi-
cal markers alone are sufficient to provide the required information. Only the 
two in conjunction will be sufficient. Although the effect of what is constructed 
might be material in an immediate sense, for example in physically keeping 
the other animal off one’s territory, it is more likely to be mainly or wholly 
informational.
Similar conditions will hold for any population where, besides the uptake of 
natural information by individuals, signals are purposefully created and trans-
mitted between individuals in accordance with some adaptive function, such 
as for warning cries or mating displays. For many animals, the making of their 
own ecological and selective environments involves the production of struc-
tures and events that occupy an intermediate position that integrates aspects of 
physically constructing environmental features and constituting specific rela-
tions between themselves and existing features of the external environment. 
Any active signalling within populations and any creation of artefacts that store 
and provide information for other members of some population, but also any 
signalling with deceptive intent to some potential prey or predator that deterio-
rates the receiver’s informational situation, will characteristically occupy this 
intermediate position. If and when that signalling involves learning and some 
kind of accumulation and transmission between individuals in a population over 
time, not only the construction/constitution distinction is blurred in an informa-
tive way, but also the distinction between ecology and history of some popula-
tion, in making information that was present in the past available and relevant 
to the present, independent of what physical conditions may matter in a given 
situation.
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Notes
1  Most of the controversy between Gould, Lewontin, Vrba and their main opponents 
(Dawkins 1999, Chapter 3; Dennett 1995, Chapter 10) does not concern whether phe-
nomena such as spandrels and exaptations actually exist but what implications their 
admission to evolutionary processes has: do they invalidate or only require us to 
amend the hypothesis that adaptation by natural selection is the key to evolutionary 
explanations?
2  The distinction at issue here is not entirely unlike the ontological distinction in the social 
studies of science between the construction of artefacts and the social construction of 
institutions, such as marriage, money or courts, as “realities created by references to 
them” (Bloor 1996, 842). The difference, of course, is that the latter realities are created 
in the course of shared linguistic practice, and thus on a higher level of informational 
complexity.
3  A similar point is made by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999, 269) who note in their discus-
sion of Brandon (1995) that it is an empirical truth that organisms may modify their 
external environments, whereas it is a conceptual truth that they modify their ecological 
and selective environments. These latter kinds of environment are always determined in 
relation to the organism – by definition, as it were.
Before providing more substance to my preliminary suggestions on purposefully 
produced signals and informational artefacts in Part II, it will be important to sys-
tematically match the account of organism-environment relations outlined in the 
preceding chapter against the account of natural information developed in Chap-
ters 2 through 4. How is an environment informationally specific to an organ-
ism? How does the specificity of informational relations match with situations of 
underspecification?
In order to at least point towards an answer to these questions, I will now work 
towards a proposal that is based on a definition of what I will call “informa-
tional environments”. This term was first used, to my knowledge, by Kim Sterelny 
(2003), with a partly similar meaning but, as we will see, within the context of 
a partly different argument. Keeping track of some of the similarities and differ-
ences to his account will be instructive to the present subject matter. Moreover, it 
will be useful to accord my account of informational environments with the con-
ceptual distinctions between external vs. ecological (vs. selective) environments 
and constitution vs. construction introduced in the preceding chapter. Hence, in 
conclusion of Part I of this book, I will prepare and then present a definition of 
informational environments, and take a look at what happens when informational 
environments happen to change or are actively changed.
Environmental information and the use of cognition
In the previous chapter, I referred to Robert Brandon (1995) as identifying eco-
logical environments, being the environments of main interest here, as the set of 
conditions generally relevant to an organism or population in terms of growth 
and reproduction. I also mobilised Richard Lewontin (1982), F. John Odling-
Smee et al. (1996) and developmental systems theory to argue that ecological 
environments and, more specifically, ecological niches, are partly of an organ-
ism’s and population’s own making. Last, I referred to Peter Godfrey-Smith 
(1996a) and his more specific account of how organisms and populations enter 
into relations of constructing and constituting aspects of their environment 




What is an informational environment? 93
At first blush, none of these accounts seem to include a role for information 
to play in determining the set of relevant conditions or to be part of these condi-
tions. With respect to the distinction among external, ecological and selective 
environments, this observation is correct, yet the exclusion of information on this 
level does not amount to an omission. Instead, it warrants a conceptual generality 
that is fully adequate: many organisms neither are able nor need to collect much 
information on many or most of the relevant conditions in their environment in 
order to meet their adaptive needs. To an external observer though, the traits and 
demographic performance of those organisms may provide information on con-
ditions in their environments, in terms of covariance with the values of some 
relevant variable or variables in that environment. Conversely, the definition of an 
ecological environment, in terms of the set of conditions relevant to an organism, 
is impartial to whether and how information is collected about these conditions 
by its inhabitants. What matters first is that the respective conditions are relevant.
With respect to the construction/constitution case, Godfrey-Smith actually does 
not omit information from his account of the relation between environmental com-
plexity and the function of cognition of which that distinction is part. Instead, he 
reserves his use of a vocabulary of information for what can be modelled in terms 
of Lewis- Skyrms style sender-receiver games (Godfrey-Smith 2013a; 2013b; see 
the discussion in Chapter 2). Natural information will not fall within the exten-
sion of this more restricted usage, where “unsent signs” figure as “cues” instead. 
Terminological preferences aside, Godfrey-Smith is duly concerned with the role 
of what I have been referring to as natural information (aka cues) in environments 
as a constituent of cognitive processes. His view echoes Fred Dretske’s theory of 
information in some respects:
Cognition is useful in an environment which is characterised by:
(i) variability with respect to distal conditions that make a difference to 
the organism’s well-being, and by
(ii) stability with respect to relations between these distal conditions and 
proximal and observable conditions.
[. . .] Cognition is most favored when there are (i) environmental conditions 
salient to the organism, which are not directly observable, and which are not 
stable or predictable in advance, and when there are also (ii) highly reliable 
correlations between these distal states and states which the organism can 
observe or detect more directly.
(Godfrey-Smith 1996a, 118)
It is the “highly reliable correlations” between distal and proximal affairs that 
count as information in this context, where the distal affairs are the conditions at 
the source and the proximal affairs are the signals. Variability at the source is as 
important to the role of information in cognition as stability and unequivocality 
of the correlations (for the terminology used in this reconstruction, see NI-4 and 
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its sub-clauses in Chapter 4). Variability at the source is what makes information 
relevant to the receiver. The set of relevant variable conditions at the source and 
the likeliness of signals to occur when certain conditions at the source obtain 
determine the reference class for the informational relations. On this account, high 
variability but not randomness at the source and little variability in their correla-
tions to proximate, signalling states are what provides a function for cognition.
On the view presented by Godfrey-Smith, an environment may be too dull 
to warrant any cognitive effort on the one hand, in terms of the relevant distal 
conditions being too stable and too predictable to provide sufficient grounding 
for any adaptive function for mechanisms of memory, learning, inference and so 
forth. Dretske’s magnetotactic bacteria may serve as an example of organisms 
living in such a dull environment. There is only one variable that is information-
ally relevant to the bacterium, and the correlation between the direction of the 
Earth’s magnetic field and the gradient of oxygen concentration in marine waters 
is extremely stable. Unless, however, the bacteria were simply being pulled down-
ward by magnetic forces instead of the organisms actively following the lines of 
the magnetic field as a proxy of the gradient of oxygen concentration, there will 
be information involved in tracking that one relevant variable. Still, the evolution 
of cognitive abilities will require more than that.
On the other hand, an environment may also be too chaotic to warrant any 
cognitive effort if distal conditions change randomly or if there are no reliable 
correlations to proximal affairs that the organism could detect. There would be 
no information for him to use in cognitive processes. Here, sheer resilience in 
organic functions or the ability to reproduce in large quantities whenever condi-
tions are favourable will be workable strategies. This is as close as it gets for 
life to being information free. According to Sterelny (2003, 149), this kind of 
case forms a class of its own, besides “tracking” favourable conditions (the con-
stitutive strategy in Godfrey-Smith’s terminology) and “ecological engineering” 
(the constructive strategy). This is the strategy of “adapting” to conditions in the 
environment, which seems to echo that classical interpretation of adaptation in 
evolutionary theory on which environmental pressure works on lineages of other-
wise inert organic matter. Here, however, it is only one class of strategies among 
others to create an organism-environment fit, not the expression of a natural law 
of natural selection.
Conditions will be neither too dull nor too chaotic for any animal that uses natu-
ral information in cognition. It would look reasonable to assume, within Godfrey-
Smith’s conceptual framework, that purposefully created signals might be used 
in the same fashion. If the function of the mind, on his “Environmental Com-
plexity Thesis” (1996a, 3) explicated in the previous quotation, is to “enable the 
agent to deal with environmental complexity”, and if environmental complexity is 
understood as the heterogeneity and variability of conditions therein, purposefully 
produced signalling events or artefacts may serve as an environmentally rooted 
means of dealing with a given situation of complexity in a manner analogous to 
natural information, as long as they fulfil the second of the aforementioned condi-
tions, namely that of stability of relations between proximal and distal conditions. 
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There might or might not be a competitor claiming that pasture over there as his 
territory. His markings will tell me, even if I cannot see him. There might or might 
not be a predator around the corner. Another individual’s warning call will tell me, 
even if I cannot see that predator myself.
There are two apparent reasons why Godfrey-Smith does not consider the pos-
sibility of an analogy of functions between natural information and purposefully 
produced signals: first, his concept of cognition is explicitly restricted to a prag-
matic interpretation in the Deweyan tradition, where it figures as a problem-solving 
capacity possessed by individuals in the first place. Perceptual cues that directly 
guide action in a Gibsonian sense are, on Godfrey-Smith’s view, no natural com-
ponent of this picture of cognition. This, however, might not be the only or the best 
way of relating Gibson’s work to the tradition of American pragmatism of which 
Dewey was part. Both Anthony Chemero (2009) and Harry Heft (2001) draw a 
fairly direct genealogical and systematic line between the “American naturalists”, 
particularly and respectively James Dewey and William James, and James Jerome 
Gibson’s ecological psychology. Gibson’s conspicuous eschewal of mental repre-
sentations as explanantia in an empirical psychology is cited as a key testimony 
to that heritage. At the end of Chapter 7, I will suggest that Dewey’s notion of 
the organism-environment relation offers another analogy to the Gibsonian view. 
According to Godfrey-Smith’s view of cognition, Gibsonian perception-action 
will be a worthwhile strategy only in an environment that is distally relatively 
more dull than, for example, a human environment, but still proximally reliable. 
One part of my argument, however, was to maintain in a Gibsonian vein that much 
of human activity is just as directly guided by perception as that of cognitively 
more humble animals. This does not amount to dismissing the importance of the 
additional accomplishment of internal sender-receiver games that constitute cog-
nition, and Godfrey-Smith’s merit lies in describing the conditions under which 
cognition, in the traditional narrow sense (no pejorative connotations intended 
for either predicate), is valuable. However, maintaining that direct perception is 
essential to human action, too, implies that only some, however important, aspects 
of human environments provide the right sort of distal-variability/proximal-relia-
bility ratio to ground a set of functions for higher-order, narrow cognition.
Second, if cognition is defined as an internally based problem-solving capacity 
on the background of the kind and level of environmental complexity an organism 
has to deal with, the possibility will not be acknowledged that the accomplish-
ment of some of the tasks of coping with environmental complexity, and hence, in 
Godfrey-Smith’s terms, cognitive tasks, may be delegated to the environment by 
means of informational artefacts that still remain constituents of cognition proper. 
I will discuss the possibility of constructed entities in the environment that play 
this latter kind of role in cognitive processes in more detail in the next two chap-
ters (Chapters 7 and 8). It will suffice to say for now that, even if one sticks to 
the view that cognition should be considered as a set of internal, neurally based 
processes in the first place, there are good reasons to believe that creating signals 
and placing them in the environment does amount to a kind of externalisation of 
the accomplishment of cognitive tasks into the environment, especially in view of 
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the fact that environments are normally shared between individuals and require 
coordinated activities.
A third and possibly stronger reason for assuming that signalling within an organ-
ism and the purposeful placement of signals and informational artefacts in the envi-
ronment are disanalogous affairs is provided by Sterelny (2003, Chapter 2): the 
production of signals by an organism, especially when directed towards organisms 
outside one’s own population, may not always and not even typically serve coopera-
tive purposes. Although the uptake of natural information on physical conditions in 
the environment is a straightforward affair, Sterelny argues, everyone who, like the 
proponents of behaviour-based AI, focuses on this kind of information misses the 
importance of signals that are made with the purpose of deception. A potential prey 
may use mimicry in order to trick a predator into mistaking him for a poisonous or 
otherwise unpleasant animal, or a predator may use camouflage in order to making 
him being mistaken for a piece of a plant or otherwise benign object in the environ-
ment. In such cases, the function of the signals or structures in question is to actually 
reduce reliability and unequivocality of the information available to the receiver, 
and hence deprive the signals of their informational, that is specifying character. 
Only if and when means of finer discrimination or additional cues are or become 
available to the receiver, can the signals in question be disambiguated.
Hence, Sterelny concludes (in explicit reference to Godfrey-Smith 1996a), one 
key function of cognition is to match less-than-reliable cues encountered in a 
multifarious, “informationally translucent” environment against each other. Pre-
cognitive “detection systems” that are confined to one or a few non-integrated 
information channels will be a viable option for organisms who are relatively 
more robust and specialised in their constitution and, as the flip side of the same 
coin, live in less variable, “informationally transparent” environments than those 
generalists for whom a complex array of conditions will matter and who have 
a rich repertoire of responses to match variation in their environments. For the 
latter, “robust tracking” will be the best solution. An “informationally opaque” 
or, in the terms referred to earlier, chaotic environment will, in terms of adaptive 
economics, not warrant that effort but favour fixed responses and resilience. The 
environment whose informational characteristics are most suitable to the evo-
lution of complex cognitive functions, as Sterelny argues, is neither transparent 
(or dull) enough to always and in all respects provide reliable cues nor opaque (or 
chaotic) enough to automatically frustrate any cognitive effort.
What informational environments are
On the background of the preceding discussion, let me now introduce an account 
of informational environments that caters for the various shades of informational 
characteristics of environments as outlined by Sterelny (2003), from opaque to 
transparent, while reserving the character of being genuinely informational to 
those signals which actually serve an adaptive function for its receivers. In depar-
ture from the distinction between natural cues and sender-receiver games pro-
posed by Godfrey-Smith, my account shall equally cover natural and purposefully 
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produced signals, to the extent that the latter have a bearing on their senders’ 
and receivers’ ecological environments. That bearing typically – but not always – 
consists in serving purposes of coordination and cooperation within a population 
of users, that is senders and receivers of such signals. Situations of competition 
and deception will constitute a relevant special case. In terms of a definition, my 
account will assume the following shape:
(IE-1)  The informational environment E of a receiver R is the subset of the 
proximal events and objects present in his external environment that 
I-regularly covary with F-conditions at a distal source s and can be 
detected by R, as outlined in NI-1,. . ., 5 (see Chapter 4), where
(a)  the F-conditions at s signalled by members of a type r within E are 
in a broad sense ecologically relevant to a population of individu-
als {R1,. . ., Rn} of which R is a member, so that the detection of r 
serves an adaptive function to them;
(b)  the relations between tokens of r and F-conditions at s are, glob-
ally or within domains D, either (i) stable and unequivocal as such, 
or (ii) can be disambiguated to a sufficient degree by members of 
{R1,. . ., Rn}, provided that ecological conditions in their environ-
ment remain within a normal range;
(c)  the degree of variance in reliability of information according to 
IE-1b accounts for the relative richness vs. impoverishment of an 
informational environment with respect to R’s constitution and 
abilities, provided that detectability conditions remain above the 
threshold described in NI-4d.
(IE-2)  E may contain types of purposefully created signals ra whose emission 
or detection serve adaptive functions for a population of cooperating or 
coordinated {R1,. . ., Rn}, where
(a)  type ra signals are produced by individuals within {R1,. . ., Rn} and 
thus are constructed aspects of the environment that can be used 
towards constitutive purposes with respect to F-conditions at s;
(b)  type ra signals can be used by members of {R1,. . ., Rn} either (i) in 
analogous fashion to natural type r signals, as in IE-2a, or (ii) will 
introduce new mapping regularities or new kinds of sources sa or 
F-conditions at s, with detectability conditions as outlined in NI-4 
having to apply;
(c)  there is a possibility that members of {R1,. . ., Rn} produce signals of a 
type rd that have as their adaptive function not the provision of infor-
mation to members of that same population but interference with the 
informational situation for other, non-cooperating {R1
l,. . ., Rn
l}.
(IE-3)  Conditions within E might be partly controlled and modified by mem-
bers of {R1,. . ., Rn}, so as to maintain or create stability, unequivocality 
and detectability conditions for type r signals.
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An organism’s informational environment is thus made up of those proximal 
signals, natural or artificial, which, under normal conditions, relate to distal condi-
tions that are ecologically relevant to him. It is the stability and unequivocality of 
the informational relations between what he receives as signals and the variable 
conditions at the distal end that enable him to deal with the relative uncertainty 
on that latter side. That stability and unequivocality, however, cannot be taken for 
granted, as both ecological and informational conditions in his environment may 
be subject to change, and as they may be so independently from each other. In 
analogy to ecological environments, informational environments are specific to 
an organism’s constitution and abilities. Even if and when external environmental 
conditions are identical, informational environments will be at variance between 
differently disposed organisms. The information present in the environment will 
be taken up differently, by different means, and will be relevant in different ways 
and acted upon differently. The activities will include the possibility for organ-
isms to modify informational environments in accordance with their specific 
needs and purposes.
Under what I called “normal” conditions in IE-1b – which are to be understood 
in Ruth Millikan’s sense as conditions that are necessary and partly sufficient for 
an explanation of the nature and the functions of whatever is being reproduced 
in a given context (Millikan 2004, 33f ) – the informational environment is made 
up of those informational relations which, qua being sufficiently reliable proxies 
of relevant conditions at the source, actually are relevant to an organism. They 
have assumed their status as relevant over the course of a history of interactions 
between organism and a subset of the ecologically relevant conditions in the envi-
ronment that involved and turned out do depend on the presence of signals of a 
given type.
The ecological relevance mentioned in IE-1a is characterised as “broad” 
because no direct effect of the conditions at the source or the presence of some 
signal on R’s reproductive chances is required. The effects may well be indirect, 
in terms of informational conditions affecting the success rates of responses to 
conditions at the source that have an effect on the reproduction of the behaviours 
themselves rather than the reproductive chances of its bearers. The paradigms 
of this kind of situation include all instances of practices that are transmitted 
between individuals and hence reproduced by means of observational learning, 
and thus all sorts of phenomena investigated under the “cultural evolution” or 
“dual inheritance” monikers (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man 1981; Tomasello 1999). Behaviours may be directly replicated by imitation 
or reproduced in view of their purposes in what is called emulation learning. 
Either way, their reproduction is subject to mechanisms of selection of its own, 
whose primary target are the distal conditions to which those behaviours relate. 
Hence, many things that are not a matter of life or death and, by consequence, 
many things that are not selectively relevant in a strict biological sense, may be 
relevant to some organism or population in less dramatic and more indirect but 
nonetheless important ways – which, if and when effects persist and accumulate, 
might have implications for biological evolution.
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The difference between an organism’s ecological and his informational 
environments is this: an ecological environment is constituted of those variables 
and their respective ranges at the distal end that are relevant to an organism. It is 
possible but not necessary that the organism can also detect the values of those 
variables. He might be built for resilience or fast reproduction instead. An infor-
mational environment, in turn, is constituted of those proximal affairs, naturally 
present in the environment or produced and reproduced in behaviour, which stand 
in sufficiently reliable relations to a subset of the ecologically relevant conditions 
at the distal end, so as to enable an organism to keep track of those distal condi-
tions. The distal affairs may be either spatially, temporally or perceptually remote 
from the organism, and in some cases their relevance may be similarly decoupled 
from the here-and-now. Both may lie in the past (this is what did F to me), in the 
future (this F-condition will return) or be merely possible (I might be in trouble 
if this s turns F ).
One decisive criterion for the inclusion of information present in the environ-
ment as part of an organism’s informational environment is that the receiver of 
that information is able to respond in some way to conditions at the source (see 
IE-1a) – either by tracking favourable and avoiding unfavourable conditions 
(Godfrey-Smith’s constitutive strategy) or by altering these conditions (the con-
structive strategy). Still, there will be distal conditions that are ecologically rel-
evant to an organism, but on whom he cannot collect information, either for want 
of stable correlations between proximal and distal affairs, or for want of means of 
collecting that information, or for want of means of responding to it. Such might 
be the case for what I called background conditions on p. 81 in Chapter 5: condi-
tions on whose relative persistence an organism relies, but which may be beyond 
his means of access, informational or other.
Conversely, not all information in a receiver’s environment is part of his infor-
mational environment, even if he is able to receive it. If the presence or absence 
of some information does not make any difference to his behaviours in general or 
to the achievement of his goals in particular, not even at the most distal reaches of 
what he can do in this world, that information does not have an adaptive function 
to him. It could just as well be indifferent, signal-free noise, unless it happens to 
interfere with his activities in other ways. Its status may, however, be subject to 
change. If an organism stumbles upon a prima facie useless bit of information, it 
might turn out to make a difference at some later point in time.
Besides natural information that is relevant and available to its receivers, an 
organism’s informational environment is likely to also contain information that 
has been purposefully added by the organism himself or other organisms, as 
indicated in IE-2 and its sub-clauses and briefly discussed with reference to the 
reproduction of behaviours. In terms of the correlations involved, the conditions 
of transmission and reception, there is no principled difference between purpose-
fully produced and natural information. However, there are differences, first, with 
respect to the correlation or “mapping” between signal and source not being war-
ranted by lawful or statistical regularities in nature but by regularities in usage or, 
under some circumstances, definition. Second and relatedly, instances of a signal 
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not mapping onto its source will have to be evaluated with respect to the sender’s 
underlying purposes, as these may include production errors (i.e. malformed sig-
nals) and errors of mapping (i.e. misplaced signals) as well as instances of inten-
tional non-mapping (i.e. deceptive purposes).
As to the condition of the regularities of mapping, the relation between signal 
and source is determinate for natural information, as the signal’s presence and 
shape could not have been otherwise under a given set of conditions, whereas 
it is indeterminate for purposefully created information. The signal may or may 
not be chosen to mimic natural signals. The signal may be chosen to depict 
its source, to bear a more abstract symbolic relation to its source, or simply 
to identify its spatio-temporal location. What unifies all kinds of signal-source 
relations is that they are, first and foremost, relations of mathematical mapping, 
as explicated on p. 67–68 above. As such, they can be abstract and indirect in 
manifold ways. A q-bird’s track in the woods physically matches and, in this 
sense, resembles the shape of the bird’s feet, whereas the orientation of mag-
netic particles in magnetotactic bacteria, although faithfully mapping onto the 
gradient of oxygen concentration in marine waters, does not bear a relation 
of resemblance to the source that would be detectable either for the bacteria 
themselves or for the human observer. The only relevant variable to be mapped 
is that of direction. An arrow and an array of symbols used on a signpost are 
supposed to map the identity and relative location of a restaurant, a cashpoint 
or a restroom. In conjunction, they will be the relevant variables for variantly 
disposed users (Do I need food, cash or a restroom now?). A description of the 
location of each of these entities from a local person, if and when accurate, will 
include the same mapping relations.
As to the condition of the status of instances of non-mapping, if a signpost, 
description or other purposefully created signal are malformed, erroneous or 
deceptive, the mapping between signal and source will not obtain, without neces-
sarily disqualifying the signal as an informational artefact. This is a condition that 
does not and cannot apply to natural information, no matter what its degree of 
reliability might be. As Dretske (1986), Millikan (2004) and others have pointed 
out, only things that have been designed to provide information can actually, and 
for various reasons, fail to do so. My weather report but not black clouds on the 
horizon may be mistaken about the imminence of rain. Still, black clouds may be 
a reliable-enough indicator of rain for guiding my response. Conversely, I might 
devise a signal with the purpose of not providing information, achieving my mis-
chievous purpose if I deceive the receiver precisely by producing something that 
has the appearance of a properly formed and properly mapping signal. Only if and 
only when the possibility of deception arises, and hence only where signals are 
purposefully produced, cooperation and coordination within a population of sig-
nal users becomes an issue deserving closer scrutiny on the informational level. 
Hence, they are first mentioned in IE-2. Populations that exclusively use natural 
information may or may not act in cooperative or coordinated fashion, but the 
only way in which they can define or defy cooperation and coordination will be in 
revealing or concealing a natural signal to other individuals.
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It is in light of these considerations on the normative nature of natural and 
artificial signals that some of the clauses in the earlier definitions should be read – 
which may have the additional effect of making the notion of the receiver- 
specificity of informational environments appear at least a bit less trivial than 
one might first believe. To begin with, the condition in IE-1a that, in order to 
be a constituent of an informational environment, information has to serve an 
adaptive function for its receivers and, by analogy, serve a function not only to 
an individual but also, potentially and in principle, for all members of his popula-
tion, is designed to keep out arbitrarily formed signalling relations. Without this 
double specification, signals placed in an individual’s environment would have to 
be counted as part of his informational environment that are designed and used to 
serve contingent, idiosyncratic and ad hoc purposes either for that same individual 
while not possibly doing so for members of his population, or that serve adaptive 
functions only for members of other populations.
If such signals were admitted, the first type of case would represent one aspect 
of Lewontian environmental construction that has been demonstrated to obscure 
the very distinction between just any effect that an organism’s behaviour has on 
his environment and those effects which have a history of being useful to mem-
bers of a population and hence acquired a proper function in Millikan’s terms: 
there might be signals that are useful for one or a few individuals but have the 
intended or unintended effect of undermining conditions for the population of 
which these individuals are members. Speaking in game-theoretical terms, an 
informational free-rider may maximise his individual benefits, but his selfish 
ways cannot provide a basis for a dominant strategy of acting within a population, 
as the reproductive chances of its members in general would be jeopardised at 
some point – especially if coordinated activities are relevant to that population. 
Even where competitive or otherwise uncooperative relations between individu-
als within one population are concerned, universal deception and unreliability 
of information could not be the norm. There would be no use in even trying to 
pick up information then. For this reason, I refer to cooperation and coordination 
in IE-2: displaying signs of putative dominance in a group’s pecking order or in 
fending off another group is not precisely cooperative but still serves coordinated 
actions within a population, nor is it deceptive. Coordination may occasionally 
be served by deception too, unless it becomes self-defeating on the group level.
In the second type of case, however, there is a perfectly adaptive function for 
signals that are emitted by some individual or individuals within a population in 
order to deceive a potential prey or predator, host or parasite, as indicated in IE-2c. 
The individuals to be thus deceived typically are not members of the signalling 
individuals’ own population, and the signals in question are produced precisely in 
order not to provide information. Here, deception will be the norm when viewed 
from the sender population’s side, whereas there certainly is no adaptive function 
of those deceptive signals when viewed from the receiver population’s side.
Consequently, the informational environment of a receiver R does, strictly 
speaking, not comprise signals that are intended to deceive R in the same way as 
it does properly mapping signals, nor does it equally comprise signals that are too 
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ambiguous to be useful to R. These signals are detectable for R but make condi-
tions in the informational environment more ambiguous, “opaque” or “impover-
ished”, for want of bearing informational relations to a relevant distal condition. 
On the positive side of the balance, R’s informational environment will contain 
any signal that helps him to make the distinction between natural and deceptive or 
otherwise ambiguous signals, and hence bears informational relations to relevant 
distal conditions. Making the distinction between signals that appear identical 
but relate to very different conditions at the source will matter to him. Although 
the detection of false negatives, that is signals that do not appear to be related to 
the same source conditions but in fact are, is relevant to be sure, detecting false 
positives will normally be of greater importance. You might live with detecting a 
predator when there is none around, and even with doing so quite often, but you 
simply do not want to mistake that well-camouflaged predator for an innocuous 
piece of wood.
Hence, R’s informational environment will at least become more complex and 
challenging if and when a deceiver or other unfavourable conditions enter. It will 
impose additional discriminatory tasks upon him if and when he is able to use 
additional cues for distinguishing between genuine information and the signals 
produced by deceivers, impostors and other sources of equivocation. If I may bor-
row Sterelny’s terminology for my purposes, R’s informational environment will 
have become less transparent and to an increasing degree merely translucent. If 
there is no such option available to R, he becomes less likely to get things right 
about what happens at the distal end. Hence, the deceptive signal will actually 
subtract information from R’s informational environment and impoverish condi-
tions therein (see IE-1c). R’s informational environment will have become less 
transparent and more opaque. However, only if the balance between properly 
informational relations and merely seeming signals is overall positive, in terms of 
maintaining R’s purposes to a minimally sufficient degree, will an informational 
environment remain intact, although possibly become impoverished. Should the 
appearance of a deceptive or de facto irremediably ambiguous signal interfere 
with trackability beyond that point, we might consider R’s informational environ-
ment having turned dysfunctional. He might not persevere after all.
At any rate, admitting for the possibility of probabilities of signal-source map-
pings to vary over space and time (see NI-5a in Chapter 4) does not amount to 
admitting for a variance in the underlying regularities but to acknowledging the pos-
sibility of variance in epistemic contact (Withagen and Chemero 2009, see p. 60–61) 
brought about by variance in ecological conditions, with the caveats I added to 
that discussion. The informational character of a signal is grounded in the type 
of sources and source conditions that bring it about – hence disallowing alternate 
sources or alternate conditions at a source as part of the same type of informa-
tional relation (see NI-1). If an organism with deceptive intentions enters R’s envi-
ronment, the reliability of his detection of the relevant conditions in question and 
hence his epistemic contact with the environment may be negatively affected but 
not the regularities that connect the ‘original’ natural signal to its natural source. 
After all, the natural and the ‘treacherous’ artificial signal in such cases are related 
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to very different sources by different regularities, and are indistinguishable from 
each other only to the extent that R has no other cues available that would reveal 
the difference to him.
Keeping cases of deceptive signalling apart from the genuine constituents of 
informational environments has a normative aspect: it honours the environmental 
grounding of the principled possibility for R to distinguish between things that 
are different in kind even if and when signals emanating from them are indistin-
guishable at first sight. If signals that are indistinguishable for R when using his 
normal means of information uptake indeed have very different aetiologies, there 
will be a point at which the variance in aetiologies is detectable in principle. In 
all realistically conceived cases, sparing Descartes’s malicious demon, brains in 
a vat and their kin, there will be at least a chance for that variance to also become 
detectable in practice – however remote that chance might be. It will be difficult to 
conceive of a situation in which the variant aetiologies will informationally mani-
fest themselves as being identical on all levels and in all possible ways. (Could 
Twin Water, or the designer of Twin Water, not only pretend that it has all the phe-
nomenal properties of water but also maintain a pretence of that substance being 
H2O in the most sophisticated of laboratories, except that it is not H2O?) Hence, 
although deception is common in many animals’ environments, and although the 
world may be hostile to its inhabitants in many ways, such hostility should not 
be considered the norm. In a perfectly treacherous world, there would neither be 
a possibility nor a use for getting things right. Conversely, in a perfectly benign 
world, there would be no need for an ability to tell right from wrong, because, 
apart from internally caused malfunction, there would be no risk of getting things 
wrong to begin with. The possibility and the usefulness of getting things right 
with some reliability should provide the normative grounding for steering through 
a world that often tends to wrong-foot us.
How informational environments change
The possibility of an informational environment to become impoverished in the 
way previously described in IE-1c is a condition that should not be confused with 
either of two other issues concerning the shape of informational environments: on 
the one hand, an impoverished informational environment is not equivalent to an 
informationally more primitive informational environment, as it would pertain to 
an organism who relies on fewer or less interconnected cues. We would then be 
comparing the informational environments of differently constituted organisms, 
not different states of one organism’s informational environment. On the other 
hand, an impoverished informational environment should not be equated with an 
environment in which the regularities that connect source and signal have altered. 
In such cases, as I argued in the preceding section, something more fundamental 
in the organism’s environment has changed. We will then have to consider the 
possibility that his ecological or external environment have been transformed in 
a significant way, with secondary effects on the informational conditions relevant 
to him.
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Notably, IE-1c also implies that an organism’s informational environment may 
become enriched, for example by artefacts that are designed to enhance detec-
tion of some relevant condition, by providing additional signals or by making 
the uptake of information more reliable. In analogy to the case of impoverish-
ment, we should not be tempted to conclude that R’s informational environment 
has become more advanced in an absolute sense, nor should we believe that 
the regularities connecting signal and source have improved in terms of being 
altered from a vaguely probabilistic towards a more law-like state of affairs. 
Either way, the regularities underlying the ‘original’, natural signalling relation 
remain the same, and they will amount to a specification relation, although the 
probabilities of correct mappings between signal and source will have altered 
due to intervening factors, which add to or subtract from the quality of what is 
received.
Having thus distinguished alterations of the informational relations proper from 
alterations of informational environments, what more can be said on the condi-
tions under which an informational environment may count as having changed? 
To begin with, whatever change there is and on whatever level it occurs, it must be 
persistent with respect to the receiver’s timescale of observation in order to qual-
ify as a genuine change. Momentary aberrations in channel conditions or transient 
fluctuations in mapping frequencies that the receiver can correct for or integrate, 
or that he might be entitled to ignore as being too insignificant altogether, will not 
count. Moreover, the change in question must be consistent with the regularities 
in his environment. Inverted spectra or green things turning bleen all of a sudden, 
as they do in some philosophical thought experiments, will not count either. If 
conditions in an environment change, and even if some of the regularities in that 
environment are affected, such change will hardly occur in capricious fashion, nor 
is it likely to merely affect isolated variables.1
In terms of its origins, a change in a receiver’s informational environment may 
owe to a change in his ecological environment. It does not necessarily depend 
on an ecological change though, and if it indeed does so depend, the ecological 
change is what should be the main matter of concern. A change in an informational 
environment may, and often will, entirely occur on the informational level, while 
having possible repercussions on the ecological level. Such an informational-
level change might be of basically two kinds, as indicated in IE-2b, allowing for 
all sorts of shades between them: first, the availability and quality of some of the 
information usable to R may vary over time and space, in terms of new channels 
or new types of signals being added, removed or beginning to interfere with each 
other. Second, however, novel informational relations, with their own mapping 
regularities, may emerge that had not been present in the environment before. On 
the account of natural information that I have presented in this and the preceding 
chapters, an addition of genuinely new informational relations to the environ-
ment will occur only if some of the natural regularities that govern the mapping 
between signals and sources are altered or new ones are introduced. Supposedly, 
this is an exceedingly rare case. Conversely, new kinds of sources of information 
may appear to which established regularities apply.
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There is an obvious, even trivial sense in which new information emerges in 
our environments all the time. This sense should be kept clearly distinct from the 
second way in which, I suggest, informational environments may change: with 
every new dawn, there will be new information on the position of the Earth in 
the Universe and on the overall conditions on our planet. With every newborn 
child, new information arrives, both in terms of his or her ever-so-slightly unique 
genome coding for ever-so-slightly unique traits and in terms of him or her sig-
nalling, in ever-so-slightly unique ways, current metabolic needs or a desire to 
be close or not so close to mother or father. Even where the domains of natural 
information concern individuals, these individuals normally do not appear as iso-
lated entities but as members of some population, species or other natural kind 
for which there are established types of informational relations, based on natural 
regularities that are not contingent on the individual. In contrast, the appearance 
of life on Earth will be a promising candidate for the novelty I have in mind here, 
and probably the best candidate one could find in nature: genetic and developmen-
tal information, their regularities and mechanisms of mapping onto phenotypical 
traits and their modes of transmission were genuinely new phenomena when they 
first appeared, as were the evolving species of organisms themselves.
Apart from the phenomenon of life on Earth, the most credible paradigms of 
the “new kinds of information” case will be found in artificial structures that not 
only produce new signals but also introduce new ways of mapping them onto their 
sources, and that are difficult to subsume under pre-existing natural kinds. Lan-
guage will appear as an equally obvious and ambiguous example in this respect: 
will the appearance of grammatical structures be entitled to count as the appear-
ance of novel regularities of informational mapping, or will language only add 
new channels to the uptake and transmission of whatever information there is? 
The latter option might be too limited, as some information that human beings 
encounter and use in their environments would not exist without the use of lan-
guage in the first place, and as grammatical rules are a necessary precondition of 
the existence of some of the structures that will count as sources of information. 
There is a number of linguistic structures that not only embody specific mapping 
rules which would not exist outside of language but whose use is also constitutive 
to entities that can then be referred to by linguistic means. One might think of 
the various applications of the negation transformation and its range of semantic 
effects, or of performative speech acts, such as promises or orders. Other exam-
ples of the “new kinds of sources” kind of case will include formal languages or 
works of art that are supposed to refer neither to natural objects nor to their subject 
in any naturally established way of informational mapping.
Prima facie, it will appear a more straightforward affair to provide real-world 
examples for the “new channels” than for the “new kinds of information” kind 
of case, but there are some difficulties. First, consider the informational proper-
ties of measuring instruments and other observational methods in science, which 
are supposed to make new modes of taking up natural information available that 
could not be found in a natural environment while affecting neither the relevant 
distal conditions nor the mapping regularities involved. However, the boundary to 
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a certain class of technological artefacts will be porous, where both mapping regu-
larities and kinds of sources might be subject to modification. Laboratory-based 
scientific observations will be a case in point here, where not only the conditions 
of observation have to be methodically and carefully crafted but also their object 
and the way in which it provides information about natural affairs. Simulations 
of world affairs will provide another example of the difficulties in distinguishing 
between creating new modes of uptake of natural information and the creation 
of artificial structures that introduce new kinds of information: is the simulation 
intended to refer to a concrete world affair or to some kind of general, idealised 
set of world affairs, or even to a fictional one, and how is reference accomplished 
in these cases? I will discuss this issue in Chapter 8.
Leaving most of these interesting and relevant complexities of the status of 
artificially created information in science aside, the paradigm of changes in the 
informational environments of human beings will be the introduction of technolo-
gies that, without necessarily interfering with the ecologically relevant conditions 
in people’s environments, alter the way in which information that is relevant to 
their activities is available to them, so as to alter the way in which they collect 
and act upon that information. In some cases, the kind of information available 
to them will have changed, too. These are the kinds of change that I will discuss 
in Part II in some more detail. The argument will look into two complementary 
directions: first, what do we do when we add something to an informational envi-
ronment? We might be extending the reach of perception and cognition, but there 
are several meanings to what that extension is, or might be. Second, what happens 
when informational environments are changed? Perception and action might be 
affected in several ways, and strategies might be required for accommodating 
for those changes. The effects of the extensions in question and the strategies of 
accommodating them will be worth exploring by means of taking a closer look at 
some examples of current and emerging technologies.
Note
1  I have to thank Volker Munz and Harald Wiltsche (personal conversation) for highlight-
ing this problematic aspect of an important subclass of philosophical thought experi-
ments. Although the possible worlds and counterfactual conditions thus conjured up 
are problematic with respect to the conditions of real-world perception, the thought- 
experimental method as such echoes a basic understanding of experimental practice: 
selecting, isolating and manipulating some variable of the target and measuring the 






In Part I, I have argued in some detail for an intrinsic connection between an 
organism’s constitution and abilities and the make-up of his informational envi-
ronment. I have also argued for the essentially natural character of the information 
involved, as being information for perception, as conceived of in ecological psy-
chology. Informational environments, I continued, are determined with respect 
to conditions of ecological relevance. At the same instance, I acknowledged the 
possibilities for an organism to modify his ecological and informational envi-
ronments. Hence, if there are activities in which parts of the environment are 
modified in constructive or constitutive fashion – in keeping with the technical 
meaning of these terms introduced by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and discussed 
in Chapter 5 – and if these modifications have an effect on the shape and availabil-
ity of information, cognitive processes will not be confined to somatic boundaries. 
They might actually depend on features of the environment that are used or made 
to serve cognitive purposes. The accomplishment – and in a relevant subset of 
cases also the establishment – of some of the functions of human cognition may 
ultimately rely on the presence and operation of things that are neither in our 
heads nor in our bodies. This proposal has a prima facie parallel in the “Extended 
Mind Hypothesis”, as introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998), 
which shall be explored in the present chapter.
In their brief, bold and controversial manifesto of a thorough, “active” external-
ism, Clark and Chalmers highlight “the active role of the environment in driving 
cognitive processes” (1998, 7). Their version of externalism goes beyond estab-
lished externalist views in the philosophy of mind and language respectively (see 
Putnam 1975b; Burge 1979 in philosophical semantics and McGinn 1977 in the 
philosophy of mind), according to which the content of mental processes or linguis-
tic expressions depends on what is in the environment. In contrast, Clark and Chal-
mers argue that there are situations in which “the human organism is linked with an 
external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen 
as a cognitive system in its own right” (1998, 8, emphasis in original). This exter-
nalist position, in its general outlook, shall be endorsed here. However, the notion 
of cognitive extension has become many things to many people in a continuously 
sprawling debate, where the most forceful critiques appear to frequently miss the 
most serious points that arguments for extended cognition are capable of making.1
7  The extension of the extended 
mind
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On pain of adding another specimen to the zoo of views of what cognitive 
extensions really are, I shall carve out an interpretation that strengthens the func-
tionalist credentials of the Extended Mind Hypothesis by rooting it in natural his-
tory. My guiding questions will be these: first, how shall the functional coupling 
between the organism and some entity in his environment be spelled out in detail? 
Second, what are the paradigmatic external entities to enter into that coupling? In 
seeking to answer these questions, I will make a suggestion towards sharpening 
the notion of “extension” that is (or should be) in play here: the paradigm of cog-
nitive extensions are those features of the environment which play either of two 
kinds of constitutive role – which has to be distinguished from Godfrey-Smith’s 
notion of constitutive strategies, which will be disambiguated as “GS-constitutive” 
where required – to the function of some cognitive trait. In functional-historical 
terms, these features have been primarily natural rather than artificial. This sug-
gestion shall help to prevent the notion of cognitive extension from becoming 
extensionally bloated to the point of vacuousness.2
I will begin by placing some of the central claims of the Extended Mind 
 Hypothesis – its notion of “active” vs. “passive” externalism and its notion of 
features of the environment serving cognitive functions – in the context of aetio-
logical theories of function and some positions within evolutionary biology. The 
insights from this discussion will then be used to identify a number of possible 
interpretations of what extensions of the mind are, and what explanatory roles they 
might play in cognitive inquiries, with particular attention to the specific ways in 
which features of the environment may be constitutive to cognitive functions. The 
constitutiveness theme will be further explored in the third section of this chapter, 
with the aim of providing some common ground for “parity” and “complementa-
rity” views of extendedness. In conclusion of this chapter, I will discuss two para-
digms of cognitive extension in the light of the aetiological variety of functionalist 
argument developed before. In Chapter 8, I will explore artefact-based modes of 
cognitive coupling in more depth and match this account against the notion of 
informational environments introduced in Chapter 6.
The extension of functional histories
When locating themselves within the context of contemporary philosophical 
debates, Clark and Chalmers (1998, 9) characterise active externalism as “active” 
for its focus on interactions between organism and environment in the here and 
now. The activity of interest is in the environment and the organism at the same 
instance, and it is that concurrent activity which serves to make both cognition 
extended and externalism active. Conversely, Clark and Chalmers characterise 
traditional semantic externalism as “passive” for its focus on the causal his-
tory that supposedly endows linguistic items and, by extension of the argument 
(McGinn 1977), mental events with their meanings. It is this history of interac-
tions that explains any possible difference between the contents of two prima 
facie identical mental or linguistic tokens, no matter what the current interactions 
may look like to participants and observers.
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Hence, if one takes active externalism by its ahistorical first word, the chemical 
difference between water and twin water in Hilary Putnam’s well-known thought 
experiment (1975b), contrary to what its author aimed to demonstrate, will not 
matter as long as my interaction with either substance produces identical effects, 
cognitively and practically. Conversely, on the “passive” account, the different 
histories of earthly and twin-earthly water are all that matters in making the differ-
ence between the semantic success conditions for “water” tokens being applied to 
either substance, even if I cannot see, feel or taste any difference between the two.
Although the active/passive terminology is now well-established (see, e.g. 
Carter et al. 2014), there remains a certain artificiality to referring to the varie-
ties of externalism in this way. Past interactions have been relevant to shaping 
the content of some present linguistic or mental token, and there is no reason to 
assume the past to be in any normative sense remote from the present. What Clark 
and Chalmers are after is quite different from Putnam-style semantic external-
ism though: their focus is on the locus of cognitive processes, whereas Putnam, 
Burge, McGinn and many others are concerned with the external conditions that 
ground the content of mental or linguistic tokens. The difference at issue here is 
also known as “vehicle” vs. “content” externalism (Hurley 1998; 2010). On an 
ahistorical reading of active externalism, the concrete content of what is being 
processed appears secondary to the issue of the locus of cognitive activity, just as 
history is deemed secondary to present states of cognitive affairs.
Such a choice of priorities might be unfortunate, for several interrelated reasons – 
of which, to be sure, theories of extended cognition have become at least partly 
aware since that initial statement.3 Nonetheless, it will be worthwhile to spell out 
why, in terms of a unified rationale, any serious theory of extended cognition 
will benefit from accounting for the history of the functions of environmental 
coupling.
First, when referring to the functions of some object or process, one will have 
to tell the difference between genuine functions and coincidental effects. That dif-
ference can be established only on the grounds of a history of how the object or 
process in question came to display the effects that it displays – and why it fails 
to do so under some circumstances. For artefacts, their design will provide part 
of the relevant criteria, whereas all relevant criteria will be historical in the case 
of natural systems.
Second, the content of cognitive activities – what in the environment they refer 
to and whether, why and how they succeed in doing so – is relevant to an expla-
nation of the shape, function and extension of these activities, historically and at 
present, on more than one level. On the one hand, the concrete content of some 
cognitive process depends on the history of cognisers living in a concrete natural 
and social environment to which they relate. More fundamentally, on the other 
hand, the mechanisms for producing and acting upon these contents are rooted in 
histories of evolution and ontogenetic development, broadly construed.
Third, present interactions dynamically reshape the mode of extension in many 
cases. There is no ending to history. If the conditions under which some relation of 
cognitive coupling is realised are altered – from within or outside the organism – that 
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change, unless ending in failure of the entire process, will provide some degree 
of variation that will result in a modified coupling relation further down the line. 
Variability in environmental conditions will be one key factor in shaping coupling 
relations.
The common rationale to unify this set of claims is an aetiological, that is his-
torically based variety of functionalist argument. It departs from the classical Put-
namian point of “machine-state functionalism”, which is based on the assumption 
that one and the same function may be realised in a variety of different structures 
(Putnam 1975a). This claim of multiple realisability has been central to any argu-
ment for the possibility of AI, and it is equally important to the “parity principle” 
in the Extended Mind debates. It has its roots in Alan Turing’s theory of comput-
ability (see p. 3–4 in Chapter 1), which says that any logical or mathematical 
operation that is formally solvable at all can be realised by elementary formal 
operations that may be implemented in a broad, in principle indefinite, variety 
of physical systems (1936). The claim of multiple realisability is also implied 
by observations on neuronal equipotentiality, according to which one cognitive 
or perceptual function can be realised by a variety of neuroanatomical structures 
(see, e.g. the discussion of Karl Lashley’s work in Proust 1995).
While sharing with these types of functionalism the basic notion of a relation of 
underdetermination between functions and structural properties of some system, an 
aetiological account is interested in the concrete enabling and constraining condi-
tions under which functions come to be established and realised. Functional aetiolo-
gies have their natural home in natural history and the Darwinian theory of evolution, 
where evolved analogies of function between phylogenetically remote species have 
been painstakingly distinguished from equally historically grounded, structural 
homologies that do not necessarily have any bearing on functions at all (see p. 5 in 
Chapter 1). Accordingly, the concrete histories of convergent and divergent functions 
within and between populations will matter to an aetiological account.
If cognitive traits have biological functions in the same way as other traits of 
an organism have biological functions, one will be entitled to analyse the mecha-
nisms that realise these processes in the same functional-historical terms. Like 
any other trait, they will be subject to processes of variation and natural selection. 
In turn, the content of these processes can be analysed in analogous fashion, to 
the extent that a type of cognitive state of one or a number of related individuals 
is constituted by reproducible tokens that may succeed or fail to map onto some 
world affair, and hence be selected to accomplish that mapping. These are the 
basic assumptions of the teleosemantic or biofunctionalist paradigm in the phi-
losophy of mind and language, as inaugurated by Ruth Millikan (1984).4
More precisely, a functional-historical account of some cognitive trait will 
recur to the contributions that the effects of that trait have made with sufficient 
frequency among its ancestral bearers to their rate of reproduction as compared 
with other members of the same population who did not possess that trait. By 
virtue of conferring a reproductive advantage over the course of several genera-
tions, the trait will acquire the proper function of producing these effects (for the 
full definition of proper functions, see Millikan (1984, 28 and Chapters 1–2 in 
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general). The “ancestors” and “generations”, rather than being organisms them-
selves, may also be component mechanisms, and they may also be reproducible 
forms that can be iteratively used by some individual or a collective thereof, such 
as artefacts or linguistic items. The individual tokens of some such reproducible 
item have proper functions derived from the functions of the mechanisms that 
produce them. It is the direct proper function of those mechanisms to generate 
the kind of effects in question if these effects, qua individually bearing certain 
relations to the environment with sufficient reliability, form part of the necessary 
conditions for the reproduction of the mechanisms themselves and of the systems 
that rely on their presence. In turn, the tokens of some reproducible item have 
the derived proper function of being adapted to some concrete world affair if and 
when one relevant condition for their reproduction lies in their co-occurrence with 
that sort of world affair and, in a relevant subset of cases, their role in directing an 
organism’s behaviours towards it.
Nothing in this account rules out the possibility of mechanisms that are only 
partly based within an organism. In fact, Millikan (1993a, 179) herself considers 
the insight that “the organismic process has no skin” fundamental to the science 
of psychology.5 Because all sorts of traits, cognitive and other, are characterised in 
terms of their historically acquired functions, and because that history incorporates 
whatever turns out to realise the function in question, the locus of the components 
involved in realising it is systematically irrelevant, under a two-part proviso: the 
organismic traits involved are to be coupled with persistent or reproducible features 
of their environment with a degree of reliability sufficient for meeting the reproduc-
tion criterion, where that coupling occurs in accordance with a uniform explana-
tion that accounts for the “normal mechanisms” of coupling. Hence, although the 
content externalism defended in the aetiological account does not entail a vehicle 
externalism, it is methodically impartial to the locus of the vehicles involved.
As to the concrete benefits of an aetiological perspective for extended func-
tionalism, accounting for the historical nature of functions will, first, provide an 
argument against the “coupling/constitution” objection brought forward by Fred 
Adams and Kenneth Aizawa (2001): in contrast to their objection, instances of 
accidental coupling between an organism and some entities in his environment do 
not count as coupling proper. Nor will legitimate instances of coupling endow the 
individual entities thus coupled with the characteristics of the entire coupled sys-
tem. These entities play constitutive, historically established roles in the establish-
ment or accomplishment of the functions of the entire system, where these roles 
may widely diverge. I will discuss this point in more detail in the next section.
Second, and for related reasons, accounting for the historical nature of func-
tions will provide an argument against the “fleeting vs. persistence” criticism 
that has been levelled against extended cognition, first and foremost, by Rupert 
(2010). The suspicion here is that environmental extensions, unlike internally 
based cognitive capacities, are not persistently coupled with the organism. If some 
such extension is accidentally detached from the cognising organism, it seems, the 
cognitive system comes apart, only to be re-instantiated if and when that exten-
sion is successfully recovered. Clark’s reply to this charge was to emphasise the 
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conditions of persistence and reliability (“glue and trust”), which supposedly 
rule out overly ephemeral coupling relations (Clark 2010a, 83f ). If the coupling 
in question has a historically established function, the issue of temporary non- 
occurrence or non-performance of that coupling relation, rather than being 
resolved by means of such auxiliary conditions, is actually dissolved: it does not 
matter if the function in question, for temporary loss of one component, turns 
out not to be performed in many instances, as long as the coupling occurs with a 
degree of reliability and according to an unequivocal regularity so as to become 
part of the explanation for the reproduction of the organic and, in some cases, the 
environmental components involved. To use a non-cognitive case of extension for 
comparison (see Menary 2010b, 14): it does not matter if a spider loses her web 
once in a while, or perhaps even very often, as long as the however intermittent 
production and use of webs provides part of the explanation for the presence of 
web-making mechanisms in the spider population.
Third, and most profoundly perhaps, a historical account of functions will coun-
ter Mark Sprevak’s critique of classical machine-state functionalism (2009) which 
targets the “Martian intuition” that an identical or analogous kind of function can 
be realised by physically or biologically very differently constituted systems. On 
that intuition, which is basically the Lewisian one (1980), if we can specify a set 
of functions for certain traits and behaviours in human beings and Martians, we 
should be able in principle to identify which concrete structures within or around 
the human being or Martian will play what sort of causal role in accomplishing 
those functions. However, Sprevak objects, one could easily imagine the condi-
tions of persistence and reliability of the respective structures and the coupling 
relations involved to be violated in manifold ways, and hence fail to meet the 
specifications laid out by extended functionalism. Playing on the Martian intuition 
in this way will probably kill the Martian – but, if we follow the historical account 
of functions, it will not kill the intuition. Any coupling with whatever structure 
that were as unreliable or otherwise insufficient or even freakish in nature as 
described by Sprevak would militate against the imagined organism’s reproduc-
tive chances, and against the factual (rather than conceptual) possibility of his 
existence. Conversely, Sprevak’s Martian may be imagined to be in command of 
capabilities and enter into environmental coupling relations so unfamiliar that we 
could not find any remote analogue in the specifications of human cognition. But 
then, the entire functional analogy will not hold. After all, there might be hyper-
cognitive functions to Martians that human beings are insufficiently equipped to 
imagine in the first place.
Clark and Chalmers’s reservations against history diagnosed here become 
explicit when they introduce a set of criteria that is supposed to be necessary and 
sufficient for the function of internal or external resources as components of cog-
nitive processes (1998, 17; see also Clark 2010b):
(1) The resource should be of reliable availability, and should be used on a 
frequent basis.
(2) The information provided by that resource should be directly available.
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(3) This information should be endorsed automatically, that is without requiring 
further reflection on its reliability.
(4) Present endorsement of this information should be based on conscious 
endorsement in the past.
The authors add a footnote to this list in which the implication of the constancy 
(3) and the past endorsement (4) criteria that history is co-constitutive of cognitive 
processes is countered by the suggestion that the past endorsement criterion might 
be dropped and the constancy criterion be given “a purely dispositional reading”: 
one is found simply to endorse the information automatically; it is not asked why. 
Although this might be a sensible tactical manoeuvre in terms of catering for the 
broadest possible range of extensions of the mind, relativising the latter two criteria 
amounts to skirting an inquiry into the normal mechanisms of cognitive coupling. 
The past endorsement criterion in particular would assimilate the argument to a 
teleofunctional one: the decisive condition for past endorsement being causally 
relevant to present endorsement is that the former has been successful, although it 
might also have been conscious. If endorsement had not been successful, although 
it might still have been conscious, there would be no endorsement at present.
Beyond tactical considerations, one possible systematic reason why the propo-
nents of the Extended Mind Hypothesis have been reluctant to adopt a historical 
account of cognitive functions is detectable in Wheeler and Clark (2008) – a con-
tribution that actually acknowledges arguments for the rooting of cognitive exten-
sions in evolutionary history: the authors match the dyad of extended/embodied 
cognition and cultural evolution hypotheses against the tenets of evolutionary 
psychology. The latter is charged with a view of evolution that takes psycho-
logical and physiological adaptations alike to be temporally remotely anchored 
solutions to a predetermined set of problems posed by the environment, where 
these solutions will be uniformly distributed over a species while being expressly 
domain specific. Moreover, Wheeler and Clark continue, the possibility of organ-
isms modifying their environments to fit their specific needs is not considered by 
evolutionary psychologists. The basic concern here appears to be that an anchor-
ing of cognitive extensions in past states of affairs that are beyond present cognis-
ers’ reach – especially if the past endorsement criterion concerns the evolutionary 
past – would undermine the notion of a two-way interaction that is central to their 
earlier cited coupled system claim. Adaptations and the conditions to which they 
respond might be more malleable and more specific to sub-populations in the 
here-and-now than evolutionary psychology appears to consider.
In order to get a clearer view of what is at issue here, a brief comparative look 
at Richard Dawkins’s theory of the extended phenotype (1999) and other, more 
constructionist biological cousins of extended cognition, as they have been pre-
sented in Chapter 5, might help: Lewontin’s environmental constructivism, niche 
construction theories and developmental systems theory. Prima facie, the parallels 
between extended phenotypes and extended cognition seem striking: Dawkins not 
only highlights the importance of an organism’s interaction with the environment 
but also promotes the notion of biological traits extending into, or incorporating 
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features of, the environment. What moves into focus in his gene-centric view are 
replicating gene sequences within a population and their interactions with their 
intra- or extra-somatic environment. Dawkins argues that the organism might not 
always be the key unit to consider when explaining patterns of genetic replication. 
Instead, he suggests, an organism’s interaction with objects or other organisms 
within his environment will have to be counted into the explanation of whether 
and how a gene succeeds in replicating.
However, Dawkins’s alternative, explicitly metaphorical proposal re-instantiates 
the notion of a unitary, individual and individualistic agent who is clearly distin-
guished from his external environment, albeit with a substitution of the referent of 
“individual”. In many relevant cases, the manifest aims of individual organisms 
will end up subordinated to their genes’ hypothetical interests. Moreover, the sys-
tematic point of adopting this view within the context of evolutionary theorising is 
to highlight a possible, and perhaps the most relevant, unit of natural selection – as 
the main force in evolution and the source of any goal-directedness or progress 
therein. The effects that the organism’s own traits and behaviours might have on 
the course of evolutionary events will not figure prominently in such an account.
Wilson and Clark (2009) expressly endorse the continuum of construction-
ist, anti-adaptationist theories in biology that takes issue with these implications 
of Dawkinsian view, as those theories might bear more profound analogies to 
some of the central claims of extended cognition.6 Their critique of Dawkinsian 
adaptationism can be unpacked into three positively stated leitmotifs: a princi-
pled openness of both evolutionary and developmental pathways, an emphasis 
on supra-individual factors as explanantia, rather than explananda, for the respec-
tive theories, and the acknowledgement of the interactive nature of the organism- 
environment relationship. On a first level, the notion of principled openness is 
expressed in the marked abstention from postulating some unifying force that 
would govern phylogeny and ontogeny. Natural selection counts as just one among 
other relevant factors in evolution, and it works on various levels, from genes to 
populations. Genes are just one among other relevant factors in shaping organisms 
and, possibly, transmitting information between generations of a population. On a 
second level, there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as evolutionary 
progress or adaptive optima. What might seem like a perfect adaptation now may 
turn out to be a disadvantageous solution later, and there is no way of knowing in 
advance. Ecological change might always upset historically entrenched states of 
affairs. Current evolutionary states of affairs are historically contingent facts, pro-
viding no guidance as to how things should stand or where they will go next. On a 
third level, ecological change, both to the better and to the worse, might be brought 
about by the organisms themselves, in intended and unintended ways.
The constitution of cognitive extensions
What do the observations in the preceding section tell us about the Extended Mind 
Hypothesis? After all, all parallels to the debates within evolutionary theory were 
identified only in retrospect. Nor did the Extended Mind Hypothesis, as originally 
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conceived, relate to teleofunctional theories. Still, arguments from either tradition 
might help to elucidate, and possibly achieve, Clark and Chalmers’s explanatory 
aims, on two levels: the epistemological status of the hypothesis (discussed under 
the short form Int) and the question of the nature of extensions (discussed under 
the short form Ext).
The status of epistemic claims
Although the biological theories considered here figure as predictive theories 
for the most part, developmental systems theory and the theory of extended phe-
notypes deliberately assume a different (separate or additional) role, namely as 
challenges to seemingly commonsensical perspectives on their subject matter. As 
such, they might ultimately but will not necessarily result in predictive theories.7 
This dual notion of theories may serve as a template for a strong and a weak inter-
pretation of the Extended Mind Hypothesis respectively: if, at least in important 
subclasses of cases, entities and processes in the environment are indispensable 
for the accomplishment or presence of some cognitive function, the expectation 
will be justified that the advocate of extended cognition shall identify the neces-
sary conditions for those objects and processes to become part of that cognitive 
function while remaining impartial to what common sense might tell us. Some of 
Clark’s own works (in particular 2007) as well as some complementarity-based 
accounts (most notably Kiverstein and Farina 2011; Sutton 2010) aim in this 
direction, in looking for real-world cases where the assumption of environmental 
extendedness of cognitive processes accomplishes tangible explanatory tasks. If, 
however, it is a mere matter of perspective to view some objects in the environ-
ment as components of cognitive processes, the claim is considerably weaker: it 
amounts to a suggestion to temporarily suspend common-sense beliefs in order to 
help us to a better understanding of some aspects of cognition.
The critique in Adams and Aizawa (2001), although not intending to capture this 
point, is diagnostic of what is at issue here. The authors explicitly mount a defence 
of common sense, presuming that common-sense views, qua being commonsensi-
cal, provide good guidance to cognitive inquiries. If, as Adams and Aizawa argue 
in alignment with a long-standing intellectual tradition (which includes, among 
many others, Karl Popper 1959 and W.V.O. Quine 1957), science is a methodi-
cal refinement and extension of common-sense reasoning, mobilising it against 
overambitious flights of imagination will be useful in itself. As, however, many 
scientific findings happen to defy common-sense beliefs, and as, arguably, the 
advancement of science sometimes even requires transgressions of the boundaries 
of common sense (as has been prominently argued by Albert Einstein 1918, along 
with other physicists whose theories indeed defy common sense, as well as by 
philosophers as different as Ernest Nagel 1961 and Paul Feyerabend 1975), the 
force of this argument will be limited to begin with. If there are defensible reasons 
for adopting a counterintuitive image of how the world stands, and if evidence 
collected under the guidance of that image turns out to advance inquiry, the trans-
gression will be vindicated. It will be difficult though to determine in advance 
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whether that vindication is forthcoming. In terms of an epistemological economy, 
the Extended Mind Hypothesis incurs the risk of investing into a transgression of 
common sense whose returns are much less than certain.
The nature of extensions 
One common denominator of all non-adaptationist theories discussed earlier is that 
there will be no way of determining the goals and accomplishments of an organ-
ism without in some way considering his coupling with the environment, where 
this coupling will have the nature of a two-way interaction rather than the organ-
ism either manipulating or being determined by the environment. Certain entities 
and conditions in the environment are relevant to the organism in such a way that 
he could not exist without them and that they would not exist without him, as the 
very set of relevant conditions that they are. On this set of views, the coupling 
between organism and environment plays, in a non-Godfrey-Smithean sense, a 
constitutive role in either of two ways: without that coupling, a trait or behaviour 
would not be possible at all, or it would have to rely on different means.
Organisms with a certain degree of adaptive plasticity, that is the ability to 
respond in various and partly innovative ways to a given set of problems, can be 
found to alternate between using internal means and one or a variety of external 
objects or tools for the same purpose, each involving different organic and behav-
ioural resources and, possibly, differential effects on reproductive chances. For 
example geographically separate populations of wild chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes) have been observed to vary in using vs. not using tools and in the kinds 
of tools they use for a certain purpose, in spite of identical biological consti-
tution and ecological similarities between the respective populations’ habitats 
(Boesch 1993; Boesch and Boesch 1990; Matsuzawa 2001, Chapter 1). It has 
been suggested that cultural transmission of tool-using abilities is involved here.8 
Although there is an analogy of function in these cases, both the entities involved 
and the mechanisms by which they are integrated in pursuit of that function 
will be at variance. The constituents of the external and internal variants of the 
processes cannot be expected to be mutually substitutable. This is the minimal 
sense in which extensions may become constitutive to the accomplishment of 
some biological function. They will be called “constitutiveW” where required for 
disambiguation.
The situation will be different in cases where there are objects and artefacts 
in the environment that enter into some coupling without which a particular, and 
possibly vital, accomplishment for the organism could not be attained at all. Cit-
ing a famous example, without felling trees and constructing a dam from timber, 
stones and mud, so as to impede the flow of a creek and create a water reservoir, 
a beaver would neither be in the position to secure himself a sufficiently large ter-
ritory for foraging nor be able to find a place for building lodges sufficiently pro-
tected from terrestrial predators (Dawkins 1999, 200, 209). There is no ‘internal’ 
alternative for the beaver to building a dam. He does so because this is the only 
way available to him to secure the presence of some of the conditions on which 
he vitally depends. This is the maximal sense in which extensions may become 
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constitutive to some biological function: extendedness will become essential to 
an explanation of the presence, rather than the mode of accomplishment, of some 
core functions – and, by implication, of the nature of the organisms to which those 
functions pertain. Cases of this kind will be labelled “constitutiveS”.
The constitutiveS and constitutiveW types of case are clearly distinct from an 
interpretation of cognitive extensions in which they appear as instruments of cog-
nition: if the cognitive function in question could be equally performed by purely 
internal means, their role would be similar to that of an artefact that produces a 
behavioural output identical to that of some type of human action, and that does so 
on the basis of at least similar mechanisms. Internal and external elements would 
be mutually substitutable without any notable effects on the performance, and the 
mode of performance, of the cognitive function. If (and only if ) extensions of the 
mind were supposed to be understood in such a straightforwardly instrumentalist 
fashion – which, to be sure, they are not – a central point of Adams and Aizawa’s 
critique of extended cognition (2001) would become tenable. The authors main-
tain that the causal processes involved in the use of cognitive extensions would 
have to be identical to those involved in internal or “intra-cranial” cognitive pro-
cesses in order to count as functionally equivalent. Because the causal processes, 
as a matter of empirical fact, will be at variance, functional equivalence is not 
accomplished. If, however, the extensions Clark and Chalmers have in mind are 
not instrumental in nature but constitutiveW to cognitive processes, the mecha-
nisms involved in extended vs. internally based cognitive processes can be freely 
acknowledged to be at variance. Adams and Aizawa hence appear to miss the entire 
point of functional analogy, which is precisely not determined on the grounds of a 
homology between the structures that realise some function but on the grounds of 
what purpose, in terms of selected effects, the respective structures serve.
To sum up
We are presented with four different possible interpretations of the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis, on two partly interdependent levels:
(ExtC) The constitutiveness claim: entities in the environment are constitutiveW 
or constitutiveS to the function of some cognitive trait.
(ExtI) The instrumentalist claim: entities in the environment are instruments 
that are mutually substitutable with internally based cognitive traits.
(IntS) The strong interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis shall identify 
part of the necessary conditions for the presence and function of the cogni-
tive traits in question.
(IntW) The weak interpretation: the Extended Mind Hypothesis suggests some 
conditions under which cognitive processes are best viewed as including 
entities in the environment.
When introducing their hypothesis, what Clark and Chalmers appear to do is this: 
they present a set of theoretical claims that speak for an interpretation under which 
objects and conditions in the environment are part of the necessary conditions for 
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the presence and function of some cognitive traits. Accordingly, the strong inter-
pretation (IntS) would seem in place here. However, these claims are quite casually 
placed alongside remarks on how a view of cognition as extended into the environ-
ment allows for a more elegant, unified and simplified explanation of cognitive 
processes (see Clark and Chalmers 1998, 10, 14). There is no reference in these 
places to explanatory problems that would require a view of cognition as being thus 
extended. Accordingly, the weak interpretation (IntW) would seem in place here.
There are two adjacent claims on the first pages of Clark and Chalmers’s essay 
where that ambiguity becomes manifest:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part 
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of 
the cognitive process.
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8, emphasis in original)
After having thus introduced the parity principle, the authors present the core of 
the hypothesis, the coupled system claim, and add:
All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly 
govern behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we 
remove the external component the system’s behavioural competence will 
drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain. [. . .] The external 
features in a coupled system play an ineliminable role – if we retain internal 
structure but change the external features, behaviour may change completely. 
The external features here are just as causally relevant as typical internal 
features of the brain.
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8f )
If, taking the first claim at face value, a part of the world worked as a process 
that could, in practice or in principle, also occur in the head, the ‘external’ and 
the ‘internal’ versions of that process would be equivalent, hence interchange-
able without loss, and arguably without a difference beyond the physical loca-
tion of that process. If, however, according to the second claim, we took some 
environmentally coupled cognitive process and removed the external component, 
we would not be left with an intact set of internal operations within the person 
accomplishing the cognitive task – only minus that component. Even less would 
we be left with a set of internal operations identical to the case of accomplishing 
the same task by internal means. As Clark and Chalmers implicate in the second 
passage, very different kinds of mental operations are required for doing a calcu-
lation in one’s head and for doing it with a pocket calculator, or for finding one’s 
way by visual recognition of a scene or by consulting a map or a notebook.
Clark and Chalmers’s choice of examples is not precisely helpful in keeping 
these points apart. The examples they extensively discuss in order to substantiate 
their hypothesis – which are the examples that also dominate the Extended Mind 
The extension of the extended mind 121
debates – concern devices that we are suggested to consider as substitutes for, or 
supplements to, internally based cognitive processes. Their notebooks, keyboards 
and pocket calculators are artefacts that can be used for operations that could be, 
at least prima facie, equally accomplished “in the head”, for example making a 
calculation or remembering an appointment or the directions to a certain place.
This choice of examples not only seems to suggest IntW but also, however inad-
vertently, creates the impression that the extensions in question might be mere 
instruments of cognition – which is a logical non sequitur: although IntS stands in 
a relation of mutual implication with the constitutiveness claim (ExtC), the instru-
mentalist claim (ExtI) and IntW are logically independent. The claim that entities 
in the environment might be viewed as parts of cognitive processes does allow 
for the possibility but does not necessarily imply that these entities will work 
as instruments of a cognitive process, nor does the reverse hold. At the same 
instance, one will be entitled to accept that ExtC and ExtI might hold at the same 
time, albeit in different, non-intersecting domains: some extensions might play a 
constitutive role, and thus imply IntS for the respective class of cases, whereas oth-
ers might count as mere instruments of cognition in another class of cases. Still, 
IntS will be vindicated, because there is a class of cases by which it is implied. On 
this analysis, the ExtC type of cases provides much better support for the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis, and it does so for its stronger version.
In conjunction with the aetiological argument, these distinctions will contribute 
to a reasonably detailed classification of relations of extendedness. Any claim for 
a functional parity between the internal and external mechanisms involved will 
have to be cashed out in some not necessarily directly biological reproductive 
advantage determinable for each part of the equation.
If, first, I were able to substitute an environmentally coupled for an internal 
process at will, where that substitution made no difference to the achievement of 
my goals, in terms of scope, effectiveness, efficiency or reliability, the functional 
equivalence involved would be of the weak ExtI kind. We still would have to 
explain how the elements involved have come to be thus substitutable.
If, second, the members of some population become equally able to mobilise 
some novel environment-based mechanism in order to supplement an established 
cognitive function, so as to achieve an increase in scope, effectiveness, efficiency 
or reliability, functional equivalence of a non-trivial constitutiveW kind will be 
reached, while adaptive fitness will actually be increased across the entire popula-
tion. This is where some of the standard examples of cognitive extensions will fit 
in, namely computing devices that increase the amount and complexity of avail-
able information or the speed of retrieval.
If, third, members of some population become able to individually mobilise a 
novel environment-based mechanism for an established function, so as to outper-
form other members of that population to whom the mechanism remains unavaila-
ble, the condition of functional equivalence will hold with respect to the sameness 
of function but not with respect to adaptive fitness within the population. Such 
would be the case for technologies of cognitive enhancement that are available 
only to some members of a population.
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If, fourth, I use an environmentally coupled process in order to compensate for 
an internally based one that I am not able to perform for some reason, and if that 
environmentally based substitute enables me to accomplish the same task with 
roughly the same degree of effectiveness, efficiency and reliability (see Clark’s 
“glue and trust” criteriondiscussed earlier), functional equivalence will be reached 
on all levels by means of a mechanism that is clearly distinct from the impaired 
one. Such will be the case in what has been termed “sensory substitution” (see 
Farina 2013; Kiverstein et al. 2015): situations of sensory impairment might be 
mended by artefacts that compensate for the function that has been lost and that 
typically recruit an alternative sensory modality.
If, fifth, an environmentally coupled process allows for the establishment of 
novel functions, and hence is constitutiveS to them, there will be no reference 
point for determining functional equivalence, so that the function in question will 
have to be identified in the first place. It is upward along this hierarchy of types 
of functional relations that one will find the most rewarding proving grounds for 
any claim of extendedness.
Constitutional matters
The distinction between constitutiveW and constitutiveS types of cases introduced 
in the previous section partly matches the respective foci of “first wave” parity-
oriented views of extended cognition, which highlight functional equivalence 
between internal and environmentally coupled cognitive processes, and “sec-
ond wave” complementarity views, which highlight the role of environmentally 
extended processes as co-constituents of some cognitive abilities.9 Still, the map-
ping of these “waves” onto the types of constitutiveness introduced earlier is not 
strictly disjunctive, and some of the preceding points might help to partly integrate 
these arguments: where classical functionalism focused on analogies between 
input/output relations in different systems on a general level, and where the “micro-
functionalism” defended by Wheeler (2010) focuses on more fine-grained analo-
gies in functions of the structures that realise a superordinate function, a history of 
selected effects of the traits of the systems under consideration will help to explain 
the establishment of certain functions in the first place. At the same instance, it 
is a matter of course to an aetiological view of functions to be impartial towards 
somatic boundaries, provided that the environmental structures in question form 
part of the necessary conditions in an explanation of the presence of some function. 
It is equally a matter of course for an aetiological view, as it is for the developmen-
tal systems theorist, to accept that the roles played by the co-constituents of some 
function are more likely heterogeneous in kind than mutually substitutable.
Still, one might accept either or both types of constitutive roles of environmen-
tal factors for some of the adaptive functions of some organism’s traits without 
necessarily accepting them as being coupled with the organism in the sense sug-
gested by Clark and Chalmers. According to Kim Sterelny (2010), the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis overemphasises prima facie functional similarities between 
internal and artefact-involving cognitive processes while playing down the role of 
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the agents who not only rely on environmental supports but also actively mobilise 
environmental resources, natural and other, so as to construct their own cogni-
tive niches (a concept more richly developed in his 2003 book). Sterelny (2010) 
argues that functional couplings of the Extended Mind kind are limiting cases 
of the more general phenomenon of environmental scaffolding: the reliance of 
organisms on the presence of some environmental features or artefacts without 
which some function could not be accomplished. For example human beings have 
become reliant on the availability of cooked food or means of cooking food, as 
their metabolic apparatus has become insufficient for coping with exclusively 
raw food. Hence, cooking is an environmental scaffolding for the human metabo-
lism, but it will be hardly illuminating to refer to the human metabolism as being 
extended into the environment.
With respect to constitutiveW cases, all hopes for an artefact to pass muster as being 
part of an extended cognitive processes rather than a mere scaffolding rest on the 
degree of integration of the artefact into the accomplishment of a cognitive function, 
such as memorising facts or orienting oneself in space – which are functions that still 
can be accomplished to some extent by the unaided mind. However, genuinely mate-
rial “anchors” for certain cognitive tasks may often be both more efficient and histor-
ically prior to analogously formed conceptual ones (Hutchins 2005). Still, there will 
always be room for debate as to whether some concrete coupling with some artefact 
is tight and integrated enough to warrant the bestowal of the “extended” predicate, 
or to make us, in Clark’s words, “natural-born cyborgs” (2003). There is no steadfast 
ontological criterion to make that decision for us, although the evolutionary history 
of the mechanisms involved will provide some guidance.
Hence, the quest will be for evolved mechanisms for recruiting artefacts for 
the performance of cognitive functions. Clearly, it is not some concrete type of 
artefact (the notebook, the smartphone) that we have evolved to be coupled with. 
What can be credibly argued to have evolved is a general and highly adaptable 
ability to create and recruit such artefacts – from simple drawings to comput-
ing gadgets. In Millikan’s terms (see p. 113), it is the direct proper function of 
the organism-based mechanisms involved to recruit a variety of artefacts for the 
accomplishment of a cognitive task, and it is the direct proper function of any 
concrete type of artefact involved to make its contribution to the accomplishment 
of that task, in cooperation with the organism-based mechanisms. If, though, one 
takes the lessons to be learned from developmental systems theory seriously, the 
practice of using artefacts should be expected to feed back into the organisation of 
the brain, and might do so beyond childhood development (Farina 2016).
It will be more difficult to identify the nature and functions of instances of 
environmental coupling that play a constitutiveS role, as the respective cognitive 
ability supposedly would not exist without the environmental counterpart. It will 
even be difficult to identify the ability in question as being properly cognitive. If 
one follows Adams and Aizawa (2001) in defining cognitive processes ab initio 
as a subset of the processes within the human nervous system, one has a criterion 
for what counts as cognitive that rules out “extra-cranial” processes by default, 
albeit a question-begging one. After all, there are many non-cognitive neuronal 
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processes. It is the additional criterion of the involvement of “non-derived con-
tent” recruited by the authors that shall suffice to identify the subset of intra-
cranial processes that are properly cognitive. In introducing that second criterion, 
the authors follow an argument in John Searle’s critique of AI (1980): although 
linguistic items or other artefacts have the meanings they have and serve the func-
tions they do because they are endowed, by stipulation or convention, with those 
meanings and functions, our thoughts have their meanings and serve their func-
tions in at least partial independence from any such external fiat. The nature of the 
human mind bearing those thoughts is supposedly at least partly sufficient for the 
presence of that content. That nature is not further explicated though.
On the aetiological view, in contrast, both artefacts of all sorts and our thoughts 
have the meanings and functions they have because individual artefacts and men-
tal tokens have been reproduced by some mechanism with sufficient frequency 
because they mapped onto some world affair, in terms of being connected to an 
appropriate set of behaviours towards it, reliably enough and according to a well-
defined set of regularities. On this view, cognition basically is a specific activity 
of relating to one’s environment, in which such mapping relations are used to pro-
duce adaptive behaviours. No principled difference exists between artefactual and 
internal mechanisms that accomplish this feat, namely producing the appropri-
ate tokens on the appropriate occasions, where the conditions of appropriateness 
essentially depend on what in the environment the organism relies on. As we will 
see in more detail in the next section, the human faculty of language is the primary 
candidate for a properly cognitive trait that may both count as environmentally 
extended and fit the constitutiveS condition, and hence militates against either of 
Adams and Aizawa’s criteria: its function and contents depend on the operation of 
mechanisms that partly operate outside the human brain or body.
Entities and processes in the environment may contribute to cognitive abili-
ties in constitutiveS fashion in either of two ways, both of which include evolved 
mechanisms of coupling: on the one hand, they might be part of the necessary 
conditions for the realisation of the direct proper functions of a mechanism that 
is otherwise based within the organism. The entities and processes in the envi-
ronment need not be reproducible items with their own direct proper functions, 
but their presence and use will be essential to the realisation of the functions 
of the organism-based production mechanisms. On the other hand, there might 
be mechanisms for the production of tokens of some type that are based in the 
environment while being coordinated with organism-based mechanisms, so as 
to jointly help him to produce behaviours appropriate to a given world affair in a 
given situation. It is in the latter, more complex type of case where reproducible 
artefacts will come to play a central role.
The art of coupling, basic and advanced
Clark and Chalmers only briefly and tentatively refer to relations that would count 
as constitutiveS on the present account (1998, 11). However, these references are 
part of a brief evolutionary excursus and include two suggestions that match the 
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distinction introduced at the end of the preceding section: the evolution of vision 
as exploiting the structure of local environments, and the evolution of language 
as a key structuring feature of human interaction.10 Although Clark and Chalmers 
proceed to using language as their paradigm extension of the mind, it might be 
worthwhile to also pay attention to more basic modes of environmental coupling. 
The function of vision and language is certainly not one of instruments that could 
be used or discarded by human beings at will. In the context of human evolution, 
both are indispensable components of, and hence constitutiveS to, human cogni-
tion. If an individual is deprived of either faculty, his or her cognitive functions 
will be impaired to some extent, and some functions could not be accomplished 
at all.
Still, there is a difference between vision and language, with their respective 
modes of environmental coupling, in terms of the depth of their evolutionary roots 
and the levels of cognition they feed into. Vision is not only the older and more 
common phenomenon in the animal kingdom. It can also be plausibly argued to 
be more directly tied to objects and structures in the environment, serving as a pre-
requisite for spatial orientation and object recognition for most animals, includ-
ing humans. Language, in contrast, serves the coupling between human agents in 
the first place and presupposes a number of pre-linguistic cognitive capabilities, 
including mechanisms of orientation and object recognition. Moreover, whereas 
the environmental coupling in visual perception, in terms of necessary constitu-
ents of the visual process, occurs between mechanisms of perception and invari-
ant properties of objects in the environment, language will rightfully count as a 
production mechanism in its own right.
On this view, the cognitively most foundational set of external entities to be cou-
pled with is to be found in natural objects or processes in the environment. Accord-
ing to the ecological view of visual perception, as developed by James Jerome 
Gibson (1979) and discussed in Chapter 3, features of an organism’s natural envi-
ronment will provide the information to guide his activities, and will be available 
to him reliably, directly, implicitly and automatically, fulfilling all four of Clark 
and Chalmers’s earlier cited criteria. Visual perception, as we saw, crucially relies 
on the perceiver’s interaction with his environment and the objects he encounters 
therein. On the ecological view, inference or inner representations are largely irrel-
evant to perception, whereas none of these higher-order cognitive accomplishments 
could emerge without the prior establishment of mechanisms of perceptual cou-
pling. Alternatively, between such elementary direct guidance by perception and 
fully fledged internal representations, one might find representations that detect 
patterns in one’s environment and direct appropriate behaviours towards them 
at the same instance. These elementary representations have been introduced as 
“pushmi-pullyu representations” by Millikan (1995), and they figure as “action-
oriented representations” in Clark (1997; see also Clark and Toribio 1994).
This image of directness has to be extended when moving from perception to 
higher-order kinds of cognition. On the one hand, some of the guidance that has 
hitherto been directly provided by perceptual couplings with the environment is 
now delegated to internal resources, some but not all of which will assume the 
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shape of explicit representations. Thus, the next remarkable development, again 
in phylogenetic terms, does not as much lie in an extension of cognition into the 
environment as it lies in the internalisation of some of the guidance that would 
otherwise be directly provided by the environment. Externalisation reappears on 
the level of artefacts that are used for cognitive functions in such a way as to re-
instantiate environmental guidance on a higher level.
On the other hand, the purposeful creation and appropriation of cognitive 
resources fosters their (partial) detachment from a present, imminent or otherwise 
predetermined practical use. In turn, however, the use of these artificial resources, 
once it has been properly learned, and if it functions smoothly, normally is quite as 
direct, implicit and automatic as in the more basic cases. One may pause to reflect 
on the information taken up from the environment, and one may then either resort 
to other sources of information or store away that information for later use. How-
ever, doing so remains a special case mostly reserved for instances of interference 
or error, and for (re-) assessing the goals of one’s actions. In a familiar and well-
behaved environment, the natural and artificial features of that environment will 
equally provide direct guidance.
Language has the intriguing property of essentially involving both artefacts 
and internal mechanisms in order to perform its functions. It is at once rooted in 
evolution and in the history of artefact use. More specifically, it has been argued, 
most prominently by Terrence Deacon (1997), that language co-evolved with the 
human brain and its capability of symbolic reference. Deacon takes language to 
be a structure whose properties and reproduction within language communities 
are in a straightforwardly evolutionary way interdependent with the properties 
particular to the human brain. The complexity and the adaptive functions of the 
human mind have as one of the necessary conditions of their emergence and pre-
sent functioning the development and use of linguistic structures. The intra- and 
extra-somatic mechanisms for the production of linguistic items are tightly inte-
grated with each other. Neither mechanism would be present nor could it function 
in absence of the other. Individually, they contribute to shaping their counterpart 
and its functions, historically and at present. Jointly, they enable speakers to create 
concrete artefactual structures on which their further interaction relies. This claim 
is to be distinguished from the considerably broader view that human linguistic 
capacities are a product of natural selection on the one hand, where the possible 
role of linguistic artefacts in shaping these capacities is not further considered, 
and Chomskyan linguistics on the other, where linguistic structures proper are 
supposed to be at once innate and not a product of natural selection.11
Complementary to the hypothesis of language-brain co-evolution, there are 
arguments for a co-evolution of tool use in general and human cognitive capaci-
ties. It is suggested that there is some covariance between an animal’s brain size 
and structure on the one hand and his skills in using or manufacturing objects 
to manipulate other objects in their environments on the other.12 Although the 
claim that there is a direct and necessary correlation between tool use and gen-
eral intelligence remains contested (for critical views see, e.g. McGrew 2013; 
Shumaker et al. 2011, Chapter 7; Teschke et al. 2013), theories of this kind may 
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enjoy somewhat more substantial empirical support in terms of paleontological 
evidence than the language-brain co-evolution hypothesis: early human tools 
have been preserved and can be classified into stages of development that accord 
with stages of human evolution, and closer comparisons are possible between 
tool use in humans and other species than between human language and animal 
signals. Such empirical support, patchy and contestable as it may be, helps to keep 
co-evolutionary theories of tool use at a comfortable distance from anthropologi-
cal speculations in philosophy such as the concept of “homo faber”, as criticised 
by Max Scheler (1928) or the diagnosis in Arnold Gehlen (1940) of man as an 
“incomplete being”.
These observations about language and tools as constitutiveS elements of human 
cognition, however, do not imply an either/or decision between them: the most 
plausible suggestion is that both tool use and language co-evolved with the estab-
lishment of modes of cultural transmission and complex social behaviours in such 
a way that only the combination of all these elements, rather than merely one or a 
few of them, sufficiently explains the complexity and function of human cognitive 
traits. It might also be that not only cognitive artefacts contributed to the evolution 
of these traits.
The constitutivenessS of tool and language use in general to human cognitive 
capacities has to be distinguished from the creation and use of any concrete arte-
fact as being constitutiveW to the accomplishment of some function for its user. 
Only under the former but not the latter perspective, one can say that the function 
in question is established by the use of artefacts as one of its necessary precondi-
tions, and only under the former but not the latter perspective, one can say that it 
is also sufficient for the anchoring of that function as a biological one. The use of 
any concrete artefact may ultimately make a contribution to the make-up of some 
cognitive trait, and, if the historical accounts referred to here are substantially 
right, the use of concrete objects has been part of establishing the cognitive traits 
that we now call our own, but when considered individually, the use of a concrete 
artefact will not provide sufficient grounds for an explanation of why our cogni-
tive traits are what they are, and what functions they serve.
If the human faculty of language and linguistic structures in conjunction are 
correctly described as achieving a complex cognitive coupling between agents 
and their environments that would not be possible without them, and hence be 
constitutiveS to it, they may actually and, at the same instance, be the cognitive 
resource with the highest potential for decoupling, as they allow for public and 
individual use in a multitude of partly unanticipated contexts, and as they allow 
for degrees of abstraction and detachment from actual matters of fact that would 
otherwise be hard to come by. Hence, contrary to one concluding observation in 
Clark and Chalmers’s essay, the human mind, without language, would not be 
“much more akin to discrete Cartesian ‘inner’ minds, in which high level cogni-
tion relies largely on internal resources” (1998, 18). If we may call our evolu-
tionary kin as witness, our minds would be coupled with their environments in 
considerably tighter and more direct fashion, in that there would be little excep-
tion to being directly guided in our actions by what we encounter there.
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If constitutive modes of cognitive coupling carry the day as the paradigms of 
extensions of the mind, as I have sought do demonstrate, we might better conceive 
of the human and other minds as extended not by virtue of being equipped with a 
number of artificial add-ons that work as external instruments of internally based 
cognition. Instead, we should conceive of cognition as being extended over traits 
of the organism and properties of the environment, incorporating and integrating 
entities, processes and mechanisms on either side of the somatic boundaries. Both 
sides have evolved, grown and, in part, purposefully created to be so integrated. 
In conjunction, they will either constituteW alternative mechanisms for the accom-
plishment of some cognitive functions or constituteS some functions, as necessary 
conditions for their presence. In either case, but to different degrees, the establish-
ment and performance of these functions depends both on evolved mechanisms 
and on the environment-shaping activities of the cognising organisms themselves.
Whether developmental systems theory or environmental constructivism or 
niche constructivism or teleofunctionalism or theories of extended cognition are 
concerned, they appear to share a leitmotif introduced into modern Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy by John Dewey (especially in 1929).13 In critical reaction to Herbert 
Spencer’s self-styled Darwinian conception of the organism-environment relation 
and in accordance with a different lesson drawn from Darwin, Dewey considers 
the distinction between organism and environment artificial to begin with. Pre-
suming that distinction to be ontologically grounded creates many of the problems 
that most accounts of the adaptive efforts of an organism keep struggling with. 
To live plainly is a particular way of being related to one’s environment. It also 
is an interactive, environment-shaping relation, and it is continuous with being a 
cognitive system, in terms of the evolved function of cognition to help an organ-
ism cope with a complex and continuously changing environment. On this view, it 
will be difficult to find cognitive processes that do not incorporate features of the 
environment. At root, all cognition is extended, and only some of the historically 
most recent cognitive traits allow for a notable degree of decoupling. The mind is 
not extended into but over the environment.
Notes
 1 For systematic mappings of that debate, see Menary (2010b) and Wilson and Clark 
(2009). Hurley (2010) embeds her account in a broader taxonomy of externalist posi-
tions in the philosophy of mind. A useful commented bibliography on extended cogni-
tion is provided by Kiverstein et al. (2013).
 2 This concern is shared by the main critics of extended cognition, Adams and Aizawa 
(2001), Rupert (2004) and Sprevak (2009).
 3 See, for example Wheeler and Clark (2008), where evolutionary and developmental con-
siderations play a major role in an argument for dynamic interactions among genetic, 
organismic and cultural factors; or Wilson and Clark (2009), where an explicit and positive 
reference is made to evolutionary accounts of biological functions; or Rowlands (2004, 
224–227), who refers to Millikan-style proper functions and their aetiological credentials.
 4 Other statements of this paradigm include Godfrey-Smith (1994), Neander (1991a, 
1991b), Papineau (1987) and Price (2001); see also the anthology by Macdonald and 
Papineau (2006).
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 5 Remarkably, this link between teleosemantics and extended cognition was first 
 highlighted by one of the main critics of the latter: Rupert (2004, 401, n22).
 6 For its emphasis on the nature of functions as, paradigmatically naturally, selected 
effects, and for its reliance on the positive selection for some trait, the teleofunctional 
account should be partly subsumable under the adaptationist rubric (these commit-
ments are quite clearly stated in Millikan 2004, Chs. 1–2).
 7 At the end of (2008), Clark asks for a “mental flip” explicitly styled after the one sug-
gested by Dawkins (1999), whereas much of the preceding text is an attempt at provid-
ing concrete evidence for the explanatory value of extended cognition.
 8 Among the few non-primate tool-using species, individuals of the New Caledonian 
crow (Corvus moneduloides) were observed to alternate between tool-guided and tool-
less techniques of extracting food in the wild (Bluff et al. 2010). A recent example of 
allegedly innovative tool use and its social transmission in captive Goffin cockatoos 
(Cacatua goffini) is to be found in Auersperg et al. (2014). For an authoritative account 
of the varieties and complexities of animal tool use, see Shumaker et al. (2011).
 9 The distinction between waves of arguments for extended cognition has been made 
by Sutton (2010). Defences of extended functionalism include Clark (2008) and Clark 
(2010b) and Wheeler (2010), while second wave views have been introduced by 
Menary (2010a, integrationism); Sutton (2010) and Kiverstein and Farina (2011, com-
plementarity); and Rowlands (2010, amalgamationism). It was Clark (1997) himself 
who anticipated complementarity views.
 10 For extended-mind-based accounts of language, see Clark (1998, 2006), and Wheeler 
(2004).
 11 See Christiansen and Kirby (2003) for a collection of positions on the evolutionary 
roots of language and the possibility of brain/language co-evolution. For a classic, 
anti-Chomskyan account of the evolution of the human faculty of language, see Pinker 
and Bloom (1990), and for the position under attack here Chomsky (2006).
 12 Studies focusing on the importance of tool use, typically in conjunction with other fac-
tors, have been assembled in Gibson and Ingold (1993), Matsuzawa (2001), and Sanz 
et al. (2013). Arguments for a primacy of cultural or “Machiavellian” intelligence over 
the use of linguistic and other artefacts are to be found in Byrne and Whiten (1988), 
Herrmann et al. (2007), Humphrey (1976), and Tomasello (2014); see also Sterelny 
(2003, Chapter 4).
 13 For historical and systematic considerations of the Spencer-Dewey axis, see Godfrey-
Smith (1996a; 1996b), Pearce (2014). Notably, Dawkins’s extended phenotype theory 
may be considered playing the Spencerian part in this context.
The term “cognitive artefacts” was introduced by Andy Clark (1998) – although 
it does not appear in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Kim Sterelny uses the roughly 
synonymous term of “epistemic artefacts” (2003; 2004) which, in turn, is taken 
up by Clark in (2010b). These terms are obviously supposed to be more accurate 
in definition than the notion of information technologies, which is both less well-
defined and typically more narrowly applied to computing artefacts. The term 
“cognitive artefacts” is supposed to refer to that class of artefacts which, by what-
ever means, serve to support, augment or substitute the cognitive functions of 
their users, in an analogous way to tools and machines that support, augment or 
substitute human activities on a straightforwardly physical level. According to 
this analogy, information would be to cognitive artefacts what directed motion is 
to conventional machines (see the discussion in Chapter 1).
Although such an intuitive definition is not off the mark, it will raise questions 
concerning, first, what the nature of the information involved is, second, what 
cognitive functions are supposed to be thus served and, third, how, and hence 
by what kinds of artefacts, they are supposed to be thus served. I have dedicated 
much space to addressing the first two questions. In a nutshell, the answers are 
that the information involved is paradigmatically natural information, and that 
the cognitive functions involved are, at root, those of embodied perception and 
orientation in an environment, which are reliant on the active uptake of natural 
information. I will now direct my attention towards the nature of cognitive arte-
facts and the ways in which they provide information of the said kind and thereby 
serve cognitive functions of the said kind.
I will argue that there are two fundamental ways in which cognitive artefacts 
may convey information about a given subject matter: the information they 
provide is either convergent with, or isomorphic to, natural information that a 
perceiving subject could collect in his or her environment. This distinction, intro-
duced towards the end of this chapter, will help to generate a more differentiated 
picture of the nature of cognitive artefacts than the conventional reality/virtuality 
distinction. It will be particularly relevant with respect to artefacts that integrate 
simulated elements into the perception of an environment, as in “mixed” or “aug-
mented” realities. These examples and their implications will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 9. I will prepare this line of argumentation by first considering 
8  The nature of cognitive 
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pictorial forms and their constitutiveW role to the accomplishment of cognitive 
functions, and by then exploring the interplay between cognitive artefacts and 
informational environments on a more general level.
Being guided by pictures
Pictorial forms are a fairly elementary kind of cognitive artefact that may help us 
to a clearer view of the relation between natural and artificial cognitive resources. 
Pictorial forms function both on the individual level and on the collective level, 
in a partly analogous fashion to language. Without making a claim for a genu-
ine theory of pictorial representation – or anything close to the paradigms set by 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1998) and Nelson Goodman (1976), I will understand 
pictures in a wide sense while keeping this concept distinct from the notion of 
images which, for including abstract mathematical mappings, is not necessarily 
perception related. A picture may be a photograph as well as a painting or draw-
ing, but it may also be a visual presentation or representation of a more abstract 
and formal kind, such as a pictogram, a graph or a map. A picture may also be of 
the moving kind, such as a film or an animated simulation.
It would be difficult to provide solid empirical evidence for the plausible claim 
that one constituentS of the evolution of human cognitive capacities lies in the 
creation and use of pictures, and that it does so in a similar or even related way to 
what Terrence Deacon (1997) claims for language (as discussed towards the end 
of Chapter 7). If one sees the essential connection between language and cognitive 
capacities in that co-evolutionary process to lie in the evolution of symbolic refer-
ence, and if symbolic reference is to be understood in the Peircean sense here, as 
distinguished from iconic and indexical reference, pictorial and linguistic forms 
would prima facie appear as quite distinct affairs anyway:1 symbolic reference is 
based on conventions and implicit norms of usage rather than qualitative similari-
ties or causal connection respectively, whereas pictures would seem to be iconic 
rather than symbolic in referential character. Notably, however, pictorial forms, in 
their broad variety, encompass the entire range of the Peircean iconic, indexical 
and symbolic modes of reference, where even iconic reference may partly rely on 
conventions and implicit norms, and where symbolic reference is accomplished in 
a partly different and less articulated fashion than for language.
If the pictorial forms in question are supposedly realistic or, in Peircean terms, 
iconic representations of natural scenes or familiar objects, they can be presumed to 
capture and contain some of the natural information for perception that is, has been or 
hypothetically could have been present in the agents’ environment. Even if the scenes 
or objects are idealised or fictitious, and even if they could not possibly exist, recog-
nition of the type of thing depicted will be possible, as long as they are provided with 
some recognisable characteristics of real-world objects or scenes. One will recognise 
a fantasy picture of a band of unicorns roaming the grassy hills of a red-skied planet 
shortly before the setting of its two suns not least because the analogy to bands of 
horses roaming the grassy hills somewhere on Earth near sunset – things that one is 
likely to perceptually encounter in a real environment – is strong and clear enough.
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Abstract paintings, graphs of statistical distributions or displays of the 
 behaviours of exceedingly small, large or remote objects in a computer simula-
tion, as visualisations of world affairs about whom no direct perceptual uptake of 
information would be feasible to begin with, and where no analogy of the afore-
mentioned kind would be in reach, will provide different kinds of information: 
either natural information that is not accessible to direct perception, as in the case 
of graphs or other scientific visualisations, or information that should be consid-
ered genuinely artefactual, in terms of relating to concepts presumably devised 
by the item’s author, as in the case of abstract works of art. Here, indexical and 
symbolic modes of reference, again in Peircean terms, will play a prominent role: 
elements of some picture will be supposed to indicate rather than resemble or oth-
erwise exemplify qualities of their referent, or they come to refer to their subject 
matter by association or convention, and thus can only be interpreted within a 
conventionally based framework of reference.
As outlined in Chapter 3, the primary cognitive achievement of pictures might 
not be precisely that of being pictorial representations – understood literally, as 
making present again. James Jerome Gibson (1979, Chapter 15) argued that the 
notion of pictorial representation is misguiding, as the set of invariants captured 
by the picture would be confined to a few channels of transmission, and hence 
remain incomplete, and that the information they contain would be made avail-
able in detachment from the original context of presentation. This is not a purely 
negative claim. What a picture, at least one of the iconic variety, can achieve is 
to extract a limited subset of the information for visual perception that has been, 
would have been or could have been present to the observer, and to display it in 
a delimited optic array, which itself, for being so delimited (and not “ambient”), 
is ultimately placed in a non-pictorial environment – while remaining within the 
same framework of perception, namely visual perception, to which the same gen-
eral principles apply. An iconic picture may be a partial record of perception, in 
that it preserves some of the invariants, hence some of the information, by means 
of which we perceive and act within our environments, and in that it presents that 
partial, delimited information in a context in which it is not naturally present.
Conversely, what an abstract work of art and a visualisation of a simulation in 
science can achieve is to present, in a delimited context, a specified set of infor-
mation that would not, and perhaps could not, be available to visual perception 
and place it in a non-pictorial environment. Instead, it will first make available to 
visual perception what is depicted, as in a simulation, or it will supposedly alter 
the observer’s perceptual and conceptual expectations, as many works of art are 
designed to do. In either case, explicit conventions or implicit understandings 
of how the pictorial form in question is supposed to refer to some world affair 
will have to be in place – from objects or processes that would be observable 
in principle but cannot be directly observed in practice, via theoretical entities 
to conceptual structures that are not necessarily supposed to bear any empirical 
reference. In some cases, visually pointing to the values of a variable or identi-
fying and visualising patterns of relations within the target will be part of how 
the picture in question refers to its subject matter, and hence imply an indexical 
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mode of reference. Both the indexical and the symbolic mode of reference may 
become part of an iconic picture, too (think of a photograph of a crowd at a rock 
concert, furnished with an arrow pointing to an individual and a caption “That’s 
me at Sleater-Kinney’s 1997 show in Cologne” – which the author of these lines 
happened to miss).
However, the question of modes of pictorial reference is in many respects inde-
pendent of the Gibsonian point that the primary function of pictures will not be 
that of representation but that of providing a partial, delimited analogue of direct 
perception of an environment and the guidance of activities in that environment. 
In the latter respect, an abstract painting or a visualisation of a simulation might 
operate in a manner quite distinct from a photograph of someone or something 
I am acquainted with. However, the “mode of reference” variable only partly 
covaries with the “perceptual guidance” variable. Concerning the latter, the cen-
tral question will be what guidance something as limited and de-contextualised as 
a picture could provide, and how.
A first approach to an answer will be to say that the possibility of pictorial 
guidance depends on a selection of invariants to be preserved by the picture that 
is suitable to the observer’s needs. A detailed re-creation of what has been seen in 
the original perceptual situation cannot be the aim of a picture, but only the pres-
ervation of some of the information available in that situation. The observer may 
also be supposed to identify the mapping relations of pictures of quite abstract 
and formal kinds, and act upon them. The empirical rendering of a simulation is 
often designed with quite pragmatic criteria in mind: directing different observers’ 
attention to what is deemed most relevant in the results. Indexicality may hence be 
combined with iconicity, but may also override it if what the observer is supposed 
to pick up so requires.
A second approach to an answer to the question of pictorial guidance will be to 
say that the information which is inevitably missing in the picture will be filled 
in by the observer: he or she may be related to the picture, or learn how to look at 
the picture, in ways that allow him or her to identify it as a picture of some con-
crete individual entity or event that he or she knows, or as exemplifying types of 
things or properties that he or she is familiar with. If the filling-in of the missing 
information is done properly, a picture may well guide the observer’s behaviours 
in a way partly comparable to the presence of the original world affair. For more 
abstract picturing relations, as in simulations, the filling in will be of an equally 
more abstract kind. In order to make the unobservable variables observable, a 
preliminary concept of the structure and behaviour of the target has to be in place 
when first-hand experience, via perceptual encounters with the target, is either 
unavailable or insufficient.
A third approach to pictorial guidance will specify that one key element of 
filling in the information that is missing in the picture will be to know how to 
apply the relevant transformations of the mapping relations between the original 
view of a scene or an object and those involved in seeing the picture. On these 
grounds, Ruth Millikan (2004, Chapter 9) argues that, if we know what transfor-
mation rules are to be applied, we actually see, through a different medium but 
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nonetheless directly, what is depicted. (Even language, on her account, allows for 
direct perception of the subject matter of some utterance.) It will be a relatively 
straightforward matter to keep track of the transformations of the mapping rela-
tions for cases such as the photographer’s view of the scene from the mountain on 
which the picture was taken vs. my view of the scene as it is now pictured in the 
book on my table. Keeping track of the transformations will, however, be more 
difficult for more abstract ways of depicting world affairs, where there is no obvi-
ous way of anchoring the transformations of the mapping relation in such a thing 
as an original view of a scene. Besides some concept of the target, a concept of the 
required transformations will have to be in place.
Among these three conditions – suitable selection of information, availability 
of contextual information for filling in the missing information and knowledge 
about the required transformations of the mapping relations – the latter two might 
suggest that perception of pictorial forms is mediated through theoretical concepts 
and hence indirect. Although there undeniably is a level of conceptual mediation 
to this kind of perception, that fact neither provides a criterion of demarcation 
from direct visual perception of natural objects and scenes, nor does it imply an 
indirectness of perception of pictorial forms. If all three conditions are fulfilled, 
the information about the target that is contained in the picture will be preserved, 
and hence be perceivable to the observer. It is the informational limitations and 
de-contextualisation of pictorial forms that will affect all kinds of pictures, but 
these limitations as such do not make the reference of the pictures indirect. What 
will be required is the filling-in of contextual information and the application of 
transformations of the mapping relations, which amounts to conceptual media-
tions. Once, however, these mediations are firmly in place – which may require 
learning how to look at a certain picture or kind of picture – information uptake 
may become quite direct, so that one will be entitled to say: “Das Bild sagt mir 
also sich selbst” (Wittgenstein 1969, IX, 115).
However, what mediation implies is, first, that a picture, like a linguistic item 
but unlike an instance of misperceiving a natural object or scene, might guide us 
with respect to things that do not exist without necessarily losing its referential 
character, and without necessarily amounting to an artfully created illusion. A pic-
ture of a band of unicorns at double sunset on a distant world, although neither that 
world nor those animals may exist, will still preserve some of the information that 
would have been present in that scene if it existed. At the same instance, it will be 
clear to the observer that the animals, the hills on which they roam and the two 
suns are not constituents of his environment.
Second, there might be considerable variation between different observers in 
terms of available contextual information and knowledge of the required transfor-
mations of mapping relations, and there might be no obvious and unequivocal way 
of mending it: is the picture in question a photograph taken during my vacation for 
private use, is it a painting of a person or place that can be assumed to be known 
to a collective of people, or is it a map or pictogram designed for public use? Is 
the other observer of a visualisation of the hydrogen bomb core simulation versed 
enough in nuclear physics to see the importance of the change in the target at tn? 
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Does he share the theoretical views that make this change relevant in explanatory 
terms? How can we make sure that a variety of observers relate to the same picture 
in the same way, so that its function as an external cognitive resource is secured? 
First and foremost, the information required for a common understanding – 
for a shared mode of filling in the missing information, as it were – may be pre-
sented in a variety of ways, with different degrees of articulation, standardisation 
and public availability. It may consist in a picture’s placement within a series of 
pictures, or in different individuals’ memories of the event depicted, or in an act 
of pointing towards what is depicted (if it is present in a shared environment) or 
in some commentary or description in natural language.
Arguably, the last of these ways of providing contextual information will be of 
the highest degree of articulation, standardisation and public availability – which, 
however, comes at a cost. In their “Extended Mind” paper, Clark and Chalmers 
justify the privileged status they assign to language as an extension of the mind by 
its function of achieving a cognitive coupling between individuals, so as to jointly 
meet individual and collective purposes of the cognitive or practical kind – rather 
than coupling one organism with aspects of his environment so as to meet a cer-
tain set of individual purposes. For linguistic items, their proper way of usage will 
be fixed and occasionally modified in the very course of public usage and, to some 
part, by explicit definitions. Moreover, the rules thus established can be explicated 
and reconstructed by using the very same cognitive resource. On the grounds of 
these properties, language may also be used to negotiate and fix the reference of 
pictorial forms, and to give their users some guidance towards the proper way 
of looking at them – although practical training of one’s visual system and some 
degree of acquaintance with the object or kind of object or scene pictured will be 
no less important for this purpose.
Considering maps or graphs, the role of language in properly understanding 
them is quite obvious, as they are usually equipped with instructions on how to 
read them (e.g. captions or legends that reveal what type of symbol stands for 
what type of referent). Language is contained in them or attached to them. For 
other pictorial forms, no such obvious and, as it were, institutionalised role of 
language is available. One may give descriptions of some elements of the pic-
ture, telling the innocent observer what he or she ought to see there, or one may 
describe the context in which the picture was taken, so as to remedy the asym-
metries in contextual information, and perhaps establish rules of looking at a cer-
tain picture or type of picture.
It may be argued that such asymmetries in contextual information pertain to the 
use of linguistic forms, too, but these asymmetries are easier to track in language, 
as they can be explicitly addressed within the same medium, which, at the same 
instance, is the medium with the highest degree of articulation that we have at 
our disposal. It would be much more difficult to comment on a picture with a pic-
ture, so as to disambiguate its content, and to do so within a publicly accessible, 
explicit framework of reference that would still remain pictorial. The cost of fill-
ing in the information missing in the picture is that the mode of presentation will 
be changed, in moving away from visual perception. Such mediation, although it 
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helps the observer in seeing what is depicted and in doing something with, to or 
about it, gets in the way of a coupling that would be at least similarly direct as in 
visual perception of world affairs in a natural environment. If it is indeed a detour 
for reality to explain itself through language (“Für die Realität ist es doch ein 
Umweg, sich über die Sprache zu erklären”, Wittgenstein 1969, IV, 114), it may 
be a necessary detour when it comes to fixing the content of a picture that does 
happen not to speak to me in the same way as the familiar environment in which 
I perceive and act would speak to me.
Pictorial forms, as I have tried to show, form an interesting example of a cog-
nitive artefact that sits halfway between direct guidance by features of one’s 
environment and the language-bound possibilities of decoupling, and thus for 
abstracting from matters of immediate practical relevance or factual existence. 
They share some of either’s merits and difficulties. At the same instance, they 
might be the artificial cognitive resource that, despite the limitations discussed 
earlier, displays the closest analogy to perception of natural objects and scenes 
under natural conditions. Although it will remain difficult to prove that pictorial 
forms are constitutiveS to cognitive functions to the same extent as, arguably, lan-
guage or tools are, they certainly will play a constitutiveW role in many contexts of 
interaction with and within human environments, and they, like language, will be 
implied in the use of other cognitive artefacts.
Cognitive artefacts and informational environments
Arguably, the distinction between constitutivenessS and constitutivenessW of arte-
facts to cognitive functions admits of degrees. Even if an artefact is not con-
stitutiveS in a strict sense, the effects of its use are likely to feed back into the 
constitution of cognitive traits and their functions. These effects will typically not 
be direct, in terms of becoming selectively relevant to the reproduction of a cogni-
tive trait, but manifest themselves in modifications of their users’ informational 
environments.
There are several ways in which cognitive artefacts may have such modifying 
effects on variables in informational environments – if these effects are persistent 
and consistent. An artefact may, first, induce perceptions of things that are not 
present in the environment, such as, for example, in the case of iconic pictures of 
objects, as discussed in the previous section. Second, it may induce perceptions 
of things that are present in the environment but not within the normal range of 
human perception, such as in a variety of sensor technologies. Third, objects in an 
environment might be arranged to appear different in certain respects from how 
they are, such as in Gibson’s example of a glass-plate extension over a cliff, which 
may be stepped and walked upon but which does not provide a stepping-on affor-
dance. Fourth, objects might be arranged to appear largely indistinguishable from 
natural, real-world objects within a simulated context. In all of these cases, part of 
the make-up of R’s informational environment will have been altered.
Hence, with respect to the effects on the environment, the difference between 
cognitive and other artefacts lies in the ways in which our environments are made 
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to serve our purposes. Tools and machines are mainly used to materially mod-
ify conditions in the environment, in the way outlined by Peter Godfrey-Smith 
(1996a) as “causal construction” (see p. 87). In contrast, cognitive artefacts might 
be found to have only modest effects in terms of materially modifying conditions 
in the environment, but they will affect the information that is available in the 
environment and the way in which it is available, and hence contribute to users’ 
“constitutive” relations to their environments.
Let us briefly recall that, although constitutive relations, as understood by 
Godfrey-Smith (and thus, for purposes of disambiguation, referred to as “GS- 
constitutive”), are always informationally based, the distinction between the 
construction and GS-constitution of features of the environment cuts across the 
 distinction between physical and informational properties of the environment. 
After all, both constructive and GS-constitutive features might take part in fur-
nishing information to the organism, or in placing additional physical interven-
tions in the environment. Territorial markers are physical entities that serve an 
informational purpose – one that will not, or not fully, be deducible from the phys-
ical nature of the marker. In a similar vein, cognitive artefacts, being artefacts that 
have the function of supporting, augmenting and, in some cases, substituting their 
users’ informational relations to their environments, incorporate both a construc-
tive and a GS-constitutive aspect. However, the organism’s informational needs 
and purposes will typically override the physical aspects.
On the argument on cognitive extensions in Chapter 7, the informational 
accomplishments of the artefacts under consideration here typically are not mere 
equivalents of, or functionally neutral additions to, natural human faculties of col-
lecting and acting upon information. They are so for at least three related reasons:
(e 1)  Cognitive artefacts introduce new mechanisms of collecting, structuring 
and presenting information.
(e 2)  The operation of cognitive artefacts might, as a secondary effect, affect the 
purposes of their users.
(e 3)  Cognitive artefacts may, purposefully or inadvertently, alter their users’ 
informational environments.
If the introduction of a cognitive artefact neither changed the mechanisms of col-
lecting information that I have at my disposal nor affected the goals that I could 
attain nor affected conditions in my informational environment, the use of the 
artefact in question would be perfectly identical to the use of the natural, inter-
nally based cognitive resources they supposedly supplement, augment or sub-
stitute. However, this is a theoretical possibility that has little chance of being 
borne out empirically. The three factors listed previously will individually or, 
more probably, jointly affect the collection and provision of information by cog-
nitive artefacts, in analogous fashion to what artefacts in general effect in terms of 
providing new mechanisms and altering their users’ purposes and environments.
To begin with, one is not likely to find many artefacts that accomplish a task 
in the same way as the unaided human organism will. A stick might qualify as 
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an extension of the arm in a straightforward, almost trivial manner that fits ExtI  
(see p. 119 in Chapter 7), but still, it might be used in a variety of ways that are not 
necessarily of the length-extension kind. At any rate, most tools and technological 
artefacts will bear a more complex relation to human behaviours. Returning to 
the Gunderson (1964) quotation in Chapter 1, the steam drill’s success in digging 
railway tunnels did not prove that machines had muscles but only that there are 
other ways of digging railway tunnels than by flexing muscles in an appropriate 
way. When it comes to cognitive artefacts, there will be, as a matter of empiri-
cal fact, no such thing as an extension that is strictly instrumental in character, 
although some such artefact might be conceivable. We should expect mechanisms 
to be variant by default. Otherwise, we will be restricted to trivial cases, such as 
spectacles or contact lenses. (Even hearing aids might not be a straightforward 
ExtI case, to the extent that their sound processing mechanisms differ from what 
happens in the human ear.)
As an implication of the variance in mechanisms involved, the use of artefacts 
is found to affect the purposes of human action with reliable frequency. Continu-
ing on the earlier example, if one can build railway tunnels more affordably and 
more quickly using steam drills rather than mere manpower, the reach and use of 
railway traffic is likely to grow, which, in turn, may produce an array of partly 
unexpected effects on the purposes of railway travel. Such effects may expand the 
scope of one’s activities, or they may turn out to undermine one’s purposes, in the 
same fashion as the effects of an organism’s or population’s behaviours, accord-
ing to the Lewontian view of constructing environments, may equally foster and 
undermine the fulfilment their biological purposes.
On the analysis of informational environments presented in Chapter 6, there are 
several possible ways in which technologies concerned with the provision and pro-
cessing of information might affect informational environments. If an artefact pro-
vides me with information about conditions in my environment that are relevant to 
my cognitive purposes, and if that information were practically impossible or more 
difficult to obtain, less complete or less reliable without the use of that artefact, or 
if it adds new kinds of information to that environment, that artefact’s operations, 
under the condition of its normal functioning, will have changed my informational 
environment in terms of enriching it or, to refer to Kim Sterelny’s previously quoted 
terminology (2003), making it more “transparent”. Conversely, if an artefact inter-
feres with my activities of information pickup so as to make signals persistently 
less reliable or even unavailable, my informational environment will have changed, 
too, namely in terms of being impoverished or becoming more “opaque”.
The positive vs. negative nature of a change in informational environments 
is not correlated with the purposeful vs. accidental nature of that change. On 
the understanding proposed here, modifications of informational environments, 
although they might be purposefully created, do not always end up being con-
ducive to human cognitive purposes, even if deception has not been the aim. 
Conversely, although changes in informational environments might result in illu-
sionary appearances, ambiguous perceptual situations or misperception of affor-
dances, this does not mean that they are due to processes that involve  deception or 
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dysfunction. To recall, the change in question has to be, first, persistent in order to 
qualify as a change in an informational environment (see p. 104 in Chapter 6). The 
introduction of new affordances or modifications of existing affordances by what-
ever means needs to be well-structured, which means that a limited and clearly 
circumscribed set of the variables within R’s informational environment is subject 
to a non-transient change. Second, the change in question requires a coherent 
pattern of modification, and hence has to be consistent in order to be accommo-
dating by some means for R. Whether the change opens up new informational or 
practical opportunities or increases informational uncertainty, it must allow him 
to methodically alter his responses towards the signals or towards what is being 
signalled.
To illustrate my threefold point in (e 1, 2, 3) with a contemporary example: if 
I have information on my precise location available at any time, using a mobile 
device that displays to me my GPS (Global Positioning System) coordinates pro-
jected into a map-like visualisation, I will be provided with information that is 
factually identical with the information that I would pick up from a map that 
I have learned to read, from a verbal description or from an environment with 
which I am familiar. In the latter two cases, however, I will not have all that 
information available at all times, or some of it may not be available at all. For 
example I have to fill in the information on my current location myself when using 
the map, which I might sometimes not be able to do. Or I must have at least partial 
acquaintance with some place when trying to get my directions only from looking 
at my surroundings.
This example might look a bit mundane, and it was deliberately chosen to do 
so, because even in such a comparably simple case, which involves a technology 
that is not intelligent on any AI-related account and whose use is presumably not 
ecologically or selectively relevant in a life-or-death manner but may become 
practically relevant in many respects and in many situations, all three conditions 
mentioned previously apply: the mechanisms involved will have changed, my 
purposes will have been affected and the availability and quality of the informa-
tion on which I rely will have been modified. Think of a world in which almost 
everyone is almost always guided by GPS devices, a world where maps and sign-
posts have been consigned to obsolescence as archaic, primitive and insufficient 
means of orientation, and where that device-based guidance is designed to feel 
so natural that the use of the technology is hardly noticed by its own users, as in 
Mark Weiser’s vision of “ubiquitous computing” (1991) quoted in Chapter 1.
Concerning the issue of mechanisms of information uptake (e 1), different cues 
are used, and different skills are required for different modes of accomplishing 
the same task, namely orientation. I do not need language to find my way by 
purely environmentally bound visual orientation. Recognising a landmark might 
involve the use of language but could, in principle, be accomplished without it. 
I do need language to learn reading a map, but once familiar with it, guidance 
will be more direct than from a description in natural language, as my orientation 
remains operating on the level of visual cues. Asking someone for directions will 
be helpful if I get lost and cannot match what I see on the map with what I see 
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around me. In the case of using the GPS device, both learning and using it will be 
less closely tied to the use of language than for maps. A well-designed device will 
help me to track the domain of the signals of my location quite directly, and to 
readily apply the appropriate transformations of mapping relations between what 
is displayed on the screen and what I see in my surroundings. Still, the cues I use 
will be different from natural, unaided visual orientation, and the requirements to 
my judgement as to whether I am still on course will be different from both natural 
visually based orientation and reading a map. Important topographical features 
might be misrendered by a GPS device or a map – which one may visually detect 
by comparing what is displayed with what is in the environment. GPS coordinates 
might be miscalculated by the device – which will be harder to detect, given that 
I normally do not and cannot track the process of calculation within the device.
Concerning the issue of modifying purposes (e 2), the reach of my activities has 
changed by allowing, under normal conditions, for rather effortless orientation in 
unknown surroundings. In principle, I could go anywhere, and perhaps remotely 
interact with other people who use similar devices, without knowing anything 
about the topographical features of the place or the presence of those people in 
advance. Using a device that provides all the information that I otherwise might 
not be able to fill in from observation and experience alone, I am likely to be more 
directly guided by such a device and remain more immersed in my other activi-
ties than in finding my way. I am likely to behave differently when moving to an 
unfamiliar place, in not consulting a map beforehand, or in not asking people for 
directions, and, arguably, in relying on whatever the display of my device displays 
to me, even if the system is in error.
Concerning the issue of changing informational environments (e 3), if the GPS 
device turns out to make my activities of spatial orientation persistently more 
complex and less reliable, either for providing ambiguous signals or for its sig-
nals, despite proper informational mappings, not being properly recognisable to 
me, I will have to resort to other available cues in order to accommodate for 
this situation, or else find my plans frustrated. If, however, the use of the device 
opens up new opportunities of acting in space and time, and if these opportuni-
ties depend on altering the cues I normally use, there will be a more positively 
connoted change of my informational environment. The GPS device might make 
spatial orientation easier and more reliable after all. Even in the latter case, some 
amount of accommodation will be required. I have to learn to use and rely on the 
altered cues.
The picture receives some additional complexity in the case of artefacts that are 
supposed to keep track of, and react to, my behaviours and include this informa-
tion into what they display to me, such as in advanced driver assistance systems, 
a concrete example of which will be presented in Chapter 9. In systems of this 
kind, information is collected and made accessible to me about my behaviours or 
cognitive states. Am I about to fall asleep behind the driver’s wheel? Am I drift-
ing off the traffic lane? Such a device may also collect and display information 
about my own relation to my environment. Am I getting distracted by my child’s 
behaviour just as a critical situation emerges ahead of me? Information on the 
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traffic situation and my behaviours is integrated in order to raise my attention to 
the situation at hand.
In cases of this kind, my purposes are certainly affected in the most straight-
forward fashion. Moreover, my informational environment is altered, in terms of 
cues being added that are relevant to my further course of action but that would 
remain, by definition, as it were, out of my perceptual reach in the kind of situ-
ation at hand. I will have to learn to make use of those additional cues. A driver 
assistance system that is successful in improving road safety is supposed to 
change my and other drivers’ ecological environment for the better, in terms of 
reduced risk of physical harm. The informational relations involved, including 
the information the system collects about my behaviours and cognitive states, are 
still part of domains of natural information though, as they could be tracked by a 
suitably placed real or hypothetical observer – but not the receiver immersed in 
the situation.
Convergence and isomorphism
In the two examples briefly discussed in the previous section, the information 
involved retains some key properties of natural information. Although there will 
be some variance in the mechanisms involved in information uptake and trans-
mission, the relations between the purposefully produced signals and the world 
affairs onto which they are supposed to map remain largely continuous with the 
relations the receiver would detect when using natural cues in his environment.
More precisely, the subclass of cognitive artefacts exemplified by these devices 
is marked by their ability to provide real-time information for perception about 
some condition in the environment, and by providing it in the course of being used 
within that same environment, so as to guide their users’ decisions and activities 
in a given situation. In this class of artefacts, the analogies to the use of natural 
information for perception will be as close as factually possible. Their primary 
purpose is to provide information that is integrated with natural information for 
perception in the natural environment in which they are used – a condition that is 
satisfied by artefacts as humble as signposts but developed to the fullest by Aug-
mented Reality Technologies, which integrate virtual elements with a naturally 
perceived environment. I will discuss these latter technologies in more detail in 
Chapter 9.
This subclass of cognitive artefacts has to be distinguished from a second sub-
class, whose purpose is to provide information that relates to a largely or entirely 
closed, artificial environment which is supposed to be perceived and treated in 
analogy to the perception of a natural environment. Hence, the environment about 
which there is information will be created by or within the artefact. The domain of 
the information involved is closed and self-contained, and typically can be clearly 
identified as such, independent of the degree of realism involved. Such will be the 
case, to a limited extent, for pictorial forms that do not picture real-world objects 
and scenes, whereas the paradigm of this class of cognitive artefacts are Virtual 
Reality or simulator environments, such as flight simulators.
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What can be claimed for the first subclass of cognitive artefacts but not for 
the second is that the domains of the signals produced by the artefact are conver-
gent with the domains of natural information that is or could be available to the 
receiver in a given situation. The term “convergence” assumes a technical mean-
ing in this context:
(DS-1)  Convergence is achieved if, for each domain Da of a type of signal ra 
that is emitted by some artefact and observable for R, there is a domain 
Dn of another type of, ultimately natural, signal rn that can be, or hypo-
thetically could be, observed by R while both domains are supposed to 
be correlated with the same conditions F at the source s, and transforma-
tions thereof, by the same or corresponding regularities of informational 
mapping.
If information basically is the co-occurrence between a proximal and a distal 
world affair in which conditions at the distal end covary with conditions at the 
proximal end in accordance with a strict natural regularity (see NI-1, Chapter 4), 
and if some artefact is supposed to track the same conditions at the distal end 
that the unaided receiver seeks to keep track of, although possibly by different 
means, the condition will still hold that any transformation of conditions at the 
distal end shall be mapped by transformations of conditions at the proximal end. 
If the artefact, in order to track the distal condition, records the values of the same 
proximate variable as the human receiver by means of a sensor that is built dif-
ferently from the respective human sense organ, the mapping regularities will be 
virtually identical for Da and Dn, even if that sensor is more receptive or capable 
of recording a wider range of values than the human sense organ. If, however, the 
artefact uses a different proximal correlate of the distal affair in order to track the 
same conditions at the source that the human sense organ is in pursuit of, trans-
formations in the respective proximate correlates will have to correspond in order 
to meet the condition of convergence. If conditions at the source change, either 
proximate variable will have to change in such a fashion as to not only ensure a 
mapping onto distal conditions individually but also provide a reliable or, for the 
purposes at hand, reliable-enough mapping between the transformations of the 
values of the natural and artefactual proximate variables.
For example if the pattern of visible radiation of some distal object were used 
as a cue of a certain condition of that object by the human observer while patterns 
of thermal radiation of that object were tracked by an artefact, the values of the 
variables recorded by the human observer and those recorded by the artefact are 
bound to correspond only for some objects. Although a source of electromagnetic 
radiation emitting a spectrum of waves quite similar to that of the sun, as filtered 
through the Earth’s atmosphere, will preserve correspondence in this respect, any-
thing emitting a different spectrum of electromagnetic waves may not. LED lights 
will be found to shine very bright without getting very warm. A piece of iron will 
get considerably hot in the process of being welded or forged well before emitting 
a visible glow. Hence, either the range of objects to be tracked has to be restricted 
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to those where correspondence between visible and thermal radiation holds, thus 
ruling out LED lights and hot iron, or the condition of convergence will not be 
met, for want of the required correspondence.
Even if correspondence is achieved, the sets of domains Da and Dn do not have 
to be fully coextensive, as some artefact may be trained on a subset or superset 
of the information that is available for direct perception. Moreover, convergence 
does not imply that the artificially created signal is a signal of the natural signal 
and, in this sense, second-order information. Such second-order information con-
stitutes a specific subcase of informational relations that will obtain only if there 
is a device or a natural mechanism with the function of signalling the presence of 
natural signals. Language is a mechanism that is often used to accomplish that.
If the natural information in a given situation is of the intrinsic kind discussed 
in Chapter 3 (p. 45), that intrinsic character will typically also be preserved for the 
receiver, although it is conceivable that it may turn extrinsic. Where in the former 
case receiver-dependent changes in the character of the affordance – for example 
when body-scaled information is involved – will have to be mapped by whatever 
artefactual rendering that can be accomplished, that affordance will be replaced 
by a display of measurements of physical variables in the latter case. Convergence 
can be achieved either way, depending on the functions of the artefact in ques-
tion and the purposes of the receiver. After all, he might have to rely on intrinsic 
information in some kind of situation (Is that item too bulky for me to carry?), and 
on extrinsic information in another (Is that cupboard too wide to fit into the niche 
in our dining room?).
The requirement of convergence will also hold for devices designed to aid or 
sharpen natural perception. Enlargement, amplification and other effects have to 
preserve the informational mappings their user would pick up if his sense organs 
were capable of the degree of discrimination available to the device. Similarly, the 
requirement of convergence will hold for any device designed to collect and dis-
play information to me that, given my biological constitution, I could not obtain 
even with an exceedingly discriminating perceptual apparatus. A Geiger counter 
is definitely supposed to track the domain of signals of nuclear radiation, which 
is natural information that might become relevant to me under certain circum-
stances, despite being inaccessible to the natural perceptual equipment with which 
I am endowed – hence the condition of hypothetical observability in the definition 
of convergence. This example also provides an additional illustration of the dif-
ference between ecological and informational environments: Human beings and 
most other species are reliant, in a strictly biological sense, on nuclear radiation 
in their surroundings constantly remaining below a certain threshold. This is an 
ecologically relevant condition, and hence will be part of the ecological environ-
ments of all those species. However, none of these species (and, to my knowledge, 
no extant or historical species on Earth) has any sensory equipment for picking up 
information on radiation levels. Hence, the uptake of signals of radiation levels is 
not normally part of their informational environments.
A markedly different kind of situation emerges when we consider a simulated 
environment: if it is designed with a realistic representation of some natural 
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environment in mind, anyone using the simulation via an interface that allows 
for a high degree of naturalness of interaction will use the same visual cues as he 
or she would use in a real environment in order to orient himself or herself and 
pick up information on objects and events. However, there will be no such natural 
environment from which to pick up any information, but a mostly iconic repre-
sentation of such an environment that serves as the information source. Under 
these conditions, the user will use a subset of an analogue of the cues that he 
or she would use in a natural environment, and he or she will pick up informa-
tion on analogues of objects and events that he or she would encounter a natural 
environment.
A paradigm of such a simulated environment is a flight simulator, whose pur-
pose is to give pilots a realistic impression of the experience of flying an aero-
plane. Events within the flight simulation call for operations on the simulation’s 
controls that are, in their effects on that simulation, analogous to the effects of 
the same operations in the flight that is being simulated. Hence, the simulator 
environment is equipped with a cockpit with displays and controls that are all 
tied to the simulated conditions in such a fashion as to produce a partial, but 
in the selected aspects credible or even near-perfect, replica of the experience 
of flying an aeroplane. Pushing the lever connected to the simulated elevator 
too far will result in a simulated nose-dive, which might be displayed to the 
pilot in some richness of detail, and to which he can react by further simulated 
manoeuvres that map onto their real-world counterparts analogously. Neither the 
physical or functional structure of an aeroplane will have to be reproduced for 
this purpose nor, of course, the physical effects of handling or mishandling an 
in-flight routine.
In simulated environments of this kind, the primary change involved does not 
concern the mechanisms of information uptake (e 1) but the creation of a self- 
contained and well-ordered domain of informational relations. In a simulated 
environment, there might be no information on concrete conditions at some indi-
vidual source in a concrete target environment, that is the environment that is being 
simulated. Concerning the possible alteration of the informational environment 
(e 3), the situation is intriguing: on the one hand, the simulation does not present 
natural information to me, as the reference of the displays and controls is purely 
internal, directed towards and contained within the simulated environment. In 
this respect, there is no common reference point in concrete natural informational 
relations with respect to which there could be a change. Hence, the condition of 
convergence (DS-1) cannot be met. On the other hand, the pilot using the simula-
tion will become part of an environment that, although being thus self-contained, 
is supposed to faithfully represent a selection of features of a natural environment, 
that is it will represent key aspects of a real aeroplane being really flown by a real 
pilot. The relations between the appearance of the simulated elements and the 
pilot’s operations on them, purely internal as they may be, have to match types of 
relations that would hold in a real environment. A picturing relation of the iconic 
kind, as discussed earlier, enriched with some indexical elements and interactive 
opportunities, will be the aim.
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To the extent that such types of relations hold in simulated environments, and to 
the extent that the information involved in the context of usage is ambient rather 
than delimited, as it would be in a picture, an informational environment will not 
be altered but first created. Within its context of use, it will comprise a defined set 
of mapping regularities and criteria of detectability, relevance and reliability of its 
own. Perception of and within that environment parallels the perception of, and 
interaction with, a natural environment in relevant respects. The condition of con-
vergence is replaced with a condition of isomorphism. Isomorphism, in this con-
text, assumes a technical meaning that partly echoes the notion of isomorphisms 
in scientific modelling introduced by da Costa and French (2003), where it refers 
to model and target sharing a set of structural properties of material or formal 
kind, which are spelled out in terms of “families of relationships” between them:
(DS-2)  Isomorphism is achieved if, for each domain Da of a type of signal ra 
that is emitted by an artefact and observable for R, there are well-defined 
structural mapping relations established, first, between ra signals and 
conditions at a sa that are internal to the artificial structure and, second, 
between these relations within Da and those within a general type of 
natural domain Dn, where the regularities that govern mapping relations 
within Da and Dn respectively may be independent of each other.
Similar to what holds for convergence, an isomorphism may well be partial, but 
the analogies that have been selected are supposed to match those properties of the 
target which are essential to how the receiver tracks, or would track, conditions in 
the target. For an interactive simulation, that match will have to be created on the 
levels of both perception and interaction. By implication, and in departure from 
the condition of convergence, which is more liberal on this issue, key aspects of 
the phenomenal character of what obtains in the target will have to be preserved, 
and hence any intrinsic information, too.
If, in a simulated environment, some object affords grasping or turning, and if 
it is not a physically implemented button, lever or other tangible interface, it will 
have to provide the right transformations of that affordance to differently sized 
and differently disposed users to map the analogous body-scaled affordances in 
real environments. Providing that affordance will mean that the simulated object 
will have to be graspable like a real object at least to some degree, raising the issue 
of how to simulate tactile and other sensorimotoric feedback. In fact, one of the 
main problems of acting within a virtual environment is that one’s visually appar-
ent locomotion within that environment has no counterpart in proprioception, as 
one typically remains stationary. This lack of isomorphism between Da and Dn 
might lead to irritation or even nausea – an effect that appears to actually increase 
with the degree of realistic rendering of a natural environment (for a survey of this 
issue, see Sharples et al. 2014).
For isomorphism to hold, the perceivable elements of a simulation have to pro-
vide a wide and consistently structured spectrum of analogies to types of world 
affairs. Any mapping between a signal within the simulation and a concrete 
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world affair will, first, occur in indirect fashion, in terms of the internal mappings 
within the simulations being mappable onto world affairs. Second, it will occur 
on the level of types of affairs on the target’s side rather than concrete individual 
instances, unless the purpose of the simulation is to re-create a concrete event in 
silico – which normally is not the purpose of demonstrative but of a certain sub-
class of investigative simulations.
Returning to the flight simulator example, I will typically not be flying through a 
digital re-creation of that thunderstorm over the Drava valley last Wednesday after-
noon but through a general-level analogue of a thunderstorm such as that one and 
numerous others. The analogous mapping is warranted by the overall appearance 
of the flying-through-a-thunderstorm simulation, as matched against conditions 
pertaining to any typical thunderstorm, rather than by any direct mappings between 
elements of the simulation and some event in that concrete thunderstorm. Any such 
concrete mapping (that gust of wind coming in from 330˚ Northwest by north at 
42 knots at 14:17:53 and lasting for 7 seconds) would be coincidental, as it would 
not preserve the mappings between transformations of source conditions and signal 
required for convergence. Antecedent conditions may vary indefinitely. Nor can the 
regularities governing the respective transformations be expected to correspond. 
The rendering of a thunderstorm in a flight simulator does not necessarily comprise 
a model of the physics of thunderstorm but only will have to partially re-create its 
perceivable effects. What counts for isomorphism is that the perceivable properties 
of the simulations reliably map onto kinds of real-world conditions as the receiver 
usually experiences them, and that they do so in a well-integrated fashion.
The isomorphism condition will apply not only to the paradigm of simulational 
environments, being its richest and most complex incarnation to date, but also 
to all kinds of pictorial forms that appear to iconically refer to their subject but 
where, unlike in a photograph or portrait painting, that subject is not a real-world 
object or natural scene. That subject might be of either of two kinds: first, it might 
be an idealised or generalised world affair exemplified by the picture – a typical 
alpine landscape but not the Alps, or an average male human being but not any 
concrete individual. Second, the subject might be a fictitious object or scene that 
both retains some core characteristics of real-world objects or scenes and purports 
to depict them naturalistically – like that band of unicorns roaming the grassy hills 
on some distant planet. There will be some informational mapping detectable for 
the receiver, but that mapping will not meet the condition of convergence, which 
is reserved to an artefactual structure’s mapping onto concrete, clearly individu-
ated sources. Instead, it will provide a partial analogue of what one would or could 
detect in concrete instances of picking up information from concrete sources, as 
they are, partly or wholly, exemplified by that pictorial form. Pictorial forms of 
either kind, by their very nature as being delimited, cannot meet the criterion of 
being artificially created informational environments in their own right, as it can 
be applied to simulational environments. Pictorial forms can only be constituents 
and modifiers of a pre-existing informational environment.
Given the conceptual distinction between convergence and isomorphism that 
I have introduced, one might believe them to be mutually exclusive relations. 
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An item produced by a cognitive artefact, to the extent is informational in  character, 
would then either be convergent with or isomorphic to natural information. 
However, as I will try to demonstrate in the following chapter, there are arte-
facts and situations in which these relations overlap, which has to do with both 
the information and the environments involved. Moreover, given the examples 
discussed so far, one might believe that the conceptual distinction I introduced 
is coextensive with that between “reality” and “virtuality” in human-computer 
interaction studies, where it is used to describe the properties of artefacts that 
(partly) simulate properties of an environment. However, additional examples 
will help to demonstrate that the convergence/isomorphism distinction cuts 
across the reality/virtuality distinction in some important cases, and in some 
important respects.
My discussion of cognitive artefacts, in view of their capacity of changing 
informational environments, might be met with a fairly straightforward sceptical 
observation: I have been selecting examples of rather novel, mostly computer-
based technologies, apparently implicating that these examples are paradigmatic 
of what technologies of this sort accomplish – and perhaps only technologies of 
this sort can accomplish. However, first, cognitive artefacts need not be com-
putational in nature, given the definition that opened this chapter. Second, there 
may be much older, pre-computational, possibly even non-cognitive and, from 
the contemporary point of view, rather mundane technologies that have the same 
kinds of effects: they add new mechanisms to the pursuit of our goals (which 
is what technologies do by definition); they expand the scope of human agency 
(which is one desired effect of technologies); and they may have the effect of 
altering our perception of, and activities towards, the environment to the point of 
altering our informational environments altogether (which is what some technolo-
gies, cognitive or other, turn out to do).
Examples to support this sceptical point would be, among others, electric light 
and the mechanical clock.2 Electric light had the effect of shifting human activ-
ity patterns into the nights, not only allowing for longer working hours but also 
permanently modifying our perception of what the night is. It is hence no less 
than constitutiveW to these activities. The mechanical clock was the first device 
to portion perceived time into measurable sequences, thus working to structure 
and discipline human activities in a way that enabled notions of punctuality and 
time efficiency that were unattainable before but now became a key ingredient 
of the industrial revolution. Again, the technology is at least constitutiveW to the 
activities in question (for a classic account of this role of the mechanical clock, 
see Mumford 1934, 13f ). In a non-trivial sense, the mechanical clock was an infor-
mation technology or cognitive artefact just as digital computers are. It may well 
count as an extension of the mind that has altered our GS-constitutive relations 
to our environments. Electric light, in turn, is a technology that enabled activi-
ties that were hitherto practically impossible between dusk and dawn, and that in 
some respects modified conditions for information uptake, while neither being an 
information technology nor being entitled to the status of an extension of the mind 
in any serious way.
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Although I admit to the point that much of what I described here has a long 
historical pedigree, the difference of degree that I see lies in the profoundness and 
systematicity of the modifications of informational relations to our environments 
that the digital computer, in its generality of purpose and in its many incarnations, 
has brought about. To the extent that digital computers are cognitive artefacts in 
the meaning discussed here – they might also serve other, non-cognitive functions 
after all – they appear to be the most potent cognitive artefacts to date. Once these 
cognitive-computational artefacts became directly concerned with, and directly 
involved in, human interactions with human environments, the question had to 
arise of what they effect with respect to these relations.
Moreover, a difference in kind to the technologies of old can be identified, first, 
for those artefacts which are capable of partly interpreting and adaptively behav-
ing towards the actions of their human counterparts. A second difference in kind 
can be claimed for technologies that create simulated environments and artefacts 
that blend natural and simulated elements in real environments, where the conver-
gence/isomorphism distinction introduced earlier might turn into a rather complex 
affair, particularly in the light of the reality/virtuality distinction.
If these technologies succeed in either of these ways, their users’ informa-
tional environments will have been modified in a significant respect: if cognition 
is an embodied activity that is coupled with a perceivable environment, and if 
that environment is enriched with embedded artefacts that adaptively and partly 
autonomously provide information for human activities, such an environment 
will supposedly become informationally more transparent and interactively more 
tractable. Whereas, under natural conditions, an environment cannot per se con-
sidered friendly, an intelligent environment of the said kind will present itself as a 
seamless, smooth and cooperative surface for its users’ activities. It will affect the 
choice and pursuit of those activities without necessarily being perceived as hav-
ing been modified in a certain way. The nature of such an environment may come 
to be perceived as a matter of course. However, the discussion of more detailed 
examples in the next chapter will suggest that this is a limiting case, and that com-
ing to be perceived as a matter of course, if accomplished at all, is a complex and 
two-way affair.
Notes
1  Among Peirce’s scattered and complex references to these semiotic concepts, the loci 
classici are Peirce (1868) and Peirce (1998).
2  I seem to remember that these two instructive examples were brought up by Martin Hitz 
in a discussion several years ago. Even if my memory should fail me at this point, my 
acknowledgement to him will not be misplaced.
I consider the notion of a “user interface” inappropriate. The notion of an interface 
suggests that we are dealing with a property of the artefact, when we should actu-
ally keep the entire interaction in view. For example, is a table’s surface its user 
interface? Or perhaps the palms of the hands of the user touching it? How should 
we decide?
(LFE-b-2015, translation Hajo Greif )
As a matter of fact, technologies barely modify the world; the ways in which 
human beings interact with technology do. The difference may seem small but it is 
fundamental. The public view is too much focused on devices to be able to grasp 
the force of technology, when it should look at human beings and their behaviours 
instead.
(Lobo 2016, html, translation Hajo Greif )
These two caveats concerning the appropriate perspective on artefacts have not 
been articulated by prominent philosophers of technology but by an ergonomist 
and a technology blogger respectively. This may be precisely why they appear 
more pointed and better grounded than what many scholars in the philosophy and 
social studies of technology try to express in so many words.
The relationship between human beings and technological artefacts on ‘micro’ 
(first quote) and ‘macro’ levels (second quote) is a key concern, first, in the largely 
sceptic – and often utterly romantic and conservative – German tradition of philo-
sophical inquiries into technology, from Karl Jaspers, Oswald Spengler, Martin 
Heidegger, Günther Anders and Ernst Cassirer to its most recent and congen-
ially baroque and sophisticated incarnation in Gernot Böhme (2008). Second, and 
from a different epistemic and ideological perspective, a classic theme in science 
and technology studies is the relationship of “mutual shaping” between artefacts 
and social practices (as paradigmatically stated by Pinch and Bijker 1984 and 
Edwards 1994). Without sharing either the first tradition’s conservatism and scep-
ticism about technology and the human condition or the second tradition’s relativ-
ism about the human condition as such, the point concerning cognitive artefacts 
that I broadly share with either tradition: what is relevant is not the artefact itself 
or any cognitive, societal or other ‘impact’ it may be claimed to have but the 
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interaction between the capacities of the artefact and human purposes and abilities 
on constitutiveW and, sometimes, constitutiveS levels.
With that caveat in mind, I will now turn to selected examples of contemporary 
cognitive artefacts, and try to analyse their properties in the light of the concept 
of informational environments introduced earlier, so as to identify the informa-
tional relations they bear to these environments, using the convergence/isomor-
phism distinction established towards the end of Chapter 8 where applicable. 
These examples will, for the most part, be introduced in illustrative manner rather 
than having the character of proper empirical studies. One participant observation 
and interviews with nine computer scientists, engineers and ergonomists are the 
modest empirical grounding for the discussion of some examples.1 Interviewees 
were based at the Institute for Cognitive Systems (ICS), the Intelligent Autono-
mous Systems Group (IAS), the Augmented Reality Research Group (FAR), the 
Chair of Ergonomics (LFE) and the Institute of Micro Technology and Medi-
cal Device Technology (MIMED), all at Technical University of Munich (TUM). 
Interviews are referenced by department acronym, counter and year, for example 
“LFE-a-2015”.
The sample presented here will not be representative of all advances that are 
being made in cognition-related information technologies. Nor will the examples 
chosen capture more than a few moments in time of the many, and often rapid, 
developments within a variety of fields of science and technology. The descrip-
tions and analyses will certainly look dated within a few years’ time, with a slim 
chance of having an afterlife as interesting contributions to the history of science 
and technology.
Still, the examples chosen should give an idea of recent approaches to sys-
tems that create or modify informational environments and that are capable of 
tracking variables in these environments, in some cases including the activities of 
their human users. Not every example will meet these specifications to the same 
extent, and in the same way. Some of the systems are not made to interact with 
human beings, while developing functional analogies to organic adaptations to 
their environment (evolutionary and cognitive robotics). Some of the systems 
under investigation create closed informational environments, whereas others cre-
ate open informational environments (Second Life and Mobile Massive Multi-
player Online Games respectively, henceforth referenced as SL and MMMOG). 
One will expressly strive for human-likeness of the machine counterpart of an 
interaction (social robotics and embodied conversational agents), one will do so in 
less unequivocal fashion (SL), whereas all others will not. Some are simulational 
in character (SL), whereas others are only partly so, in intriguing ways (especially 
Augmented Reality, henceforth referenced as AR, but also MMMOG) – but the 
distinction between “simulated” or “virtual” and “embodied” will turn out to be 
less sharp than expected to begin with. Some are readily classifiable as cogni-
tive artefacts (AR in particular, but also conversational agents), whereas others 
are not. Some belong to the realm of fundamental research (especially evolution-
ary and cognitive robotics, but partly also social robotics), some to the realm of 
emerging technologies (embodied conversational agents and AR) and some to the 
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realm of established application-oriented technologies (SL and, quite recently and 
also very successfully, MMMOG). Some will follow some paradigm of AI (to dif-
ferent degrees, cognitive robotics, social robotics, and AR), whereas others will 
not. What emerges, I believe, is an instructive mosaic image of what informational 
environments are, and what the interplay between informational environments and 
cognitive artefacts is.
Evolutionary and cognitive robotics
The research field of evolutionary robotics addresses the question of how adap-
tive patterns may be established – or rather, may establish themselves – in the 
course of some evolution-like development.2 In contrast to behaviour-based AI, 
with which it shares the notions of decentralised processing and of bottom-up 
modelling of basic adaptive behaviours, there is no pre-defined task whose fulfil-
ment is broken down into smaller sub-routines which, in self-organising fashion, 
constitute the global behaviour. In evolutionary robotics, the self-organising char-
acteristics are located at an even more basic level than that, namely in random 
variation of an artificial “genome” that produces behavioural mechanisms, and 
quasi-natural selection of the behavioural patterns, as the corresponding “pheno-
type”, in the robot’s environment. The robot will be moving within a simplified 
artificial environment, and he will be provided with only a few optical sensors that 
are coupled with his actuators by means of a rather modest neural network as his 
control system. The robot is not equipped with inner models, maps or images of 
his environment.
In a classic experiment in this field (Harvey et al. 1994), a population of robots 
encounters rectangles and triangles in its environment, and is supposed to evolve 
an ability to distinguish between them. The robots are neither provided with the 
task of making that distinction, nor are they equipped with sensors that could 
distinguish between rectangles and triangles per se. They can only distinguish 
between straight vs. oblique orientation of edges. Instead, a fitness function is 
defined for them that consists of rewarding the robots for turning away from the 
rectangles and moving towards the triangles, and punishing them for moving 
towards the rectangles. The algorithms responsible for the robots’ behaviours vary 
in accordance with a random function from generation to generation. In repeated 
rounds of the experiment, and hence over a number of “generations”, the variant 
algorithms are selected on the grounds of how they link the robots’ sensory input 
to their behavioural output. Only algorithms for behaviours that, in practice, map 
onto the distinction between triangles and rectangles with some degree of reliabil-
ity will be reproduced in the next generation. If a robot fails at tracking the right 
object at one stage of the experiment, the algorithm will not be reproduced in the 
next generation, where a different variant, producing a different set of behaviours, 
will get its chance.
However, the activation state of the sensors typical for encounters with trian-
gles will also obtain when approaching a rectangle from some specific angles. 
Only some variants of behaviour, namely taking a partial turn and thus positioning 
152 Environments of intelligence
the sensors in a different angle towards the object, will allow the robots to attain 
the disjunct activation states for their sensors that are correlated with the differ-
ence between triangles and rectangles. The variant algorithms resulting in this 
behaviour will be positively selected. In a number of runs (or “generations”) of 
this setting, the robot’s control system will have learned to practically distinguish 
triangles from rectangles with a high degree of reliability, thus establishing an 
adaptive fit between his behavioural mechanisms and the features of his environ-
ment that serve as his fitness function. A very basic functional analogy to the 
development of adaptive behaviours in natural organisms is thus established.
Still, despite the capability of practically distinguishing between triangles and 
rectangles, even the most successful robots will not acquire even the most basic 
of concepts of triangles or rectangles. Instead, the robots’ behaviour is directly 
guided by the natural information pertaining to the shapes of triangles and rectan-
gles, to the effect that the difference in shape between them constitutes the only 
relevant variable in their informational environment. The invariant tracked by the 
robot is the angular orientation of edges that covaries with the presence of trian-
gles and rectangles, for which there exists one ambiguous state that has to be, and 
can be, disambiguated by moving in relation to those edges, so that transforma-
tions of the robot’s relative position match transformations in the detected angular 
orientation of the edges.
If there are affordances, in Gibsonian terms, that would be provided by that one 
trackable invariant, these could be circumscribed as a drive-to-ability or favour-
able proximity to triangles and avoidance of rectangles respectively, despite the 
absence of concepts of triangles or rectangles that would be available to the robot. 
To the extent that seeking the proximity of triangles and seeking distance from 
rectangles is the fitness function for the robots, activities of information uptake 
that match this function will be activities of furnishing the respective affordances 
on the most basic level.
The robot’s informational environment is composed of the one relevant vari-
able that he is capable of tracking, namely the difference between triangles and 
rectangles. Given the experimental setting described earlier, he is bound to the 
domain in which the difference between angular orientation of edges, given a cer-
tain relative position of his sensors towards them, reliably and regularly covaries 
with the difference between triangles and rectangles. That difference being the 
one and only ecologically and selectively relevant condition to him, his ecological 
and selective environment is composed of that spatio-temporal region in which 
the correlation between angular orientation and the objects in question holds, 
which happens to coincide with the room and the time in which the experiment 
is conducted – unless tampering with the fitness function becomes part of the 
experiment.
However, the experiments in evolutionary robotics described here are not sup-
posed to provide models of ecological perception in the first place, but to provide, 
in elementary embodied fashion, a model of processes of biological evolution, 
with the elements of variation, selection and adaptation. These processes are that 
model’s primary target system. Notably, neither the specific variations produced 
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by the algorithms nor the specifically relevant properties of the environment nor 
the behaviours of the robot itself can be fully predicted by the experimenter. Ele-
mentary cognitive abilities are part of this endeavour only to the extent that they 
are part of the evolutionary story that is modelled here, and to the extent that the 
general method allows for scaling up towards more complex, at least minimally 
cognitive tasks – which has been the topic of later experimental work (as, e.g. 
reported in Beer 2003; Beer and Williams 2015). The issue of scaling and its 
possible limits has been raised both with respect to the practical difficulties of 
scaling (e.g. by Nelson 2014) and as a more fundamental objection to all sorts of 
behaviour-based, bottom-up, representation-free approaches to adaptive behav-
iour as the foundation of cognition.
A markedly different approach to building systems that use natural information 
in pursuit of producing an analogue of natural adaptive behaviour is taken by what 
is called “cognitive robotics” by its proponents (ICS-a/b-2015).3 Starting, as it 
were, at the other end of systemic complexity but omitting the evolutionary aspect 
that would provide a foundation for genuine functional analogies, this approach 
commits itself to viewing cognition from a systems perspective. This means that 
cognitive systems are considered as integrated wholes, so as to include in any 
model as many aspects of their embodiment as practically possible.
The rationale behind this perspective partly parallels the ecological approach to 
perception discussed in Chapter 3. It commences from the critical observation that 
the cognitive sciences in general, and many computational and robotic approaches 
in particular, are too narrow in their focus when considering only one or a few 
components of a cognitive system in isolation, in a detached and typically rather 
static experimental setting. Moreover, it is maintained that the relevance of touch 
and other senses and of mechanisms of bodily feedback has been underestimated 
in much of (very much vision-centred) cognitive science. A plausible model of a 
cognitive system, according to cognitive robotics, needs to account for its bodily 
and environmental contexts and the interplay between them, in view of the inte-
gration of various sensory modalities.
Models of this kind are realised as humanoid robots that incorporate various 
human-like physical traits and a broad range of sensor input, including vision, 
touch and key modes of proprioception such as balance and kinaesthesia. For 
example a visual system, human or robotic, will not be able to stabilise its view 
on its own when moving or being moved. Stabilisation requires physiological 
feedback patterns that keep the eyes or cameras fixated on the object of attention. 
A robot visual system will also have to replicate the functional roles of fovea and 
periphery of the visual field in human vision. In order to provide tactile feed-
back, the robot will be equipped with touch-sensitive artificial skin, and it will use 
accelerometers to provide kinaesthetic feedback (Mittendorfer and Cheng 2011; 
Wieser et al. 2011). Cognitive robots that functionally integrate these kinds of 
capabilities serve as a research platform to generate plausible neurological models 
of how human beings perform the same set of cognitive tasks.
Hence, the kind of humanoid robots involved here is humanoid not for the sake 
of creating human-like effects on a behavioural or interactive level (as the social 
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robots to be discussed in the next section will typically be), but with the aim of 
being genuinely anthropomorphic in its functional architecture. Relevant features 
of the human being as an organism are replicated in reasonable functional detail. 
Such a robot, like evolutionary robots and all other robots built under the para-
digm of behaviour-based AI, will not have to be fed with explicit models of the 
environment or the situations in which to act. If such explicit models were used, 
any attempt at sensu-motoric integration would lead to combinatorial explosion. 
Instead, a robot will learn to cope with its environment, partly by observational 
learning and partly by refining its skills in the course of executing some task, 
where that learning is guided by a set of basic semantic rules, allowing the robot to 
infer higher-order regularities in the activities it observes (Ramirez-Amaro et al. 
2015). Skills of communicating or interacting with human beings as intentional 
beings are not part of this endeavour.
A key notion employed by, and embodied in, cognitive robotics is that of 
“sensory-motor maps”, to be understood as the mapping of cortical structures 
onto certain areas of the body and their sensu-motoric properties (Cheng 2014; 
Mittendorfer and Cheng 2011). What makes this notion relevant is the observa-
tion that processing of sensory input and motor output is not organised along 
sensory modalities (visual, tactile, etc.) but as an integrated cortical representation 
of the information provided by various modalities with respect to the body regions 
involved in an activity. Motor maps also account for the phenomenon that similar 
brain areas will show similar activation patterns when a subject A observes sub-
ject B’s activities (Chaminade and Cheng 2009). This specific property of motor 
maps is cited as the reason why it was possible to transfer an entire motor map 
dataset developed by one robot to another not exactly identical but similarly built 
robot who adapted that motor map within a day. In an earlier experiment, a mon-
key was able to control the walking of a remote robot without walking himself 
(Nicolelis and Chapin 2002).
A prima facie similar notion employed by cognitive roboticists is that of a “body 
schema” (Cheng 2014; Wieser et al. 2011), which goes back to Head (1920) and 
is to be understood as dynamic representation of one’s posture – the shape and 
relative position of one’s limbs – used for the spatial organisation one’s activities. 
Unlike motor maps, however, a body schema does not make reference to cortical 
mapping, and hence may be organised differently. A motor map is the set of corti-
cal structures in which one’s body parts, their sensations and their movements are 
organised, whereas the notion of a body schema is genuinely phenomenological, 
qua being a representation of a perceiving subject’s posture of which he or she is 
supposedly aware, and which he can readily use in the organisation of action. Nota-
bly, one’s body schema can be modified or “extended” by using tools. An artefact, 
once one is trained in its use, becomes part of his or her body schema. According 
to one experiment, artefacts such as additional (rather than prosthetic) artificial 
limbs, connected via brain-computer interfaces, can be used roughly as naturally as 
natural limbs. Most notably, a robotic exoskeleton was used by a paralysed person 
to accomplish the symbolic kick-off at the 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil, as a dem-
onstration of the accomplishments of the “Walk Again Project” (Lin et al. 2014).
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A humanoid robot built according to the cognitive robotics approach will 
inhabit an informational environment that is analogously shaped to that of a 
human being in a number of relevant aspects. Prevailing disanalogies are to only 
some extent a matter of the limitations of the subset of trackable information cho-
sen for the model. They are to a more significant extent a matter of the underlying 
ecological relevance of the conditions to be thus tracked. This problem haunts all 
approaches to embodied AI bar evolutionary robotics: unless a genuine functional 
equivalence with organic traits can be established for a robotic trait, the make-up 
of the robot’s informational environment will be based on a presumed, putative 
relevance of the conditions to be tracked. Human sensu-motoric integration has 
the function it has because human beings need to track ambient information in 
a certain integrated way, as a matter of biological necessity. Equally, an object 
affords what it affords to a human being on the grounds of his or her constitution 
and abilities, which, again, to a large part are a matter of biological necessity. 
One may design analogues of these necessities in similar but tremendously more 
complex fashion as in evolutionary robotics, but this is not part of the approach 
under discussion here. Still, a cognitive robot will be in the business of tracking 
some of the same informational domains that human beings are in the business 
of tracking, even in the absence of a genuine biological, somatic, evolutionary 
foundation – which will always be the ultimate sceptical resource for an AI critic 
of the Searlean or Dreyfusean slant.
Experiments in evolutionary and cognitive robotics have been feeding into 
an image of the human mind according to which perception and action are cou-
pled in direct and integrated fashion, and which has gained much prominence, 
within and outside computer science and engineering, over the representationalist 
and logicist image that travelled with classical AI and its artefacts. By different 
but nonetheless behaviour-based means, other approaches in Nouvelle AI, most 
prominently ‘sociable’ humanoid robotics, can be found to feed into the same 
image. Unlike evolving and cognitive robots, sociable robots and, as their clos-
est kin, embodied conversational agents are designed to interact with humans in 
shared environments, and not only shape their own but also have a chance to alter 
human informational environments.
Embodied conversational agents and social robotics
Embodied conversational agents are human-like virtual agents, normally dis-
played on a screen, with whom some form of natural spoken conversation is 
possible, including the display of a number of natural behavioural cues. These 
include adequate intonation and prosody in spoken expressions as well as gestures 
and facial expressions from the agent’s side. However, the mode of interaction 
remains mostly asymmetrical to date, as input to the system in most current agent 
technologies can only be typed, so that the agent is not in command of vision 
or other sensory modalities by which to register behavioural cues of its human 
counterparts. In response to the typed input, the conversational agent articulates 
complex, syntactically and semantically well-formed sentences with gestures, 
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expression and intonation to match, provided that the input is meaningful and 
semantically located within a specified range of pre-defined topics that are made 
known to the human counterpart.
This is, in some respects, the reverse to approaches in social robotics, where 
non-verbal interaction is designed for symmetry, but where the robot may not be 
able to understand or articulate sentences in natural language. The human-likeness 
of social robots is primarily located on the level of behaviour and interactive abili-
ties of the robot, and only partly on human-likeness in appearance. One of the 
best-known examples of a humanoid robot designed for simulating sub-linguistic, 
emotional levels of human communication is MIT’s KISMET, to be followed by 
partly more advanced, partly differently disposed models such as LEONARDO, 
MERZ and NEXI (the line of research to which I am referring to here was first 
documented in Breazeal 2002; 2003; Brooks 2002a; 2002b, with newer develop-
ments to be discussed later in this section). It consists of a desk-mounted head 
with some key human facial features that are animated by small electric motors: 
mouth, ears, eyes and eyebrows, which are connected to a visual and auditory 
system via a neural network. By those means, KISMET produces reactions to 
people’s posture, gestures, facial expressions and prosody, but not to the content 
of what is said, which to analyse it has no means. Nonetheless, KISMET’s reac-
tions proved to be realistic and human-like enough to their human partners to 
allow for a degree of natural communicative interaction that is said to have lured 
not only its designers but also even avowed sceptics into ascribing beliefs, desires 
and emotions to the robot in the course of interaction (see Brooks 2002a, 149).
In some respects, embodied conversational agents in particular may appear as 
players in an advanced and, notably, non-blinded version of Turing’s imitation 
game: similarity to human appearance and behaviour is the proximate aim and, 
at least to the human counterpart, more channels are available through which to 
receive information on the computer’s skills in impersonating a human expert in 
some specified field of knowledge. Social robots offer a different take on imitation, 
in allowing for a more natural and symmetric interaction in terms of visual and audi-
tory cues while not, or only rudimentarily, offering a level of verbal conversation.
These different levels of interaction seemingly match the different levels of 
embodiment of the agents: the physical embodiment of the social robot allows for 
a more immediate, embodied kind of communication that may spare the verbal 
level altogether, whereas the ‘virtual’, that is screen-bound, embodiment of the 
conversational agent is more remote in interactional terms and has to rely on ver-
bal cues on the agent’s side. Especially in the case of social robots, the embodied 
aspects of the interaction include for example cues of spatial distance vs. proximity. 
A human being will afford flinching to the robot when getting uncomfortably close 
to it, just as the robot is capable of affording flinching to the human. Such elements 
of interaction would be difficult to simulate for a screen-bound agent on a display 
that is, qua being a display, delimited in the sense introduced for pictures by James 
Jerome Gibson. This observation, however, does not speak against the possibility 
of including a capacity for using some visual cues in virtually embodied agents, let 
alone against adding advanced capacities for verbal behaviour to humanoid robots.
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Despite the human-likeness and naturalness of interaction involved, the aim of 
the systems under investigation here is not indiscernibility of the agent or robot 
from human beings but, either proximately (for social robots) or ultimately (for con-
versational agents), a design that allows human beings to engage in an anxiety-free, 
in some selected respects, natural communication with a computer system – which 
is an issue of increasing societal relevance, given that demographic developments 
in Western societies are such that caring for the elderly will increasingly have to 
be delegated to partly human-like robots and agents, acceptance of whom by their 
users will be a design issue (LFE-b-2015, MIMED-a-2015).
On the accounts provided by Joseph Bates (1994) and Robbert-Jan Beun 
et al. (2003), embodied conversational agents in particular are one experimental 
approach to the recurrent problem of mismatching metaphors in human-computer 
interaction (HCI): one of the key variables in the choice of metaphors of inter-
action is the degree of human-likeness, visual, textual or other, with which the 
system is going to appear to the user. The metaphors intended in design and the 
ones experienced in use are often found to diverge, thus leading to difficult or 
failed interaction. In this context, an additional cue for the human-likeness of 
one’s machine counterpart may enable a better matching, in that the expectation 
of being able to converse with the system as with a human being is reinforced. 
However, there are at least two instructive limitations to this strategy.
The first limitation concerns the choice of the aspects and the degree of human-
likeness of the agent. Although it might seem that a high degree of perceived 
human-likeness would facilitate interaction, that degree does not necessarily cor-
relate with the perceived degree of familiarity – a problem that has been discussed 
in HCI research under the imaginative heading of the “uncanny valley” (Mori 
1970): although perceptions and attitudes towards an industrial robot normally 
remain indifferent, as it neither displays a notable degree of human-likeness nor 
is expected to look familiar in any way, humanoid robots and embodied conver-
sational agents will be both more human-like and more familiar in appearance – 
until a certain point: modest similarity is conducive to familiarity if the appropriate 
human features are chosen for imitation, and if the degree of approximation is 
well-calibrated. Robots and agents may remain clearly distinct from human beings 
but still appear fairly familiar in interaction, if a limited but well-chosen set of cues 
used in human communication is implemented in a pointed fashion – very much 
in the sense of a good caricature. If, however, the degree of similarity increases 
further, yet without attaining absolute perfection, the robot’s or agent’s appearance 
is likely to become less familiar, to the point of being irritating or even eerie. In 
fact, Ho and MacDorman (2010) present empirical evidence for the assumption 
that the familiarity variable in Mori’s argument is most accurately described as the 
inverse degree of eeriness (i.e. as reassurance) in the appearance of the agent. Thus, 
the selection of features to be imitated by an agent system, and the degree to which 
they actually resemble the human model, turn out to be crucially important vari-
ables.4 Hence, convergence or isomorphism between the cues of human-likeness 
of artificial agents and the features of natural human beings are best conceived 
as obtaining in relation to certain key variables that shall be faithfully matched, 
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whereas others are deliberately omitted or even distorted, arguably even if a faith-
ful match could be accomplished for them.
The second limitation with which the strategy of human-likeness of agents is 
confronted lies in the observable irritations in the course of interaction that are 
induced by the asymmetries of the transmission channels available to either side, 
and by the human interrogator’s very knowledge of the machine nature of his or 
her counterpart. Instead of interrogators trying to reveal the agents’ nature as a 
machine, as in Turing’s imitation game, human users can be observed to deliber-
ately and playfully test the limits of the agents’ conversational capabilities – for 
example by teasing them (for the following observations, see Krummheuer 2008; 
2009): in human communication, teasing is a means of applying criticism in a 
playful, tongue-in-cheek fashion that tests for the counterpart’s sense of humour. 
It is a practice that relies on a degree of mutual familiarity, and it is not normally 
applied on first encounter. Otherwise, teasing behaviour will appear inappropri-
ate or even transgressive. Teasing a conversational agent on first encounter thus 
appears as an awkwardly hybrid kind of interaction. It implies a wilful trans-
gression, while generally remaining within the bounds of interpersonal com-
munication and the mutual expectations that come with it: to which extent does 
the counterpart cooperate in the teasing game, and at which point will irritation, 
embarrassment or annoyance ensue? It can be observed that, first, the agent will 
appear irritated quite quickly, obviously not ‘getting the point’ of the tease and, 
second, that the interrogators are likely to exploit the aforementioned communica-
tive asymmetries of the interaction to achieve precisely this end. Neither is likely 
to happen in normal interpersonal communication.
In the social robotics case, one will not find instances of teasing sensu strictu, as 
this practice will require an elaborate degree of verbal behaviour from both sides. 
What one will find, however, is that, in the set-up of the interaction experiments, 
behaviours towards KISMET, the paradigm-defining social robot, were actually 
designed to resemble the behaviours one would normally display towards a small 
child, with utterances of whatever content being produced in a characteristically 
pointed praising, scolding, comforting or other tone that is typically reserved 
to parent-child communication. In effect, however, the subjects’ behaviours go 
beyond this mode of communication, in being marked by a lack of distance and a 
sense of not taking the counterpart seriously that would be unusual in any kind of 
interpersonal interaction, whereas the basic patterns of interpersonal interaction 
remain intact. Hence, a partial analogy to teasing can be observed. For example 
in a video recording of an interaction in the robotics laboratory, one subject will 
be found asking KISMET in a scolding tone: “Where did you put your body?” 
Although obviously not expecting a verbal response, the subject will be seen elic-
iting an apparently embarrassed expression from the robot. Another subject can 
be observed turning towards the laboratory staff and jokingly grimacing towards 
them after having successfully elicited a similarly embarrassed reaction on scold-
ing the robot.5
In either example, no degree of naturalness, familiarity and human-likeness in 
the agent’s design will ensure that it is ultimately interacted with as a person, yet 
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neither is it unequivocally not being treated as a person. The agent is treated like a 
human being to a very peculiarly circumscribed extent that has no genuine coun-
terpart in interpersonal communication in everyday, real-world contexts. It will 
be thus treated on the grounds of a selection of specifically presented elementary 
human-like features. The domain of signals that typically pertain to interpersonal 
interaction has become ambiguous in its extension. Although the human beings 
involved will readily distinguish between an agent or robot and another human 
being, there will be some relevant cues emanating from the agents and robots 
that cannot be disambiguated by the human counterparts to a degree sufficient to 
confidently place them within either realm. The agents and robots are somewhat 
precariously situated in human informational environments, where the boundaries 
of the domains of signals of being human are being tested, and may be modified, 
in interaction.
With respect to the convergence/isomorphism distinction introduced in the last 
section of Chapter 8, both conditions apply to an – instructively – limited extent: 
to the extent that naturalness of interaction between human being and robot or 
agent is successfully achieved, and to the extent that the agent’s or robot’s behav-
iours are governed by regularities, that is programmes, that have such natural-
ness as their aim, and to the extent that the robot or agent’s expressions provide 
recognisable and reliable analogues of what a human counterpart would display 
in the same kind of situation, the condition of isomorphism holds. Under this pro-
viso, an agent or robot will be able to provide a general model of the elementary 
cues by which human beings recognise a human counterpart’s surprise, sadness, 
embarrassment or other affective state, without implying a claim that such states 
are actually implemented in the robot. For example a robot model was used to 
identify the cues by which a person’s trustworthiness is recognised (DeSteno et al. 
2012; Lee et al. 2013). However, to the extent that irritation and ambiguity inad-
vertently arise in interaction, the isomorphism will remain incomplete.
Conversely, if convergence were to hold on the level of human-likeness, the 
human-like cues emitted by the agent or robot would, first, have to map onto traits 
with human-like functions of the agent or robot itself. Second, they would have 
to be detectable for the human counterpart with sufficient reliability, for being 
governed by the same regularities. Hence, convergence would require a functional 
analogue of surprise, sadness, embarrassment or other affective state to hold for 
the robot or agent, and hence a partly human-like cognitive architecture, which 
is not necessarily part of the design of these systems – but see Breazeal et al. 
(2009) for a study in pursuit of such a design within the social robotics paradigm. 
To the extent that the cues involved are tailor-made to leave a partly human-like 
impression, and to the extent that irritation and ambiguity may arise in interaction 
precisely for the partialness of that impression and the non-identity of underlying 
functions in the robot or agent, convergence is not achieved.
A different kind of convergence-requiring situation arises when human and 
robot are supposed to work in coordinated fashion on a shared, environment-
bound task, where it is the information on that task that has to match in the first 
place, and where any verbal or behavioural cues exchanged stand in the service 
160 Environments of intelligence
of accomplishing that task in the first place (Shah and Breazeal 2010). In the cur-
rently most advanced approach to this kind of informational convergence in a 
social robotics study, a robot was enabled to purposefully manipulate the human 
subject’s mental states in the course of interaction (Gray and Breazeal 2014). This 
task was accomplished by modelling human cognitive states in real time by proxy 
of the (intended or unintended) effects of a given interaction, and by accounting 
for the human counterpart’s perspective of that situation. For example the robot’s 
task was to grasp whether his human counterpart still sees some object, or whether 
he may still believe that it is present, after it has been moved. The resulting model 
was then used for cooperative or deceptive purposes by the robot. The common 
reference point for both partners in that interaction is the environmentally embed-
ded information that is or would be available to the human subject – and it will 
remain so even if the robot’s task is to deceive him or her, and hence to make his 
or her informational environment more opaque.
Second Life
By its very nature, Second Life (SL) is a testbed for emerging modes of mediated 
interaction between human beings within a genuinely artificial environment. All 
of these modes revolve around some kind of impersonation by means of control-
ling avatars that inhabit this environment. Within a few years of operation since 
2003, Second Life became the paradigm virtual world, and at any rate it is second 
only to World of Warcraft in terms of membership and server space (although 
its popularity has been waning after the SL hype’s culmination in 2007). How-
ever, an ambiguity in its ontological status already becomes palpable in attempts 
at classification. While, at first sight, Second Life may be filed under Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs), again along with World of 
Warcraft, it is also being referred to as a multi-user virtual environment (MUVE; 
Mennecke et al. 2008). Most likely, it is both at once. What it is to its users or “res-
idents” does ultimately depend not as much on definitions or pre-existent rules 
as it does on the ways in which the residents play or act in this world, and the 
constraints imposed by the design of that world. SL may count as a particularly 
malleable informational environment of the simulated kind.
Most basically, the environment of Second Life is a three-dimensional virtual 
space rendered on a two-dimensional screen. In this space, besides moving around 
in all directions by using a menu, the keyboard or on-screen buttons, a number 
of activities is possible: In the first place, an avatar will have to be chosen that 
moves and is interacted with in SL. Its appearance may be changed in a multitude 
of ways, and a profile may be created describing the SL persona’s interests but, 
optionally, also providing information about his or her real-life (RL) self. In terms 
of in-world communication, local chat and instant messaging functions are availa-
ble, which are normally operated by keyboard, as well as social network functions 
are present, including the options of “friending”, creating and joining groups – 
however, always under the veil of the avatar’s identity. An activity particular and, 
in fact, constitutive, to SL consists in creating digital items, such as buildings or 
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clothes or bodily extensions (“attachments”) or even entire bodies for avatars, 
from “prims” or “primitives”, that is from basic computer-generated shapes and 
textures. These structures can be placed on land purchased or rented by the user, 
or they can be bought and sold between users with in-world currency, which is 
converted to and from real-world currency. This sort of activity is constitutive to 
SL because all in-world objects and structures are user generated. The same partly 
holds on the behavioural level, where there is a possibility for scripting bodily 
movements, expressions, poses and gestures for one’s own or other avatars’ use 
that are more diversified and refined than the default settings.
Access to that virtual space is granted by registering as a “resident”, which 
does not necessitate the acquisition of virtual land. However, not only is the entire 
visual appearance of SL besides being a navigable space user-crated, but all real-
world economic revenue for SL is generated by those users who engage in build-
ing, scripting, and then buying and selling digital items. Within this framework, 
and depending on users’ interests, areas are designated to certain themes, from 
being a virtual university to being a virtual shopping mall or nightclub, or to cer-
tain theme-oriented role-playing games. By such means, well-defined places are 
created within the digitally simulated space. Unless restricted by membership or 
by age constraints for the use of “adult” content, residents are free to move to any 
kind of place and to engage in any kind of activity appropriate to the respective 
place. Only at this stage, under such locally bounded conditions, place-specific 
rules can be imposed and, sometimes automatically, enforced by a place’s owners. 
Such rules are usually explicitly communicated to the resident entering the respec-
tive place. For example ‘physical’ attacks, that is scripted behaviours targeted at 
another avatar’s integrity, are forbidden in most places, but are a core practice in 
places dedicated to fighting games. This specificity of SL serves to distinguish it 
from online role-playing games that are, ab initio and globally, dedicated to one 
certain set of rule-sanctioned roles and activities.
Attempts have been made to classify SL residents by their type of engagement, 
but not without difficulty (Bartle 2003). However one may choose to subsume 
residents under certain types, one very basic distinction seems to be possible: 
there is an apparent difference between role-players, who predominantly move 
within spaces dedicated to the game of their choice and who are careful to play 
and remain within the character assigned to them, and a more amorphous and 
casual set of residents who assume a variety of identities under a variety of condi-
tions, and who do not always distinguish between SL and RL to the same degree. 
In the context of a role-play, any remarks that are “out of character” must be indi-
cated as such, and sparingly used (see Sixma 2009 for an instructive example). In 
the wider context of SL, roles are either not defined or vary from place to place, 
allowing for a significant amount of communicative confusion – which may actu-
ally be part of the fun to some players.
However, even under the role-playing paradigm, a number of common interac-
tive oddities requires residents to step out of their role, for example when having 
to ask for help or when offering advice to fellow residents who do not know how 
to use a certain script. Thus, the resource of interaction becomes the topic of 
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interaction, and residents quite naturally engage in conversation about the inter-
active possibilities and limitations of SL. Moreover, residents are intermittently 
confronted with technical warning messages from the server and with service 
disruptions, or users’ computers or SL applications may simply crash in the mid-
dle of a conversation, making the avatars disappear or ‘freeze’. These common 
mishaps have an effect on interactions, and may be turned into a topic of further 
interaction.
Above and beyond such disruptions in the perceived stability and continuity of 
the SL environment, the genuine ontological status of that environment is open 
to interpretation. Although referring to an ontology in this context may appear 
as a philosophical exercise for its own sake, its implications are quite practical: 
just as different places in SL have different rules, SL may be a different kind of 
environment to different players, depending on their interactional aims and self-
perception. Symptomatic of such disagreement are arguments among residents 
about the extent to which they are supposed to reveal details of their real lives 
in SL interaction. For example the appropriateness of posting a real-life photo to 
one’s profile, or of asking other residents to exchange RL photos or to use voice 
chat is very much contested, as is the question whether one’s SL character is 
supposed to resemble one’s real-life self. For example is a “women only” club 
restricted to female avatars or to female players? In fact, gender identity remains 
one of the most hotly contested issues in SL. Although it is quite common for 
players to explore alternate gender identities in SL (Ducheneaut et al. 2009; Hus-
sain and Griffiths 2008), the discovery of such supposedly ‘faked’ identities is 
likely to lead to conflict between residents.6 The most notorious cases of ontologi-
cal ambiguity are to be found in the possible effects and the meaning of emotional 
involvement with other residents. Do residents fall in love with other avatars, or 
with the person behind the keyboard, or are both involved in a falling-in-love role-
play? The players’ answers to these questions will have a bearing on how they 
evaluate other players’ alternate identities.
To none of these problems are there rules or guidelines of global applicabil-
ity, nor are there reliable and universal cues to be found within the environment. 
Although the textual interaction possibilities in SL are mostly identical with that 
of any online chat, other kinds of behavioural cues can be simulated on different 
levels of perception. These may or may not be internally coherent for one char-
acter, and they may or may not be congruous between different players. SL is a 
genuinely open environment, suitable to many varieties of interaction, in which 
certain artificial channels are available for the transmission of information, while 
most of the natural channels used and relied on in real life are missing. In a rich 
artificial environment that supersedes Turing’s informationally one-dimensional 
teletype communication, interaction consists in games of impersonation to which 
conventions of real-world interpersonal communication are only partly applica-
ble, as many of the cues used in the latter are either not present at all or can 
be manipulated at will, while some resemblance to natural interaction will be 
expected in some way by most residents, but to different extents and under differ-
ent interpretations. What most residents expect most of the time is some degree of 
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informational isomorphism between what they encounter in-world and what they 
encounter in real life, but it is often not sufficiently clear to what extent and with 
respect to which domains an isomorphism is supposed to hold, and whether it is 
expected to hold in the same way by other residents. In some cases, for example 
when SL identity is expected to match RL identity, informational convergence 
will be expected by some residents instead of partial isomorphism.
Even the relevance of the information picked up in SL is ambiguous: one’s per-
ceptions, interactions and so forth, when they fail, will fail only within the context 
of SL (unless, of course, relationships that started in SL are carried over into RL), 
but the perceived graveness of misunderstandings or failures will depend on the 
residents’ overall interpretation of the relevance of what they do and encounter 
in SL, which, again, may vary widely and actually contribute to further misun-
derstandings and failures. At the same instance, an interplay has been claimed to 
occur between resident’s real life and SL self-perception, which may account for 
some of the blurring of identities in the games of impersonation played in SL (Yee 
et al. 2007). It is the very virtuality of the SL environment, and of the identities 
and behaviours played out in that arena, that remain contested among its residents. 
SL is an informational environment whose domains and relevant variables are 
subject to continuous, open-ended negotiation.
Mixed Reality Games
A markedly hybrid gaming environment that combines real-world environments 
and virtual elements is to be found in the field of Mixed Reality Games or, in 
allusion to the previously introduced concept of MMORPGs, Mobile Massively 
Multiplayer Online Games (MMMOGs).7 After a number of earlier attempts that 
remained confined to prototype or niche product status, this type of mobile game 
has finally reached a broad audience and significant media attention in 2016 with 
Pokémon Go. These games are designed to transform everyday environments into 
playing fields that integrate physical modes of interaction and virtual elements in 
a manner clearly distinct from console or conventional online or mobile games. 
Using GPS-equipped mobile devices, mostly smartphones, the cues for interac-
tion between players, other persons and features of their common surroundings 
are purposefully modified in Mixed Reality Games – and hence, if only within 
the context of the game, the players’ informational environments. I will now give 
some detailed consideration to one such game, named GeoBashing in playful allu-
sion to Geocaching, a similarly location-based game that, however, lacks some of 
the mobile and all of the virtual aspects of what is proposed by the developers of 
the game under discussion here (a first outline of the GeoBashing concept is to be 
found in Dieber et al. 2010). This game, at the time of this writing, has remained 
in prototype status but it already incorporates key features of what would appear 
in the immensely popular Pokémon Go five years later.
GeoBashing offers two distinct gaming modes, which can be combined: “chal-
lenges” and “fights” (with further modes considered for addition at a later stage), 
which are designed to create a “virtual overlay to the real world”. That virtual 
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overlay, however, is not something that is pictorially displayed on the handset’s 
screen, like it would be in Augmented Reality applications proper (see the next 
section on AR). Notably, the virtual overlay in this game does not include ava-
tars but only pseudonyms by which players are identified. Players are engaged 
in face-to-face interaction but, unless being already personally acquainted, they 
might recognise each other as players only in the course of the game. Obviously, 
the game is supposed to be played in public everyday contexts, on the way to or 
from school, on an afternoon stroll and so forth, and typically not in recession 
from interaction in public environments. There are no messaging or chat func-
tions incorporated in the game. Besides real-time information on the presence of 
other players in one’s vicinity and the status of the game, the gaming interface 
is used only for allocating roles to locations and spatial relations, in the form of 
descriptions of tasks and geographical coordinates (direction and distance) related 
to these tasks, plus feedback on the accomplishment of the tasks, gaming points 
collected and rankings between players.
In the first of the two paradigmatic gaming modes, one player could define 
a sequence of GPS points which the other players are then challenged to track 
physically, by locating them with their devices while walking or running the vir-
tual course. Gaming points (“experience points”) are awarded to those players 
who complete the sequence first or fastest. Separately or in conjunction with such 
challenges, a player could pick a virtual fight with another player in his vicinity 
who, after being located and formally solicited, is alerted to the imminent attack 
and has a “fight or flight” choice at hand. Although the flight option has to be 
physically realised, as the targeted individual will have to run from his pursuer to 
bring himself out of the (rather narrow) fighting range, the fight itself is not sup-
posed to include any physical elements apart from the players’ spatial proximity. 
Instead, it is played out on their mobile handsets as a random function based trial 
of strength, with no tactics available to the players to overpower their adversary.
On occasion of a set of field trials of a GeoBashing prototype with high-school 
students and first-term IT students at the University of Klagenfurt, the author of 
these lines and his colleagues conducted a short series of participant observations.8 
What could be observed on that occasion was that what had been intended as a 
virtual overlay to the real world interacted with aspects of the real world in sev-
eral respects, not all of which were anticipated: First of all, and least surprisingly, 
everyday surroundings, like a city park or a university campus, are transformed 
into a playing field, by virtue of being thus perceived and treated by the players. 
Being tagged with GPS coordinates, otherwise wholly insignificant and feature-
less locations are turned into landmarks, which to detect and physically occupy is 
essential to the purpose of the game. The patch of ice behind the building on the 
wintry campus might turn out to be the target, while the building itself might be a 
mere obstacle. (Actually, buildings cannot possibly be more than obstacles in this 
game, as GPS becomes unreliable or dysfunctional indoors, making the gameplay 
a dedicated outdoor activity.)9
In terms of perceptual coordination, the players are presented with the predica-
ment of mapping the tasks and coordinates displayed on their handsets’ screens 
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onto what they encounter in their surroundings, hence having to keep track of 
both at once. In practice, this predicament is solved in strikingly variant ways. 
On being presented with a challenge as an individual, some players would start 
running toward the first GPS point indicated on their screen without hesitation, 
with little regard to whom or what they would encounter, and all on their own, 
paying no attention to other players nor to much else of what goes on around 
them. Others would start crowding together, discussing the challenge and trying 
to solve it cooperatively. A third subgroup of players (who, in the present sample, 
is coextensive with those participants identifying themselves as players of online 
role-playing games) would not pay much attention to the initial challenge, opting 
to spoil for a fight instead. Hence, different players would be found to treat the 
gaming environment differently – an observation that might change once an eti-
quette of gameplay is established for that game. Alternatively, and in analogy to 
what can be observed in SL, an emerging gaming community might develop into 
a variety of subcultures, with expressly different views and goals.
In terms of interaction with the aspects of the environment that are not included 
in the game, it has been observed that a specific kind of oblivious immersion is 
typical for the use of console games and online computer games played at home. 
However, the behavioural implications of this state of mind are at most marginally 
visible in public for console games. Mobile games that do not appear to involve 
the environment may be played with a more visible form of oblivious immersion, 
or alternatively in a more casual, distracted fashion. In either case, the variable of 
place exerts its influence in psychological and emotional ways in the first place, 
rather than being directly included as an element of the game (see Hjorth 2011; 
Hjorth and Richardson 2011).10
In our empirical case, it was observed that immersion in the game results in 
largely ignoring those aspects of the environment which have not directly been 
assigned with a role in the game, or partially integrating them in improvised fash-
ion. This somewhat suspended state of relating to the non-game environment is 
likely to result in strange encounters of a specific sort. For example a garbage 
truck or delivery vehicle entering the space that was used as the playing field, 
and hence as some form of territory, were mostly treated as just another obstacle. 
The slightly bemused looks of the non-participant delivery and garbage collection 
workers on encountering a crowd of young people transfixed to their handsets 
and seemingly erratically moving about the place were largely ignored, in some 
respects as if the workers’ and the vehicles’ presence were not much else than 
static to the information that the players are immersed in tracking and acting upon.
A mobile online game of the sort described here will perhaps be the most 
clear-cut case, or even a paradigm, of a transformed informational environment. 
In physical terms, and viewed as an external environment, the university campus 
remains the university campus, whereas many informationally relevant variables 
are artificially added to this environment and are acted upon as if they were natural 
affordances. The purpose of the game lies in tracking the domains of the signals 
of the relevant variables, which are the geographical coordinates that are part of 
the challenges to be completed and the presence and behaviours of other players. 
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Although the relevance of the variables in question is restricted to the game – a 
kind of restriction that will apply to any clearly circumscribed practice – they are 
constitutive of the players’ behaviours within that context. The information and 
interaction opportunities provided by the game do not concern the external envi-
ronment in which players are moving but are informational with respect to the 
contents of the game, which may but need not be partly sensitive to conditions 
at the concrete location of the player. One is supposed to perceive his or her sur-
roundings differently in a gaming situation, in some cases turning everyday objects 
into elements of the game, thus temporarily redefining their meaning and function. 
The virtual overlay to the real world introduced by the game, by creating domains 
of artificial information that supplement and partly displace those of natural infor-
mation, structures the players’ behaviours in a straightforwardly embodied sense.
The most successful commercial application sharing the features of MMMOGs 
described and discussed for the GeoBashing prototype, and adding more features 
to the game, is Pokémon Go (Economist 2016; Kohler 2016). The first significant 
difference to the former game is the inclusion of AR elements (discussed further 
in the next section) in the gaming display instead of purely GPS-based challenges. 
One AR-involving gaming mode consists of finding and capturing variously shaped 
Pokémons that are trackable in the environment on the basis of GPS data, and that 
are visible on the smartphone display as embedded in the player’s surroundings by 
virtue of a camera-based see-through function: looking at some spot through the 
display, the player will see the Pokémon as a moving virtual item in his or her sur-
roundings, and he or she has to capture it by hitting it with a virtual ball. A second 
gaming mode consists in finding so-called “Pokéstops” that offer gaming resources, 
again on the basis of GPS data. These stops are landmarks or more innocuous 
objects with an AR overlay that have to be physically approached in order to collect 
the resources. A third AR- and GPS-based gaming mode consists in finding “gyms” 
where to “fight” other players by proxy of the Pokémons captured to date. Here, the 
trial of strength is based on the number, kind and rarity-related power of Pokémons 
collected. Intriguingly, the kind of Pokémons one has available for capturing cova-
ries with variables in the external environment: for example water Pokémons are 
found near water, or fire Pokémons in hot places. Gaming strategies might involve 
seeking out particular, and particularly rare, Pokémons in the appropriate places. In 
most respects, gameplay and player’s behaviours are supposed to be analogous to 
what was observed with respect to GeoBashing, from the modes – and sometimes 
physically dangerous excesses – of immersion to the options of teaming up vs. 
competing in the accomplishment of gaming tasks, with one issue gaining more 
prominence: it has been reported that Pokéstops can be found having been set up 
in places, such as cemeteries or Holocaust memorials, in which mobile gaming 
will appear inappropriate (Akhtar 2016; Peterson 2016), prompting the provider to 
remove the gaming items and make the respective areas unavailable to gameplay, 
and prompting calls for codes of ethics for AR games (Cross 2016).
In the case of Mixed Reality Games, the issue of convergence and isomorphism 
of the information provided is fairly complex: informational relations pertain-
ing to the virtual realm, that is the game, interact with natural information for 
The intelligence of environments 167
perception rather than being self-contained in a virtual environment or assigned 
to supposedly well-defined sub-domains. The environmental variables that are 
supposed to be tracked by the players are elements of the gaming environment, 
while several non-game environmental variables remain relevant. In a virtual real-
ity game, in a simulator environment or in SL, that environment will be closed, 
so that the domain of the information involved would be (largely) coextensive 
with the virtual world. Not even isomorphism with natural informational rela-
tions would be required in principle, although any decrease in isomorphism would 
make that environment look and feel increasingly bizarre. In contrast to virtual 
reality or simulator environments, a Mixed Reality Game environment is open by 
definition. The virtual elements of the game are supposed to be informationally 
isomorphic in terms of the gaming tasks, which have clearly identifiable type coun-
terparts in the real world in general while being realised in a concrete environment 
that cannot possibly be controlled by the gaming operations. The game itself is 
not supposed to furnish information on real-world variables beyond identification 
of players and locations and the mapping of space-related tasks onto the environ-
ment as it is encountered by the players. It is the players themselves who have to 
accomplish ad hoc mappings between the gaming tasks at hand and the perceiv-
able structure of the environment and the interactive requirements it imposes upon 
them, and who may succeed or fail at accomplishing these mappings.
Augmented Reality
In the reference that has remained canonical for decades, Ronald Azuma (1997, 
356) defines Augmented Reality (AR) as follows:
AR [is] any system that has the following three characteristics:
(1) Combines real and virtual
(2) Is interactive in real time
(3) Is registered in three dimensions.
In elaboration of this first definition, Azuma et al. (2001, 34) states that an “AR 
system supplements the real world with (computer-generated) objects that appear 
to coexist in the same space as the real world [so as to combine] real and virtual 
objects in a real environment [. . .] interactively and in real time”. By these means, 
orientation or interaction within the environment shall be facilitated. Hence, 
its primary purpose lies in the support of human cognitive tasks (“Intelligence 
Amplification”, FAR-a-2015), and to supply information in such a way as to make 
it clearly recognisable without becoming obtrusive or confusing (LFE-b-2015). 
Established AR services include navigation, virtual guided tours and mobile gam-
ing (see the preceding MMMOG example and the earlier navigation example on 
p. 139–40 in Chapter 8). Visual support of endoscopic surgery and mechanical 
engineering routines are cited as other promising fields for AR applications, and 
automotive services, such as driver assistance, are highlighted as the potential 
main field of application (FAR-a-2015, IAS-a-2015, LFE-b-2015).
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In line with Azuma’s approach, AR researchers frequently refer to Paul Mil-
gram’s continuum between real and virtual environments, in which AR is located 
closer to the “real” than the “virtual” end of the continuum, within the broad realm 
of “mixed reality” that stretches between these two poles (Milgram and Kishino 
1994). AR appears to be the conceptual counterpart to Virtual Reality in many 
ways: instead of cognitive and, possibly, behavioural immersion in a simulated 
environment, information that is not or not directly accessible to perception is 
added to the perceiving subject’s environment (LFE-a-2015), predominantly on 
the level of visual perception. Such additional information may be displayed in 
the form of text, audio, images, graphics or video on mobile phones or other 
devices. In its most advanced versions, the information and interactive oppor-
tunities provided by AR applications are not confined to delimited displays but 
projected onto objects and surfaces, so as to become integrated with their user’s 
perception of his or her surroundings (Feiner 2002) – which would bring all three 
of the aforementioned characteristics of AR to full realisation.
With respect to the intended functions of AR, one should clearly not presume a 
contrast between reality and virtuality in which what is virtual appears as unreal, 
and hence incurs connotations of being fake, made up and devoid of relevance. 
In fact, AR applications are paradigmatically supposed to help to provide infor-
mation about the real world to their users by means of virtual elements, some of 
which may well refer to real objects in their user’s environments, and none of 
which are supposed to tamper with correct and effective perception of the non-
virtual components of the environment – although they might end up doing so 
under some circumstances. Only in gaming-oriented AR, as discussed earlier 
(MMMOG), might the first of these two conditions be waived.
The reality/virtuality distinction in AR is supposed to highlight differences in 
the mode of presenting information. If it is displayed on a screen or other delim-
ited interface, the locality- and context-sensitive information provided by an AR 
application remains clearly perceivable as having been added to the environment, 
and it is still unequivocally localised on an interface that is itself an object in that 
environment, equipped with real or virtual buttons, keys or bars for interaction. 
In the most advanced cases of AR, however, the optic array itself becomes the 
interface in a certain (although probably not properly Gibsonian) sense. Virtual 
objects, although not being present in space, are projected onto surfaces in such 
a way as to make them appear as integral parts of the environment. Ideally, they 
should also allow for some degree of manipulation by their users, which poses 
additional challenges for their integration into perception (Zhou et al. 2008).
If there is a mix of realities involved in AR, the reality/virtuality distinc-
tion will capture only one dimension of that mix, as it remains focused on the 
mode of presentation of whatever kind of information it is concerned with rather 
than the nature of that information. In order to account for the relation of what 
is afforded by AR systems to natural information for perception, the distinc-
tion between informational convergence and isomorphism may be added as a 
second dimension. An AR application may provide information about concrete 
objects and activities in the environment that are of shared concern, and it might 
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provide interactive opportunities towards them. Alternatively, an AR system 
might aim at a more general parallelism between what it signals and real or ficti-
tious objects and activities, or types thereof, such as in AR-based gaming. I will 
briefly present two types of concrete AR applications, so as to further explicate 
these relations.
The first example is driver focus technologies, that is advanced driver assis-
tance systems. In the wake of other driver assistance technologies, for whom a 
‘trickle-through’ effect from the upmarket to the middle segment of the automo-
bile market is already observable, and where a process of making them manda-
tory by law has commenced (LFE-b-2015, citing the example of eCall), driver 
focus systems stand a chance of becoming marketable in the near future.11 The 
basic function of a driver focus system is to autonomously monitor both the cur-
rent traffic situation around the car and to detect potentially hazardous situations 
and to observe the driver’s degree and direction of attention, and to match these 
variables against each other and in real time. Tracking the driver’s direction of 
attention is accomplished by camera-based detection of the viewing direction and 
the current geometry of the driver’s face. If and when a critical situation emerges 
outside his or her current perceptual focus, or if there is evidence that he or she is 
completely distracted from traffic events in a critical moment, the Driver Focus 
System sends an optical signal through an LED strip that completely encircles 
the vehicle’s interior. It might also send an additional acoustic signal. The optical 
signal comprises intuitively colour-coded moving light bands that converge in the 
direction of the relevant situation registered by the system (e.g. red for imminent 
danger of collision, violet for close approach to an obstacle when manoeuvring). 
Unlike conventional proximity sensors, a situation-specific warning is issued only 
if and when the system actually registers a mismatch between the situation and 
the driver’s attention.
Driver focus technologies of the kind just described thus involve a tracking of, 
and reaction to, the driver’s behaviours and include this information into what 
they display to him or her. This is information that would be fairly difficult for the 
driver to track himself or herself, and it is practically impossible for him or her 
to do so from a third-person perspective. In fact, such information is displayed to 
the driver especially in situations where his or her self-awareness is registered as 
being below par. Nonetheless, a driver focus system provides real-time informa-
tion about the environment, including the driver that, although partly not present 
and partly even inaccessible to him or her by direct perception, has all the char-
acteristics of natural information for perception. Convergence of this information 
with what the driver could hypothetically observe himself or herself (or what an 
attentive passenger could actually observe) is paramount to the proper function-
ing of a driver focus system. The domain of artificially created signals and the 
domains of natural information have to map onto a shared (identical or overlap-
ping) set of concrete world affairs in a shared environment, and it will have to 
do so along corresponding regularities of informational mapping. After all, the 
purpose of the Driver Focus System is to help the driver to track relevant condi-
tions in the environment.
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A failure of informational convergence, so conceived, between what a driver 
could perceive and what an assistance system is capable of registering appears to 
be responsible for the first-ever fatal accident of a semi-autonomous vehicle on 
a Florida highway in May 2016. According to the accident investigation report, 
the car was moderately speeding at the time of the accident while “the driver 
was operating the car using the advanced driver assistance features Traffic-Aware 
Cruise Control and Autosteer lane keeping assistance” (National Transporta-
tion Safety Board 2016). Notably, the car manufacturer refers to these features 
as an “autopilot” function (Tesla Motors 2016). The systems involved, as sev-
eral reports indicate, failed to distinguish between the side of a plain-coloured 
white semi-tractor trailer that was crossing the highway at right angle and the 
bright sky in its background (Knight 2016a; Reuters 2016; Tesla Motors 2016). 
It appears that the driver on the highway neither tried to intervene when the other 
vehicle infringed his right of way nor paid any attention to the traffic situation 
in the first place (some witnesses suggest that he was watching a film instead, 
see Reuters 2016). Issues with distinguishing bright, plain-coloured objects from 
the bright sky were known to the manufacturer, and detecting obstacles crossing 
the path of the vehicle at right angle was not part of the sensor’s specifications 
(Knight 2016b). At the same instance, the car, being a semi-autonomous vehicle 
without a genuine autopilot function, included a feature to monitor the driver’s 
hands remaining at the steering wheel. This single-cue driver monitoring feature, 
which was not coupled with the traffic monitoring and steering system, was sup-
posed both to issue warnings to the driver and to slow down the vehicle if his or 
her hands remained off the wheel for a certain period (Tesla Motors 2016), but 
appears to have been ineffective for some reason. Hence, the information avail-
able to the traffic monitoring system did not match the visual information that the 
driver would have had available if he had kept the traffic situation in view, and 
no information was exchanged between traffic and driver monitoring systems that 
could have corrected for that situation. All of these sets of information would have 
had to be integrated for convergence to obtain.
The second, historically slightly older example is the mobile gesture-based 
interface Sixth Sense, developed at the MIT Media Lab (Mistry et al. 2009) where, 
however, it did not progress beyond an advanced prototype status. The basic con-
cept of that interface is to provide information and afford activities relevant to the 
context of whatever may be the user’s current purposes independently of a fixed 
physical interface. The system consists of a small camera and a small projector 
that, sufficiently miniaturised, could be worn in front of the torso like a pendant, 
and that are networked with a mobile device operating in the background. When 
looking forward, camera and projector are usually equally oriented in viewing 
direction. With small, maximally intuitively designed gestures, objects or people 
can be recognised, relevant information can be retrieved from the Internet or inter-
action possibilities can be invoked without further user input; drawings can be 
created, photos can be taken and virtual objects projected onto a suitable surface 
can be manipulated. For example it should be possible for the user to draw a real, 
physical book from the shelf and flip through it, while an application recognises 
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the book and projects meta-information (such as ratings, reviews, additional 
information on the content) directly onto the cover or any open page. Moreover, 
a wall may become a telephone dial, a display for travel information or a game 
board, depending on the activity intended by the user. Beyond tangible practical 
applications of this kind, the design leitmotif of Sixth Sense is that it shall “give 
us seamless access and easy access to meta-information or information that may 
exist somewhere and that may be relevant to help us make the right decision about 
whatever it is that we are coming across” (Maes and Mistry 2009, TED Talk).
An interface with the capacities of Sixth Sense projects information and inter-
active elements into the environment that may, but neither need nor always do, 
concern concrete world affairs within that environment. Hence, there will be situ-
ations where there is no information on objects or situations within that concrete 
environment that would be projected into it. The information provided by Sixth 
Sense may concern any other, related or unrelated world affair, such as the status 
of one’s flight being projected onto any given wall or the back of the front seat 
of one’s taxi to the airport. It may also concern fictional objects if gaming is 
involved. Hence, the virtual nature of some object is indifferent to the conver-
gence/isomorphism distinction.
At the same instance, and independently of the issue of the reference of the 
information involved, a smooth integration of what is displayed with perceptual 
uptake of natural information in a given environment has to be accomplished, in 
order for the user not to become unduly distracted or irritated by the display. An 
AR system of the kind and sophistication of either Sixth Sense or the Driver Focus 
System is supposed to track both environmental variables and as users’ perspec-
tives and behaviours with respect to those variables, and integrate them. Tracking 
of either sort has become the predominant topic in AR research, and is acknowl-
edged as one of its main design challenges (Zhou et al. 2008). Inasmuch as people 
normally rely on a number of different, not exclusively visual cues when tracking 
an object in their environment, a richer realistic impression of virtual objects in 
AR will be provided by hybrid tracking across different sensory modalities (Feiner 
2002, 53). In practice, however, these additional modalities are typically confined 
to auditory and tactile feedback, at the expense both of the other senses and of gen-
uine provision of information by non-visual means (FAR-a-2015, LFE-a-2015).
For systems that, like Sixth Sense but unlike the Driver Focus System, pro-
ject virtual objects into the environment as related to the user, the movements 
of a user’s body, head and eyes, and thus his or her position and movement rela-
tive to a virtual object, will be factored into the equation by which virtual object 
is aligned with the physical objects surrounding it. The object’s changing shape 
when viewed from different angles has to be accounted for as well as the effects 
of changing lighting conditions or partial occlusion by physical objects. Thus, 
besides an adequate design of digital objects, a correct and real-time calculation 
of how to integrate an object into the users’ stream of perception is part of the 
practical requirements for those AR systems that use the user’s surroundings as 
the interface. Even for the more modest varieties of AR, the users’ perspective 
and behaviours will have to be reliably tracked, in conjunction with the context in 
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which they obtain. What is he or she looking at? What object is he or she follow-
ing? What is relevant to him or her in the present context? Tracking the domains 
of information relevant to the human counterpart will require convergence with 
natural informational domains.
To cite issues that arose in trials of another gesture-based interface, albeit one 
more modest than Sixth Sense and concerned with gestural control functions for 
utility vehicles, it was observed (as reported in FAR-a-2015) first, that the avail-
able vocabulary of unequivocally discernible gestures is very limited with respect 
to the set of commands required for effective and comprehensive control of the 
vehicle. Second, that natural gestures inadvertently produced by the operator 
which are not intended as commands are easily mistaken as commands by the 
system – a problem referred to as the “Midas Touch” problem: just as the mythical 
king’s wish that everything he touches turns to gold coming true turned against 
him once he reached for food and drink, one would wish to be able discern what 
shall be a command and what a natural gesture when interacting with a gesture-
based interface. Disambiguation, then, will require invocation commands or simi-
lar indicators of the proper context of a gesture to be available to the system, so as 
to provide the domain of command gestures with explicit and reliably trackable 
boundaries.
To sum up the importance of informational convergence in AR systems: such 
convergence may but need not obtain with respect to affairs in a shared environ-
ment. Instead of convergence with natural information for perception, more gen-
eral isomorphisms might be the relation of choice, depending on application and 
usage involved. However, what has to converge in either case is the information 
required for successful interaction between AR system and user, and hence the 
cues by which objects and activities are recognised. If convergence is achieved 
on either or on both levels, human beings and AR systems will share a focus 
on certain objects of reference or towards certain conditions in their common 
surroundings, thereby implying some kind of symmetrical relationship: both are 
situated in a shared environment of interaction, where the success of both human 
beings’ actions and the systems’ behaviours depends on shared attention to rel-
evant conditions in that environment, and on the stability of the conditions under 
which they interact. If successful, the goal states of the behaviours towards an 
object, condition or activity may indeed be identical, in terms of a certain task 
being fulfilled cooperatively.
However, this observation does not imply that the same conditions will nec-
essarily be relevant in the same way to both sides. The particular purposes of 
the human and artificial participants in the situation may remain at variance, and 
may have to be so for the sake of accomplishing a given task. To the extent that 
virtual objects are integrated in real environments in AR, the function of AR is to 
simulate, in a different medium, some of the key properties of the environment in 
relation to human perception. In contrast to attempts at imitating human-like fea-
tures for the artificial counterparts in an interaction, as in Turing’s imitation game, 
conversational agents or social robotics, the imitation involved in AR concerns 
features of the environment as they present themselves to the perceiving human 
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being. The subtle additions or changes to that environment are what is supposed to 
enhance human cognition and action while at the same instance human beings will 
need to keep track of those additions and changes in order to avoid irritation. How-
ever, irritation would arise not only from incongruously implemented, unnatural 
looking augmentations of reality that are cumbersome to interact with, but also 
from augmentations so subtle that they would not be discernible in any way from 
real-world objects and events anymore (FAR-a-2015). If the Gibsonian account 
of pictorial forms is a reliable guide, the practical requirements for augmentations 
that approach an ideal of perfect illusions will be improbably steep though.
Either way, the user is supposed precisely not to be concerned with anticipat-
ing the AR system’s purposes but only with the pursuit of his or her initial goals. 
Thus, a significant asymmetry between human beings and AR systems lies in the 
fact that the counterpart of human interaction is a modified environment, or a 
modification of one’s perception of his environment, not something that can be 
addressed as a clearly individuated being. AR technologies are meant to keep 
track of human relations to their environment, whereas the reverse does not hold 
under normal operating conditions, where the presentation of near-natural affor-
dances takes centre stage and the aim of the technology is, after all, to become 
ambient.
Naturalising the artificial
Throughout all examples in the previous sections, as different as they may appear 
at first sight, one can identify at least one common thread: by artefactual means, 
informational environments are modified or, in some cases, created. At a mini-
mum, there is an interplay between the introduction and effects of artificial struc-
tures designed to make available, augment or otherwise affect the information for 
an informational environment’s inhabitants on the one hand, and their attempts at 
integrating whatever change these artefacts may effect into an established frame-
work of reference – which might thus be altered itself. Or entire informational 
environments are constructed from scratch, as it were – but will have to be inte-
grated into an established framework of reference, too, as they do not exist in 
complete isolation from such frameworks.
The informational environment and the artificial structures are of an obviously 
very simple kind to the evolving robot in the evolutionary robotics example. The 
entire external environment for the robot is artificially created, and hence all infor-
mation that will be available to the robot – yet there is no anticipation in neither 
that environment’s nor the robot’s design of how the signals of the one relevant 
difference in this artificial environment will be tracked by him. If successful, the 
robot will, over a number of runs of the experiment, develop a GS-constitutive 
relation to that environment, as introduced by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and 
discussed in Chapter 5, under which specific behaviours of tracking the domain 
of signals of the difference between triangles and rectangles emerge. His informa-
tional environment is made up of the signals and the differences between signals 
that he has to keep track of in order to prevail.
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Cognitive robots, as discussed in the same section, are not in a situation of hav-
ing to evolve their own informational environments, as their functional structure 
is intended to resemble human cognitive abilities in some important respects. Nor 
is those robots’ external environment artificially created, as they are supposed 
to act within unrestricted environments. Still, an informational environment will 
have been created for them, precisely by virtue of simulating some of the pat-
terns of organism-environment relations that are relevant to the human cognitive 
functions.
Second Life is the other example in the aforementioned set in which the entire 
environment of interaction is, in the fullest and most direct sense, constructed. 
Apart from the basic virtual world infrastructure and the general framework of 
modes of interaction, residents are involved in creating, along with the shape they 
decide to assume and the items they construct, much of the informational relations 
that exist in that world, and they will do so with different aims and purposes in 
mind. Being a simulated environment, relations of isomorphism between infor-
mational relations within the simulations and natural information are relevant, but 
remain underdetermined in intriguing ways. Some informational relations within 
the simulated environment may not even have a genuine counterpart in the real 
world. Given that an avatar of any shape might be operated by a human being of 
any race, gender and persuasion but also by a scripted agent, the underdefined 
isomorphisms to real-world informational relations involved here make for what 
may count as the most sophisticated incarnation of the imitation game, as origi-
nally described by Turing.
In all remaining examples, rather than entire environments of interaction being 
constructed, artificial elements are added to existing external environments. Addi-
tions might be accomplished in material fashion, as in the case of social robotics, 
or in simulated or virtual fashion, as for embodied conversational agents, virtual 
overlays with gaming purposes (MMMOG) or virtual objects that can be inter-
acted with in non-virtual environments (AR). The elements thus added are likely 
to affect the informational environments of those interacting with them, either in 
wholesale fashion as, supposedly, in AR, or within clearly circumscribed contexts 
of interaction, as for conversational agents and social robots, or within a hybrid 
context, as in the case of gaming affordances being embedded in an everyday 
environment. The player waiting for the bus home may, at an instance and with-
out changing places, be surprised with a challenge or a fight. Although, being an 
MMMOG player, he will be disposed to be thus surprised, and although he also 
might be the one to pose the challenge or to solicit the fight with the guy at the 
bus stop on the other side of the street, a switching between specific informational 
environments obtains without any otherwise perceptible change in the external 
environment, apart from the presence and operation of mobile handset and gam-
ing application.
Neither the distinction between the construction of entire environments and the 
addition of elements to existing environments nor the different extensions of what 
is modified by what means will be reliable predictors of the actual scope of the 
artefact-based effects on informational environments. A seemingly minor addition 
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or a modification limited to a well-defined area of application might have more 
wide-ranging repercussions than its original context would have suggested. In all 
cases that involve human beings as users, transformations of informational envi-
ronments will obtain in the use of, or interaction with, these artefacts that at some 
points and in some respects transcend the limits of specific and well-established 
contexts of application and interaction. Nor can these transformations be exhaus-
tively explained by reference to the abilities of the machines.
These more profound transformations obtain if and when first, returning to the 
distinction made by Robert Brandon and discussed on p. 78 in Chapter 5, the 
construction or addition of elements to external environments has lasting effects 
on the ecological environment of the actors involved. Whenever, second, some 
such effect is neither transient nor has already been accommodated, situations of 
informational uncertainty ensue whose relevance is coupled with the relevance 
of that effect in ecological terms. There will be no clearly delimited domain of 
signals of the world affair in question that the actors have already learned to track 
and on which they could rely. Whether the informational relations thus added or 
altered are regular, stable and unequivocal as such is not the same issue as whether 
a relation of convergence or isomorphism between the domains of the new or 
modified signals and the domains of natural information that the receivers are 
accustomed to can be determined in practice. Resolving these uncertainties is an 
equally practical matter.
In this respect, the clearest of the cases under discussion here is to be found in 
MMMOGs. It bears some resemblance to the issue of the (hitherto still partial) 
accommodation of mobile phone use in public contexts to the realm of socially 
accepted behaviours. Until the day when these games have become a normal part 
of everyday practice, they will, with some likeliness, be sources of irritation to 
non-players as to whether their gaming behaviour, being unpredictable to the 
uninitiated, will be considered harmless or annoying, amusing or inappropriate. 
The everyday contexts in which the gaming situations occur will provide no cues 
unless, first, external observers are able to unequivocally identify the gaming situ-
ations as such and, second, a set of implicit or explicit rules has emerged that will 
tell players when and where joining a fight or challenge will count as appropriate. 
Once these two conditions are fulfilled, the possibility of everyday environments 
suddenly being turned into mobile online gaming environments will be taken for 
granted by players and at least tolerated by non-players.
Conversely, AR might confront its users with designs of virtual objects that 
may or may not or not yet strike the right balance between making the similarities 
to physical objects appear natural enough while making the differences to physi-
cal objects obvious enough to the user, so as to both facilitate interaction with 
the virtual objects and allow for the recognition of their identity as virtual. The 
introduction of virtual objects into real-world environments is likely to require 
some degree of habituation and accommodation from their users, so as to put 
the similarities and differences in context. Complete intuitiveness of interaction 
might be a convenient fiction anyway, where ease of learning should be the design 
paradigm instead from an ergonomist’s perspective (LFE-a/b-2015). The lower 
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the degree of habituation and accommodation that is required, the less profound 
the changes in the user’s informational environment will be, and vice versa.
If we look from the other side of the interactive relation, from the system to 
the user, the requirements will be partly complementary. Quite obviously, coming 
to correctly anticipate and interpret human behaviours will be crucial to the sys-
tem’s success. To the extent that an AR system falls short of correctly interpreting 
human perceptions and actions, and to the extent that it does not correctly antici-
pate the effects of its own behaviours on human perception and action, it will be 
confined to some kind of cognitive trial-end-error game. The resulting behaviour 
is likely to create irritating effects on the side of the users which will have to be 
dealt with but from which the system, if so capable, may also learn.
In the SL case, although one may teleport and fly in this environment, and 
although avatars may assume the shape of animals, robots or even potted plants on 
wheels, one expects to interact with other natural human beings. However, much 
of the information that would be used in face-to-face interactions is not present 
in this environment, or it is transmitted through channels that would otherwise be 
complemented by information arriving through other channels (a gesture or wink 
to see, an exaggerated intonation to hear). Moreover, SL residents encounter the 
entire virtual environment in which they act with a sense of uncertainty towards 
its ontological status that can hardly be fixed in-world. The domains of informa-
tional relations in that world, both in terms of the unequivocality and stability of 
the correlations involved and in terms of the degree of isomorphism to natural 
informational domains, remain in constant jeopardy.
In all cases under discussion here, if the conditions of ambiguity of the infor-
mational relations were selectively relevant in a biological sense, such ambiguity 
would not persist for long. Still, actions or entire practices may fail in painful and 
embarrassing ways. An evolving robot will be at a selective disadvantage when 
being unable to resolve the ambiguity in edge detection from certain angles, so 
his artificial genes are unlikely to be replicated in the next generation of the simu-
lated evolutionary process. In the SL case, residents with different perceptions of 
some game-relevant conditions, after a series of communicative and interactive 
mishaps that they encounter as “newbies”, will be found either to quickly drop out 
of SL altogether, or to coalesce with like-minded residents, save the occasional 
clash with members of variant subcultures in this essentially social environment.
In turn, conversational agents and social robots are boundary cases in which 
the counterpart of interaction is known not to be a human being but supposed to 
be human-like in appearance and behaviour in important respects. It will be found 
being treated unambiguously neither as a person nor as a machine – an ambiguity 
that may turn out to be of somewhat more general relevance than in SL encoun-
ters. Even the most natural and familiar appearance would not warrant the agent’s 
or robot’s integration into common modes of social interaction, as the interaction 
remains asymmetrical, and as the counterpart’s artificiality remains discernible. 
Some of the behavioural cues by which human beings identify each other as such 
are present but, first, one cannot be sure that they convey information on any 
sort of analogue of a real human being’s beliefs and desires. Second, whatever 
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human-likeness is conveyed in such interactions remains partial in a way that 
allows for uncomfortably surprising experiences of un-likeness. These conditions 
leave some room for uncertainty in the human counterpart about what kind of 
being he or she is interacting with. As long as there is no strategy of disambigua-
tion that involves the robots and agents themselves, these beings will exist in a 
state of suspended or partial sociality. A certain mode of perceiving and treating 
them might emerge over time, but there is no clear path or predictable goal. The 
further development of these technologies and the degree of pervasiveness they 
assume will be factors in the emergence of a less suspended and more clearly 
defined state of affairs.
For all examples involving human interaction, it can be said that, where human 
agents encounter stubborn informational ambiguities in their environments, and 
where these ambiguities concern relevant environmental variables, they will, by 
acting under and towards these conditions so as to achieve some degree of dis-
ambiguation, effectively modify the framework of reference for that interaction. 
They will hence accommodate those changes where possible and adapt to them 
where necessary. Partly in allusion to the biological and juridical meanings of the 
term respectively, namely of being adopted in a new environment as an organism 
and of assuming citizenship of one’s host country, and partly in reference to the 
use of that term in philosophy, I chose to call this latter kind of process one of 
“naturalisation”. If naturalism is true, and if we are natural beings involved in the 
business of dealing with conditions in environments as we encounter them, natu-
ralisation is not merely something that we are subject to. It is also something that 
we do, and it is, at root, the other face of one and the same process.
Naturalisation, in this context, means trying to integrate the unfamiliar beings 
and environments one encounters into a common framework of knowledge about, 
and expectations towards, how environments and other agents behave. This does 
not necessarily mean that those beings are treated like any conventional social 
actor, that is like other human beings under all circumstances, nor that the envi-
ronment is treated as a natural environment. More often, it means treating them 
in a manner that tests the boundaries of commonly shared expectations, so as to 
assign to them a place within the cognitive and practical order that one has come 
to know as his or her familiar environment. The domains of information on which 
one relies are tentatively adjusted, as are the channels through which information 
is transmitted and the conditions under which something is taken to be informa-
tion. Thus, any human-like signal emanating from a human or a machine would 
henceforth only convey information about the presence of a human-or-machine, 
either asking for additional cues by which to make that information unequivocal, 
or asking for the domain of that information to be modified so as to accommodate 
the presence of the machines.
As the examples discussed in this chapter suggest that the complexity of 
technological modifications of human informational environments is increas-
ing proportionally to the capabilities of the artefacts involved, the number and 
complexity of ways of accommodating these modifications should be expected to 
increase, too. Returning to the opening quote of this book, when Herbert Simon 
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claimed that human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple and 
that the apparent complexity of their behaviour is a function of the complexity 
of their environments (Simon 1969, 126f ), he was, perhaps unwittingly, stating 
a counterfactual conditional: there is no proper way of viewing human beings in 
isolation form their environments to begin with. In being intrinsically, irreducibly 
and dynamically coupled with their environments, human beings also have a hand 
in shaping the kind and complexity of these environments – which will, in turn, 
play a constitutive role in making the mind a rich, complex and adaptive affair. 
The human condition is a moving target.
Notes
 1 In terms of methodology, the interviews were of qualitative, semi-structured kind that 
is common to “expert interviews”, as typically employed in the exploratory phases 
studies that seek to gather an overview of the knowledge available in some field that 
is then inquired mostly with respect to its social aspects (see Bogner et al. 2009; Gäser 
and Laudel 2009; Meuser and Nagel 2009). The relevant social aspects with respect 
to computer science and related fields were scientists’ and engineers’ perceptions of 
human-technology relations and, more specifically, their views of abilities and pur-
poses of users. In line with the format of the expert interview, the interviews were not 
structured by a standardised list of questions but by an outline that stated the inter-
view’s informational aims in more general terms. Interviews lasted between one and 
one and a half hours, and were conducted face to face, with the exception of one tel-
ephone interview. The interviews were not tape-recorded but protocolled by the inter-
viewer, who in all cases was the author of this study.
 2 I am primarily referring to research at the University of Sussex by Inman Harvey 
et al. (1994) and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2003). My account also draws on the exposition 
in Boden (2006, 1325–1327). For a general introduction to the field of evolutionary 
robotics, see Nolfi and Floreano (2000). For more recent surveys of the field’s develop-
ment, see Doncieux and Mouret (2014) and Nelson (2014).
 3 The discussion of the cognitive robotics approach is based on interviews with the 
chair of the Institute for Cognitive Systems (ICS) at Technical University of Munich, 
Gordon Cheng, and two researchers at the same department, Karinne Ramirez-Amaro 
and Stefan Ehrlich, all of whom shall be acknowledged here. The interviews were sup-
plemented by a survey of literature and brief demonstrations.
 4 This is why I believe it is wrong to dismissively characterise experiments in these 
fields as “caricatures” of human features and behaviours on the grounds of the sim-
plification and exaggeration implied (this criticism is brought forward by Suchman 
2008). The aim of these experiments is not a mockery of the human condition, but an 
experimental inquiry into the physical and behavioural features by which people rec-
ognise each other as human beings. Even granted that humanoid robots and embodied 
conversational agents are caricatures, a good caricature always is a pointed (albeit not 
naturalistic) representation of certain salient properties of its subject matter.
 5 The two sequences mentioned are at 1:47 through 1:53 and 1:37 through 1:46 minutes 
respectively in one part of the online video documentation of the Sociable Machines pro-
ject, titled “Recognition of Affective Intent”, http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/sociable/ 
movies/affective-intent-narrative.mov.
 6 See, for example the blog debates in https://jira.secondlife.com/browse/SVC-4180? 
and http://alphavilleherald.com/2009/05/is-your-second-life-woman-a-real-life-man.
html. As Derek Stanovsky (2004) argues, a metaphysical point can be made of per-
sonal identities in virtual reality being ‘fake’ by necessity – but only a few SL residents 
are likely to self-consciously play upon that point.
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 7 For that terminology, see, for example Bell et al. (2006), Dieber et al. (2010), Korhonen 
et al. (2008) and Rashid et al. (2006).
 8 The field trials or “demonstrations” took place in late 2010 and early 2011. The groups 
were each sized about 12–15 people. Video recordings were taken of the trials, in 
which each group was provided with GeoBashing-equipped mobile handsets and set 
out to play simultaneously, and informal group interviews were conducted after the 
trials. In terms of social research methodology, the empirical setting was rather casual, 
and so are the empirical observations in this section. Acknowledgements go out to my 
co-researchers Oana Mitrea and Matthias Wieser – and, of course, to the GeoBashing 
developers, especially Bernhard Dieber, Thomas Grassauer and Jakob Mayring, for 
their interest in our interest in the game.
 9 Under a much more practical aspect, MMMOGs could become pioneer applications 
for ad hoc networks, for reasons that are only indirectly related to the gaming purposes: 
as mobile games played in real time require the players’ devices to be in permanent 
online status and, ideally, to have push channels available, the effects on battery life 
would be considerable. Ad hoc networking, in which these tasks could be distributed 
among a number of players’ devices, might offer a solution to the energy consump-
tion problem while at the same instance providing a natural testbed for exploring the 
requirements for mobile ad hoc networks.
 10 For inquiries into the phenomenon of immersion in, or cognitive absorption by, com-
puter games, see Brown and Cairns (2004), Chesher (2004) and Jennett et al. (2008). 
Agarawal and Karahanna (2000) deliver an influential study on immersive experiences 
with respect to information technologies in general, while Juul (2010) provides insights 
into the immersive nature of “casual games”. With respect to mobile gaming, studies 
on their effect on human perception and action include de Souza e Silva (2009), de 
Souza e Silva and Sutko (2009), Montola et al. (2009), Parikka and Souminen (2006), 
and Stenros et al. (2012).
 11 The concrete system I am referring to here, the Driver Focus Vehicle, has been revealed 
to the public in February 2013, see news reports Cole (2013) and Sedgwick (2013).
If anyone starts talking to you about human nature/Ignore them, it means they’re 
as dumb as their parents were/Our nature is to change our nature
(King Face 1987, “Anyone”)
One of the notable virtues of the analytical tradition in philosophy lies in its 
specific combination of intellectual modesty and conceptual rigour. Grand met-
aphysical systems, as they were typical of post-Kantian idealist philosophies 
of several stripes, and as they dominated much of modern European philoso-
phy, now came to be viewed with due suspicion, for their very combination 
of intellectual haughtiness and conceptual obscurity. Instead, it was hoped, 
logical analysis might help not to solve but to actually dissolve some of the 
seemingly great philosophical questions, in proving their meaninglessness, as 
Rudolf Carnap did in his aptly titled “The Elimination of Metaphysics through 
Logical Analysis of Language” (1959) – which was originally published in 
German with a title that, more subtly, suggests metaphysics to be “overcome” 
rather than “eliminated” (Carnap 1931). Alternatively, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
preferred to do in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1933), one might use 
logical means to show the meaninglessness of the seeming great questions in 
philosophy.
Taking the liberty of expressing my appraisal of this endeavour and its vir-
tues by playing on the famous phrasing in the last sentence of Charles Dar-
win’s The Origin of Species (1859, 490), there is grandeur in this view of 
philosophy – if not in every detail of content then in spirit. I will build my 
concluding remarks both on my appraisal and on some of the difficulties of 
the analytic view of philosophy, carving out a domain within my arguments 
in which conceptual analysis may be appropriate – while ultimately adopting 
a naturalist perspective in my effort to overcome metaphysics. For the most 
part adopting a broader, bolder, more free-form and, at times, more polemic 
stance than in the preceding nine chapters, I will tentatively probe for some 
of the possible wider philosophical implications of my project, and develop 
an idea of what sort of project it actually is in the wider context of the history 
and methods of philosophy.
10   Afterthoughts on conceptual 
analysis and human nature
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A domain for conceptual analysis
Commencing from a revision of Immanuel Kant’s account of the analytic/ synthetic 
distinction (1781, “Einleitung”), the conceptual analyst’s hope was that it would 
be possible to ground epistemology by sorting out those statements which are ana-
lytically true, that is true by virtue of the meanings of its constituent concepts and 
thus by logical necessity, and justified a priori, that is justified independently of 
experience, from a variety of other types of statements: those which are synthetic, 
that is true only by virtue of how the world stands and thus logically contingently, 
and those which are justified only by experience, and hence a posteriori – and 
those which Kant considered the genuine domain of metaphysics, namely the 
class of synthetic a priori statements. Using Kant’s own examples, the statement 
“All bodies are extended” is analytic because the predicate of extendedness is part 
the definition of, and thus logically tied to, the term “body”. It is impossible to 
think in a logically consistent fashion of something that is a body and not extended 
or, to use a contemporary way of expressing this condition, it is true that bodies 
are extended in all possible worlds. Typically, a statement that could be tested for 
analyticity will have the form of, or be translatable without loss of meaning into, 
a universally quantified subject-predicate sentence of the form “All s are F”, so as 
to see how the predicate term F relates to the subject term s.
Besides being analytic, the statement “All bodies are extended” is also a pri-
ori because one – hypothetically – does not have to consult experience to obtain 
knowledge about that conceptual affair. “All bodies” is not equal to “All known 
bodies” but “All possible bodies”. In contrast to this first example, the statement 
“All bodies are heavy” is synthetic because the predicate of heaviness is not part 
the definition of, and thus is not logically tied to, the term “body” (although, 
again, “All bodies have mass” would be). “Bodies exist”, in turn, is a synthetic a 
posteriori statement, as the concept of a body does not logically contain or entail 
its existence, and as we have to consult experience to obtain knowledge about 
whether that existential quantification is true – which it is. “All bodies are heavy” 
is equally a posteriori but not true, as the property of having weight rather than 
mass only obtains in another object’s gravitational field. Or consider the con-
trast between “All bachelors are unmarried”, which is analytic a priori because 
being a bachelor means being unmarried, and “All bachelors are unhappy”, which 
is synthetic a posteriori because it is a contingent claim that requires empirical 
validation – which will show that it is false. Analyticity and a-prioriness are typi-
cally fellow travellers, as are syntheticity and a-posterioriness, whereas synthetic 
a priori statements are logically conceivable and the notion of analytic a posteriori 
statements is a logical contradiction in terms.
The Kantian and the analytic path of reasoning about concepts parted on the 
topic of synthetic a priori statements (see Rey 2015): mathematical propositions 
such as “2 + 2 = 4” counted as synthetic a priori statements for Kant, as there is 
no conceptual containment relation of “2 + 2” in “4” but a principled knowability 
of its truth independent of experience. Kant equalled the possibility of knowledge of 
the truth of such statements with the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, in 
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contrast to straightforward conceptual knowledge about the truth of analytic a 
priori statements and empirical knowledge about the truth of synthetic a poste-
riori statements. Carnap (1928), as before him Gottlob Frege (1884), subsumed 
mathematical propositions of the aforementioned kind under analytic a priori 
statements, by extending the notion of analyticity so as to comprise elementary 
logical relations such as symmetry, transitivity and negation. They sought to thus 
avoid some of the logical problems that arose from Kant’s otherwise reasonable 
and relevant definition. By implication, 2 + 2 can now count as being contained 
in the definition of 4. The domain of analytic statements is thus enlarged, so as 
to include a number of non-trivial conceptual relations in logic and mathematics, 
whereas the entire domain of synthetic a priori statements, and with it the domain 
of metaphysics, is called into question.
On the grounds of that revision of Kant’s distinction, the analytic philosophers 
hoped to be able to delimit the domain of philosophy with surgical precision, as 
the exercise of demarcating the extension of what can be meaningfully said by 
exclusively logico-mathematical means. One would admit to that domain only 
the first, analytic a priori kind of statements, and thus the propositions of logic 
and mathematics, plus some foundational concepts in the experiential sciences. It 
would have been a small but solidly founded domain for philosophy to work in, 
helping the empirical sciences to treat their empirical domains with conceptually 
sharpened tools, and committing metaphysics to oblivion with a few surgical cuts. 
Conceptual analysis, then, could have been a therapy for (or, in a more pessimistic 
vein, a cure against) philosophy – not necessarily in accordance with the surgical 
analogy that I have chosen but as something more akin to a psychotherapy against 
common linguistic delusions, as one interpretative paradigm of Wittgenstein’s 
work has it (see Crary and Read 2000).
Alas, this hope did not come true, for various reasons, which to recapitulate 
in detail I cannot endeavour here. I will leave it at a few hints. It has been sug-
gested, most prominently by W.V.O. Quine (1961), that the analytic/synthetic 
distinction is artificial to begin with, and itself a metaphysical proposition. In 
a slightly less fundamental version of that critique, the domain of statements 
that can be unequivocally demonstrated to be analytic a priori is considered 
too small to be entirely useful, and perhaps not much larger and not much more 
interesting than what Kant originally envisioned. It certainly was helpful to 
debunk as meaningless concepts such as “the Absolute” or “der Weltgeist” but 
having little more than logical tautologies such as “all Fs that are G are F” 
as one’s incontestable home ground might make the analytic endeavour look 
philosophically toothless. After all, debunking those metaphysical statements as 
meaningless did little to stop them from being uttered and consumed by many 
philosophers with abandon. Still, a popular, watered-down vestige of the ana-
lytic endeavour is to be found in one definition of the task of philosophy as 
being the clarification of concepts of various sorts: logical, scientific or even 
ordinary linguistic ones.
Given my appraisal of the analytic philosophers’ quest for conceptual clarity 
and their dismissal of metaphysics, what status within the analytic/synthetic – a 
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priori/a posteriori grid do I believe accrues to my central claims? In lieu of a 
 narrative summary, I will list and discuss my claims as follows:
(H-1)  Natural information is a strictly regular relation between world affairs 
in which a condition r occurs if and only if another condition of s being 
F obtains, with transformations on either side having to map in strictly 
regular fashion, too (the informational specification claim).
(H-2)  An organism’s environment is composed of the specific set of conditions 
that are relevant to the accomplishment and the subset of those which 
are constitutive to the presence of his biological functions, where these 
conditions may be partly altered by him (the ecological coupling claim).
(H-3)  If H-2 and H-1 are true: an organism inhabits an informational environ-
ment that is specific to him, to the extent that a certain set of distal s- 
conditions in his environment is relevant to him and the related proximal 
r-conditions are detectable for him (the informational specificity claim).
(H-4)  If H-3 is true: the presence and accomplishment of cognitive functions 
depends on the availability of natural information in the environment, 
where the availability or treatment of that information may partly depend 
on the presence and operation of artefacts (the cognitive coupling claim).
(H-5)  If an organism’s environment is specific and dynamic in character (H-2), 
and if conditions in his informational environment are strictly related to 
conditions in his ecological environment (H-1 and H-3), and if the pres-
ence and accomplishment of some cognitive functions depends on the 
presence and operation of cognitive artefacts (H-4), and if the presence 
and use of those artefacts, being constituents of the environment, feeds 
back into the relevant conditions therein (H-2), then there is no immuta-
ble, artefact-independent human nature (the anthropological claim).
Are any of these statements analytic? Such will be untenable to claim for most of 
them, especially H-5. However, H-1 is a statement that can be readily considered 
for analyticity. To be sure, it would be immediately faced with the objection that 
the term “information” is used in a different way in the majority of contexts, and 
that there are reasons why the Dretskean notion of information informally reca-
pitulated here found it hard to gain widespread acceptance. However, these are 
issues not of conceptual analysis but of terminological convention, which may be 
mended by adding a marker of difference, for example by referring to information 
as intended here as natural information.
As it stands, H-1 is recognisably a definition of a concept. It can be transformed 
into a form such as “All information is a lawfully regular relation of the type 
r ↔ F(s)” or “Information is the case if and only if a lawfully regular relation of 
the type r ↔ F(s) obtains” without loss, and then can be tested for its semantic 
properties. The strictly regular co-occurrence between distal and proximal condi-
tions is part of that definition, so that any statement derived from it by means 
of elementary logical operations – such as its negation or the symmetry of the 
relation – is contained within it. Hence, the conceptual claim is that it is true 
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that information is strictly regular co-occurrence of world affairs in all possible 
worlds. Irregular or asymmetric co-occurrences shall not be admitted under any 
conditions. Misinformation is not information that happens to be false but will be 
better characterised as non-information or pseudo-information. This is what Fred 
Dretske claimed to be the case for information, so as to make it foundational to the 
possibility of knowledge, and this is what I claim to be the case, even independent 
of epistemological considerations.
Given these characteristics, and given the logical impossibility of analytic a 
posteriori statements, the claim that information has the said characteristics will 
be justified a priori. We will not have to investigate a manifold of real-world infor-
mational relations and then proceed to an empirical generalisation that informa-
tion has the said characteristics. No epistemological claim could be built on such 
foundations. Information, as conceived of here, is an elementary and ubiquitous 
relation, and cannot be otherwise.
A defence of analyticity will already become impractical for H-2: what is con-
tained in the concepts of organism and environment and, for that matter, in the 
conceptual distinction between organism and environment? “All environments 
do not comprise the organisms inhabiting them” would be a start, but it is pre-
cisely the organism-environment distinction that has been called into question 
by environmental constructivism, developmental systems theory and all serious 
claims for the extendedness and environmental scaffolding of organismic pro-
cesses. These critiques are by no means intended to be conceptual analyses of the 
terms “organism” and “environment” but mobilise empirical evidence from vari-
ous domains of biology. Nor is this a terminological issue that could be mended 
by linguistic convention. We can redefine the term information, adding markers 
of conceptual difference to prior definitions, and then probe for the analyticity 
of statements about information, so conceived. We might try something similar 
for environments, following the distinction in Brandon (1995) among external, 
ecological and selective environments. However, these specifications will rely 
on empirical concepts such as ecological equilibria or natural selection. We can-
not say what holds for natural selection and ecological equilibria in all possible 
worlds, although we can say many things about what holds for them in this world, 
on the Earth as we know it. All resulting statements will be a posteriori, and can-
not be analytic.
If “environment” was difficult, “organism” will verge on the impossible. If we 
confine a definition of organisms to a near-tautology such as “All organisms live”, 
we are stuck with that near-tautology (all organisms that are not either dead or 
not yet born are alive indeed). Otherwise, we would have to unpack that descrip-
tion into statements that refer to uncontested constituents of vital processes, such 
as “all organisms develop” and “metabolise” and “reproduce” and “accomplish 
homeostasis” and “respond to stimuli”. Are these unmarried-bachelor or unhappy-
bachelor type statements? I strongly suspect the latter, as, first, these descriptions 
do not denote elementary relations but include complex concepts themselves, and 
as, second, we can refer to known organisms and hence empirical knowledge 
only when subsuming these characteristics under the concept of an organism 
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(should “are carbon-based” be part of that catalogue?). Moreover, we face bound-
ary cases, such as viruses, for which not all of the mentioned characteristics hold, 
and where empirical disagreement prevails. If one is a Neo-Darwinist, viruses 
will count in (genes are replicated but much else is missing). If one is a vitalist, 
one will postulate a vital force as a metaphysical – and hence, according to Kant, 
a synthetic a priori – criterion that is supposedly expressed in the aforementioned 
set of empirical characteristics. Everything else we could do, it seems, is synthetic 
and a posteriori.
By virtue of being partly derived from a partly empirical claim (namely H-2), 
H-3 will itself be an empirical claim about what organisms in environments do 
with natural information. Any attempt to analyse this statement will initiate cas-
cades of specifying and qualifying statements, many or most of which are of the 
synthetic a posteriori kind. “Informational environments” should be well-defined 
though, by virtue of comprising the notion of information as analytically treated 
in H-1. By virtue of being partly derived from H-3, H-4 is to be viewed in partly 
analogous fashion, while adding a concept of artefacts that is not further expli-
cated here but certainly is not exhausted by an analysis of the “All artefacts 
are structures created by organisms” kind. Because the purpose of the artefacts 
involved here is the provision and treatment (to inelegantly avoid the strongly 
computation-connoted term “processing”) of information, only a certain subset 
of these structures is of interest here, and some of them may not even have been 
created in a narrow sense. For this reason, I have been using the term “cognitive 
artefacts”, or would suggest to refer to “cognitive resources” if natural structures 
are used for the provision of information.
What comes closest to the appearance of a synthetic a priori statement in my list 
is H-5. It includes a claim concerning the human condition and artefacts – which 
has been a topic of metaphysically inclined philosophical anthropologies since 
the early twentieth century and thus may invite the reader to interpret my state-
ment as a derived from, or embedded in, philosophical anthropology. Helmuth 
Plessner’s work may be considered the pinnacle of this specifically German tradi-
tion, in justifying a set of highly elaborated claims about the human condition on 
partly metaphysical partly biological arguments (of a neo-vitalist stripe), but Max 
Scheler, Arnold Gehlen and, in a slightly different vein, Ernst Cassirer have been 
more popular and accessible reference points for arguments about human nature 
and the nature of human artefacts.
According to Scheler (1928), man is a being whose nature is not exhausted by 
being a more diligent, artefact-creating animal, which he refers to as homo faber, 
nor is he bound to concrete environments; instead, and in explicit rejection of what 
the biological sciences may tell us in these respects, man is considered the only 
living being capable of viewing the world and himself as objects of thought and 
action, thereby abstracting from concrete conditions of existence. According to 
Gehlen (1940), man is a being that is by his biological nature incomplete, helpless 
and un-specialised in comparison with other organisms, and thus requires artefacts 
and other “institutions” as extensions that augment his capacities and develop a 
degree of autonomy that, in turn, requires from him a degree of subordination 
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under them in order to provide him with a stable mode of existence. Plessner 
(1928), like Gehlen but in markedly brighter colours, places human beings back 
in the order of nature but attests to them a mode of existence that is at variance 
with either plants, whom he considers “openly” organised, for their lack of central 
organs, and other animals, whom he considers “centred” in organisation, for pos-
sessing central organs to regulate traffic with their environments, whereas human 
beings are “excentrically” organised, in being able to self-reflexively refer to their 
position in the world, which they, by virtue of that very nature, always access in 
mediated fashion, through artefacts, culture and social practices. Cassirer (1944) 
roots these human-specific modes of accessing the world in their nature as an 
animal symbolicum, and thus an organism that is not merely capable of perceiving 
and signalling immediately relevant conditions in its environment but endowed 
with an ability to form symbolic representations and concepts, from which all 
kinds of other abilities flow.
None of these characterisations of the human condition is contained in, or 
strictly logically derivable from, a basic concept of a human being but only from 
the various presupposition-rich conceptions devised by the authors. At the same 
instance, none of these characterisations is an empirical claim that could be derived 
from, or proven by, experience in general and biological science in particular. All 
of them are unhappy-bachelor type statements but, at the same instance, they are 
supposed to grasp something about human nature that is prior to, and in princi-
ple independent of, any human experiences or interaction, with partial exception 
granted to Plessner. Above all, these characteristics are supposed to be immutable 
at least in terms of being possessed by all beings known as humans, and only by 
those beings. A living being not possessing those characteristics would then not, 
not yet, or not anymore be a human being.
Hence, looking at H-5, the crucial difference between the claims made by the 
philosophical anthropologists and my project seems to be that I consider the human 
condition to be dynamic and historical. A rephrasing of my statement would be 
“There is a human nature, but it is neither immutable nor artefact-independent.” 
To be sure, such a claim would constitute a major departure from the tradition of 
philosophical anthropology, as either predicate negates at least part of what the 
philosophical anthropologists claim. I could then proceed to a set of metaphysi-
cal claims about how the essence of the human condition is our ability to change 
ourselves and our environments, and happily sing along with the “our nature is 
to change our nature” chorus (King Face 1987) – after explicating why this is not 
paradoxical as an anthropological claim in the first place.
Alternatively, and more fundamentally, the difference to the philosophical 
anthropologists could lie in an act of throwing out the concept of “human nature” 
altogether and settling for a constructivist position. The corresponding rephras-
ing of my statement would then be “There is no human nature, so it could not 
be immutable and artefact-independent either.” Nor could it be mutable and 
artefact-dependent for that matter, as it is the subject term that is negated in this 
rephrasing, so any further predications would be meaningless. The mutual shap-
ing relations between humans and artefacts would not presuppose a human nature 
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that would first enter into that relation. Instead, it would be a product of that 
relation. According to this image, the relation will first create the relata. Hence, 
the notion of human nature would be subject to deconstruction, in that there is 
nothing natural about human nature. This reading, however, amounts to a set of 
metaphysical, synthetic a priori claims, too, albeit negative ones that are at risk 
of falling victim to the paradoxes of epistemic perspective concomitant with any 
radically constructivist claim.
I am hopeful that the preceding chapters have created an impression that suf-
ficiently stands out against either of these two readings. The primary, founda-
tional difference between H-5 and what the philosophical anthropologists claim 
is that I am seeking to make an empirical claim about human beings as a species 
and about salient properties of their environments as being closely coupled in a 
dynamic relationship – without denying the possible deeper implications of these 
claims but also without either assuming to have proven or promising to prove 
them. Hence, the proper rephrasing of my statement in H-5 will be “It is a contin-
gent empirical fact about human nature that it is mutable and artefact-dependent.” 
This is a synthetic a posteriori statement that eschews metaphysical commitments 
while suggesting a perspective on how human nature may be best conceived of in 
extra-scientific, normative terms. This view of a partly self-made and changeable 
human nature, I will now proceed to demonstrate, firmly stands in the tradition of 
philosophical naturalism.
A naturalist’s view of human nature and machines
Contemporary philosophical naturalism has been concisely defined as “the view 
that all phenomena are subject to natural laws, and/or that the methods of the 
natural sciences are applicable in every area of inquiry” (Boyd et al. 1991, 778) – 
which, as Hilary Putnam (2004) rightly observes, is a disjunctive definition or, 
more precisely, two definitions of different content and scope that reflect the two 
main understandings of naturalism in theoretical philosophy. A paradigmatic 
description of these two main understandings reads as follows:
Ontologically, naturalism implies the rejection of supernaturalism. [. . .] 
Positively, naturalists hold that reality, including human life and society, is 
exhausted by what exists in the causal order of nature. [. . .]
Epistemologically, naturalism implies the rejection of all forms of a priori 
knowledge, including that of higher level principles of epistemic validation. 
Positively, naturalists claim that all knowledge derives from human interac-
tions with the natural world.
(Giere 2009, 308)
This basic distinction is not uncommon and can be found in similar form in, for 
example Quine (1969c, 26), who holds “that knowledge, mind, and meaning are 
part of the same world that they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in 
the same empirical spirit that animates natural science”. The same distinction can 
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also be found in David Papineau (2007), who further subdivides epistemological 
naturalism into, first, epistemological externalism, that is the view that all knowl-
edge hinges on empirical factors and can thus be only reliable, never certain, and, 
second, the assumption that philosophy should be continuous with the natural 
sciences. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (2004, 4) refer to epistemological 
naturalism as a “methodological theme” and to ontological naturalism as “a com-
mitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature.”
The ontological and the epistemological understanding of naturalism, although 
appearing quite closely related at first sight, are not necessarily interdependent, 
and they may or may not co-occur in naturalistic arguments and their critiques – 
although ontological naturalism is explicitly or implicitly presupposed by many 
epistemological naturalists. The key tenet of ontological naturalism is that the 
causal order of nature is closed in the sense of ruling out the possibility of super-
natural or extra-natural interventions. Two sub-clauses that follow by implicature 
rather than entailment are that the causal order of nature is complete in the sense 
of all physical phenomena being sufficiently explainable by physical causes, and 
that it is uniform in the sense of the same laws of nature applying in all places at 
all times. For most authors, closure and completeness are synonymous. It might 
be worthwhile, however, to consider the distinction made by Eric Marcus (2005): 
closure, like uniformity, is a genuinely metaphysical claim about how the world 
stands above and beyond physics – namely that there is nothing that exists above 
and beyond the physical realm, or that, if there exists some such thing, it does not 
matter to the physical realm. Completeness, in turn, is a claim about explanations 
in the first place, namely that physical explanations are sufficient; they might, 
however, not be necessary. Completeness suggests closure but does not require it.
Ontological naturalism is at once the most general and sweeping and the least 
provable of naturalistic tenets. It is a metaphysical claim that is supported – but 
cannot be proven – by empirical evidence and philosophical argument. In con-
junction, evidence and argument may demonstrate that assumptions of supernatu-
ral or extra-natural powers are not necessary to explain the causal order of nature 
and the place of life, the human mind and other philosophically relevant phe-
nomena therein. Accordingly, even those authors who actually provide explicit 
arguments for ontological naturalism confine themselves to demonstrating that 
the assumption of completeness is tenable and coherent, and probably compel-
ling. They do not claim that this assumption is true by necessity, let alone that it 
is strictly correlated with closure of the causal order of nature (see, e.g. Davidson 
1980, Chapters 11 and 13; Papineau 1993, Chapter 1; or Smart 1963). One of the 
main reasons behind the logical positivist’s reservations against naturalism, which 
seem to contradict his or her commitment to a scientific world view, is just that: 
the inevitably metaphysical and thus, on the view of logical analysis, nonsensical 
nature of materialism as an ontological doctrine (Stoljar 2009).
Conversely, epistemological naturalism, in all its varieties, seeks to ground 
knowledge in “human interactions with the natural world” (Giere 2009, 308) but 
is not of one mind as to whether the natural sciences are one incarnation, the para-
digm or even the exclusive domain of such knowledge. On the most restrictive 
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view, a ‘hard’, physicalistic reductionism of explanations in the special sciences 
to physical explanations prevails. The argument for this position, also known as 
the “unity of science” argument (Carnap 1955; Oppenheim and Putnam 1958), 
rests on the hypothesis that physics is the most basic science, for being concerned 
with the most basic processes in the natural world – processes on which all other 
phenomena rest. However, this claim is not entailed by the claim of a universality 
of the methods of the natural sciences in Boyd et al. (1991), which is more plausi-
bly read as a weaker claim: unless biology, psychology or sociology make claims 
about an ontological specificity of their subject matter, their tenets and methods 
are, although heterogeneous and dis-unified, fully compatible with the closure and 
completeness of the causal order of nature.
Unless a metaphysical commitment to ontological naturalism and or a strictly 
physicalistic reductionism about explanations are involved, epistemological natu-
ralism will be a fairly broad and inclusive doctrine, amounting to the minimal 
epistemological requirement that all knowledge is empirical knowledge and is 
to be achieved by the methods of all varieties of the empirical sciences, defined 
in the widest sense. This “broad church” interpretation was the hallmark of early 
twentieth century American naturalism, notably John Dewey (1929) and Roy 
Wood Sellars (1922; see the historical account in Keil 2008). However, apart from 
denying the possibility of a priori knowledge, such a minimalist position will be 
systematically, and possibly purposefully, vague – which does not mean that its 
purpose is vague.
For Dewey in particular, philosophical naturalism has a therapeutic function, 
albeit in a different, arguably more positive sense than Wittgenstein’s: we will 
be better prepared to cope with the upsetting of traditional concepts, values 
and modes of thinking by modernity if we employ an “empirical method which 
remains true to nature”, so as to inspire “the mind with courage and vitality to 
create new ideas in the face of the perplexities of a new world”, Dewey argues 
in a paradigmatic statement of his naturalism, “The Influence of Darwinism on 
Philosophy” (1910, iif ).
This philosophical-therapeutical argument cuts two ways, which are distinct 
but related: one of general philosophical outlook and one of suitable philosophical 
methods. Dewey argues that Darwin’s theory of evolution changed philosophy, 
first, by opening philosophical reasoning about life, politics and morality to the 
idea of change – an idea of change, however, that is clearly distinct from random 
variance. Second, Darwin’s theory “emancipated, once and for all, genetic and 
experimental ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking for explana-
tions” (Dewey 1910, 9). Hence, on the first level, Dewey’s naturalism offers an 
alternative route to the overcoming of metaphysics to what the conceptual analysts 
proposed, in suggesting that the quest for ultimate, immutable truths, whether 
metaphysical or conceptual, should be abandoned in favour of an open-minded 
stance that allows for constant revision. On the second level, Dewey’s naturalism 
amounts to the endeavour of modelling the resources and conduct of philosophical 
reasoning primarily on the experimental, evidential and critical methods, and to 
some extent also on the concrete contents, of the empirical sciences. On this level, 
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a naturalistic view will depend on the concrete contents of scientific inquiries, in 
Dewey’s case on inquiries into evolution and cognition. Still, a naturalist view 
thus anchored in science does not need to amount to a scientistic philosophy – 
at least not to a larger extent than any other philosophical doctrine in history that 
relied on the state of scientific inquiry of its age.
Either way, scientific and philosophical concepts are likely to turn out to be 
subject to change, so that the very notion of the existence of a priori justified 
statements of any sort, synthetic or analytic, is called into question – with the 
exception perhaps of logical constants and the tautological statements derivable 
from them. Do we need an a priori concept of space to reasonably think and act 
in this world in the first place, as Kant (1781, “Transzendentale Ästhetik”, § 1–3) 
famously insisted and James Jerome Gibson (1979, 32) denied? As Gibson’s work 
was rooted in the tradition of the American naturalists, we should naturally expect 
him to cancel space from the list of a priori concepts, along with many others. But 
then, do we need an a priori concept of natural information as a specification rela-
tion in order to explain perception? Hence, should we expel the concept of natural 
information from the realm of a priori statements, too?
The relations singled out by the concept of natural information may be so 
elementary that tracking them by some means is indeed a precondition for any 
perception, activity and knowledge. Hence, pace Kant, the uptake of natural infor-
mation may be a factual, practical precondition for forming a concept of space. 
On the account I presented in Part I, the possibility of tracking natural informa-
tion allows for forming, but does not depend on the presence and operation of 
concepts in the perceiving organism. Natural information is used for purposes 
such as spatial orientation in organisms that cannot be expected to have concepts 
of any sort, perhaps not even the most elementary practical concepts or “unicepts” 
as proposed by Ruth Millikan (2004; 2017). These organisms do not have to be 
in a position to perceive anything as something in order to be afforded with the 
requisite activity by that information. In contrast, space, like time, may count 
as a method of conceptually ordering relations thus picked up that is available 
to organisms that are reliant on grasping objects and relations in their environ-
ments in complex spatio-temporal constellations, such as an object being behind, 
beneath or above another, or a moving object reappearing after being occluded 
by another. A concept of space also allows for abstracting from concrete relations 
of this sort by using absolute measures, thereby moving from the use of intrinsic 
to extrinsic information. If this naturalistic view is tenable, environment-bound 
information comes first, and a concept of space later, so the latter will not be 
accepted as being a priori.
If space is denied the status of being an a priori, experience-preceding, immu-
table concept, the concept of human nature is unlikely to fare better in this respect 
under a naturalistic perspective. It is open to revision on the levels both of pre-
ferred methods and of general outlook: inquiries into human nature on the bio-
logical level might lead to, or be guided by, a change in general outlook on the 
human condition, in an open-ended process of mutually informing each other. 
This commitment to systematic openness of the naturalist’s quest has a corollary 
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that, although not being a metaphysical statement, constitutes a constraint on the 
anthropological perspective to be reasonably adopted: man should be treated in 
philosophical endeavours in the same way as in scientific inquiries, namely as a 
natural being like any other, with cognitive capacities that are likely to be more 
sophisticated in degree, but otherwise, in their functional roles, analogous to what 
other animals accomplish in order to cope with their environments. Man should 
also be taken to be a natural being like any other in terms of living in, and having 
to cope with, changeable environments, where some of these changes are, inten-
tionally or inadvertently, self-made.
Hence, the naturalistic anthropological claim to be defended here contrasts with 
the philosophical anthropologists’ views as follows: it affirms the very the notion 
of homo faber that Scheler disdained, and subtracts any residual metaphysics 
from that notion. It affirms a deflated version of Plessner’s claim that artificial-
ity is partly constitutive to human nature, subtracting his vitalist preconceptions 
and proposing a deflationary, biologically more grounded reading of his notion 
of positionality. It affirms Cassirer’s claim for the speciality of human abilities 
of symbolising but views them as properly evolved and hence continuous with 
animal signalling. It affirms Gehlen’s notion of man as an incomplete being but, 
again, subtracts the metaphysics from it and dispenses with its negative normative 
connotations. After all, if artefacts are constitutive to the shape and accomplish-
ment of human abilities, and if a coupling with the environment is constitutive to 
biological functions for all organisms, and the coupling with artefacts for some 
organisms, there will be no incompleteness once the whole picture is taken into 
consideration.
A naturalistic account as outlined here will have to accomplish two tasks that 
the philosophical anthropologists were free to waive: first, it will have to show in 
as much empirical detail as possible how human cognitive abilities are actually 
and concretely coupled with the environment, and hence how they actually oper-
ate in such a coupling relationship. How does the uptake of natural information 
work on the organic and neuronal level, and how does it map on activities? Where 
and how precisely do representations come into play? This is a task for an eco-
logically minded cognitive science, as outlined in Chemero (2009). I freely admit 
of having provided little in the way of such empirical detail on this level, instead 
confining my account to reviewing some work that has been done in that field 
and possibly offering some contributions to further concept- and theory-building 
therein. Second, a naturalistic account will have to show in as much empirical 
detail as possible how artefacts are dynamical constituents of environmentally 
coupled cognitive abilities. On this level, I am hopeful to have escaped the phi-
losopher’s chronic condition of armchair confinement with at least some success – 
while risking putting myself in the position of one of the proverbial blind men 
who try to collectively determine the nature of an elephant by each touching one 
part of him. What I tried in order to avoid that epistemological problem was to 
develop a good idea what the more capable men and women on the first level 
are doing, and match my account of natural information and cognitive artefacts 
against it.
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More positively, there might be a historically grounded, indirect but still sys-
tematic justification for commencing from an account of artefacts, so as to arrive 
at some conclusions with respect to cognitive functions more generally. After all, 
the concept of machine played a crucial role in the emergence of the cognitive 
sciences, as two of its founding disciplines strongly relied on machine models: 
AI as inspired by Turing’s work, especially (1950), and Cybernetics as inspired 
partly by Ashby’s non-computational, material machine model of adaptive pro-
cesses known as the “homeostat” (1960). These two different but related types of 
models – Turing and Ashby were concurrent and corresponding members of the 
“Ratio Club” and knew each other’s work (Husbands and Holland 2008) – were 
crucial to the establishment of the notion of “mind as machine” that defined the 
cognitive sciences ever since (Boden 2006; Gardner 1985). One of the reasons 
why Turing considered the original question of whether machines can think “too 
meaningless to deserve discussion” (1950, 442, see Chapter 1) is that the “normal 
use of the words” (1950, 433) is so parochial and historically contingent that 
the very conjunction of “machine” and “thinking” seemed to be a conceptual 
impossibility on the normal use of the words in 1950. Part of Turing and Ashby’s 
endeavours was to demonstrate that what first seemed a conceptual impossibil-
ity could become a matter of serious consideration and empirical investigation. 
If such an empirical investigation is possible, even if it has its limitations, and 
if such investigation informed the design of real-world computing artefacts, and 
even if these artefacts are not thinking machines, these artefacts will have made a 
contribution to redefining not only the concepts of “machines” and “thinking” but 
also our perceptions and practical treatment of what the nature of machines and 
human thinking actually is.
In one of the best-defined and most carefully argued sceptical accounts of AI, 
Harry Collins and Martin Kusch (1998) propose a conceptual distinction between 
human beings and machines that is very intriguing in this respect: on their account, 
a machine is distinguished from a human being by its inability to perform or “do” 
actions of one kind in particular, namely those actions which can be accomplished 
in manifold, materially dissimilar ways and can be identified only as belonging 
to the same type by reference to an understanding of their social context. To the 
observer, the behavioural patterns involved may look rather different on different 
occasions, but they are tied together by the socially sanctioned purposes that they 
serve. One can pay a bill in several ways, by handing over cash or by swiping a 
credit card through a card reader. It would be the same action in the light of the 
purpose of paying a bill – but only in a society where credit card payment is an 
established practice.
In contrast to these parochially human “polimorphic” actions (playing on the 
words “polymorphic” and “polis”), Collins and Kusch continue, human beings 
and machines seem to share an ability of performing “mimeomorphic” actions, 
which are defined as those actions which are tied to one and the same type of 
behavioural sequence, with no or rather minute degrees of variance permitted. 
There are only so many ways of performing a certain dance move or golf swing. 
Doing them different is likely to amount to doing them incorrectly. For their 
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invariability, these are behaviours that can be imitated or simulated by a machine. 
Hence, machines might be able to imitate human behaviours of this kind, but they 
will not be able to – deliberately – take different routes to the same goal, as this 
would require an understanding of the purposes of seemingly variant behaviors.
In the light of this argument, a machine could succeed in Turing’s imitation 
game in a restricted sense, by providing an imitation of human conversational 
behaviour, but it could not play that game, because playing a game would require 
an understanding of the practice of playing games in general, and playing that 
game in particular. However, the authors object, the machine would be unlikely to 
succeed in imitating conversational behaviour in the first place, as such imitation 
cannot be accomplished without an understanding of conversation in general and 
the present conversational context in particular. It would be like playing Chinese 
Whispers without knowing the language of the input word or phrase. Polimorphic 
actions, Collins and Kusch conclude, cannot be simulated by machines, because 
such a simulation would have to presuppose a genuine understanding of those 
actions on the part of the machines.
Remarkably, however, Collins and Kusch use a purely ability-based definition 
of human beings and machines. To them, a human being is whoever or whatever is 
or could be, under appropriate conditions, capable of performing both mimeomor-
phic and polimorphic actions, whereas a machine is whatever is only capable of 
simulating mimeomorphic actions. By adopting this definition, any hypothetical 
machine that might transgress this boundary would cease to be a machine, and 
the extension of the set of entities to be subsumed under the concept of human 
beings would have been enlarged. Hence, the answer to Turing’s question, “Can 
a machine think?” would remain negative – presuming that there is a relation 
between the ability of performing actions and the presence of mental processes – 
but this would be so by virtue of the machines involved losing the defining char-
acteristics of machines and assuming defining characteristics of human beings.
One could ask whether it is an analytic statement about machines that they are 
capable only of simulating mimeomorphic actions, and of humans that they are 
always also capable of performing polimorphic actions, but this is what Collins 
and Kusch (1998) seem to suggest, although their aim certainly is not conceptual 
analysis. But then, simulating mimeomorphic actions was certainly not part of 
the kinematics-based classical concept of machines, briefly summarised at the 
beginning of Chapter 1, that confined the domain of what machines can do to the 
movement of matter and the harnessing of energy. Even to Turing’s revision of 
that view and his conception of what computing machinery can do, the imitation 
of human actions was relevant only in a circumscribed sense, namely as one of the 
indefinitely many possible accomplishments of his Universal Machine.
Collins and Kusch offer a conceptual escape route from one central – fallacious – 
implication of the basic point of the AI sceptic that equivalence between human 
cognitive and machine abilities is impossible in principle, a point the authors oth-
erwise seem to share and which I may rephrase as follows: “Machines cannot 
think because thinking is whatever a machine cannot do.” This is one possible ren-
dering of the “moving the goalposts” machination against the notion of thinking 
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machines – as, for example, reported by Pamela McCorduck (2004, Chapter 9) 
with respect to Hubert Dreyfus’s critique of AI: if a machine can perform a certain 
cognitive task, successful accomplishment of that task, whatever it is, by defini-
tion, cannot be thinking. Dreyfus himself states his critique as the problem of 
the horizon of AI systems actually accomplishing the cognitive tasks they were 
promised to accomplish to be “receding at an accelerating rate” because these 
tasks turn out to be vastly more complex than AI researchers believed (1979, 5). 
On either version of the argument, the boundary of what constitutes the accom-
plishment of a cognitive task will be continuously pushed upward with the advent 
of more capable machines, and there is little we will have learned until we thereby 
either ultimately carve out a domain for a Cartesian res extensa, or something to 
the same effect, that would remain essentially inaccessible to any kind of machine 
simulation – or stand to find out that nothing inaccessible is left.
What I have been suggesting in this book sought to turn this line of argument 
on its head in order to put reasoning about human cognition on its feet: ever 
more capable cognitive artefacts become part of human environments in ways 
that highlight how we are coupled with our environments in perception, cognition 
and action, and they do so by modifying the ways in which we are thus coupled. 
These artefacts are not machines that think, nor are they supposed to be machines 
that simulate human thinking. This may be the wrong accomplishment to seek 
from them to begin with, particularly if the conception of the nature of cognition 
that entered into that quest is at risk of being incorrect, inadequate or inaccurate. 
Still, the abilities of cognitive artefacts move way beyond traditional conceptions 
of what machines can do in a variety of practical ways that may be instructive to 
inquiries into human cognition in different fashion. To end on an artefact-based 
metaphor other than that of machines: they may serve as calibrating instruments, 
in not simply measuring but helping to adjust our measurements of what sort of 
environment-bound activity human thinking is.
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